Works by Robert Shaver
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- Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.Robert Shaver -1992 -Philosophical Review 101 (2):458.
- Egoism.Robert Shaver -2021 -Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Egoism can be a descriptive or a normative position. Psychological egoism, the most famous descriptive position, claims that each person has but one ultimate aim: her own welfare. Normative forms of egoism make claims about what one ought to do, rather than describe what one does do. Ethical egoism claims that it is necessary and sufficient for an action to be morally right that it maximize one's self-interest. Rational egoism claims that it is necessary and sufficient for an action to (...) be rational that it maximize one's self-interest. (shrink)
- Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory.Robert Shaver -1992 -Philosophical Review 101 (4):926.
- Sidgwick on Pleasure.Robert Shaver -2016 -Ethics 126 (4):901-928.Sidgwick holds that pleasures are feelings that appear desirable qua feeling. I defend this interpretation against other views sometimes attributed to Sidgwick—for example, the view that pleasures are feelings that are desired qua feeling, or that pleasures are feelings with a particular feel that can be specified independently of desire. I then defend Sidgwick’s view against recent objections. I conclude that his account of pleasure should be attractive to those looking for an account suitable for normative work.
- (1 other version)Rational Egoism: A Selective and Critical History.Robert Shaver -1998 - Cambridge University Press..This book is the first full-length treatment of rational egoism, and it provides both a selective history of the subject as well as a philosophical analysis of the arguments that have been deployed in its defense.
- Sidgwick's Axioms and Consequentialism.Robert Shaver -2014 -Philosophical Review 123 (2):173-204.Sidgwick gives various tests for highest certainty. When he applies these tests to commonsense morality, he finds nothing of highest certainty. In contrast, when he applies these tests to his own axioms, he finds these axioms to have highest certainty. The axioms culminate in Benevolence: “Each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own, except in so far as he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable (...) or attainable by him.” The axioms face challenges from two sides.First, one test requires that a claim not be denied by someone of whom one has no more reason to suspect of error than oneself. For Sidgwick, then, the egoist must not deny the axioms. But it would seem that an egoist would reject benevolence. Second, Sidgwick thinks he must show that the commonsense moralist agrees to the axioms. Benevolence seems to say that the only reason for departing from being bound to treat others like oneself is that more good would be produced. But the commonsense moralist will not agree that this is the only reason. In reply to the threat of an egoist's disagreement, this essay argues that many of the axioms should be read as having as their antecedent “from the point of view of the universe.” The essay replies to the objection that this makes these axioms analytic. In reply to the threat of a commonsense moralist's disagreement, this essay argues that each axiom states, in effect, a prima facie duty. The argument against the commonsense moralist concerns not benevolence but whether there are further duties that pass the tests. The essay raises the worry that here Sidgwick is unfair since sometimes he criticizes all-things-considered versions of commonsense duties; such criticisms would count against benevolence as well. (shrink)
- The Appeal of Utilitarianism.Robert Shaver -2004 -Utilitas 16 (3):235-250.Utilitarianism continues to vex its critics even in the absence of generally respected arguments in its favour. I suggest that utilitarianism survives largely because of its welfarism. This explains why it survives without the backing of respected arguments. It survives without such arguments because justifying the value of welfare requires no such argument.
- Sidgwick's false friends.Robert Shaver -1997 -Ethics 107 (2):314-320.
- Three methods of ethics: A debate.Robert Shaver -2000 -Philosophical Review 109 (1):125-128.In The Methods of Ethics, Sidgwick took seriously egoism, utilitarianism, and commonsense morality. Virtue ethics was treated as part of commonsense morality. Three Methods, reflecting recent tastes, considers Kant, consequentialism, and virtue ethics. Oddly, it does not reflect the major development since Sidgwick—the revival of contractualism.
- Grotius on Scepticism and Self-Interest.Robert Shaver -1996 -Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 78 (1):27-47.
