Works by R. De Sousa
103 found
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| Ronald de Sousa [84] | Ronald B. de Sousa [9] | R. de Sousa [3] | Ronald Bon de Sousa [2] |
| Rodrigo Ribeiro de Sousa [2] | Rogério Ferreira de Sousa [2] | Rafael T. de Sousa [1] | Renata Floriano de Sousa [1] |
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- The Rationality of Emotion.Ronald De Sousa -1987 - MIT Press.In this urbane and witty book, Ronald de Sousa disputes the widespread notion that reason and emotion are natural antagonists.
- The Rationality of Emotion.Ronald de Sousa,Jing-Song Ma &Vincent Shen -1987 -Philosophy and Culture 32 (10):35-66.How should we understand the emotional rationality? This first part will explore two models of cognition and analogy strategies, test their intuition about the emotional desire. I distinguish between subjective and objective desire, then presents with a feeling from the "paradigm of drama" export semantics, here our emotional repertoire is acquired all the learned, and our emotions in the form of an object is fixed. It is pretty well in line with the general principles of rationality, especially the lowest reasonable (...) principles. Turned to the second part of this side of reasonable. I will inquire how emotional beliefs, desires, and behaviors contribute to the rationality. I will present a very general biological hypothesis: emotions by controlling highlights the characteristics of perception and reasoning, so that we remove the difficulties due in particular to lead to paralysis; they are being simulated by a simplified perception of information, thus limiting our practice and cognitive choice. How are we to understand emotional or axiological rationality? I pursue analogies with both the cognitive and the strategic models, testing them against intuitions about emotional desires. We distinguish two different classes of desires, the subjective and the objective, and propose that emotions have a semantics that derives from "paradigmatic scenarios", in terms of which our emotional repertoire is learned and the formal objects of our emotions fixed. This fits in well with emerging facts about how our emotional capacities develop, and it can also be squared with the general principles of rationality, particularly minimal rationality. In the second part, I return to the perspective of rationality. I ask how emotions contribute to the rationality of beliefs, desires, and behavior. I proffer a very general biological hypothesis: Emotions spare us the paralysis potentially induced by a particular predicament by controlling the salience of features of perception and reasoning; they temporarily mimic the informational encapsulation of perception and so circumscribe our practical and cognitive options. (shrink)No categories
- Emotion.Ronald de Sousa -2007 -Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Emotional Truth.Ronald de Sousa -2011 - Oxford University Press USA.The word "truth" retains, in common use, traces of origins that link it to trust, truth, and truce, connoting ideas of fidelity, loyalty, and authenticity. The word has become, in contemporary philosophy, encased in a web of technicalities, but we know that a true image is a faithful portrait; a true friend a loyal one. In a novel or a poem, too, we have a feel for what is emotionally true, though we are not concerned with the actuality of events (...) and characters depicted. To have emotions is to care about certain things: we can wonder whether those things are really worth caring about. We can wonder whether our passions reflect who we are, and whether they constitute fitting responses to the vicissitudes of life. So there are two aspects to emotional truth: how well an emotion reflects the threats and promises of the world, and how well it reflects our own individual nature. That is the starting point of this book, which looks first at the analogies and disanalogies between strict propositional truth and a looser, "generic" sense of truth. As applied to emotions, generic truth is closer to those original meanings: as in a portrait's fidelity or friend's loyalty. Taken in this sense, the notion of emotional truth opens up large vistas on areas of life essential to our existence as social beings, and to our concerns with beauty, morality, love, death, sex, knowledge, desire, coherence, and happiness. Each of those topics illustrates some facet of the dominant theme of the book: the crucial but often ambivalent role of our emotions in grounding and yet also sometimes undermining our values. Emotions act, in holistic perspective, as ultimate arbiters of values where different and independently justified standards of value compete. (shrink)
- (1 other version)The Structure of Emotions.Robert M. Gordon &Ronald De Sousa -1989 -Journal of Philosophy 86 (9):493-504.
- The Good and the True.Ronald B. De Sousa -1974 -Mind 83:534.
