Works by Robert Gordon
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- Folk psychology as simulation.Robert M. Gordon -1986 -Mind and Language 1 (2):158-71.
- The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy.Robert Morris Gordon -1987 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.The Structure of Emotions argues that emotion concepts should have a much more important role in the social and behavioural sciences than they now enjoy, and shows that certain influential psychological theories of emotions overlook the explanatory power of our emotion concepts. Professor Gordon also outlines a new account of the nature of commonsense (or ‘folk’) psychology in general.
- The simulation theory: Objections and misconceptions.Robert M. Gordon -1992 -Mind and Language 7 (1-2):11-34.
- Simulation without introspection or inference from me to you.Robert M. Gordon -1995 - In Martin Davies & Tony Stone,Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications - Reading in Mind and Language. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Folk psychology as mental simulation.Luca Barlassina &Robert M. Gordon -2017 -The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Mindreading (or folk psychology, Theory of Mind, mentalizing) is the capacity to represent and reason about others’ mental states. The Simulation Theory (ST) is one of the main approaches to mindreading. ST draws on the common-sense idea that we represent and reason about others’ mental states by putting ourselves in their shoes. More precisely, we typically arrive at representing others’ mental states by simulating their mental states in our own mind. This entry offers a detailed analysis of ST, considers theoretical (...) arguments and empirical data in favour of and against it, discusses its philosophical implications, and illustrates some alternatives to it. (shrink)
- (1 other version)The Structure of Emotions.Robert M. Gordon &Ronald De Sousa -1989 -Journal of Philosophy 86 (9):493-504.
- 'Radical' simulationism.Robert M. Gordon -1996 - In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith,Theories of Theories of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Reply to Stich and Nichols.Robert M. Gordon -1992 -Mind and Language 7 (1-2):87-97.
- The Rationality of Emotion.Robert M. Gordon -1991 -Philosophical Review 100 (2):284.How should we understand the emotional rationality? This first part will explore two models of cognition and analogy strategies, test their intuition about the emotional desire. I distinguish between subjective and objective desire, then presents with a feeling from the "paradigm of drama" export semantics, here our emotional repertoire is acquired all the learned, and our emotions in the form of an object is fixed. It is pretty well in line with the general principles of rationality, especially the lowest reasonable (...) principles. Turned to the second part of this side of reasonable. I will inquire how emotional beliefs, desires, and behaviors contribute to the rationality. I will present a very general biological hypothesis: emotions by controlling highlights the characteristics of perception and reasoning, so that we remove the difficulties due in particular to lead to paralysis; they are being simulated by a simplified perception of information, thus limiting our practice and cognitive choice. How are we to understand emotional or axiological rationality? I pursue analogies with both the cognitive and the strategic models, testing them against intuitions about emotional desires. We distinguish two different classes of desires, the subjective and the objective, and propose that emotions have a semantics that derives from "paradigmatic scenarios", in terms of which our emotional repertoire is learned and the formal objects of our emotions fixed. This fits in well with emerging facts about how our emotional capacities develop, and it can also be squared with the general principles of rationality, particularly minimal rationality. In the second part, I return to the perspective of rationality. I ask how emotions contribute to the rationality of beliefs, desires, and behavior. I proffer a very general biological hypothesis: Emotions spare us the paralysis potentially induced by a particular predicament by controlling the salience of features of perception and reasoning; they temporarily mimic the informational encapsulation of perception and so circumscribe our practical and cognitive options. (shrink)
- (1 other version)Sympathy, simulation, and the impartial spectator.Robert M. Gordon -1995 -Ethics 105 (4):727-742.
- Executive control of visual attention in dual-task situations.Gordon D. Logan &Robert D. Gordon -2001 -Psychological Review 108 (2):393-434.
- Ascent Routines for Propositional Attitudes.Robert M. Gordon -2007 -Synthese 159 (2):151 - 165.An ascent routine (AR) allows a speaker to self-ascribe a given propositional attitude (PA) by redeploying the process that generates a corresponding lower level utterance. Thus, we may report on our beliefs about the weather by reporting (under certain constraints) on the weather. The chief criticism of my AR account of self-ascription, by Alvin Goldman and others, is that it covers few if any PA’s other than belief and offers no account of how we can attain reliability in identifying our (...) attitude as belief, desire, hope, etc., without presupposing some sort of recognition process. The criticism can be answered, but only by giving up a tacit—and wholly unnecessary—assumption that has influenced discussions of ascent routines. Abandoning the assumption allows a different account of ARs that avoids the criticism and even provides an algorithm for finding a corresponding lower level utterance for any PA. The account I give is supported by research on children’s first uses of a propositional attitude vocabulary. (shrink)
- Reply to Perner and Howes.Robert M. Gordon -1992 -Mind and Language 7 (1-2):98-103.