- The Decline of Egoism.Robert Shaver -2022 -Utilitas 34 (3):300-316.Sidgwick saw egoism as important and undefeated. Not long afterward, egoism is largely ignored. Immediately after Sidgwick, many arguments were given against egoism – most poor – but one argument deserves attention as both influential and plausible. Call it the “grounds objection.” It has two strands. It objects that there are justifying reasons for action other than that an action will maximize my self-interest. It also objects that sometimes, what makes an action right is a fact other than its maximizing (...) my self-interest. I briefly explain and criticize many of the arguments given against egoism in the period, then explain and defend the grounds objection. (shrink)
- Sidgwick's Minimal Metaethics.Robert Shaver -2000 -Utilitas 12 (3):261.Non-naturalism has a shady reputation. This reputation is undeserved, at least in the case of one variety of non-naturalism – the variety Sidgwick offers. In section I, I present Sidgwick's view, distinguishing it from views with which it is often lumped. In II and III, I defend Sidgwick against recent objections to non-naturalism from motivation and supervenience. In IV, I briefly consider objections which brought about the downfall of non-naturalism at the middle of the century. In V, I consider the (...) role Sidgwick's arguments for non-naturalism play in Methods I.3. In VI, I contrast Sidgwick's attitude toward analytic metaethics to that of Moore and the non-cognitivists. (shrink)
- Ross on Self and Others.Robert Shaver -2014 -Utilitas 26 (3):303-320.Ross suggests a trilemma:(i)Innocent pleasure is good as an end.(ii)I have a prima facie duty to produce what is good as an end.(iii)I have no prima facie duty to produce innocent pleasure for myself.InThe Right and the Good, he denies (iii). InFoundations of Ethics, he denies (i). Neither of these solutions is satisfactory. One ought instead to deny (ii). I close by considering a similar trilemma concerning justice.
- Hume on the duties of humanity.Robert Shaver -1992 -Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (4):545-556.
- Virtues, utility, and rules.Robert Shaver -1996 - In Knud Haakonssen,The Cambridge companion to Adam Smith. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Promises as invitations to trust.Robert Shaver -2020 -Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1515-1522.It is now popular to think that promissory obligation is grounded in an invitation to trust. I object that there are important differences between invitations and promises; appealing to trust faces one of the main problems alleged to face appealing to expectations; and whatever puzzles afflict promissory obligation afflict the obligation not to renege on one’s invitations.
- Contractualism and Restrictions.Robert Shaver -2007 -Philosophical Studies 132 (2):293-299.T.M. Scanlon writes that deontological constraints on taking lives are to be defended “by considering what principles licensing others to take our lives could be reasonably rejected.” I argue that Scanlon can offer no such defence of deontological constraints.No categories
- Rational Egoism (R. Shafer-Landau).Robert Shaver -2000 -Philosophical Books 41 (1):60-61.
- Sidgwick's Distinction Passage.Robert Shaver -2020 -Utilitas 32 (4):444-453.I suggest that Sidgwick, in his controversial “distinction passage,” has Schopenhauer in mind as someone who denies egoism on the ground that there are no separate individuals. I then reconstruct Sidgwick's argument in the passage. I take him to be defending a presupposition of the case for choosing egoism over utilitarianism. He is claiming that there are separate individuals. I close by rejecting alternative interpretations, on which Sidgwick is arguing directly for egoism.
- Nietzsche on suffering and morality.Robert Shaver -2024 -Philosophical Forum 55 (3):293-306.Nietzsche claims that suffering is needed for achievement. Morality, he thinks, aims to end suffering, and so would end achievement. I argue that at best some achievements are partly caused by suffering. Nietzsche could get a more secure connection between suffering and achievement by arguing that some achievements are constituted in part by suffering. But in both the causal and constitutive cases, moralists do not condemn inflicting on oneself the suffering involved in achievement. Nietzsche could instead argue, more simply, that (...) morality is mistaken to think suffering is bad. He could deploy a ‘conditionality’ view of organic wholes, on which the value of suffering changes when part of an achievement, to argue that in some cases, suffering is good. I argue that here the conditionality view is less plausible than Moore's view of organic wholes, on which suffering would remain bad. (shrink)
- Sidgwick on moral motivation.Robert Shaver -2006 -Philosophers' Imprint 6:1-14.Sidgwick holds that moral judgments are claims about what it is reasonable to do. He also holds that these judgments about what it is reasonable to do can motivate. He must, then, respond to Hume’s argument that reason cannot motivate. I clarify Sidgwick’s claims, give his argument against Hume, and reply to various Humean objections.
- The Birth of Deontology.Robert Shaver -2011 - In Thomas Hurka,Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Prichard's Arguments against Ideal Utilitarianism.Robert Shaver -2018 -Utilitas 30 (1):54-72.