- Love: A Very Short Introduction.Ronald De Sousa -2015 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.Do we love someone for their virtue, their beauty, or their moral or other qualities? Are love's characteristic desires altruistic or selfish? Are there duties of love? What do the sciences tell us about love? In this Very Short Introduction, Ronald de Sousa explores the different kinds of love, from affections to romantic love.
- I—Ronald de Sousa.Ronald De Sousa -2002 -Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):247-263.Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such as emotions; belief-like states, by contrast, (...) are digital representations. I argue that the gravest problem-objectivity-is not insurmountable. /// [Adam Morton] It is accuracy rather than truth itself that is valuable. Emotional truth is a dubious though attractive notion, but emotional accuracy is much easier to make sense of. My approach to accuracy goes via an account of what makes a story accurate. Stories can be accurate but not true, and emotions can be accurate whether or not they are true. The capacity for emotional accuracy, for emotions that fit a person's situation, is an aspect of emotional intelligence, which is as important an aspect of rational human agency as the intelligent formation of beliefs and desires. (shrink)
- Who Needs Values When We Have Valuing? Comments on Jean Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling.Ronald de Sousa -2022 -Emotion Review 14 (4):257-261.Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 257-261, October 2022. Müller argues that the perceptual or “Axiological Receptivity” model of emotions is incoherent, because it requires an emotion to apprehend and respond to its formal object at the same time. He defends a contrasting view of emotions as “Position-Takings" towards “formal objects”, aspects of an emotion's target pertinent to the subject's concerns. I first cast doubt on the cogency of Müller's attack on AR as begging questions about the temporal characteristics (...) of perceptual events. I then argue that Müller's version of PT is not radical enough. On my attitudinal view, formal objects are not values but natural properties that justify specific affective or behavioral responses. Values are constituted only by a negotiated social aggregation of individual evaluative attitudes. (shrink)
- Truth, Authenticity, and Rationality.Ronald De Sousa -2007 -Dialectica 61 (3):323-345.Emotions are Janus‐faced. They tell us something about the world, and they tell us something about ourselves. This suggests that we might speak of a truth, or perhaps two kinds of truths of emotions, one of which is about self and the other about conditions in the world. On some views, the latter comes by means of the former. Insofar as emotions manifest our inner life, however, we are more inclined to speak of authenticity rather than truth. What is the (...) difference? We need to distinguish the criteria of correspondence or appropriateness suitable for authenticity from those that embody the criterion of truth. Furthermore there is also a question about the transitions – among states of mind, and between states of mind and behaviour – that emotions encourage. This realm of transitions concerns rationality. After sketching the relevant distinctions, I will endeavour to justify the view that emotions should be appraised in terms of all three terms. (shrink)
- Moral emotions.Ronald de Sousa -2001 -Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):109-126.Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question (...) of the naturalness of emotions and on that of their objectivity as revealers of value: emotions are neither simply natural nor socially constructed, and they apprehend objective values, but those values are multidimensional and relative to human realities. The axiological position I defend jettisons the usual foundations for ethical judgments, and grounds these judgments instead on a rationally informed reflective equilibrium of comprehensive emotional attitudes, tempered with a dose of irony. (shrink)
- Emotions: What I know, what I'd like to think I know, and what I'd like to think.Ronald de Sousa -2004 - In Robert C. Solomon,Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. New York: Oxford University Press USA.
- The Natural Shiftiness of Natural Kinds.Ronald de Sousa -1984 -Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (4):561-580.The Philosophical search for Natural Kinds is motivated by the hope of finding ontological categories that are independent of our interests. Other requirements, of varying importance, are commonly made of kinds that claim to be natural. But no such categories are to be found. Virtually any kind can be termed ‘natural’ relative to some set of interests and epistemic priorities. Science determines those priorities at any particular stage of its progress, and what kinds are most ‘natural’ in that sense is (...) always a real and lively scientific question. The general philosophical problem of scientific realism is also real; but between the scientific and the metaphysical, the ‘Problem of Natural Kinds’ sits otiose. (shrink)
- Self-deceptive emotions.Ronald B. De Sousa -1978 -Journal of Philosophy 75 (11):684-697.
