Results for 'Psychophysics'
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- Michael Heidelberger.Herbert Feigl &Psychophysical Parallelism -2003 - In Paolo Parrini, Merrilee H. Salmon & Wesley C. Salmon,Logical Empiricism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 233.No categories
- Psychophysical scaling: Judgments of attributes or objects?Gregory R. Lockhead -1992 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (3):543-558.Psychophysical scaling models of the form R = f, with R the response and I some intensity of an attribute, all assume that people judge the amounts of an attribute. With simple biases excepted, most also assume that judgments are independent of space, time, and features of the situation other than the one being judged. Many data support these ideas: Magnitude estimations of brightness increase with luminance. Nevertheless, I argue that the general model is wrong. The stabilized retinal image literature (...) shows that nothing is seen if light does not change over time. The classification literature shows that dimensions often combine to produce emergent properties that cannot be described by the elements in the stimulus. These and other effects cannot be adjusted for by simply adding variables to the general model because some factors do not combine linearly. The proposed alternative is that people initially judge the entire stimulus – the object in terms of its environment. This agrees with the constancy literature that shows that objects and their attributes are identified through their relations to other aspects of the scene. That the environment determines judgments is masked in scaling studies where the standard procedure is to hold context constant. In a typical brightness study the essential stimulus might be the intensity of the light or a difference between the light and the background. The two are perfectly confounded. This issue is examined in the case of audition. Judgments of the loudness of a tone depend on how much that tone differs from the previous tone in both pitch and loudness. To judge loudness people first seem to process the stimulus object in terms of differences between it and other aspects in the situation; only then do they assess the feature of interest. Psychophysical judgments will therefore be better interpreted by theories of attention that are based in biology or psychology than those that are based in classical physics. (shrink)
- Psychophysics as a science of primary experience.Jiří Wackermann -2010 -Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):189 – 206.In Fechner'spsychophysics, the 'mental' and the 'physical' were conceived as two phenomenal domains, connected by functional relations, not as two ontologically different realms. We follow the path from Fechner's foundational ideas and Mach's radical programme of a unitary science to later approaches to primary, psychophysically neutral experience (phenomenology, protophysics). We propose an 'integralpsychophysics' as a mathematical study of law-like, invariant structures of primary experience. This approach is illustrated by a reinterpretation of psychophysical experiments in terms of (...) perceptual situations involving a constructed apparatus and an instructed subject. The problematic notion of 'measurement of sensation' is thus eliminated: 'sensations' are merely indices for classes of perceptually equivalent configurations (states of the apparatus) specified by the instruction. The locus of the measured is in the inter-subjectively shared, communicable world—not inside the subject's mind. Finally we discuss the role of integralpsychophysics as a scientia prima , logically and methodically preceding physics and psychology. (shrink)
- Relationalpsychophysics: Messages from Ebbinghaus' and Wertheimer's work.Viktor Sarris -2010 -Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):207 – 216.In past and modernpsychophysics there are several unresolved methodological and philosophical problems of human and animal perception, including the outstanding question of the relational basis of wholepsychophysics. Here the main issue is discussed: if, and to what extent, there are viable bridges between the traditional “gestalt” oriented approaches and the modern perceptual-cognitive perspectives inpsychophysics. Thereby the key concept of psychological “frame of reference” is presented by pointing to Hermann Ebbinghaus' geometric-optical illusions, on the one (...) hand, and Max Wertheimer's treatment of the traditional transposition phenomenon, on the other hand. A much-needed theoretical reorientation of future research may help to overcome the philosophical narrowness of present-day human and comparativepsychophysics. (shrink)
