From S-matrix theory to strings: Scattering data and the commitment to non-arbitrariness.Robert vanLeeuwen -2024 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 104 (C):130-149.detailsThe early history of string theory is marked by a shift from strong interaction physics to quantum gravity. The first string models and associated theoretical framework were formulated in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the context of the S-matrix program for the strong interactions. In the mid-1970s, the models were reinterpreted as a potential theory unifying the four fundamental forces. This paper provides a historical analysis of how string theory was developed out of S-matrix physics, aiming to clarify (...) how modern string theory, as a theory detached from experimental data, grew out of an S-matrix program that was strongly dependent upon observable quantities. Surprisingly, the theoretical practice of physicists already turned away from experiment before string theory was recast as a potential unified quantum gravity theory. With the formulation of dual resonance models (the “hadronic string theory”), physicists were able to determine almost all of the models' parameters on the basis of theoretical reasoning. It was this commitment to “non-arbitrariness”, i.e., a lack of free parameters in the theory, that initially drove string theorists away from experimental input, and not the practical inaccessibility of experimental data in the context of quantum gravity physics. This is an important observation when assessing the role of experimental data in string theory. (shrink)
The product of self-deception.Neil VanLeeuwen -2007 -Erkenntnis 67 (3):419 - 437.detailsI raise the question of what cognitive attitude self-deception brings about. That is: what is the product of self-deception?Robert Audi and Georges Rey have argued that self-deception does not bring about belief in the usual sense, but rather “avowal” or “avowed belief.” That means a tendency to affirm verbally (both privately and publicly) that lacks normal belief-like connections to non-verbal actions. I contest their view by discussing cases in which the product of self-deception is implicated in action in (...) a way that exemplifies the motivational role of belief. Furthermore, by applying independent criteria of what it is for a mental state to be a belief, I defend the more intuitive view that being self-deceived that p entails believing that p. Beliefs (i) are the default for action relative to other cognitive attitudes (such as imagining and hypothesis) and (ii) have cognitive governance over the other cognitive attitudes. I explicate these two relations and argue that they obtain for the product of self-deception. (shrink)
The spandrels of self-deception: Prospects for a biological theory of a mental phenomenon.Neil VanLeeuwen -2007 -Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):329 – 348.detailsThree puzzles about self-deception make this mental phenomenon an intriguing explanatory target. The first relates to how to define it without paradox; the second is about how to make sense of self-deception in light of the interpretive view of the mental that has become widespread in philosophy; and the third concerns why it exists at all. In this paper I address the first and third puzzles. First, I define self-deception. Second, I criticizeRobert Trivers' attempt to use adaptionist evolutionary (...) psychology to solve the third puzzle (existence). Third, I sketch a theory to replace that of Trivers. Self-deception is not an adaptation, but a spandrel in the sense that Gould and Lewontin give the term: a byproduct of other features of human (cognitive) architecture. Self-deception is so undeniable a fact of human life that if anyone tried to deny its existence, the proper response would be to accuse this person of it. (Allen Wood, 1988). (shrink)
The Spandrels of Self-Deception: Prospects for a Biological Theory of a Mental Phenomenon.D. S. Neil VanLeeuwen -2007 -Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):329-348.detailsThree puzzles about self-deception make this mental phenomenon an intriguing explanatory target. The first relates to how to define it without paradox; the second is about how to make sense of self-deception in light of the interpretive view of the mental that has become widespread in philosophy; and the third concerns why it exists at all. In this paper I address the first and third puzzles. First, I define self-deception. Second, I criticizeRobert Trivers’ attempt to use adaptionist evolutionary (...) psychology to solve the third puzzle (existence). Third, I sketch a theory to replace that of Trivers. Self-deception is not an adaptation, but a spandrel in the sense that Gould and Lewontin give the term: a byproduct of other features of human (cognitive) architecture.Self-deception is so undeniable a fact of human life that if anyone tried to deny its existence, the proper response would be to accuse this person of it. (Allen Wood, Citation 1988 ). (shrink)
