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This paper considers the implications of precautionary restrictions against technologies, in the context of the potential for creating and sustaining rumours. It focuses on the restriction against mobile phone use at petrol stations, based on therumour that a spark might cause an explosion. Rumours have been substantiated by precautionary usage warnings from mobile phone manufacturers, petrol station usage restrictions, and a general lack of technical understanding. Petrol station employees have themselves spread therumour about alleged incidents, filling (...) the information gap about the basis for the restriction. (shrink)

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Social networks are widely used as a fast and ubiquitous information-sharing medium. The mass spread of food rumours has seriously invaded public’s healthy life and impacted food production. It can be argued that the government, companies, and the media have the responsibility to send true anti-rumour messages to reduce panic, and the risks involved in different forms of communication to the public have not been properly assessed. The manuscript develops an empirical analysis model from 683 food anti-rumour cases (...) and 7,967 data of the users with top comments to test the influence of the strength ofrumour/anti-rumour onrumour control. Furthermore, dividing the users into three categories, Leaders, Chatters, and General Public, and study the influence of human characteristics on the relationship between the strength ofrumour/anti-rumour andrumour control by considering the different human characteristics as moderator variables. The results showed that anti-rumours have a significant positive impact on the control of rumours; the ambiguity of rumours has a significant negative impact on the Positive Comment Index inrumour control. Further, the Leaders increased the overall level of PCI, but negatively adjusted the relationship between evidence and PCI; the Chatters and the General Public reduced the overall level of PCI, and Chatters weakened the relationship between the specific type of anti-rumour form and PCI while the General Public enhanced the relationship between the specific type of anti-rumour form and PCI. In the long run, the role of Leaders needs to be further improved, and the importance of the General Public is growing in the foodrumour control process. (shrink)

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This paper reviews the actual and potential use of social media in emergency, disaster and crisis situations. This is a field that has generated intense interest. It is characterised by a burgeoning but small and very recent literature. In the emergencies field, social media (blogs, messaging, sites such as Facebook, wikis and so on) are used in seven different ways: listening to public debate, monitoring situations, extending emergency response and management, crowd-sourcing and collaborative development, creating social cohesion, furthering causes (including (...) charitable donation) and enhancing research. Appreciation of the positive side of social media is balanced by their potential for negative developments, such as disseminating rumours, undermining authority and promoting terrorist acts. This leads to an examination of the ethics of social media usage in crisis situations. Despite some clearly identifiable risks, for example regarding the violation of privacy, it appears that public consensus on ethics will tend to override unscrupulous attempts to subvert the media. Moreover, social media are a robust means of exposing corruption and malpractice. In synthesis, the widespread adoption and use of social media by members of the public throughout the world heralds a new age in which it is imperative that emergency managers adapt their working practices to the challenge and potential of this development. At the same time, they must heed the ethical warnings and ensure that social media are not abused or misused when crises and emergencies occur. (shrink)

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BackgroundThe participant recruitment process is a key ethical pivot point when conducting robust research. There is a need to continuously review and improve recruitment processes in research trials and to build fair and effective partnerships between researchers and participants as an important core element in ensuring the ethical delivery of high-quality research. When participants make a fair, informed, and voluntary decision to enroll in a study, they agree to fulfill their roles. However, supporting study participants to fulfill study requirements is (...) an important ethical obligation for researchers, yet evidenced as challenging to achieve. This paper reports on participants’ motivations to volunteer and remain part of a dietary study conducted in Kasungu District, Malawi.MethodsWe conducted twenty in-depth interviews (with chiefs, religious leaders, trial participants, and health surveillance assistants), five systematic ethnographic observations, and fourteen focus group discussions with trial participants and their partners. Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. We used a grounded theory methodology to analyse data that included coding, detailed memo writing, and data interpretation.FindingsThe findings reveal that many participants had concerns during the trial. Thematically, experiences included anxieties, mistrust of researchers, rumours, fears of exploitation, and misconceptions. Anonymous concerns collected from the participants were reported to the trial team which enabled the researchers to appropriately support participants. Despite initial concerns, participants described being supported and expressed motivation to take up their role.ConclusionThese findings highlight a diverse map of multiple notions of what is ethically relevant and what can impact participation and retention within a study. The study has revealed how embedding a responsive approach to address participants’ concerns and ethical issues can support trust relationships. We argue for the need to employ embedded ethics strategies that enhance informed consent, focus on participants’ needs and positive experiences, and support researchers to fulfill their roles. This work highlights the need for research ethics committees to focus on the risks of undue influence and prevent exploitation especially in settings with a high asymmetry in resources and power between researcher and participant groups.Trial Registration: The Addressing Hidden Hunger with Agronomy (Malawi) trial was registered on 5th March 2019 (ISCRTN85899451). (shrink)

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BackgroundCommunity Advisory Boards (CAB) have become essential organs of involving communities in HIV clinical trials especially in developing countries. However, limited empirical evidence exists on the role of CABs in low and middle-income countries including Tanzania. This study aims at exploring the role of CABs in community-based HIV clinical trials conducted in Tanzania.MethodologyWe adopted a phenomenological approach to purposefully select HIV clinical trial stakeholders. These included CAB members, researchers and Institutional Review Board (IRB) members in Tanzania. We conducted In-depth Interviews (...) (IDIs) with ten participants and three Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with eighteen participants. The data were thematically analyzed with the aid of MAXQDA software version 20.2.1.ResultsThe findings indicate that at every stage of implementation of a community-based HIV clinical trial, a functioning CAB is important for its success. This importance is based on contextualization of the informed consent process and protocol, managing rumours in the community, weighing trial risks and benefits, sensitizing the community, assisting participant recruitment, tracing and retention. However, being perceived as financial beneficiaries than community representatives emerged as a challenge to CAB members. ConclusionThe study empirically indicates the need for functioning CABs in every stage of implementation of community-based HIV clinical trials. The roles of which are interwoven in serving research goals and protecting the interests of the community and that of trial participants. (shrink)