- The passivity of emotions.Robert M. Gordon -1986 -Philosophical Review 95 (July):339-60.
- (1 other version)The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy.Robert M. Gordon -1990 -Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1):63-67.
- Beyond mindreading.Robert M. Gordon -2008 -Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):219 – 222.I argue that there is no conflict between the simulation theory, once it is freed from certain constraints carried over from theory theory, and Gallagher's view that our primary and pervasive way of engaging with others rests on 'direct', non-mentalizing perception of the 'meanings' of others' facial expressions, gestures, and intentional actions.
- Emotions and knowledge.Robert M. Gordon -1969 -Journal of Philosophy 66 (July):408-413.
- Simulation and reason explanation: The radical view.Robert M. Gordon -2001 -Philosophical Topics 29 (1-2):175-192.Alvin Goldman's early work in action theory and theory of knowledge was a major influence on my own thinking and writing about emotions. For that reason and others, it was a very happy moment in my professional life when I learned, in 1988, that in his presidential address to the Society for Philosophy and Psychology Goldman endorsed and defended the “simulation” theory I had put forward in a 1986 article. I discovered afterward that we share a strong conviction that empirical (...) evidence is relevant to a full assessment of the theory. We both find the burgeoning evidence from cognitive neuroscience to be of particular interest, I believe, in part because it makes possible a major departure for the philosophy of mind: turning its attention from " the neural basis of mental states, " to. (shrink)
- Fear.Robert M. Gordon -1980 -Philosophical Review 89 (4):560-578.No categories
- Simulation and the explanation of action.Robert M. Gordon -2000 - In K. R. Stueber & H. H. Kogaler,Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Human Sciences. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Autism and the "theory of mind" debate.Robert M. Gordon &John A. Barker -1994 - In George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens,Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.
- The Aboutness of Emotions.Robert M. Gordon -1974 -American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (1):27-36.I attempt to show that when someone is, E.G., Angry about something, The events or states that conjointly are causing him to be angry conform to a certain structure, And that from the causal structure underlying his anger it is possible to 'read out' what he is angry about. In this respect, And even in some of the details of the structure, My analysis of being angry about something resembles the belief-Want analysis of intentional action. The chief elements of the (...) causal structure I describe are a belief and an attitude so related in content as to constitute either a wish-Frustration (in the case of negative emotions) or a wish-Satisfaction (in the case of positive emotions). The analysis makes otiose, In those cases for which it is a correct analysis, The mysterious non-Causal relation between an emotion and its 'object' which is invoked by the majority of philosophers now writing on emotions. (shrink)
- Sellars’s Ryleans Revisited.Robert M. Gordon -2000 -ProtoSociology 14:102-114.Wilfrid Sellars's essay, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," (1) introduced, although it did not exactly endorse, what many philosophers consider the first defense of functionalism in the philosophy of mind and the original "theory" theory of commonsense psychology.
- Commercial Pressures on Professionalism in American Medical Care: From Medicare to the Affordable Care Act.Theodore R. Marmor &Robert W. Gordon -2014 -Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 42 (4):412-419.This essay describes how longstanding conceptions of professionalism in American medical care came under attack in the decades since the enactment of Medicare in 1965 and how the reform strategy and core provisions of the 2010 Affordable Care Act illustrate the weakening of those ideas and the institutional practices embodying them.The opening identifies the dominant role of physicians in American medical care in the two decades after World War II. By the time Medicare was enacted in 1965, associations of American (...) physicians were almost completely in charge of medical education, specialist certification, and the enforcement of professional norms on their members. Who could be a doctor, what education and training would be required, and what collegial oversight was operative was first a professional matter and only secondly implicated the state through malpractice or major corporations via the employment of physicians. (shrink)
- (1 other version)Simulation theory.Joe Cruz &Robert M. Gordon -2003 - In L. Nadel,Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.What is the simulation theory? Arguments for simulation theory Simulation theory versus theory theory Simulation theory and cognitive science Versions of simulation theory A possible test of the simulation theory.