- Psychophysical supervenience and nonreductive materialism.Ausonio Marras -1993 -Synthese 95 (2):275-304.Jaegwon Kim and others have claimed that (strong) psychophysical supervenience entails the reducibility of mental properties to physical properties. I argue that this claim is unwarranted with respect to epistemic (explanatory) reducibility (either of a global or of a local sort), as well as with respect to ontological reducibility. I then attempt to show that a robust version of nonreductive materialism (which I call supervenient token-physicalism) can be defended against the charge that nonreductive materialism leads to epiphenomenalism in failing to (...) account for the causal or explanatory relevance of mental properties. (shrink)
- Psychophysical Harmony: A New Argument for Theism.Brian Cutter &Dustin Crummett -forthcoming -Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.This paper develops a new argument from consciousness to theism: the argument from psychophysical harmony. Roughly, psychophysical harmony consists in the fact that phenomenal states are correlated with physical states and with one another in strikingly fortunate ways. For example, phenomenal states are correlated with behavior and functioning that is justified or rationalized by those very phenomenal states, and phenomenal states are correlated with verbal reports and judgments that are made true by those very phenomenal states. We argue that psychophysical (...) harmony is strong evidence for theism (or, at least, strong evidence against atheism in its standard naturalistic form). (shrink)
- Thepsychophysics of order and anisotropy: Comment on Riemer.Sean Enda Power -2015 -Consciousness and Cognition 38:198-204.Riemer’s recent paper on the perception of time discusses a neglected yet important topic in the psychological literature: the consequences for psychology (andpsychophysics) from the ‘anisotropy’ of time. The paper presents an argument that there are unique kinds of challenges forpsychophysics from such temporal anisotropy: (a) Challenges because the psychological experience of time has temporal anisotropy and the physical concept of time does not have temporal anisotropy. (b) Challenges for experimental research which are unique to temporal (...) anisotropy. -/- Although it is important to consider temporal anisotropy, I think there are reasons to deny the force of both kinds of challenges. (shrink)
- Psychophysical Nature.Max Velmans -2007 - In Harald Atmanspacher & Hans Primas,[Book Chapter] (in Press). Springer. pp. 115-134..There are two quite distinct ways in which events that we normally think of as “physical” relate in an intimate way to events that we normally think of as “psychological”. One intimate relation occurs in exteroception at the point where events in the world become events as-perceived. The other intimate relationship occurs at the interface of conscious experience with its neural correlates in the brain. The chapter examines each of these relationships and positions them within a dual-aspect, reflexive model of (...) how consciousness relates to the brain and external world. The chapter goes on to provide grounds for viewing mind and nature as fundamentally psychophysical, and examines similar views as well as differences in previously unpublished writings of Wolfgang Pauli, one of the founders of quantum mechanics. (shrink)
- Psychophysics: On the possibility of another approach.Tarow Indow -1989 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (2):276-277.
- Psychophysical identity and free energy.Alex Kiefer -2020 -Journal of the Royal Society Interface 17.An approach to implementing variational Bayesian inference in biological systems is considered, under which the thermodynamic free energy of a system directly encodes its variational free energy. In the case of the brain, this assumption places constraints on the neuronal encoding of generative and recognition densities, in particular requiring a stochastic population code. The resulting relationship between thermodynamic and variational free energies is prefigured in mind–brain identity theses in philosophy and in the Gestalt hypothesis of psychophysical isomorphism.
- Integrationpsychophysics.Norman H. Anderson -1989 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (2):268-269.
- Psychophysical supervenience: Digging in its foundations.Giovanna Hendel -2002 -Journal of Philosophical Research 27:115-141.I put forward and defend the thesis (Th) that psychophysical supervenience (PS) in its full generality can be satisfactorily supported if and only if one is willing to make one or another of some substantial assumptions (the Assumptions) about the nature of mental and physical properties. I first deal with the “if” part of the claim by presenting and considering the Assumptions. I then argue for the inadequacy of suggestions of support for PS that do not require any of the (...) Assumptions. Finally, I show that as a result of (Th) a PS claim is made potentially stronger than what it would be if (Th) were false. (shrink)
- Psychophysical “blinding” methods reveal a functional hierarchy of unconscious visual processing.Bruno G. Breitmeyer -2015 -Consciousness and Cognition 35:234-250.