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Translated by Drew S. Burk and Anthony Paul Smith. Excerpted from Struggle and Utopia at the End Times of Philosophy , (Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing, 2012). THE END TIMES OF PHILOSOPHY The phrase “end times of philosophy” is not a new version of the “end of philosophy” or the “end of history,” themes which have become quite vulgar and nourish all hopes of revenge and powerlessness. Moreover, philosophy itself does not stop proclaiming its own death, admitting itself to be half dead (...) and doing nothing but providing ammunition for its adversaries. With our sights set on clearing up this nuance, we differentiate philosophy as an institutional entity, and the philosophizability of the World and History, of “thought-world,” which universalizes the narrow concept of philosophy and that of “capital.” We also give an eschatological and apocalyptical cause to this end, of “times” or “ages” rather than those of philosophical practice. Last but not least, it is the Future itself in the performativity of its ultimatum that determines this end times, reversing these times from the Identity the Future accorded to it, withdrawing the thought-world from the lie of its death. Why this style of axioms and oracles, these more or less subtle distinctions, old and debased, with an appeal to the ultimata , to end times and last words? We fight to give, parallel to the concept of Hell, its new theoretical position, for its philosophical return and its non-philosophical transformation. No more so than any other word, Hell is not a metaphor here, just the Principle of Sufficient World. Every man, no doubt, has his “hell” readily available, connivance, control, conformism, domestication, schooling, alienation, extermination, exploitation, oppression, anxiety, etc. We have our little list that the Contemporaries established in the previous century in the same way one used to construct lists of virtues and vices or honors and wealth. They invented it for us without knowing it, for us-the-Futures who have as our responsibility to invent its use. In the Christian and Gnostic tradition, the struggle of the End Times takes place “on earth.” The most sophisticated of believers have it taking place in Heaven as well, above all in Heaven. The various kinds of gnosis imagine infinite falls and vertiginous highs, the vertigo of salvation. On Earth as in Heaven, a hell is available. The Marxists have the law of profit and the control of production, the class struggle Capital imposes on man. The Nietzscheans, the dull grumble of the struggle in the foundations of World and History, the domestication of man, the society of control. The phenomenologists, the capture of being, the most superficial amongst them, the age of suspicion. But all of these “hells” are taken from World, History, Society, and Religion. What we call Hell is no longer of the order of these specific and total intra-worldly generalities, it is both more singular and more universal, no longer being at all of the same order, it is the determinant Identity of these small hells strung out through history but unified here in the name of the last Humaneity. It is even found within the French idiom for hell [ enfer ], en-fer literally means “in-irons.” We are as much “in-irons” as we are “alive” [ en-Vie ]. We believe in Hell but as non-philosophers and it is even because we are non-philosophers that we can believe in it outside of any sort of religion. Hell is less mythological than ideological, it combines philosophizability with universal capital. Under what form? A single term could work for them without being a metaphor or something they would participate in by analogy, a more innovative and conjectural term than control, more universal than profit. It would denote the growing and permanent extortion of a surplus-value of communication, of speed and of urgency in change, in productivity and in work, in the pressure of images and slogans. It would be worse than solicitation, more tenacious than capture, more active and persecutory than control, softer and more insidious than a frontal attack, just as perverse as questioning and accusation, less brutal and offensive than extermination, less ritualized than inquisition, it would be soft and dispersed, instantaneous and vicious, it would be a crime without declared violence. Collusion and conformism, it would be afraid to show itself. Related to rumor, from which it borrows its infinite and tortuous ways. It is harassment. As a modernized form of Hell, perhaps harassment has a long future in front of it, of innocent torture, slow assassination, in short the fall, but radical with no way of recovering and which tolerates only salvation. THE PHILOSOPHICAL PAST OF NON-PHILOSOPHY Non-philosophy is thus Man as the utopian identity of the philosophical form of the World, a utopia destined to transform it. We still have to understand these equations, in particular that of the being-uni-versed from Man, and this book adheres to this by re-exposing non-philosophy in a different way via one of its new possibilities. It uses this opportunity to once again take up formulations that lead to objections answering certain external critics, as well as revisiting diverging interpretations specific to non-philosophers. A portion of this book is devoted to going through these theories via a strict or “lengthy” presentation of non-philosophy, and its defense against more expeditious solutions. This work of rectification is the occasion, merely the occasion, for refocusing non-philosophy on Man (the “Man-in-person,” “Humaneity”), and in a more innovative manner, on its utopian vocation established since the book Future Christ . As for this “occasion,” it is quite obvious. A school of posture, not to say a school of thought, supposes a minimum of closure from the most liberating of knowledge, a heritage, its utilization, and its no less certain dispersal. Within its development, a variety of interpretations will no doubt appear, deviations that are as much normalizations, and a struggle against this multiplication of divergent tendencies. These are perhaps not inevitable evils, especially here, merely a normal development according to the twisting paths of history. But the problem is made worse by the fact that this school of non-philosophers is that of utopia. Not the former attempts devoted to commenting on the worst authoritarian and criminal forms of the past and the present, but utopia as the determinant principle for human life, or to put it another way, of the Future as an irreducible presupposition of (for) thinking the World and History. Non-philosophers are engaged in an aleatory navigation between the respect for the most rigorous utopia, whose rules are not that of the reproductive imagination but those from the Future determining imagination itself, as well as the temptations, diversions, and remorse of history. Little by little, we will begin to understand that the Future as we understand it no longer has any temporal consistency or positive content, without being an empty form or a nothingness, but that it is foreclosed to past and present History, just as it is foreclosed to the place of places, the World, and that it is the only method for establishing the practice of thinking in a non-imaginary instance. Because it is the World and History that are imaginary and have a terrible materiality, it is not necessarily utopia. We will overlap two objectives here: the defense of non-philosophy against the (non-) philosophers that we are, only occasionally, and the introduction of philosophy to a rigorous future. Together they set out to definitively render, without any possible return to philosophical conformism or towards the facilities of the past and present, the non-philosophical enterprise understood as utopia or uchronia. Imagination and speculation, left to themselves and thus undistinguished, are quite good for participating in the grand game of History but have little value or worse for the Future which is unimaginable and unintelligible and must be maintained as such. MAN-IN-PERSON AS SUSPENSION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL CHORA The point where philosophical resistance is concentrated is without a doubt the invention of the Name-of-Man, first name, oracular as much as axiomatic, of the determining cause for the non-philosophical posture. And that which concentrates the differends is the style of non-philosophy as identity that possesses the dual aspect, of discipline and of the oeuvre, of the theorem and of the oracle. But the real difficulty in understanding the simplicity of non-philosophy is profoundly hidden in the depths of philosophy itself. Because philosophy, from Parmenides to Derrida, even Levinas, continues to be a divided gesture, without a veritable immanence, transforming its thematic contents of transcendence in also forgetting to transform the operative transcendence in the element from which the ontology of surface is established which we will call, in memory of Plato, the chorismos. The general effect of the chora literally gives place to philosophy, demanding binding and sutures to which we will once and for all “oppose” the Man-in-person, his power of cloning, and his future being. All philosophy contains a hinter-philosophy in which it deploys its operations and weaves its tradition like an understudy of a topographical nature and in the best of cases being itself topological. Philosophy as well consists of two levels, its pre-ontological operative conditions on the one hand, and its superficial theme on the other, it too has its presupposed, but is not aware of it or erases it within the unity of appearance named Logos. Rightly, the Logos, and its flash or lightning nature, possesses a “dark precursor,” the chora, which is as much a virtual image, and philosophy, dazzled by its own lightning flash, seems to completely forget about it at the same time it sets itself up within it. Non-philosophy risks taking this same path, of confusing what it believes to be the real with its phantom double, contenting itself to working on the thematic level of philosophy, not its surface objects and its idle chatter (we stopped talking about this a long time ago and in any case they are merely simple materials for inducing a work of transformation), but the transcendence-form of its objects. In the end it risks, through precipitation, taking back up the heritage of philosophy, a heritage of a misunderstood presupposed, even more profound than the play of transcendences. This is what the imperative of the radicality of immanence meant, to treat immanence in an immanent manner, not to make a new object out of it. And from here we get non- (philosophy) and its refusal of the Platonic chorismos , symbol of all abstraction, and thus all transcendental appearance. There are no illusions. The message will leave a heritage in tattered pieces and interpretations. But it was difficult not to dispute the differend to its core. There will be complete confusion of the multiple, possible, and necessary effectuations of non-philosophy with its interpretations. The non-philosophical or human freedom of philosophical effectuation and the philosophical freedom of interpretation. Effectuations demand non-philosophy to return to zero from the point of view of its philosophical material and thus also but within these limits the formulation of its axioms , but in no way providing from the outset divergent interpretations of the aforementioned axioms. They are divergent because they do not take into account the material from which these axioms are derived within non-philosophy, and because they do not see themselves as symptoms of another vision of the World. The utterances of non-philosophy are not mathematical theorems and pure axioms, they merely have a mathematical aspect . They are, by their extraction or origin, mathematical and transcendental. And by their determined function in-Real, within non-philosophy, they are identically in-the-last-Humaneity entities which have an aspect of an axiom and an aspect of interpretation (or an oracular aspect as we say) that attempts (sometimes it is ourselves who provide the occasion) to isolate and transform, in complete freedom of interpretation. There