Evidence and Religious Belief.Raymond VanArragon &Kelly James Clark (eds.) -2011 - Oxford, US: Oxford University Press.detailsA fundamental question in philosophy of religion is whether religious belief must be based on evidence in order to be properly held. In recent years two prominent positions on this issue have been staked out: evidentialism, which claims that proper religious belief requires evidence; and Reformed epistemology, which claims that it does not. Evidence and Religious Belief contains eleven chapters by prominent philosophers which push the discussion in new directions. The volume has three parts. The first part explores the demand (...) for evidence: some chapters object to it while others seek to restate it or find space for compromise between Reformed epistemology and evidentialism. The second part explores ways in which beliefs are related to evidence; that is, ways in which the evidence for or against religious belief that is available to a person can depend on that person's background beliefs and other circumstances. The third part contains chapters that discuss actual evidence for and against religious belief. Evidence for belief in God includes the so-called common consent of the human race and the way that such belief makes sense of the moral life; evidence against it includes profound puzzles about divine freedom which suggest that it is impossible for a being to be morally perfect. (shrink)
Transworld damnation and craig’s contentious suggestion.Raymond J. Vanarragon -2001 -Faith and Philosophy 18 (2):241-260.detailsIn this paper I discuss William Lane Craig’s response to problems faced by Molinists who hold that an eternal hell exists and that most people who fail to accept Christ during their earthly lives end up there. Craig suggests that it is plausible to suppose that most people who fail to accept Christ suffer from transworld damnation, and that the fact that they do ensures that it is fair that they end up in hell regardless of whether they hear the (...) Gospel message. I argue that whether this suggestion-which I call ‘Craig’s contentious suggestion’-is true depends on how transworld damnation is understood. I present four interpretations of transworld damnation, and argue that on three of the interpretations Craig’s suggestion is clearly unacceptable, but that it may be acceptable on the fourth. (shrink)