- Psychophysics of active kinesthesis.Heather Wood -1969 -Journal of Experimental Psychology 79 (3p1):480.
- Psychophysical theory: On the avoidance of contradiction.John C. Baird -1981 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):190-190.
- A psychophysical study of hunger in the rat.Robert C. Bolles -1962 -Journal of Experimental Psychology 63 (4):387.
- A psychophysical and electrophysiological study of light adaptation.Robert M. Boynton &M. Howard Triedman -1953 -Journal of Experimental Psychology 46 (2):125.
- Psychophysical judgments of probabilistic stimulus sequencies.William Simpson &James F. Voss -1961 -Journal of Experimental Psychology 62 (4):416.
- (1 other version)Psychophysical Holism in Stoicism and Epicureanism.Christopher Gill -2006 - InThe structured self in Hellenistic and Roman thought. New York: Oxford University Press.This chapter identifies, as a key innovative feature of Hellenistic thought about personality, the idea of the person as a psychophysical unit or whole in Stoicism and Epicureanism. It contrasts this idea with the core-centred or part-based view of the personality sometimes found in Plato and Aristotle, while highlighting certain strands in Platonic or Aristotelian thought that may have helped to shape Stoic and Epicurean thought about personality. Psychophysical holism in Stoicism and Epicureanism is illustrated by reference to their views (...) about the physical nature of the psyche and the development of human beings as embodied psychological wholes. Connections are also traced with some puzzles about identity in Stoic and Epicurean thought. (shrink)No categories
- Psychophysical scaling: A conditional defense of R=f(I).Adam Reeves -1995 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):605-606.Psychophysical scales can be constructed under suitable restrictions from appropriate data, but they still do not justify privileged internal sensations.
- Psychophysical and tractarian analysis.Timm Lampert -2003 -Perspectives on Science 11 (3):285-317.This paper argues for a physicalistic interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Wittgenstein's general conception of world and language analysis is interpreted and exemplified in relation to the historical background of the psychophysical analysis of sense data and, in particular, color analysis. Three of his main principles of analysis—the principle of independence, the context principle and the principle of atomism—are interpreted and justified on the background of physicalism. From his proof of color exclusion in the Tractatus, it is shown that Wittgenstein (...) had a detailed conception of how philosophy should fulfil the task of distinguishing between sense and nonsense using physicalistic presuppositions. (shrink)
- Psychophysical causation and a pragmatist approach to human behavior.David H. Brendel -2007 -Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 205-207.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Psychophysical Causation and a Pragmatist Approach to Human BehaviorDavid H. Brendel (bio)Keywordsmind-body problem, philosophy, pragmatism, psychology, psychophysical causationJochen Fahrenberg and Marcus Cheetham have performed a valuable service by conducting and presenting an empirical study of some basic philosophical assumptions of psychologists, philosophers, and scientists. Well-designed, large-scale empirical studies of this kind are all too rare in the literature. Those of us interested in the human sciences are rather in (...) the dark about the assumptions of others working in our own and related fields. For the most part, we are privy only to the philosophical assumptions of friends and colleagues we know intimately and of those relative few who publish their views. We can only speculate about the views of the countless others with whom we have not had the opportunity to establish direct philosophical discourse. The findings presented by Fahrenberg and Cheetham give us an intriguing glimpse at some of the key philosophical assumptions of a variety of clinicians and academics who are interested in human nature and the human sciences.My aim in this commentary is to present an interpretation of a central finding of this questionnaire study: that psychologists were more likely than philosophers and scientists to embrace “psychophysical causation” as a part of their philosophical worldview. It is not, I think, too much of an oversimplification to define psychophysical causation as the presumption that mental events and physical events can cause other mental events and physical events. Psychophysical causation can be distinguished from other positions on the mind–body relation, some of which Fahrenberg and Cheetham mention in their article. Among these alternative positions is epiphenomenalism, the position that physical events cause other physical events and can cause mental events, but that mental events themselves have no causal power. Another philosophical position distinct from psychophysical causation is monism, which holds that all events in the world in general (and