will be an opportunity to complain about the complex character of the language of non-philosophy, an idiom saturated with classical references, sophisticated in a contemporary way. Its freedom of decision up against the whole of philosophy demands these effects of “complication” and “privatization,” as the saying goes. But it also demands fighting against the drift [ dérive ] of the pedagogical-all and the mediatic-all that leads philosophy into the shallow depths of opinion, which is the site of its impossible death. The noble idealism of “pop-philosophy” has been consumed into a “philo-reality;” against this we propose philo-fiction. Parricide, which is at the bottom of these interpretations and which we can judge as being quite fertile, although it has informed tradition, only takes place once or within one lone meaning. In regards to Parmenides, it was possible; Plato introduced the Other as non-being and language, bringing into existence the philosophical system of the World, but is it possible to repeat it again with the same fecundity in regards to non-philosophy, this time in introducing (non) religion or (non) art, still mixing them without taking into account this mixture, alternatively as a philosophical or religious resentment? If philosophy begins via a crime, it is no doubt obliged to continue down similar pathways, to the effect that the crimes of philosophy, once the founding crime has been committed, are a reaction of self-defense. It is undoubtedly from this that we get Marx’s declaration that history begins by tragedy and repeats itself or ends in farce. The preservation of rigor and fecundity is, in every respect, a psychologically difficult task within a theory such as non-philosophy. Having posited an essential objective of liberation in regards to philosophy and its services, one has often understood this objective as an authorization of providing particular interpretations of its axioms and ends up obliterating their scope. This ends up confusing, on one hand, two kinds of freedoms in regards to non-philosophy, the freedom of its interpretations and the freedom of its effectuations. On the other hand, any defense of “principles” against precipitated interpretations is immediately taxed with a will to orthodoxy, a prohibitive objection when we are dealing with, as is the case here, a heretical theory of thought. Nevertheless, it is time to stop confusing heresy as the cause of thought with an ideology of heresies, which is certainly not at all our object, but rather a form of normalization. As for the “disciplinary” aspect, which is not the only aspect, it demands something other than philosophical “answers to objections,” a precision in the definition and use of its procedures in the formation of utterances, since non-philosophy is neither a supplementary doctrine interior to philosophy nor a vision of the world but one whose priority is a “vision of Man,” or rather Man as “vision” that implies a theory and a practice of philosophy. In the end, struggle is only one aspect of non-philosophy, not its whole or telos, struggle coming only from its materiality. In particular, if the discipline of non-philosophy is inseparable from struggle, it is not a question of reducing the monomaniacal obsession of its “marching orders.” This would reduce its complexity and kill its indivisibility, deploying it in a “long march” and a form of Maoization whose philosophical presuppositions no longer have any pertinence here, a case of the One and the Two, which are now cloned and no longer tied together. More generally, non-philosophy is a complex thought composed of a multitude of aspects, which is to say, unilateral interpretations, of a philosophical origin but reduced by their determination in-the-last-instance . The “liberalism” of non-philosophy is merely one of the aspects of which it is capable, not an essence. Similarly, it is only capable of having a “Maoist” aspect. Let us generalize. The weakness of non-philosophy is due to a specific cause, the determination-in-the-last-Humaneity of a subject for the World. Everything that has a right to the philosophical city can be said about it in turn and in a retaliatory mode since Man contributes nothing of himself that Man takes from the World. We can consider non-philosophy as being pretentious, absurd, idealistic, empty, materialistic, formalistic, contradictory, modern, post-modern, Zen, Buddhist, Marxist; it endures or tolerates, perhaps “appeals” to, or at least renders possible, sarcasms, ironies, and insults without even talking about the misunderstandings, partly for the same reason as psychoanalysis. All of this goes beyond simple “deviations.” They are its aspects, which is to say, its “unilateral” philosophical interpretations in both senses of the word, being either sufficient coming from the mouth of philosophers, or reduced to their absolute dimension of sufficiency and totality in the mouths of non-philosophers, and both times due to the weakness and strength of Man-in-person as their determination only in-the-last-instance. The non-philosopher is certainly not a Saint Paul fantasizing about a new Church. The non-philosopher is either a (Saint) Sebastian whose flesh is pierced with as many arrows as there are Churches, or a Christ persecuted by a Saint Paul. What is engaged in here is the practice of retaliation. A negative rule of the non-philosophical ethics of outlawed discussion by way of argumentation (the sufficient is you, the orthodox one is always you, you are the fashionable one, and when a master you are someone else) that is founded on the confusion of effectuations of non-philosophy and of its overall interpretations. Retaliation is the law but as with any too-human law, it must acquire a dimension that displaces it, or rather emplaces it and takes away its authority but not all of its effectiveness. If the non-philosopher is only authorized by himself, which is to say by philosophy but limited by the Real-of-the-last-instance, its critique of other non-philosophers can merely be retaliatory under the same conditions, only by the Real limited in-the last-instance. THE TREE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SAINTLINESS The thematic horizon or material of these debates is in the relationships between philosophy, religion as gnosis, and non-philosophy. It is inevitable, regarding non-philosophers in general (whether they are non-philosophers by name or simply its neighbors) that we often end up evoking Marx’s Holy Family and imagining, arranged on the neighboring branches of the tree of philosophy and annexed, sometimes abusively, to non-philosophy, authors who would quite evidently and quite rightly refuse this label. So it is that we find, for example, a Saint Michel, a Saint Alain, a Saint Gilles 1 without even mentioning the youngest who aspire as well to the freedom of “saintliness” and who make their muted voices heard here. If there is a Holy Family of non-philosophers, it extends completely beyond these three, provided that the sectarian spirit can save us. This book is organized in the following manner: To begin, in order to recall the essential part of the problematic, we have organized a Summary of Non-Philosophy , a vade-mecum of notions and basic problems, in a classical style. Secondly, there is Clarifications On the Three Axioms of Non-Philosophy , designed to posit their proper use as much as to elucidate their meaning. Thirdly, an analysis of Philosophizability and Practicity , both being extreme constituents of philosophical material or the contents of the third axiom. Fourthly, the heart of this work: Let us Make a Tabula Rasa of the Future or of Utopia as Method . Fifthly, we have a theoretical outline of a non-institutional utopia, The International Organization of Non-Philosophy, L’Organisation Non-Philosophique Internationale, (ONPHI) already created in practice but under the conditions of possibility and functioning from which here we put into question “de jure,” thus not without a perplexity concerning “facts,” in any case, without the capability of “getting to the bottom of things.” Sixthly, an essay characterizing The Right and the Left of Non-Philosophy , a brief topology of several philosophizing and normalizing positions of proponents or tenants of this problematic. Seventhly, Rebel in the Soul: A Theory of Future Struggle , a systematic discussion starting from a confrontation of non-philosophical gnosis and non-religious gnosis to the extent that they pose, posed or perhaps still will pose themselves as rivals to non-philosophy in a mixture of fidelity and infidelity. Despite the fact that it can also be read as putting non-philosophy into perspective: it pits against a standard Platonism two contemporary appropriations of Gnosticism. On the basis of the paradigm of Man who never ceases to come as the Future-in-person, each one of these moments strives to reestablish not the “true” non-philosophy and its orthodoxy, but the minimal conditions to respect in order to allow for its maximum fecundity. And in order to bring about one of the last possibilities of its development, making explicit Humaneity as a utopia-for-the-World. In introducing these considerations in the form of a “testament” and “ultimatum,” we want to indicate two things: First, that this is the last time we will intervene in order to caution non-philosophers against the temptation of returning and looking backwards towards philosophy. Only a disillusioned nostalgia for the former World and its traditions barely remain permissible to us.… Secondly, that non-philosophy is also a sort of ultimatum for considering one’s life and transforming one’s thought from the perspective of a uni-version rather than a conversion. Man as future is this ultimatum in action, not an impatient self-proclaimed genius, and philosophy is his testament. It is obviously the ultimatum that determines this testament as “old” with a view towards a life that is, itself, non-testamentary. In and of itself, the “old” can never bear a veritable eschaton. Thus, this book intersects according to the logic of this paradigm, under the sign of the ultimate or “last” as future, philosophy as testament and cautionary note for maintaining the non-philosophical oeuvre as “future” or “utopian.” We will see that between these two dimensions it cradles a theory of struggle. In the end, this book envisions non-philosophers in multiple ways. It inevitably sees them as subjects of knowledge, most often academics insofar as life in the world demands, but above all as close relatives of three great human types. The analyst and political militant are quite obvious, for non-philosophy is close to psychoanalysis and Marxism insofar as it transforms the subject in transforming philosophy. Here again, one must have a sense not of certain nuances but of aspects (of the interpretations, albeit unilateralized) and not in order to construct a simple proletarization or militarization of thought as theory. To be rigorous, rather than authoritarian or spiteful, is its task. And lastly, non-philosophy is a close relative of the spiritual but definitely not the spiritualist. Those who are spiritual are not at all spiritualists, for the spiritual oscillate between fury and tranquil rage, they are great destroyers of the forces of Philosophy and the State, which are united under the name of Conformism. They haunt the margins of philosophy, gnosis, mysticism, science fiction and even religions. Spiritual types are not only abstract mystics and quietists; they are heretics for the World. The task is to bring their heresy to the capacity of utopia, and their utopia to the capacity of the paradigm. NOTES We will recognize allusions, and sometimes references, to closely related or distant themes, but which are related, in the work of Michel Henry, Alain Badiou and via the representative of “non-religious” gnosis of a Platonic origin, in Gilles Grelet. It goes without saying that these discussions are current and local, neither concerning the ensemble of doctrines nor prejudging the eventual evolution of certain amongst them. This concerns defining certain proximities with non-philosophy (rather than adversaries which in some sense they are) and typological and emblematic differends (rather than conflicts with a certain author). (shrink)