- Emotions, Education and Time.Ronald de Sousa -1990 -Metaphilosophy 21 (4):434-446.No categories
- Emotion and self-deception.Ronald De Sousa -1988 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty & Brian P. McLaughlin,Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press.
- Why think?: evolution and the rational mind.Ronald de Sousa -2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.Introduction -- Function and destiny -- What's the good of thinking? -- Rationality, individual and collective -- Irrationality.
- Rational homunculi.Ronald De Sousa -1976 - In Amélie Rorty,The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
- Twelve varieties of subjectivity.Ronald B. de Sousa -2002 - In M. Larrazabal & P. Miranda,Twelve Varieties of Subjectivity: Dividing in Hopes of Conquest. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Biological Individuality.Ronald de Sousa -2005 -Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):195-218.The question What is an individual? goes back beyond Aristotle’s discussion of substance to the Ionians’ preoccupation with the paradox of change -- the fact that if anything changes it must stay the same. Mere reflection on this fact and the common-sense notion of a countable thing yields a concept of a “minimal individual”, which is particular (a logical matter) specific (a taxonomic matter), and unique (an evaluative empirical matter). Individuals occupy space, and therefore might be dislodged. Even minimal individuals, (...) therefore (Strawsonian individual or Aristotelian substance) already contain the potential for competition or conflict. What is added by biology to this basic notion? It emerges from some recent work on the evolution of metazoan animals that individuals as we know them are minimal individuals towhich four features have been added, and which appear to be inseparable: differentiated multicellularity; sexual reproduction; segregation of germ from somatic cells; and obligatory death. Whether or not individuals are to be counted as units of selection, they are not the beneficiaries of natural selection. (shrink)
- Emotion. I: Zalta EN, red.R. de Sousa -2012 - In Ed Zalta,Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Is Contempt Redeemable?Ronald de Sousa -2019 -Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):23-43.In this essay, I will focus on the two main objections that have been adduced against the moral acceptability of contempt: the fact that it embraces a whole person and not merely some deed or aspect of a person’s character, and the way that when addressed to a person in this way, it amounts to a denial of the very personhood of its target.No categories
- What Philosophy Contributes to Emotion Science.Ronald De Sousa -2022 -Philosophies 7 (4):87.Contemporary philosophers have paid increasing attention to the empirical research on emotions that has blossomed in many areas of the social sciences. In this paper, I first sketch the common roots of science and philosophy in Ancient Greek thought. I illustrate the way that specific empirical sciences can be regarded as branching out from a central trunk of philosophical speculation. On the basis of seven informal characterizations of what is distinctive about philosophical thinking, I then draw attention to the fact (...) that scientific progress frequently requires one to make adjustments to the way its basic terms are conceptualized, and thus cannot avoid philosophical thought. The character of emotions requires attention from many disciplines, and the links among those disciplines inevitably require a broader philosophical perspective to be understood. Thus, emotion science, and indeed all of science, is inextricably committed to philosophical assumptions that demand scrutiny. (shrink)
- Evolution et rationalité.Ronald De Sousa -2004 - Paris: Presses universitaires de France.À quoi bon la pensée? Pour de nombreux chercheurs, inspirés par les théories évolutionnistes, la pensée réfléchie est utile à notre espèce. Elle lui confère des avantages importants et contribue à son succès reproductif. Pourtant ses avantages ne sont pas si évidents. La pensée ne figure ni dans les mécanismes de l'évolution qui ont façonné la vie, ni parmi les procédés dont se servent la plupart des organismes pour s'y maintenir. Dans Évolution et rationalité, Ronald de Sousa montre que, pour (...) comprendre les avantages de la pensée réfléchie, il faut changer nos présupposés relatifs à la rationalité et reconnaître la multiplicité de ses dimensions. La rationalité ne nous sert pas seulement à avoir des croyances vraies et à agir de manière efficace dans un environnement changeant. Elle nous aide à gérer nos plaisirs et nos peines dans le temps et nous permet d'envisager des situations qui n'existent pas. En général, le statut de la rationalité comme ensemble de capacités ayant évolué dans le cours de l'histoire naturelle de notre espèce, passant des tropismes aux désirs et de la détection à la représentation, n'a pas été pris suffisamment au sérieux. Suivre ce processus d'évolution de la rationalité permet de comprendre comment elle est devenue une norme, mais aussi pourquoi il lui arrive aussi souvent d'échouer. Ronald de Sousa a profondément modifié nos façons de concevoir les émotions. Avec Évolution et rationalité, il pourrait avoir une influence aussi décisive sur nos façons de concevoir la rationalité. (shrink)
- The mind's Bermuda Triangle: philosophy of emotions and empirical science.Ronald de Sousa -2009 - In Peter Goldie,The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Comment: Language and Dimensionality in Appraisal Theory.Ronald de Sousa -2013 -Emotion Review 5 (2):171-175.The proliferation of dimensions of appraisal is both welcome and worrying. The preoccupation with sorting out causes may be somewhat otiose. And the ubiquity of emotions in levels of processing raises intriguing problems about the role of language in identifying and triggering emotions and appraisals.