in human beings in particular) are physical and are best described in physical terms. Fahrenberg and Cheetham do not describe the multiple forms of monism in detail, but it is worth noting that reductive materialism (Wilson 1998) and eliminative materialism (Churchland 1981) are two highly developed forms of the kind of monism to which they allude. It is beyond the scope of this commentary to explore the differences between the two, but suffice it to say that both these forms of materialism reject the legitimacy of mental [End Page 205] events or the mental vocabulary that refers to such events.It is also beyond the scope of this commentary to advance arguments either for or against psychophysical causation in the philosophy of mind. The concept of psychophysical causation certainly has multiple proponents among philosophers, including those who are ontological monists. The compelling nonreductive materialism of a philosopher such as Terence Horgan, for example, suggests the viability of combining ontological monism with methodological pluralism. In a book chapter entitled “Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology,” Horgan (1993) developed the position that the world is entirely physical (i.e., there are no disembodied minds, persons, or other entities) but is so complex that it can only be understood and explained by employing many vocabularies and methodologies, spanning “the microphysical, neurobiological, macrobiological, and psychological.” This kind of methodological pluralism in the philosophy of mind can be disputed on conceptual grounds, but it seems to be at least as justifiable (and perhaps more justifiable) when compared with other well-defined positions on the mind–body relation.The appeal of nonreductive materialism and psychophysical causation comes into particularly clear focus in contexts where our philosophical concerns are pragmatic in nature. In other words, when we need to achieve practical goals in our everyday lives, we usually benefit from a philosophy that provides us with the flexibility to use a broad range of ideas, conceptual tools, and causal hypotheses that can be adapted to specific needs and challenges. Nonreductive materialism regards the world as a purely physical place, but ensures this kind of conceptual and methodological flexibility when it comes to explaining and predicting complex human experience and behavior. “Typically, certain context-relative features of discourse,” Horgan wrote (1993, 298), “will determine, in a given... (shrink)
- Psychophysical studies of expressions of pain.Temre N. Davies &Donald D. Hoffman -2002 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (4):458-459.What differentiates expressions of pain from other facial expressions? Which facial features convey the most information in an expression of pain? To answer such questions we can explore the expertise of human observers using psychophysical experiments. Techniques such as change detection and visual search can advance our understanding of facial expressions of pain and of evolved mechanisms for detecting these expressions.
- Psychophysics Beyond Sensation: Laws and Invariants of Human Cognition.Christian Kaernbach,Erich Schröger &Hermann Müller (eds.) -2004 - Psychology Press.This volume presents a series of studies that expand laws, invariants, and principles ofpsychophysics beyond its classical domain of sensation.
- (1 other version)Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David K. Lewis -1972 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.
- Psychophysical Methods and the Evasion of Introspection.Mazviita Chirimuuta -2014 -Philosophy of Science 81 (5):914-926.While introspective methods went out of favour with the decline of Titchener’s analytic school, many important questions concern the rehabilitation of introspection in contemporary psychology. Hatfield rightly points out that introspective methods should not be confused with analytic ones, and goes on to describe their “ineliminable role” in perceptual psychology. Here I argue that certain methodological conventions withinpsychophysics reflect a continued uncertainty over appropriate use of subjects’ perceptual observations and the reliability of their introspective judgements. My first claim (...) is that different psychophysical methods do not rely equally on the introspective capabilities of experimental subjects. I contrast “minimally-introspective” tasks with “introspection-heavy” ones. It is only in the latter, I argue, that introspection can be said to have a non-trivial role in the subjects’ performance. My second claim is that my rough-and-ready distinction maps onto a number of important “dichotomies” in vision science. Not coincidentally, the introspection-heavy categorisation captures many of the tasks typically considered less able to yield useful information regarding the processes underlying visual sensation. (shrink)
- Psychophysical and computational studies towards a theory of human stereopsis.John E. W. Mayhew &John P. Frisby -1981 -Artificial Intelligence 17 (1-3):349-385.