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Why we have done this research and written this book -- Immoral panics -- A courageous proposal, but this would be a highrisk study : ethics review procedures,risk and censorship -- Truths and stories -- Confused, angry and actually betrayed : it was time to get out -- Timpson versus Regina -- How do you tell teenage children that their father's been -- Accused of sexual abuse?? -- It didn't take long for therumour mill (...) to start grinding -- Nobody can prove anything for definite -- Endwords. (shrink)

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The online version of the original article can be found under doi:10.1007/s11948-007-9045-2.

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The goal of this paper is to mark the transition from an anti-luck epistemology to an anti-risk epistemology, and to explain in the process how the latter has advantages over the former. We begin with an account of anti-luck epistemology and the modal account of luck that underpins it. Then we consider the close inter-relationships between luck andrisk, and in the process set out the modal account ofrisk that is a natural extension of the modal (...) account of luck. Finally, we apply the modal account ofrisk to epistemology in order to develop an anti-risk epistemology, and then explore the merits of this proposal. In particular, it is shown that this account can avoid a theoretical lacuna in anti-luck epistemology, and there is a stronger theoretical motivation for anti-risk epistemology compared with anti-luck epistemology, especially when it comes to explaining why environmental epistemic luck is incompatible with knowledge. (shrink)

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This book brings together eleven case studies of inductiverisk-the chance that scientific inference is incorrect-that range over a wide variety of scientific contexts and fields. The chapters are designed to illustrate the pervasiveness of inductiverisk, assist scientists and policymakers in responding to it, and productively move theoretical discussions of the topic forward.