- Emotion labelling and cognition.Robert M. Gordon -1978 -Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 8 (2):125–135.
- The black–white factor is g.Robert A. Gordon -1985 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (2):229-231.
- Implications of valid IQ differences: An unstatesmanlike view.Robert A. Gordon -1980 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):343-344.
- Teleology and agency in speech production.Robert M. Gordon -1986 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (3):525-525.
- Moorean pretense.Robert M. Gordon -2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams,Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Developing commonsense psychology: Experimental data and philosophical data.Robert M. Gordon -1995Philosophers have been debating the nature of folk or commonsense psychology for three decades. We ask: What are the resources that enable us to navigate the social world, anticipating what others do, explaining what they’ve done, and perceiving them--and ourselves--as selves, subjects, persons, with beliefs, desire, perceptions, and feelings? Unlike traditional philosophy of mind, instead of directly confronting the mind-body problem and subproblems such as intentionality and qualia, we step back and look at the resources that give us the concepts (...) that get us into these knots. (shrink)
- Self-ascription of belief and desire.Robert M. Gordon -1993 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):45-46.
- Cross slip and the plastic deformation of NaCl single and polycrystals at high pressure.Erdem Aladag,Lance A. Davis &Robert B. Gordon -1970 -Philosophical Magazine 21 (171):469-478.No categories
- Desire and self-intervention.Robert M. Gordon -1986 -Noûs 20 (2):221-238.
- Professionalisms old and new, good and bad.Robert W. Gordon -2005 -Legal Ethics 8 (1):23-34.
- Socratic definitions and "moral neutrality".Robert M. Gordon -1964 -Journal of Philosophy 61 (15):433-450.No categories
- Sixteenth-century metalworking technology used in the manufacture of two German astrolabes.Robert B. Gordon -1987 -Annals of Science 44 (1):71-84.An examination of tool marks and other evidence of manufacturing techniques on two astrolabes of identical pattern made by Hartman of Nuremberg in 1537 shows that all of the parts have been laid out with scribers and filed to final dimensions. All parts except the rings of the maters, which are castings, are made of sheet brass. The only machine tool employed was a small lathe with longitudinal feed, which was used to turn the diameters of the pins. Corresponding dimensions (...) of the two astrolabes differ by less than 0·2 mm on average, but parts are not interchangeable between the instruments. There is evidence that this pattern of astrolabe was made in batches with division of labour in Harman's shop. This paper is an introductory study intended to show methods of examination that reveal manufacturing techniques. (shrink)No categories
- Inverse probability and modern statisticians.Robert Dean Gordon -1940 -Philosophy of Science 7 (4):389-399.Introduction: Purpose of this essay is to draw attention to some points which are relevant to the underlying philosophy of modern statistics, but which the writer feels have been largely overlooked both by the defenders and the opponents of the classic conceptions of Laplace. There is no quarrel with methodologies as such which have found their introduction under the heads of “maximum likelihood”, “fiducial limits”, etc. But the writer cannot accept arguments ) which would make of such procedures an absolute (...) sine qua non for all decisions based on evidence, and which would relegate human judgment and all considerations of the intended use of a decision to the rubbish heap of outmoded conceptions. To assume that two rational minds, having different backgrounds and different objectives, must necessarily find themselves in agreement in their appraisal of a given objective situation, is simply absurd; yet this is the basis which underlies, so far as I can make out, all the “criticisms” of Laplace and Bayes which constitute the excuses put forward for attempting to displace those procedures in Statistics which involve “inverse probability”. Also the so-called “paradoxes” which have been invented by many writers in order to assail Laplace, contradict only this one assumption; without it they are not paradoxes. (shrink)
- Cultural Value and Evolving Technologies: Instances From Music and Visual Art.Daniel Asia &Robert Edward Gordon -2021 -Social Philosophy and Policy 38 (2):210-231.Scientific advancement is inextricably linked to cultural advancement, and historically the arts have worked hand in hand with technological change. This essay explores some of the connections that exist between science, technology, and the arts, privileging instances where technological change resulted in new forms of artistic creation. Although the role of the arts in contemporary society has ebbed in comparison to that of technology and science, the essay argues that quality, meaningfulness, and longevity are key components in how the arts (...) can retain cultural value in today’s technocentric world. It explores significant instances from the history of music and visual art as the authors make the case that the methods of science and art are both distinct yet commensurate in their ability to shape the values and ideas of contemporary society. (shrink)
- Innesti: Primo Levi e i libri altrui.Gianluca Cinelli &Robert S. C. Gordon (eds.) -2020 - Peter Lang.L'opera di Primo Levi presenta un caso straordinariamente ricco e in qualche modo enigmatico di intertestualità. Con questo volume si è cercato di tracciare i lineamenti di una mappa immaginaria, uno schema degli innesti, intertesti e trapianti che collegano l'opera leviana ai libri altrui.No categories
- Autism and the "theory of mind" debate Robert M. Gordon and John A. Barker.Robert Gordon -manuscriptWith this understanding, children are better able to anticipate the behavior of others and to attune their own behavior accordingly. In mentally retarded children with Down's syndrome, attainment of such competence is delayed, but it is generally acquired by the time they reach the mental age of 4, as measured by tests of nonverbal intelligence. Thus from a developmental perspective, attainment of the mental age of 4 appears to be of profound significance for acquisition of what we shall call psychological (...) competence : possession of the skills and resources people routinely call on in the.. (shrink)Export citation
Bookmark - A causal role for “conscious” seeing.Robert M. Gordon -1984 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):628.