- Psychophysical Reductionism without Type Identities.Justin Tiehen -2012 -American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):223-236.Nonreductive physicalists have a causal exclusion problem. Given certain theses all physicalists accept, including psychophysical supervenience and the causal closure of the physical realm, it is difficult to see how irreducible mental phenomena could make a causal difference to the world. The upshot, according to those who push the problem, is that we must embrace reductive physicalism. Only then is mental causation saved. -/- Grant the argument, at least provisionally. Here our focus is the conditional question: What form should one's (...) reductionism take if it is motivated in part by the exclusion problem? Must one be a type identity theorist, or are alternative reductive views available, as Jaegwon Kim has suggested more than once? (shrink)
- Psychophysical dualism from the point of view of a working psychologist.Peter C. M. Molenaar -2006 -Erkenntnis 65 (1):47-69.Cognitive neuroscience constitutes the third phase of development of the field of cognitive psychophysiology since it was established about half a century ago. A critical historical overview is given of this development, focusing on recurring problems that keep frustrating great expectations. It is argued that psychology has to regain its independent status with respect to cognitive neuroscience and should take psychophysical dualism seriously. A constructive quantum physical model for psychophysical interaction is presented, based on a new stochastic interpretation of the (...) quantum potential in the de Broglie–Bohm theory. This model can be applied to analyze cognitive information processing in psychological experiments. It is shown that the quantum potential shares several features with Duns Scotus’ notion of contingent causality. (shrink)
- Psychophysical analysis of the odor intensity of homologous alcohols.Trygg Engen -1965 -Journal of Experimental Psychology 70 (6):611.
- On psychophysical linking hypotheses, the direction of pattern induction, and the representation of distance and size.John M. Foley -1983 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (4):663.
- Psychophysical measurement of the judged seriousness of crimes and severity of punishments.George A. Gescheider,Edgar C. Catlin &Anne M. Fontana -1982 -Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 19 (5):275-278.
- Psychophysical Evidence.Raul Kompass -2004 - In Christian Kaernbach, Erich Schröger & Hermann Müller,Psychophysics Beyond Sensation: Laws and Invariants of Human Cognition. Psychology Press. pp. 451.Export citation
Bookmark - Psychophysical relations.Edgar Wilson -1981 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 24 (October):305-322.
- Psychophysical law: Keep it simple.Lester E. Krueger -1989 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (2):299-320.
- Three psychophysical laws.L. L. Thurstone -1927 -Psychological Review 34 (6):424-432.
- Psychophysical Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic and Same-Sex Couples’ Conflict: The Mediating Effect of Internalized Sexual Stigma.Jessica Pistella,Stefano Isolani,Salvatore Ioverno,Fiorenzo Laghi &Roberto Baiocco -2022 -Frontiers in Psychology 13.Research on the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on same-sex relationships is limited. The present study aimed at analyzing the association between the psychophysical impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and same-sex couples’ conflict, also considering the potential mediating effect of internalized sexual stigma. For this purpose, psychophysical challenges and couples’ conflict during the COVID-19 pandemic, ISS, age, biological sex, sexual orientation, relationship duration, religiosity, involvement in lesbian, gay, and bisexual associations, sexual satisfaction, and interpersonal partner violence were assessed in an (...) Italian sample of 232 LGB people engaged in a same-sex relationship. The results indicated that the psychophysical impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was significantly associated with couples’ conflict, and ISS mediated this relationship. Among the covariates considered, only sexual satisfaction was associated with couples’ conflict. The findings suggest that ISS, over and above the adverse effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on psychophysical health, triggered conflict within same-sex relationships. Studying the role of ISS in various relational and social contexts is important, as ISS may have an adverse effect on the mental health of sexual minority people. We recommend that more efforts be made to improve research on the LGB population during the public health response to the COVID-19 emergency, because the paucity of studies underlines the invisibility of this population in many domains, including the domain of romantic relationships. Implications and directions for future research are discussed. (shrink)
- Thepsychophysics of subliminal perception.Neil A. Macmillan -1986 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):38-39.