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The challenges of the Anthropocene are growing ever more complex and uncertain, underpinned by the emergence of systemic risks. At the same time, the landscape ofrisk governance has become compartmentalised and siloed, characterized by non-overlapping activities, competing scientific discourses, and distinct responsibilities distributed across diverse public and private bodies. Operating across scales and disciplines, actors tend to work in silos which constitute critical gaps within the interface of science, policy, and practice. Yet, increasingly complex and ‘wicked’ problems require (...) holistic solutions, multi-scalar communication, coordination, collaboration, data interoperability, funding, and stakeholder engagement. To address these problems in a real-world context, we present theRisk-Tandem framework for bridging theory and practice; to guide and structure the integration of disasterrisk management (DRM), climate change adaptation (CCA) and systemicrisk management through a process of transdisciplinary knowledge co-production. Advancing the frontiers of knowledge in this regard, TheRisk-Tandem framework combinesrisk management approaches and tools with iterative co-production processes as a cornerstone of its implementation, in efforts to promote the co-design of fit-for-purpose solutions, methods and approaches contributing toward strengthenedrisk governance alongside stakeholders. The paper outlines how the framework is developed, applied, and further refined within selected case study regions, including Denmark, Germany, Italy and the Danube Region. (shrink)

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The article discusses the work of the Orthodox Christian churches with children and especially children-at-risk. This work is new for these churches and is not yet theologically grounded or systematically organized. Observing the various activities of Orthodox Christians with children-at-risk, questions are raised, such as: is this missionary work, or is it ministry, or is it a task fulfilled by individuals and not by the Church at large? These questions are explored, yet readers are left to make their (...) own conclusions. What becomes evident is the necessity for the Orthodox churches to cooperate with other Christian churches and organizations that are engaged in work with children, and particularly those at-risk, so that all learn from each other and continue their ministry with children in more innovative and successful ways, for the glory of God and the salvation of people, especially the ‘little ones’. (shrink)

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This poster presents results from applying agent-based modeling to an exploration ofrisk attitudes and rational decision making in the context of group interaction. We are also interested in the place of agent-based modeling and computational philosophy within the computational humanities. Computational philosophy has not typically been included in Digital Humanities; computational work has been done using philosophy texts as a source for analysis (Kinney 2022; Malaterre et al. 2021; Fletcher et al. 2021; Zahorec et al. 2022), but there (...) are few examples of philosophical arguments being made based on computation (Zahorec et al. 2022). Modeling is largely accepted as a computational humanist method (McCarty 2004; So 2022), but typically models are based on data rather than designed simulations as a method analogous to a thought experiment (Mayo-Wilson / Zollman 2021). Agent-based modeling is not as common in computational humanities, but we are interested in its potential; for instance, see work modeling correspondence networks to better understand lost information and biases in correspondence data sets (Buarque / Vogl 2023), or work simulating past human societies (Romanowska et al. 2021). Our project explores Lara Buchak’s theory ofrisk-weighted rational decision making by extending it to the context of group populations and interactions. Buchak has proposedrisk-weighted expected utility maximization, which incorporates individualrisk attitudes into the standard expected utility (EU) calculation based on utility and probability of outcomes (Buchak 2017). This theory provides an explanation for differences of behavior seen in human populations, while still allowing those different choices to be rational. Buchak’s theory has previously only been applied to individual decision making; our work uses agent-based modeling to develop and analyze simulations which incorporate a variety ofrisk attitudes (risk avoidance andrisk seeking) into game theoretic interactions. This project is a collaboration between a philosopher and a research software engineer; we have worked together to develop simulations that implement agents withrisk attitudes making risky choices. This presentation focuses on results from an implementation of a hawk/dove game with multiplerisk attitudes andrisk attitude adjustment. In the hawk/dove game cooperation, or playing dove, is better for the population, but acting aggressively, or playing hawk, is better for an individual if they are in a neighborhood of doves. To set up the game, we place agents on a grid and have them play against each of their neighbors, and accumulate payoffs based on the success of their plays. We definerisk attitudes 0 through 9, where that number corresponds to the minimum number of neighbors playing dove for an agent to play hawk. An agent withrisk attitude 0 is mostrisk seeking and always plays hawk; an agent withrisk attitude 1 will play hawk if at least one neighbor plays dove; an agent withrisk attitude 9 always takes the safe choice and plays dove; an agent withrisk attitude 4 or 5 isrisk neutral (breaking ties in different ways), which corresponds to expected utility. In this simulation we randomly set agent initialrisk attitudes, and then every ten rounds agents compare their payoffs with their neighbors and adopt the most successfulrisk attitude in their neighborhood. The simulation is coded to stop oncerisk attitude adjustments stabilize. We define 13 different population states based on primary and second majority ofrisk averse,risk inclined, orrisk moderate, and analysis of over 1 million runs indicate that while it’s more likely to stabilize with the population having become majorityrisk inclined, that is not the only outcome; we also see cases where the population stabilizes asrisk neutral,risk avoidant, and many cases with no clear majority. This diversity of stable populations provides support for the argument that no onerisk attitude is uniquely rational, but rather thatrisk attitudes are conventional. This matches what we observe in the real world: that different populations have differentrisk attitudes. Our simulations include numerous parameters to vary grid size; adjustment frequency, strategy, and wealth comparison; neighborhood sizes for observing previous choice, playing against, and comparing payoffs for adjustingrisk attitudes; and different distributions for initializingrisk attitudes. Analysis of parameters and adjustedrisk attitudes shows that the strongest correlations are the initial distribution ofrisk attitudes, which tend to be preserved. * * * This poster was accepted and presented at the DH2024 conference in Washington, D.C. (shrink)

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For decades, the field of system safety has designed safe systems by reducing therisk of physical harm to humans, property and the environment to an acceptable level. Recently, this definition of safety has come under scrutiny by governments and researchers who argue that the narrow focus on reducing physical harm, whilst necessary, is not sufficient to secure the safety of AI systems. There is growing pressure to expand the scope of safety in the context of AI to address (...) emerging harms, with particular emphasis being placed on the ways AI systems can reinforce and reproduce systemic harms. In this paper, we advocate for expanding the scope of conventional safety to include non-physical harms in the context of AI. However, we caution against broadening the scope to address systemic harms, as doing so presents intractable practical challenges for current safety methodologies. Instead, we propose that the scope of safety-related harms should be expanded to include psychological harms. Our proposal is partly motivated by the debates and evidence on social media, which fundamentally reshaped how harm is understood and addressed in the digital age, prompting new regulatory frameworks which aimed to protect users from the psychological risks of the technology. We draw on this precedent to motivate the inclusion of psychological harms in AI safety assessments. By expanding the scope of AI safety to include psychological harms, we take a critical step toward evolving the discipline of system safety into one that is better tuned and equipped to protect users against the complex and emerging harms propagated by AI systems. (shrink)

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Polygenicrisk scores (PRSs) have recently been used to inform reproductive decision-making in the context of embryonic screening. While this is yet to be widespread, it is contested and raises several challenges. This article provides an overview of some of the ethical considerations that arise with using PRSs for embryo screening and offers a series of regulatory considerations for jurisdictions that may wish to permit this in the future. These regulatory considerations cover possible regulators and regulatory tools, eligibility criteria, (...) information and education requirements and the need for ongoing refinement of the relevant technology, research and consultation. (shrink)