- Kinds of kinds: Individuality and biological species.Ronald de Sousa -1989 -International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3 (2):119 – 135.
- Kripke on Naming and Necessity.R. B. De Sousa -1974 -Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):447-464.Some wag reported the following story: Scholars have recently established that the Iliad and the Odyssey were not, after all, written by Homer. They were actually written by another author, of the same name.The majority of current theories of naming and reference, including ones as divergent in other respects as those of Russell and Searle, would rule this story impossible. They would do so on roughly these grounds: the sense and reference of the name ‘Homer’ is determined, given the absence (...) of other reliable testimony, by the sole description: ‘Author of the Iliad and the Odyssey’. ‘Homer is the author of the Iliad and the Odyssey’ is therefore known a priori, hence necessarily true. There could not be another author of that name and claim to fame.In lectures delivered at Princeton in the Winter of 1970, Saul Kripke offered a lucid alternative to such theories. (shrink)
- (1 other version)Against Emotional Modularity.Ronald De Sousa -2006 -Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1):29-50.How many emotions are there? Should we accept as overwhelming the evidence in favour of regarding emotions as emanating from a relatively small number of modules evolved efficiently to serve us in common life situations? Or can emotions, like colour, be organized in a space of two, three, or more dimensions defining a vast number of discriminable emotions, arranged on a continuum, on the model of the colour cone?There is some evidence that certain emotions are specialized to facilitate certain response (...) sequences, relatively encapsulated in their neurophysiological organization. These are natural facts. But nature, as Katherine Hepburn remarked to Humphrey Bogart, is what we were put in the world to rise above. I shall suggest that we can consider the question not merely from a scientific point of view, but from a political point of view. And so I will try to explain how to reconcile the evidence of emotional modularity - which, as some of the contributions to the present volume illustrate, is not devoid of a certain ambiguity - with a reasonable plea for an attitude of disapproval towards the rigidities of our taxonomy. (shrink)
- Is art an adaptation? Prospects for an evolutionary perspective on beauty.Ronald De Sousa -2004 -Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (2):109–118.
- Love Undigitized.Ronald de Sousa -1997 - In Roger Lamb,Love analyzed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.No categories
- I. Self‐deception.Ronald B. de Sousa -1970 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 13 (1-4):308-321.