Review ofRobert Trivers'The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit and Self-Deception in Human Life. [REVIEW]Neil VanLeeuwen -2013 -Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 18 (1-2):146-151.detailsHere I reviewRobert Trivers' 2011 book _The Folly of Fools_, in which he advocates the evolutionary theory of deceit and self-deception that he pioneered in his famous preface to Richard Dawkins' _Selfish Gene_. Although the book contains a wealth of interesting discussion on topics ranging from warfare to immunology, I find it lacking on two major fronts. First, it fails to give a proper argument for its central thesis--namely, that self-deception evolved to facilitate deception of others. Second, the (...) book lacks conceptual clarity with respect to the focal term "self-deception.". (shrink)
Age effects on attentional blink performance in meditation.Sara vanLeeuwen,Notger G. Müller &Lucia Melloni -2009 -Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):593-599.detailsHere we explore whether mental training in the form of meditation can help to overcome age-related attentional decline. We compared performance on the attentional blink task between three populations: A group of long-term meditation practitioners within an older population, a control group of age-matched participants and a control group of young participants. Members of both control groups had never practiced meditation. Our results show that long-term meditation practice leads to a reduction of the attentional blink. Meditation practitioners taken from an (...) older population showed a reduction in blink as compared to a control group taken from a younger population, whereas, the control group age-matched to the meditators’ group revealed a blink that was comparatively larger and broader. Our results support the hypothesis that meditation practice can: alter the efficiency with which attentional resources are distributed and help to overcome age-related attentional deficits in the temporal domain. (shrink)
Acting or Letting Go: Medical Decision Making in Neonatology in The Netherlands.E. vanLeeuwen &G. K. Kimsma -1993 -Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2 (3):265.detailsThe development of neonatology and the establishment of neonatal intensive care units has led to a vast array of new medical ethical problems and dilemmas centered around discontinuing treatment or nontreatment decisions. Neonatology has become one of the fields that has made clear that medical success is only rarely nonproblematic. The new technology can be a blessing for some, but it may also become a sad experience to others, with life-long repercussions.The ethical problems of neonatology transcend national boundaries. Nevertheless, there (...) are differences in approach among various countries. In The Netherlands, the ethical deliberations have been a matter of public debate, but most of the decision making is left to the medical profession; these decisions are considered too harsh for the general public. Recently, two developments have emerged. The Royal Dutch Medical Association and the Dutch Pediatrics Society have published reports with guidelines and ethical reflections. Over the same period of time, cases have been brought to court for legal analysis and the development of case precedence. (shrink)
Two paradigms for religious representation: The physicist and the playground.Neil VanLeeuwen -2017 -Cognition 164 (C):206-211.detailsIn an earlier issue, I argue (2014) that psychology and epistemology should distinguish religious credence from factual belief. These are distinct cognitive attitudes. Levy (2017) rejects this distinction, arguing that both religious and factual “beliefs” are subject to “shifting” on the basis of fluency and “intuitiveness.” Levy’s theory, however, (1) is out of keeping with much research in cognitive science of religion and (2) misrepresents the notion of factual belief employed in my theory. So his claims don’t undermine my distinction. (...) I conclude by suggesting some approaches to empirically testing our views. (shrink)
From Adult Finger Tapping to Fetal Heart Beating: Retracing the Role of Coordination in Constituting Agency.Alessandro Solfo &Cees vanLeeuwen -2018 -Topics in Cognitive Science 10 (1):18-35.detailsThe phenomenon of experienced agency is related to perceptual‐motor coordination, and Solfo and vanLeeuwen discuss two ways that context can change this relationship. One is that agency is experienced only in contexts where environmentally‐coupled actions are stitched together over time to form long‐range correlations. The other is that the locus of agency depends on the temporal relationship between actions and events in the environment.