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It is argued that the standard way that the criminal justice debate regarding the permissible extent of wrongful convictions is cast is fundamentally flawed. In particular, it is claimed that there is an inherent danger in focussing our attention in this debate on different ways of measuring the probabilistic likelihood of wrongful conviction and then evaluating whether these probabilities are unacceptably high. This is because such probabilistic measures are clumsy ways of capturing the level ofrisk involved, to the (...) extent that a defendant can be subject to an unacceptably high level of legalrisk in this regard even where the relevant probabilities are very low. An alternative conception of legalrisk – one that is primarily cast along modal rather than probabilistic lines – is set out which offers a much better way of framing the debate regarding what would be an acceptable level of wrongful conviction. It is further argued that with this modal conception of legalrisk in play we can capture an important necessary condition that should be imposed on legal evidence, one that has application beyond the context of the criminal trial. (shrink)

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The notion ofrisk plays a central role in economics, finance, health, psychology, law and elsewhere, and is prevalent in managing challenges and resources in day-to-day life. In recent work, Duncan Pritchard (2015, 2016) has argued against the orthodox probabilistic conception ofrisk on which therisk of a hypothetical scenario is determined by how probable it is, and in favour of a modal conception on which therisk of a hypothetical scenario is determined by how (...) modally close it is. In this article, we use Pritchard’s discussion as a springboard for a more wide-ranging discussion of the notion ofrisk. We introduce three different conceptions ofrisk: the standard probabilistic conception, Pritchard’s modal conception, and a normalcy conception that is new (though it has some precursors in the psychological literature onrisk perception). Ultimately, we argue that the modal conception is ill-suited to the roles that a notion ofrisk is required to play and explore the prospects for a form of pluralism aboutrisk, embracing both the probabilistic and the normalcy conceptions. (shrink)

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Almost all philosophers agree that a necessary condition on lying is that one says what one believes to be false. But, philosophers haven’t considered the possibility that the true requirement on lying concerns, rather, one’s degree-of-belief. Liars impose arisk on their audience. The greater the liar’s confidence that what she asserts is false, the greater therisk she’ll think she’s imposing on the dupe, and, therefore, the greater her blameworthiness. From this, I arrive at a dilemma: either (...) the belief requirement is wrong, or lying isn’t interesting. I suggest an alternative necessary condition for lying on a degree-of-belief framework. (shrink)

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Support is canvassed for a new approach to epistemology called anti-risk epistemology. It is argued that this proposal is rooted in the motivations for an existing account, known as anti-luck epistemology, but is superior on a number of fronts. In particular, anti-risk epistemology is better placed than anti-luck epistemology to supply the motivation for certain theoretical moves with regard to safety-based approaches to knowledge. Moreover, anti-risk epistemology is more easily extendable to epistemological questions beyond that in play (...) in the theory of knowledge specifically. A key advantage of the view, however, is that anti-risk epistemology fares much better than anti-luck epistemology when it comes to accounting for the phenomenon of negative epistemic dependence. In particular, anti-risk epistemology is ideally placed to explain why such epistemic dependence is incompatible with knowledge, even when the negative epistemic dependence in play is of a purely modal variety. (shrink)

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A response to pressures on pension finance caused by population ageing and economic turbulence has been a substantial move from traditional defined-benefit plans in which, at least in principle, allrisk falls on the contributions side, to defined-contribution plans in whichrisk during accumulation all falls on the benefits side. This paper argues that both designs are ‘corner solutions’ and hence generally suboptimal, and goes on to set out a range of designs that offer different ways of sharing (...)risk among workers, employers, future pensioners and current pensioners. (shrink)

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Several types of inferences are employed in the diagnosis and prognosis of patients with brain injuries and disorders of consciousness. These inferences introduce unavoidable uncertainty, and can be evaluated in light of inductiverisk: the epistemic and nonepistemic risks of being wrong. This article considers several ethically significant inductive risks generated by and interacting with inferences about patients with disorders of consciousness, and argues for prescriptive measures to manage and mitigate inductiverisk in the context of disorders of (...) consciousness. (shrink)

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This paper examines fraudulent financial reporting within the context of Jones' (1991) ethical decision making model. It was hypothesized that quantitative materiality would influence judgments of the ethical acceptability of fraud, and that both materiality and financialrisk would affect the likelihood of committing fraud. The results, based on a study of CPAs employed as senior executives, provide partial support for the hypotheses. Contrary to expectations, quantitative materiality did not influence ethical judgments. ANCOVA results based on participants' estimates of (...) the likelihood that a "typical CPA" would manipulate reported results indicated that both materiality andrisk significantly influenced the likelihood of fraud, but that the perceived morality of the action did not. In contrast, results based on participants' self-reported behavior indicated that materiality and the perceived morality of the action would influence the likelihood of fraud, but that financialrisk would not. Regardless of the measure used for the likelihood of fraud, the results indicate that financial executives continue to be influenced by quantitative materiality when misstatements are clearly material on qualitative grounds. (shrink)

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This article considers financialrisk management practice using a virtue ethics lens, in response to ongoing critiques ofrisk management from within business ethics.Risk management should be seen as embedded within a complex system of cultures, organizations and regulations that are underpinned by a quantitatively reductive or ‘mechanistic’ economic paradigm, where dominant logics of self-interest, profit maximization and short-termism prevail. Building on recent work applying virtue ethics in finance, an alternative to the values, normative expectations and (...) priorities in financialrisk management is presented in the form of a refined ‘taxonomy’ of the virtues that can be applied to individuals and organizations engaged in financialrisk management. This article aims to contribute to and extend debate on the ethical aspects ofrisk management and presents an alternative to more technically based critiques which do not engage with the underlying socially constructed foundations ofrisk management practice. It thereby provides a basis to critique the mechanistic and narrow approach used in the current regulation of the sector. (shrink)

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Trust is a core feature of the physician-patient relationship, andrisk is central to trust. Patients take risks when they trust their providers to care for them effectively and appropriately. Not all patients take these risks: some medical relationships are marked by mistrust and suspicion. Empirical evidence suggests that some patients and families of color in the United States may be more likely to mistrust their providers and to be suspicious of specific medical practices and institutions. Given both historical (...) and ongoing oppression and injustice in American medical institutions, such mistrust can be apt. Yet it can also frustrate patient care, leading to family and provider distress. In this paper, I propose one way that providers might work to reestablish trust by taking risks in signaling their own trustworthiness. This interpersonal step is not meant to replace efforts to remedy systemic injustice, but is an immediate measure for addressing mistrust in occurrent cases. (shrink)