- Seizing the Hedgehog by the Tail: Taylor on the Self and Agency.Ronald de Sousa -1988 -Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):421-432.For those of us who are sympathetic to the research program of cognitive science, it is especially useful to face the deepest and sharpest critic of that program. Charles Taylor, who defines himself as a ‘hedgehog’ whose ‘single rather tightly related agenda’ fits into a very ancient and rather elusive debate between naturalism and anti-naturalism, may well be that critic. My ambition in this paper is to distill Taylor’s central objection to the cognitive science approach to agency and the self (...) as it is expressed throughout Human Agency and Language. After trying to set out the core of this objection, I want to remark on some rather curious aspects of the dispute of which it is a part, and then sketch, in relation to one or two examples, what I take to be the most promising line of resistance to Taylor’s attack. I conclude with a proposal as to how Taylor may – narrowly – escape one logical consequence of his position, according to which he should stop knocking the cognitive science program and instead go to work building a robot. (shrink)
- Bashing the Enlightenment: A Discussion of Charles Taylor's Sources of the Self.Ronald de Sousa -1994 -Dialogue 33 (1):109.This is a Big Book from one of Canada's preeminent philosophers. It aims at nothing less than to define what characterizes modernity, and then to tell us what is wrong with it. Like many a Big Book, it is predictably full of interesting things, and equally predictably disappointing, not to say feeble, in some of the central theses for which it argues. But then what more, in philosophy, can we really expect? It's what we tell our students: you don't have (...) to be right, and you don't have to make me agree with you, but you do have to produce interesting arguments and show that you have thought seriously about the issues. (shrink)
- Paradoxical Emotion: On sui generis Emotional Irrationality.Ronald de Sousa -2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet,Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press.Weakness of will violates practical rationality; but may also be viewed as an epistemic failing. Conflicts between strategic and epistemic rationality suggest that we need a superordinate standard to arbitrate between them. Contends that such a standard is to be found at the axiological level, apprehended by emotions. Axiological rationality is sui generis, reducible to neither the strategic nor the epistemic. But, emotions are themselves capable of raising paradoxes and antinomies, particularly when the principles they embody involve temporality. They constitute (...) an ultimate court of appeal, yet their biological origin allows little hope that these antinomies can be resolved. (shrink)
- Restoring emotion's bad rep: the moral randomness of norms.Ronald De Sousa -2006 -European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):29-47.Despite the fact that common sense taxes emotions with irrationality, philosophers have, by and large, celebrated their functionality. They are credited with motivating, steadying, shaping or harmonizing our dispositions to act, and with policing norms of social behaviour. It's time to restore emotion's bad rep. To this end, I shall argue that we should expect that some of the “norms” enforced by emotions will be unevenly distributed among the members of our species, and may be dysfunctional at the individual, social, (...) moral, or even species levels. I”ll adduce three considerations in support of that pessimistic view: The fallacy of adaptive fixation, the moral randomness of group selection, and the lack of fit between “natural norms” set up by evolution and those moral and social norms we would like philosophy to justify. (shrink)
- Les émotions contemplatives et l’objectivité des valeurs.Ronald de Sousa -2018 -Philosophiques 45 (2):499-505.No categories
- What Can’t We Do with Economics?Ronald B. De Sousa -1997 -Journal of Philosophical Research 22:197-209.Ainslie’s Picoeconomics presents an ingenious theory, based on a remarkably simple basic law about the rate of discounting the value of future prospects, which explains a vast number of psychological phenomena. Hyperbolic discount rates result in changes in the ranking of interests as they get closer in time. Thus quasi-homuncular “interests” situated at different times compete within the person. In this paper I first defend the generality of scope of Ainslie’s model, which ranges over several personal and subpersonal levels of (...) psychological analysis. I raise a problem which results from the temporal relativity of assessments of value, and affects the possibility of objective values. Finally, I offer one example of a form of time-related irrationality on which Ainslie’s scheme does not seem to have a grip, namely one which relates not to a situation’s relative position in time, but to its temporal (‘progressive’ or ‘perfect’) temporal aspect. (shrink)
- Cristianismo liberal e espiritismo: as convergências entre William Ellery Channing e Allan Kardec.Rodrigo Farias de Sousa -2024 -Horizonte 22 (67):226707-226707.Em 1869, em uma recomendação de livros de interesse para o público espírita, Allan Kardec escreveu que a “filosofia moral” do pastor americano William Ellery Channing era “o mais puro espiritismo”. Este artigo parte desse fato para efetuar uma análise das similaridades entre o pensamento de Kardec e o chamado cristianismo liberal (ou unitarismo) dos Estados Unidos, do qual Channing era o mais famoso representante na primeira metade do século XIX. Para isso, efetua-se, primeiro, uma definição do termo “cristianismo liberal”; (...) em seguida, traçam-se algumas de suas raízes intelectuais no pensamento cristão anglo-americano e, finalmente, comparam-se alguns elementos de sua versão do cristianismo com a leitura kardequiana dessa tradição religiosa por meio, principalmente, de um texto representativo de cada autor quanto a esse assunto, a saber: _Unitarian Christianity_, de 1819, e _O Evangelho segundo o Espiritismo_ (na versão definitiva de 1866). Ao fim, constata-se que algumas das teses e abordagens propostas por Kardec já circulavam há décadas no meio protestante americano, não se restringindo apenas à “filosofia moral”. (shrink)
- Dust, Ashes, and Vice.Ronald De Sousa -2006 -Dialogue 45 (1):139-150.