“A Dream, Dreamed by Reason … Hollow Like All Dreams”: French Existentialism and Its Critique of Abstract Liberalism.Bart vanLeeuwen &Karen Vintges -2010 -Hypatia 25 (3):653-674.detailsThe recent claiming of Simone de Beauvoir's legacy by French feminists for a policy of assimilation of Muslim women to Western models of self and society reduces the complexity and richness of Beauvoir's views in inacceptable ways. This article explores to what extent a politics of difference that challenges the ideals and political strategies of abstract liberalism can be extracted from and legitimized by the philosophies of Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre. Without assuming their thought is identical, we can (...) read them as elucidating each other and as implicitly exposing weak and strong points in their respective philosophies on ethnocultural relations and social identities. (shrink)
Onze hersenen van sterrenstof: de essentie van ons bestaan in feit en fictie.Peter Mooij &Joke vanLeeuwen -2023 - Amsterdam: Thomas Rap.detailsHoe is onze planeet ontstaan? Wat is het verschil tussen mens, dier en plant? Is er leven na de dood? De mensheid denkt al eeuwen na over dergelijke grote vragen. Nog niet zo lang geleden boden alleen religies, legenden en mythen antwoorden. Zo ontstond de Aarde volgens de Cherokee uit modder die door de waterkever uit de zee werd opgedoken, plaatst de Bijbel mens boven dier en plant, en kregen doden in het oude Griekenland een muntje mee voor hun overtocht (...) naar het rijk van Hades. Tegenwoordig formuleren ook wetenschappers prachtige onderbouwde antwoorden op deze grote vragen, maar niet in verhaalvorm. En dat is jammer, vinden Peter Mooi en Joke vanLeeuwen, want juist verhalen hebben de kracht om je een leven lang bij te blijven. 'Onze hersenen van sterrenstof' biedt daarom zowel wetenschappelijke als verhalende antwoorden op de grote vragen die iedereen zich stelt."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)
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Religion as Make-Believe: a theory of belief, imagination, and group identity.Neil VanLeeuwen -2023 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.detailsWe often assume that religious beliefs are no different in kind from ordinary factual beliefs—that believing in the existence of God or of supernatural entities that hear our prayers is akin to believing that May comes before June. Neil VanLeeuwen shows that, in fact, these two forms of belief are strikingly different. Our brains do not process religious beliefs like they do beliefs concerning mundane reality; instead, empirical findings show that religious beliefs function like the imaginings that guide (...) make-believe play. -/- VanLeeuwen argues that religious belief—which he terms religious “credence”—is best understood as a form of imagination that people use to define the identity of their group and express the values they hold sacred. When a person pretends, they navigate the world by consulting two maps: the first represents mundane reality, and the second superimposes the features of the imagined world atop the first. Drawing on psychological, linguistic, and anthropological evidence, VanLeeuwen posits that religious communities operate in much the same way, consulting a factual-belief map that represents ordinary objects and events and a religious-credence map that accords these objects and events imagined sacred and supernatural significance. -/- It is hardly controversial to suggest that religion has a social function, but Religion as Make-Believe breaks new ground by theorizing the underlying cognitive mechanisms. Once we recognize that our minds process factual and religious beliefs in fundamentally different ways, we can gain deeper understanding of the complex individual and group psychology of religious faith. [Abstract writing credit: book editor Andrew Kinney, HUP]. (shrink)
Legitimizing Immigration Control: A Discourse-Historical Analysis.Ruth Wodak &Theo vanLeeuwen -1999 -Discourse Studies 1 (1):83-118.detailsAustrian immigration authorities frequently reject the family reunion applications of immigrant workers. They justify their decisions not only on legal grounds but also on the basis of their own often prejudiced judgements of the applicants' ability to `integrate' into Austrian society. A discourse-historical method is combined with systemic-functionally oriented methods of text analysis to study the official letters which notify immigrant workers of the rejection of their family reunion applications. The systemic-functionally oriented methods are used in a detailed analysis of (...) a sample of rejection letters while the discourse-historical method allows this analysis to be intertextually connected to other related genres of discourse and strategies of argumentation, and to the history of post-war immigration in Austria generally. (shrink)