- Against Methodological Fundamentalism: Towards a Science for a Complex Dynamic Psychology.Robert M. Gordon -unknownPsychological research has generally suffered from methodological fundamentalism, which is an overly strict interpretation of what is considered “scientific” and has created a psychology of triviality. Methodological fundamentalism often constricts the study of a complex dynamic psychology that encompasses both observed and unobserved reality with interacting and interdependent variables. In Against Method, Feyerabend (1993) posits there could be no set scientific method and that great scientists are methodological opportunists who use any methodology that helps with discovery. As opposed to Fisher’s (...) (1925) arbitrary, categorical standard of p<.05, I suggest as a strength of a scientific finding the review of confidence levels of across various populations, methods, measures and forms of analyses. Eventually, I hope that an unbiased computer analysis of studies can guide researchers as to what theories show high confidence levels across various populations, methods, measures and forms of analyses and suggest the next step to advance the science. (shrink)No categories
- Abstract of Comments: The Call of the Wild Epistemic Engine.Robert M. Gordon -1983 -Noûs 17 (1):19 - 20.No categories
- Benefits and Costs of a Propositional Focus: Response to Deigh.Robert M. Gordon -1990 -Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):57 - 60.
- Consciousness, folk psychology, and cognitive science.Robert Gordon -manuscriptThis paper supports the basic integrity of the folk psychological conception of consciousness and its importance in cognitive theorizing. Section 1 critically examines some proposed definitions of consciousness, and argues that the folk- psychological notion of phenomenal consciousness is not captured by various functional-relational definitions. Section 2 rebuts the arguments of several writers who challenge the very existence of phenomenal consciousness, or the coherence or tenability of the folk-psychological notion of awareness. Section 3 defends a significant role for phenomenal consciousness (...) in the execution of a certain cognitive task, viz., classification of one's own mental states. Execution of this task, which is part of folk psychologizing, is taken as a datum in scientific psychology. It is then argued (on theoretical grounds) that the most promising sort of scientific model of the self-ascription of mental states is one that posits the kinds of phenomenal properties invoked by folk psychology. Cognitive science and neuroscience can of course refine and improve upon the folk understanding of consciousness, awareness, and mental states generally. But the folk-psychological constructs should not be jettisoned; they have a role to play in cognitive theorizing. (shrink)
- Empathy, simulation, and Pam.Robert M. Gordon -2001 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):37-37.The wealth of important and convergent evidence discussed in the target article contrasts with the poorly conceived theory put forward to explain it. The simulation theory does a better job of explaining how automatic “mirroring” mechanisms might work together with high-level cognitive processes. It also explains what the authors' PAM theory merely stipulates.
- First person representations need a methodology based on simulation or theory.Robert M. Gordon -1996 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):130-131.Although their thesis is generally sound, Barresi & Moore give insufficient attention to the need for a methodology, whether simulation based or theory-based, for choosing among alternative possible matches of first person and third person information. This choice must be sensitive to contextual information, including past behavior. Moreover, apart from simulation or theory, first person information would not help predict future behavior.
- It's about Time: A History of Archaeological Dating in North America. Stephen E. Nash.Robert Gordon -2001 -Isis 92 (1):144-145.
- Judgmental emotions.Robert M. Gordon -1973 -Analysis 34 (December):40-48.
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
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