- Moral error theory and hypothetical reasons.Robert Shaver -2022 -Synthese 200 (4):1-12.Most error theorists want to accept hypothetical reasons but not moral reasons. They do so by arguing that there is no queerness in hypothetical reasons. They can be reduced to purely descriptive claims, about either standards or ordinary standard-independent facts: when I say “I have a reason to take this flight, ” all I say is that “according to certain standards of reasoning, I have a reason to take this flight” or that “I have a desire such that taking this (...) flight is the only way of doing so.” Error theorists who want to accept hypothetical reasons but not moral reasons think that one of these approaches works for hypothetical reasons but neither work for moral reasons. I shall argue that whatever arguments are given for rejecting these approaches in the case of moral reasons are also arguments for rejecting them in the case of hypothetical reasons. (shrink)
- Nietzsche on the value of power and pleasure.Robert Shaver -forthcoming -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.Nietzsche seems to hold that ‘higher types’, or examples of great power, are the only things good as an end. I consider and reject three reconstructions of Nietzsche’s argument for this: that it follows from understanding evolution, or from the will to power understood as a descriptive thesis, or from our admiration for such types. I suggest that Nietzsche’s strategy is to take for granted our shared admiration for higher types and then attack our admiration for other goods such as (...) virtue, knowledge, and pleasure. I argue that his arguments against pleasure fail. (shrink)
- Korsgaard on Hypothetical Imperatives.Robert Shaver -2006 -Philosophical Studies 129 (2):335-347.I argue that rationalists need not adopt Kant’s method for determining what one has reason to do, where by “Kant’s method” I mean the view that normative guidance comes only from directives imposed on the agent by the agent’s own will. I focus on Kant’s argument for “imperatives of skill,” one sort of hypothetical imperative. I argue, against Korsgaard, that Kant’s argument is neither better nor significantly different than the sort of argument non-Kantian rationalists offer. I close by arguing that (...) Korsgaard is wrong to think that her question “why should I care about performing the means to my ends?” is a serious worry. (shrink)
- Henry Sidgwick (review).Robert Shaver -2003 -Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (4):569-570.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003) 569-570 [Access article in PDF] Ross Harrison, editor. Henry Sidgwick. New York: Published for The British Academy by Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. v + 122. Cloth, $24.95. Henry Sidgwick consists of papers by Stefan Collini, John Skorupski, and Ross Harrison, with replies by Jonathan Rée, Onora O'Neill, and Roger Crisp.Collini's rich and witty paper considers two pictures of Victorian intellectuals—the (...) "public moralist," such as John Stuart Mill, and the academic specialist. Sidgwick in the 1880s and 1890s does not fit comfortably into either camp. He champions the academic philosopher over Leslie Stephen or Mathew Arnold; he contributes to Mind rather than writing to newspapers or standing for parliament; he refuses to take a public stand on the Boer war despite opposing it. He would not have been a teledon. But he also exerts influence on university policies (founding Newnham College for women, opposing the Latin and Greek requirement for admission), through Royal Commissions, and through his personal connections to those in power. (He had as brothers-in-law the Prime Minister and the Archbishop of Canterbury.) He represents one solution to the new problem of combining academic specialization with practical concerns. [End Page 569]One quibble: Collini argues that Sidgwick wields his analytic method in order to end public debate; disagreements rest on conceptual confusions. But Sidgwick's late essays do not close with "a thin, dry question to which... the answer is more or less obvious," but with controversial proposals (44): to prevent war, individual cultivation of impartiality is more important than external arbitration; there are no significant differences between moral requirements on states and individuals; the unequal distribution of luxuries is morally defensible if and only if necessary for "aesthetic progress"; sociology is suspect and must be kept distinct from ethics. A second paper on clerical veracity is needed given controversy about the first.Harrison's slightly diffuse paper places Sidgwick in the utilitarian tradition of discussing sanctions for morality. (Crisp argues neatly that Bentham and Mill are closer to Sidgwick than Harrison allows.) Harrison closes by arguing that Sidgwick should not have been bothered by the dualism of practical reason—the view that utilitarianism and egoism conflict and that there are no decisive arguments for choosing between them. He should have ended the Methods with utilitarianism. The conflict between egoism and utilitarianism "should not matter" because "these are truths of practical rather than speculative reason." Conflict shows only that "we are not in the best of all possible worlds" (114). This helps if, with Harrison, Sidgwick's worry is the "theoretical" one that