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The Motivational Role of Belief.D. S. Neil VanLeeuwen -2009 -Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219-246.detailsThis paper claims that the standard characterization of the motivational role of belief should be supplemented. Beliefs do not only, jointly with desires, cause and rationalize actions that will satisfy the desires, if the beliefs are true; beliefs are also the practical ground of other cognitive attitudes, like imagining, which means beliefs determine whether and when one acts with those other attitudes as the cognitive inputs into choices and practical reasoning. In addition to arguing for this thesis, I take issue (...) with Velleman's argument that belief and imagining cannot be distinguished on the basis of motivational role. (shrink)
Assumptions and moral understanding of the wish to hasten death: a philosophical review of qualitative studies.Andrea Rodríguez-Prat &Evert vanLeeuwen -2018 -Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 21 (1):63-75.detailsIt is not uncommon for patients with advanced disease to express a wish to hasten death. Qualitative studies of the WTHD have found that such a wish may have different meanings, none of which can be understood outside of the patient’s personal and sociocultural background, or which necessarily imply taking concrete steps to ending one’s life. The starting point for the present study was a previous systematic review of qualitative studies of the WTHD in advanced patients. Here we analyse in (...) greater detail the statements made by patients included in that review in order to examine their moral understandings and representations of illness, the dying process and death. We identify and discuss four classes of assumptions: assumptions related to patients’ moral understandings in terms of dignity, autonomy and authenticity; assumptions related to social interactions; assumptions related to the value of life; and assumptions related to medicalisation as an overarching context within which the WTHD is expressed. Our analysis shows how a philosophical perspective can add to an understanding of the WTHD by taking into account cultural and anthropological aspects of the phenomenon. We conclude that the knowledge gained through exploring patients’ experience and moral understandings in the end-of-life context may serve as the basis for care plans and interventions that can help them experience their final days as a meaningful period of life, restoring some sense of personal dignity in those patients who feel this has been lost. (shrink)
Religious Credence is not Factual Belief.Neil VanLeeuwen -2014 -Cognition 133 (3):698-715.detailsI argue that psychology and epistemology should posit distinct cognitive attitudes of religious credence and factual belief, which have different etiologies and different cognitive and behavioral effects. I support this claim by presenting a range of empirical evidence that religious cognitive attitudes tend to lack properties characteristic of factual belief, just as attitudes like hypothesis, fictional imagining, and assumption for the sake of argument generally lack such properties. Furthermore, religious credences have distinctive properties of their own. To summarize: factual beliefs (...) are practical setting independent, cognitively govern other attitudes, and are evidentially vulnerable. By way of contrast, religious credences have perceived normative orientation, are susceptible to free elaboration, and are vulnerable to special authority. This theory provides a framework for future research in the epistemology and psychology of religious credence. (shrink)
What needs to emerge to make you conscious?Cees vanLeeuwen -2007 -Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):115-136.detailsPerceptual experience can be explained by contextualized brain dynamics. An inner loop of ongoing activity within the brain produces dynamic patterns of synchronization and de- synchronization that are necessary, but not sufficient, for visual experience. This inner loop is controlled by evolution, development, socialization, learning, task and perception- action contingencies, which constitute an outer loop. This outer loop is sufficient, but not necessary, for visual experience. Jointly, the inner and outer loop may offer sufficient and necessary conditions for the emergence (...) of visual experience. This hypothesis has methodological, empirical, theoretical, and philosophical implications. (shrink)
Does "Think" Mean the Same Thing as "Believe"? Linguistic Insights Into Religious Cognition.Larisa Heiphetz,Casey Landers &Neil VanLeeuwen -2021 -Psychology of Religion and Spirituality 13 (3):287-297.detailsWhen someone says she believes that God exists, is she expressing the same kind of mental state as when she says she thinks that a lake bigger than Lake Michigan exists⎯i.e., does she refer to the same kind of cognitive attitude in both cases? Using evidence from linguistic corpora (Study 1) and behavioral experiments (Studies 2-4), the current work provides evidence that individuals typically use the word “believe” more in conjunction with statements about religious credences and “think” more in conjunction (...) with factual statements, pointing to two different understandings of claims made with these two terms. These patterns do not appear to reflect low-level differences based on the amount of consensus surrounding a particular claim, the extent to which the truth of a particular claim is known to the participant, or linguistic differences between religious and factual statements. We discuss implications of these findings for religious cognition (e.g., as supporting the theory that religious credences are qualitatively distinct from factual beliefs) as well as cognitive processes more broadly. Finally, we relate the present findings to prior theoretical work on differences between factual belief and religious credence. (shrink)