- Teleology and the Great Shift.Ronald B. de Sousa -1984 -Journal of Philosophy 81 (11):647.
- Perversion and Death.Ronald de Sousa -2003 -The Monist 86 (1):90-114.Philosophers like to warn against fools’ paradises: not places where fools can safely cavort, but rather conditions in which fools mistakenly think themselves happy. The warning presupposes that real and merely apparent happiness can be told apart. Of course that claim is not altogether disinterested, since philosophers have a professional investment in the distinction. Thus they have endorsed this or that attitude to death, holding up promises of ultimate comfort or threats of excruciating regret, to be dispensed at the last (...) hour, just when the money-back guarantee expires. (shrink)
- Résumé de Évolution et rationalité.Ronald De Sousa -2007 -Dialogue 46 (1):151-154.
- Desire and Serendipity.Ronald de Sousa -1998 -Midwest Studies in Philosophy 22:120-134.No categories
- The tree of English bears bitter fruit.Ronald Bon de Sousa -1966 -Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):37-46.No categories
- Desire and time.Ronald B. De Sousa -1986 - In Joel Marks,The Ways of Desire: New Essays in Philosophical Psychology on the Concept of Wanting. Precedent.No categories
- Fringe consciousness and the multifariousness of emotions.Ronald B. de Sousa -2002 -PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 8.Mangan draws his inspiration from James's account of fringe consciousness, but differs from James in focusing on something non-sensory, necessarily fuzzy, though not necessarily fleeting. A long tradition in philosophy has deemed non-sensory elements of consciousness to be indispensable to thought. But those, chiefly conceptual, forms of non-sensory fringe are not Mangan's focus. What then is Mangan talking about? This commentary envisages a number of possible answers, and tentatively concludes that fringe consciousness is essentially emotional. Emotional consciousness involves proprioception, however, (...) hence is non-sensory only in the weak sense of excluding the five senses. (shrink)
- Paradoxical emotions.Ronald de Sousa -2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet,Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bachelard: o contexto do racionalismo epistemológico na filosofia das ciências.Gabriel Kafure da Rocha,Marina Ferreira de Sousa,Rosimar Emília Xavier de Sousa &Rosimar Emilia Xavier de Sousa -2018 -Perspectivas 1 (2):34-51.O presente artigo pretende esclarecer a problemática da epistemologia como fundamento para a compreensão filosófica das ciências. Para isso, contamos com a visão do filósofo francês Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962), focando principalmente no seu texto O racionalismo aplicado (publicado em 1949) e a sua teoria que busca demonstrar a complexidade presente nas linhas de pensamento construídas na história da filosofia: o empirismo e o racionalismo.No categories
- A produção da desinformação na esfera pública.Meri Nadia Marques Gerlin,Rodrigo Silva Caxias de Sousa &Carla Monego Lins Pastl -2023 -Logeion Filosofia da Informação 10:495-507.Discute a pertinência do quanto o uso dos conceitos de mal banal e mal radical se esboçam como potenciais referências analíticas para a compreender os processos de desinformação que circulam na esfera pública, em especial nas plataformas de rede social, como forma de fomentar uma problematização que defende que essas manifestações encontram-se fundamentadas tanto na pauperização interpretativa dos sujeitos e coletividades, quanto no ódio reproduzido de forma instrumental, perpetuado em razão de interesses políticos, econômicos e religiosos. Dessa forma, o presente (...) estudo apresenta aspectos relativos às noções de mal radical (Kant) e sua rearticulação na obra de Arendt (mal banal e mal radical), os relacionando, aos conceitos de desinformação, de esfera pública e de mundo da vida como forma de teorizar o quanto a desinformação inviabiliza a ampliação de atos inter locucionários e o entendimento intersubjetivo no âmbito da política. (shrink)No categories
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
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