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The article investigates the resources of contractualist moral theory to make sense of the ethics ofrisk imposition. In some ways, contractualism seems well placed to explain how it can be reasonable to accept exposure torisk of harms whose direct imposition would not be acceptable. However, there are difficulties getting clear about what directness comes to here, especially given the difficulty of adequately motivating traditional views that assign ethical significance to what the agent intends as opposed to (...) merely foreseeing. The article considers two principles which might help the contractualist: the Redistribution Principle, which, while attractive, is perhaps somewhat too restrictive, and the Aim Consistency Principle, which grants ethical significance to the aims with which our actions are in principle consistent whatever our actual intentions may be. The article also considers the relative significance of ex ante and ex post perspectives from which to evaluate actions and principles. Key Words: contractualism • Doctrine of Double Effect • ethics • intention • justice •risk • T.M. Scanlon • utilitarianism. (shrink)

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The development of the notion of care brings about profound changes in ethical, political and legal thinking, particularly with regard to the environment. This is not simply an extension of care – whose plurality and diversity of forms, activities, subjects and places are already well known. Care has helped to modify a dominant conception of ethics and has placed vulnerability at the very heart of morality – in place of its hitherto held essential values such as autonomy, impartiality. Care has (...) hence made environmental vulnerability the paradigm and not only a subspecies of care. Care for the environment (in both senses: attention to the ordinary environment and the well-being that this environment provides for individuals) is attention to what makes our lives possible, and which for this very reason we fail to see and neglect. The paradigm of care may prove more powerful to describe our situation than the 20th century concept ofrisk. A radical vision of care forces us to see an entire form of life as maintained by a care activity, most often invisibilized. (shrink)

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In this paper, I give an answer to the central epistemic question regarding the normative requirements for beliefs based on testimony. My suggestion here is that our best strategy for coming up with the conditions for justification is to look at cases where the adoption of the belief matters to the person considering it. This leads me to develop, in Part One of the paper, an interest-relative theory of justification, according to which our justification for a proposition p depends on (...) our evidence in favour of p in proportion to our interest in p, as signalled by the epistemicrisk we take in believing that p is true. In Part Two, I argue that this theory shows that the reductivist view offers a better normative account for the epistemic status of beliefs based on testimony than the credulist one, but it is inaptly named; the view I develop here is better conceived of as The Dependence Account. (shrink)

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Women are commonly stereotyped as morerisk averse than men in financial decision making. In this paper we examine whether this stereotype reflects gender differences in actualrisk-taking behavior by means of a laboratory experiment with monetary incentives. Gender differences inrisk taking may be due to differences in valuations of outcomes or in probability weights. The results of our experiment indicate that value functions do not differ significantly between men and women. Men and women differ in (...) their probability weighting schemes, however. In general, women tend to be less sensitive to probability changes. They also tend to underestimate large probabilities of gains more strongly than do men. This effect is particularly pronounced when the decisions are framed in investment terms. As a result, women appear to be morerisk averse than men in specific circumstances. (shrink)

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Although legitimacy theory provides strong arguments that environmental, social and governance disclosure and performance can help mitigate firm-specific risks, this relationship has been repeatedly challenged by conceptual arguments, such as ‘transparency fallacy’ or ‘impression management’, and mixed empirical evidence. Therefore, we investigate this relationship in the revelatory case of initial public offerings, which represent the first sale of common stock to the wider public. IPOs are characterised by strong information asymmetry between firm insiders and society, while at the same time (...) suffering from uncertainty in firm legitimacy, culminating in amplified financial risks for both issuers and investors in aftermarket trading. Using data from the United States, we demonstrate that voluntary ESG disclosure reduces idiosyncratic volatility and downside tailrisk and higher ESG ratings have lower associated firm-specific volatility and downside tailrisk during the first year of trading in the aftermarket. We provide theoretical arguments for the relationships observed, suggesting that companies striving for ESG performance and communicating their efforts signal their compliance with sustainability-related norms, thus acquiring and upholding a societal license to operate. ESG performance and disclosure help companies build their reputation capital with investors after going public. We also report that ESG disclosure is a more consistent proxy for ex-ante uncertainty as an indicator of aftermarketrisk, thereby replacing some of the more conventional measures, such as firm age, offered in the existing literature. (shrink)

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To protect children in research, procedures that are not administered in the medical interests of a child must be restricted. Therisk threshold for these procedures is generally measured according to the concept of minimalrisk. Minimalrisk is often defined according to the risks of “daily life.” But it is not clear whose daily life should serve as the baseline; that is, it is not clear to whom minimalrisk should refer. Commentators in research ethics (...) often argue that “minimalrisk” should refer to healthy children or the subjects of the research. I argue that neither of these interpretations is successful. I propose a new interpretation in which minimalrisk refers to children who are not unduly burdened by their daily lives. I argue that children are not unduly burdened when they fare well, and I defend a substantive goods account of children’s welfare. (shrink)

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There is a dearth of business ethics research on family firms, despite the importance of such firms to the US economy. We answer Vazquez’s call to examine the intersection of family-firm research and business ethics, by investigating whether external auditors assess higherrisk of fraud in family firms. We test the contradictory predictions of two dominant theoretical perspectives in family-firm research—entrenchment theory and alignment theory. We conduct an experiment with highly experienced external audit professionals, who assess therisk (...) of fraud and make client acceptance decisions for family firms versus non-family firms with different strength of corporate governance: strong versus weak audit committees. We find that auditors assess therisk of fraud as higher for family firms than for non-family firms, consistent with the predictions of entrenchment theory. Auditors are also less likely to make client acceptance recommendations for family firms. The strength of the AC moderates the family-firm effect, whereby auditors assess family firms with weak ACs to have the highest fraudrisk and to be the least desirable audit clients. Our findings suggest that auditors perceive more severe agency conflicts to be present in family firms than in non-family firms, consistent with entrenchment theory, according to which family members may behave opportunistically to extract rents and potentially expropriate the firm’s resources at the expense of minority shareholders. (shrink)

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In this paper I examine the prospects for a rights-based approach to the morality of purerisk-imposition. In particular, I discuss a practical challenge to proponents of the thesis that we have a right against being imposed arisk of harm. According to an influential criticism, a right againstrisk-imposition will rule out all ordinary activities. The paper examines two strategies that rights theorists may follow in response to this “Paralysis Problem”. The first strategy introduces a threshold (...) for when arisk-imposition is a rights violation. The second strategy drops the claim that rights are absolute and maintains that all rights infringements generate compensation duties. It is argued that both strategies face significant practical problems of their own and that the Paralysis Problem seems fatal for a right againstrisk-imposition in the absence of an adequate account of the morally relevant thresholdrisk. (shrink)