The Meanings of "Imagine" Part I: Constructive Imagination.Neil VanLeeuwen -2013 -Philosophy Compass 8 (3):220-230.detailsIn this article , I first engage in some conceptual clarification of what the words "imagine," "imagining," and "imagination" can mean. Each has a constructive sense, an attitudinal sense, and an imagistic sense. Keeping the senses straight in the course of cognitive theorizing is important for both psychology and philosophy. I then discuss the roles that perceptual memories, beliefs, and genre truth attitudes play in constructive imagination, or the capacity to generate novel representations that go well beyond what's prompted by (...) one's immediate environment. (shrink)
Reversing as a dynamic process variability of Ocular and brain events in perceptual switching.Hironori Nakatani,Nicoletta Orlandi &Cees vanLeeuwen -2012 -Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (5-6):5-6.detailsWe investigated the possible causes of perceptual switching in ambiguous figures. Ambiguous figures are a special class of visual stimuli that can give rise to at least two alternative interpretations. Because the figures themselves stay the same, these stimuli are particularly suitable to study the dynamic changes in our visual apparatus that enable us to see the world in different ways. Recent studies stress the importance of both low-level and high-level processes in switching. We show that these processes lead to (...) switching independently, and that, when they co-occur, they do not occur at exactly the same time.We take these results to indicate that perceptual switching is a radically multiply realizable process, in that various neurological states can instantiate it in a single individual from time to time. We reflect on the consequences of this conclusion for experiential realism, in particular the notion that embodiment misleads us in identifying psychological types. (shrink)
The Puzzle of Belief.Neil VanLeeuwen &Tania Lombrozo -2023 -Cognitive Science 47 (2):e13245.detailsThe notion of belief appears frequently in cognitive science. Yet it has resisted definition of the sort that could clarify inquiry. How then might a cognitive science of belief proceed? Here we propose a form of pluralism about believing. According to this view, there are importantly different ways to "believe" an idea. These distinct psychological kinds occur within a multi-dimensional property space, with different property clusters within that space constituting distinct varieties of believing. We propose that discovering such property clusters (...) is empirically tractable, and that this approach can help sidestep merely verbal disputes about what constitutes “belief.”. (shrink)
Imagination is where the Action is.Neil VanLeeuwen -2011 -Journal of Philosophy 108 (2):55-77.detailsImaginative representations are crucial to the generation of action--both pretense and plain action. But well-known theories of imagination on offer in the literature [1] fail to describe how perceptually-formatted imaginings (mental images) and motor imaginings function in the generation of action and [2] fail to recognize the important fact that spatially rich imagining can be integrated into one's perceptual manifold. In this paper, I present a theory of imagining that shows how spatially rich imagining functions in the generation of action. (...) I also describe the imaginative structures behind two under-explored forms of action: semi-pretense and pretense layering. In addition, I suggest that my theory of imagining meshes better than the competitors with current work in cognitive and affective neuroscience. (shrink)
(1 other version)The problem of certainty in English thought, 1630-1690.Henry G. VanLeeuwen -1963 - The Hague,: Springer.detailsCHAPTER I FRANCIS BACON AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE Of the great scientific figures of early seventeenth century England - Harvey, Gilbert, and Bacon - none was so often referred to by members of the Royal Society for a statement of the...
Synaesthetic perception of colour and visual space in a blind subject: An fMRI case study.Valentina Niccolai,Tessa M. vanLeeuwen,Colin Blakemore &Petra Stoerig -2012 -Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):889-899.detailsIn spatial sequence synaesthesia ordinal stimuli are perceived as arranged in peripersonal space. Using fMRI, we examined the neural bases of SSS and colour synaesthesia for spoken words in a late-blind synaesthete, JF. He reported days of the week and months of the year as both coloured and spatially ordered in peripersonal space; parts of the days and festivities of the year were spatially ordered but uncoloured. Words that denote time-units and triggered no concurrents were used in a control condition. (...) Both conditions inducing SSS activated the occipito-parietal, infero-frontal and insular cortex. The colour area hOC4v was engaged when the synaesthetic experience included colour. These results confirm the continued recruitment of visual colour cortex in this late-blind synaesthetes. Synaesthesia also involved activation in inferior frontal cortex, which may be related to spatial memory and detection, and in the insula, which might contribute to audiovisual integration related to the processing of inducers and concurrents. (shrink)