rival properties claim to be right-making (110). But Sidgwick sees the problem as practical: when egoism and utilitarianism conflict, I must decide which to follow.Skorupski also rejects the dualism. There are many true underived claims about reasons for action. Each can be seen as an instance of the "Feeling/Disposition Principle" (F): "If there's a reason to feel f there's reason to do what feeling f characteristically disposes one to do" (74). For example, if there is a reason to feel gratitude, there is a reason to express this gratitude. Egoistic reasons are the products of F when desire is the feeling. Any impartial theory, because it goes beyond the feelings of a particular individual in a particular situation, cannot be a case of F and so counts as a principle of practical reason. True claims about reasons for action are either many or, if restricted to practical reason, one. (Skorupski adds that an impartial theory, since indefeasible, trumps egoism. For example, my reason to express gratitude is defeated by noting that general good is not served by expressing gratitude, but need not be defeated by noting that my own good is not served. This, however, seems mere assertion. I suspect it, and F, are best pursued in Skorupski's Ethical Explorations [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999].)Showing that an impartial theory is not a case of F does not, by itself, show that it is a principle of practical reason... (shrink)
- Hume's Moral Theory?Robert Shaver -1995 -History of Philosophy Quarterly 12 (3):317 - 331.Hume's moral theory is often taken to be descriptive rather then normative. This is a misinterpretation: Hume justifies moral claims, as he justifies claims about what to believe, by appeal to initially credible cases. This procedure is defensible.
- Rousseau and Recognition.Robert Shaver -1989 -Social Theory and Practice 15 (3):261-283.
- The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics.Robert Shaver -2015 -Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):301-304.
- Principia Then and Now.Robert Shaver -2003 -Utilitas 15 (3):261.Moore is taken to have followed Sidgwick in his arguments against naturalism and in his consequentialism. I argue that there are differences on both issues. Sidgwick's arguments against naturalism do not rely on a controversial view of analysis, and one of his arguments for consequentialism gives him greater resources against critics of consequentialism such as T. M. Scanlon.
- A New History of Modern Moral Philosophy.Robert Shaver -2000 -Dialogue 39 (3):585-.Of Sidgwick’s Outlines of the History of Ethics, J. B. Schneewind wrote that the author.
- Emile's education.Robert Shaver -1990 -Journal of Philosophy of Education 24 (2):245–255.Robert Shaver; Emile's Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 245–255, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1990.t.
- Hume’s Self-Interest Requirement.Robert Shaver -1994 -Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):1-17.Having explained the moral approbation attending merit or virtue, there remains nothing but briefly to consider our interested obligation to it, and to inquire whether every man, who has any regard to his own happiness and welfare, will not best find his account in the practice of every moral duty. [W]hat theory of morals can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can show, by a particular detail, that all the duties which it recommends, are also the true interest of (...) each individual? (shrink)
- Inescapable and affective moralities.Robert Shaver -1994 -Philosophical Studies 75 (3):175 - 199.
- Leviathan, King of the Proud.Robert Shaver -1990 -Hobbes Studies 3 (1):54-74.Hobbes begins the Elements of Law by claiming that "[t]he true and perspicuous explanation of the elements of laws natural and politic... dependeth upon the knowledge of what is human nature." 1 He agrees that morality and politics are "not to be discovered but to be made," but they are to be made as solutions to problems discovered through a detailed study of human nature.2 Among other things, this study reveals that humans are obsessed both with contemplating their own power (...) and having others recognize it. The former desire is the desire for glory: the latter is the desire for honour. Hobbes goes on to show the conflict these desires cause. They ensure scarcity, since their objects are intrinsically scarce, and they contribute to irresolution, and so make it hard to keep covenants. In addition, they determine the form of any solution: the market is not a fully satisfactory solution, and the sovereign must redirect desires for honour and glory into harmless channels. I shall first argue against David Gauthier, who takes Hobbesian men to pursue honour and glory as mere instruments to the satisfaction of their asocial desires. I shall then present a revamped version of what Jean Hampton calls the "passions account" of conflict, defending it from her objections. I shall close by sketching how Hobbes responds to the problems caused by the desire for honour and glory. (shrink)
- Montaigne and the problem of living in others.Robert Shaver -1994 -History of European Ideas 18 (3):347-360.
- Non-Naturalism.Robert Shaver -2007 - In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay,Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Oxford University Press.