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Risk prediction in emergency medicine (EM) holds unique challenges due to issues surrounding urgency, blurry research-practise distinctions, and the high-pressure environment in emergency departments (ED). Artificial intelligence (AI)risk prediction tools have been developed with the aim of streamlining triaging processes and mitigating perennial issues affecting EDs globally, such as overcrowding and delays. The implementation of these tools is complicated by the potential risks associated with over-triage and under-triage, untraceable false positives, as well as the potential for the (...) biases of healthcare professionals toward technology leading to the incorrect usage of such tools. This paper exploresrisk surrounding these issues in an analysis of a case study involving a machine learning triage tool called the Score for EmergencyRisk Prediction (SERP) in Singapore. This tool is used for estimating mortalityrisk in presentation at the ED. After two successful retrospective studies demonstrating SERP’s strong predictive accuracy, researchers decided that the pre-implementation randomised controlled trial (RCT) would not be feasible due to how the tool interacts with clinical judgement, complicating the blinded arm of the trial. This led them to consider other methods of testing SERP’s real-world capabilities, such as ongoing-evaluation type studies. We discuss the outcomes of arisk–benefit analysis to argue that the proposed implementation strategy is ethically appropriate and aligns with improvement-focused and systemic approaches to implementation, especially the learning health systems framework (LHS) to ensure safety, efficacy, and ongoing learning. (shrink)

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Robert Nozick has suggested that risky actions are a problem for a moral view based on rights. We ordinarily think that some actions are too dangerous to be permissible, taking into account both the harm risked and the degree of therisk. Other actions, although they run somerisk of serious harm, are thought permissible. The problem is to draw this distinction in a principled way by looking to rights.I think that Nozick's argument aboutrisk can be (...) answered but a different argument has convinced me that the rights view cannot handlerisk in a satisfactory way. The inability is a function of the basic nature of the view. (shrink)

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Within philosophy of action, there are three broad views about what, in addition to beliefs, answer the question of “what to do?” and so determine an agent’s motivation: desires, judgments about values/reasons, or states of the will, such as intentions. We argue that recent work in decision theory vindicates the volitionalist. “What to do?” isn’t settled by “what do I value” or “what reasons are there?” Rational motivation further requires determining how to trade off the possibility of a good outcome (...) against the possibility of a bad one—i.e., determining how much of arisk to take. Therisk attitudes that embody this tradeoff seem best understood as intentions: as self-governing policies to weight desires or reasons in certain ways. That we need to settle ourrisk attitudes before making most decisions corroborates Bratman’s claim that self-governing policies are required for resolving impasses of evaluative and normative underdetermination. Moreover, far from being rare or confined to tie-breakings, cases that are underdetermined but for one’srisk attitudes are typical of everyday decision-making. The will is required for most rational action. (shrink)

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Artists often emphasize the importance ofrisk to their work. But this raises a puzzle, as on a standard probabilistic account ofrisk we are obliged to treat some of these cases as not involving genuinerisk at all. It is argued that the way to resolve this puzzle is to recognize a crucial shortcoming in the probabilistic account ofrisk. With this shortcoming rectified, and hence with a revised modal account ofrisk in place, (...) we are able to treat the relevant cases of putative aestheticrisk as entirely genuine. (shrink)

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Accurate estimation ofrisk and benefit is integral to good clinical research planning, ethical review, and study implementation. Some commentators have argued that various actors in clinical research systems are prone to biased or arbitraryrisk/benefit estimation. In this commentary, we suggest the evidence supporting such claims is very limited. Most prior work has imputedrisk/benefit beliefs based on past behavior or goals, rather than directly measuring them. We describe an approach – forecast analysis – that would (...) enable direct and effective measure of the quality ofrisk/benefit estimation. We then consider some objections and limitations to the forecasting approach. (shrink)

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This paper explores the temporal dimension of risks associated with the production, trade and consumption of food. The paper operates at many levels of substantive and theoretical analysis: it focuses on problems for understanding and action that arise from the invisibility of the hazards, explores the effects of those hazards on consumers and sets out the differences in risks that are faced by farmers, processors, traders and consumers. With its emphasis on that which tends to be disattended in conventional social (...) science analysis – the temporal and the invisible – the paper has implications for social theory at the level of ontology and epistemology. It concludes with reflections on the role of social theory in such contemporary timescapes ofrisk. (shrink)

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The use ofrisk assessment tools has come to play an increasingly important role in sentencing decisions in many jurisdictions. A key issue in the theoretical discussion ofrisk assessment concerns the predictive accuracy of such tools. For instance, it has been underlined that mostrisk assessment instruments have poor to moderate accuracy in most applications. However, the relation between, on the one hand, judgements of the predictive accuracy of arisk assessment tool and, on the (...) other, conclusions concerning the justified use of such an instrument in sentencing practice, is often very unclear. The purpose of this paper is to examine this relation. More precisely, it is argued that the relation between predictive accuracy and the question as to whether a newrisk assessment tool should be introduced in sentencing practice is highly complicated. For instance, there may be cases in which a newrisk assessment tool is more accurate than those currently in use, but should nevertheless not be introduced; and conversely, where a new tool is less accurate, but where its introduction instead of current tools would be morally preferable. (shrink)

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Standard theories of liability say that X is liable to Y only if Y was harmed, only if X caused Y harm, and (usually) only if X was at fault. This article offers a series of criticisms of each of these claims, and use them to construct an alternative theory of liability in which the nature of X's having imposed arisk of harm on Y is central to the question of when X is liable to Y, and for (...) how much. The article ends with some conjectures on ignorance as an excusing condition. (shrink)

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Inmaculada de Melo-Martín and Kristen Intemann consider whether, from the perspective of the argument from inductiverisk, ethical and political values might be logically, epistemically, pragmatically, or ethically necessary in the “core” of scientific reasoning. In each case, they argue that there are significant conceptual problems. In this comment, employing regulatory uses of high-throughput toxicology at the US Environmental Protection Agency as a case study, I respond to some of their claims about the notion of “pragmatic necessity.” I conclude (...) that, while an inductiverisk framework has some significant limitations, it is still conceptually and rhetorically valuable. (shrink)

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Stem cell research has important implications for medicine. The source of stem cells influences their therapeutic potential, with stem cells derived from early-stage embryos remaining the most versatile. Somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), a source of embryonic stem cells, allows for understandings about disease development and, more importantly, the ability to yield embryonic stem cell lines that are genetically matched to the somatic cell donor. However, SCNT requires women to donate eggs, which involves injection of ovulation-inducing hormones and egg retrieval (...) through laparoscopy or transvaginal needle aspiration. Risks from this procedure are fiercely debated, most notablyrisk of ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS). This review examinesrisk of OHSS resulting from oocyte donation. We conclude thatrisk posed by OHSS in egg donation is not significant enough to warrant undue concern, and much of this can be eliminated when proper precautions are taken. This bears relevance to the future of stem cell research policymaking. (shrink)

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We survey a variety of possible explications of the term “IndividualRisk.” These in turn are based on a variety of interpretations of “Probability,” including classical, enumerative, frequency, formal, metaphysical, personal, propensity, chance and logical conceptions of probability, which we review and compare. We distinguish between “groupist” and “individualist” understandings of probability, and explore both “group to individual” and “individual to group” approaches to characterising individualrisk. Although in the end that concept remains subtle and elusive, some pragmatic (...) suggestions for progress are made. (shrink)

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