Philippus van Limborch’s Amica Collatio and its Relation to Grotius’s De Veritate.Th Marius vanLeeuwen -2014 -Grotiana 35 (1):158-167.details_ Source: _Volume 35, Issue 1, pp 158 - 167 This paper deals with the influence of De veritate on Van Limborch’s Amica collatio cum erudito Judaeo, which is often considered as an early example of interfaith dialogue in a tolerant atmosphere. The first section introduces the Remonstrant theologian Van Limborch, with special attention to his relation to Grotius. The second section focuses on the Collatio. Van Limborch’s discussion partner Orobio de Castro is introduced. The way in which the dialogue (...) develops is sketched: it starts in a reasonable mode, but towards the end Van Limborch’s tone can hardly be called ‘friendly’ anymore. He cannot accept that a reasonable man does not see the superiority of Jesus, and tries to convert his discussion partner. The third section summarizes the influence of Grotius on the Collatio. Van Limborch learned from him not to argue about dogmatic constructions, but to start from the Bible and its unquestionable revelations. He follows the logic of De veritate, Book II and III, arguing that the truth about Jesus can only be proven from the New Testament, which contains reliable testimonies to him and his miracles. He follows the tenor of Book v as well, arguing that the Jews should look upon the miracles of Jesus as sufficiently attested and greater than those of Moses, and therefore should convert themselves. On closer analysis the Collatio can hardly be considered as an example of interfaith tolerance, neither can Grotius’ De veritate. (shrink)
The Trinity and the Light Switch: Two Faces of Belief.Neil VanLeeuwen -forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong,The Nature of Belief. Oxford University Press.detailsSometimes people posit "beliefs" to explain mundane instrumental actions (e.g., Neil believes the switch is connected to the light, so he flipped the switch to illuminate the room). Sometimes people posit "beliefs" to explain group affiliation or identity (e.g., in order to belong to the Christian Reformed Church Neil must believe that God is triune). If we set aside the commonality of the word "belief," we can pose a crucial question: Is the cognitive attitude typically involved in the first "light (...) switch" sort of case the same as the cognitive attitude typically involved in the second "Trinity" sort of case? Or: Is mundanely believing the same cognitive relation as groupishly believing? In this essay, I argue that the answer is no. Mundane Beliefs play their instrumental roles well if they are true, and their manner of processing is accordingly sensitive to evidence. Groupish Beliefs play their identity-constituting roles well if they are distinctive, and their manners of processing accordingly allow for and often support distortions of evidence and truth. The manners of processing are thus so different that--despite the common word "belief"--philosophy of mind and epistemology would do well to recognize distinct cognitive attitudes. (shrink)
Mocht Plato zien wat er van de universiteit geworden is, dan zou hij stomverbaasd en bezorgd zijn.Michael S. Merry &Bart VanLeeuwen -2024 -Https://Www.Knack.Be/Nieuws/Belgie/Onderwijs/Mocht-Plato-Zien-Wat-Er-van-de-Universiteit-Geworden-is -Dan-Zou-Hij-Stomverbaasd-En-Bezorgd-Zijn/.detailsAls Plato de hedendaagse academie zou aanschouwen, zou hij niet alleen stomverbaasd zijn over de massificatie en de byzantijnse bureaucratie, maar gezien het ethische doel van de universiteit zou hij ook reden hebben om bezorgd te zijn.
Establishing and Registering Identity in the Dutch Republic.Henk Looijesteijn &Marco Hd vanLeeuwen -2012 - In Looijesteijn Henk & van Leeuwen Marco Hd,Registration and Recognition: Documenting the Person in World History. pp. 211.detailsThe Dutch Republic had a broad range of means to establish an individual's identity, and a rudimentary ‘system’ of identity registration, essentially established at the local levels of town and parish. This chapter seeks to provide a description of the ways in which the Dutch established an individual's identity. The various registration methods covered almost the entire population of the Dutch Republic at some stage in their life, and it is argued that on balance identity registration in the Dutch Republic (...) was fairly successful. The chapter contends that the degree to which identity was registered and monitored in the early modern era in the Netherlands, while certainly not wholly effective, is remarkable given the absence of a centralized state and the lack of a large bureaucracy. (shrink)
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Capturing Cognitive Flexibility: Responses to Cavallarin and Van Eyghen, Oviedo, and Szocik.Neil VanLeeuwen -forthcoming -Zygon.detailsThis is a response piece to the commentaries by Alberto Cavallarin and Hans Van Eyghen, Lluis Oviedo, and Konrad Szocik on my book _Religion as Make-Believe: A Theory of Belief, Imagination, and Group Identity_.