- Paris and Patriotism.Robert Shaver -1991 -History of Political Thought 12 (4):627.In 1771, Rousseau was asked to write a constitution for Poland. He replied with The Government of Poland. It is his last political work. At one point he describes the sort of Pole he hopes to produce: his �love of the fatherland . . . makes up his entire existence: he has eyes only for the fatherland, lives only for his fatherland; the moment he is alone, he is a mere cipher; the moment he has no fatherland, he is no (...) more; if not dead, he is worse-off than if he were dead�. On the face of it, this looks more like the description of a problem than any solution. I will explain how the mad patriotism of the Government of Poland is indeed a solution. I will treat it as a response to the general modern problem of �life in others� that Rousseau found endemic to big cities such as Paris, and which he has Saint-Preux detail in his letters from Paris to Julie in Book II of La Nouvelle Heloise. I begin with a short account of life in others, follow this with an account of how patriotism solves this problem, and conclude with an attempt to make Rousseau's patriotism less frightening, more necessary, and slightly more possible than it seems at first glance. (shrink)
- Sidgwickian Ethics (review).Robert Shaver -2013 -Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (1):136-137.
- Sidgwick on Virtue.Robert Shaver -2008 -Etica E Politica 10 (2):210-229.Sidgwick’s arguments for hedonism imply that virtue is not a good. Those arguments seemed to many wholly unpersuasive. The paper analyzes them, focusing also on many changes Sidgwick made on chapter XIV of Book III through the various editions of the Methods. From an analysis of the first sections of this chapter, it emerges that Sidgwick employed two different argumentative schemes, one against the view that virtue is the sole good and the other against the much more diffused claim that (...) virtue is one of the goods. These arguments can be fully understood in the context of Sidgwick’s general claim that only “desiderable conscious life” is good. Sidgwick’s general point is that virtue, insofar as it is valuable as an end, is so because of the feelings or consciousness associated with it. (shrink)Export citation
Bookmark - The Beloved Self: Morality and the Challenge from Egoism – Alison Hills.Robert Shaver -2011 -Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):658-660.
- Thomson's Trolley Switch.Robert Shaver -2011 -Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (2):1-6.
- (1 other version)Utilitarianism and Egoism in Sidgwickian Ethics.Robert Shaver -2013 -Revue D’Études Benthamiennes 12.In his excellent Sidgwickian Ethics, David Phillips argues that Sidgwick’s argument for utilitarianism from the axioms is less successful than Sidgwick believes. He also argues that Sidgwick’s argument for egoism is more successful than this argument for utilitarianism. I disagree. I close by noting, briefly, a possible solution to an epistemological puzzle in Sidgwick that Phillips raises. I. Utilitarianism Phillips takes the argument for utilitarianism to have two premises: The good of...
- Welfare and Outcome.Robert Shaver -2002 -Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):103 - 115.The Slogan claims a connection between evaluations of outcomes and evaluations of welfare. Temkin’s main strategy is to argue that no theory of welfare is plausible as both a theory of welfare and as a theory of outcomes. He considers three theories of welfare: hedonism, preference satisfaction theory, and objective list theory. In the case of hedonism and objective list theory, Temkin’s arguments are not new. The argument against hedonism, for example, engages a familiar and inconclusive debate against hedonism as (...) a theory of outcomes: the hedonist claims that mental states alone are relevant for judging alternative outcomes; the anti-hedonist replies that something in addition to mental states, such as desert or equality, is also relevant, and indeed is sometimes more important than any mental state; the hedonist replies that any allegiance to values such as desert or equality stems from their usual connection to promoting pleasurable mental states, and that, absent this connection, we no longer value them; the anti-hedonist denies that this is so. (shrink)
- Book review. Moral theory David S. Oderberg. [REVIEW]Robert Shaver -2001 -Mind 110 (438):531-534.No categories
- Crisp, Roger. The Cosmos of Duty: Henry Sidgwick’s “Methods of Ethics”Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. 256. $60.00. [REVIEW]Robert Shaver -2017 -Ethics 127 (2):477-481.
- David Phillips, Rossian Ethics: W. D. Ross and Contemporary Moral Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 216. [REVIEW]Robert Shaver -2020 -Utilitas 32 (4):506-509.
- Freedom and Moral Sentiment. [REVIEW]Robert Shaver -2004 -International Studies in Philosophy 36 (1):280-281.
- Review of Bart Schultz,Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe. An Intellectual Biography. [REVIEW]Robert Shaver -2005 -Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (2).
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
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