- Psychophysical supervenience.Jaegwon Kim -1982 -Philosophical Studies 41 (January):51-70.
- Psychophysical investigations into the neural basis of synaesthesia.Vilayanur S. Ramachandran &Edward M. Hubbard -2001 -Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, B 268:979-983.We studied two otherwise normal, synaesthetic subjects who `saw' a speci¢c colour every time they saw a speci¢c number or letter. We conducted four experiments in order to show that this was a genuine perceptual experience rather than merely a memory association. (i)The synaesthetically induced colours could lead to perceptual grouping, even though the inducing numerals or letters did not. (ii)Synaesthetically induced colours were not experienced if the graphemes were presented peripherally. (iii)Roman numerals were ine¡ective: the actual number grapheme was (...) required. (iv)If two graphemes were alternated the induced colours were also seen in alternation. However, colours were no longer experienced if the graphemes were alternated at more than 4 Hz. We propose that grapheme colour synaesthesia arises from `cross-wiring' between the `colour centre' (area V4 or V8)and the `number area', both of which lie in the fusiform gyrus. We also suggest a similar explanation for the representation of metaphors in the brain: hence, the higher incidence of synaesthesia among artists and poets. (shrink)
- Integrationpsychophysics is not traditionalpsychophysics.Norman H. Anderson -1992 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (3):559-560.
- Psychophysical scaling: To describe relations or to uncover a law?Gunnar Borg -1992 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (3):561-562.
- Psychophysical and cognitive aspects of categorical perception:A critical overview.Stevan Harnad -unknownThere are many entry points into the problem of categorization. Two particularly important ones are the so-called top-down and bottom-up approaches. Top-down approaches such as artificial intelligence begin with the symbolic names and descriptions for some categories already given; computer programs are written to manipulate the symbols. Cognitive modeling involves the further assumption that such symbol-interactions resemble the way our brains do categorization. An explicit expectation of the top-down approach is that it will eventually join with the bottom-up approach, which (...) tries to model how the hardware of the brain works: sensory systems, motor systems and neural activity in general. The assumption is that the symbolic cognitive functions will be implemented in brain function and linked to the sense organs and the organs of movement in roughly the way a program is implemented in a computer, with its links to peripheral devices such as transducers and effectors. (shrink)
- Psychophysical Functions and Instructions to Subjects.Henry Bennett &Joseph Lyons -1989 -Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 20 (1):40-59.
- Psychophysical discrimination of spatial structure in natural images.P. Carlin &R. Watt -1996 - In Enrique Villanueva,Perception. Ridgeview Pub. Co. pp. 43-44.We report a series of experiments in which subjects were required to make spatial discriminations about naturally obtained images, as follows. Subjects were shown two natural images on a computer screen, side by side and for a period of 500 ms. Subjects were then shown, on a separate part of the computer screen, a small patch of one of the images selected at random. Subjects were required to decide which of the two full images the patch comes from, and whereabouts (...) in that image it is taken from. They indicated their response by clicking the mouse cursor at the appropriate point on the screen. -/- The proportion of trials on which the subjects selected the correct image and the accuracy of the spatial position of their correct responses were calculated. These two measures independently indicate the general discriminability of the two image sets, and the extent to which the spatial layout of the image has been perceived. By comparing response accuracy for images that are from different sets (such as mountain or town scenes) with response accuracy when the two images are from the same set it is possible to establish the image properties that underlie coarse scene apprehension. By using sets of images that are perhaps best described as being natural textures (such as patterns of foliage or rock surface) it is possible to measure the extent to which texture is processed spatially. Our results are interpreted in the light of statistical differences between the image sets that we have used. (shrink)Export citation Bookmark
- Psychophysical materialism from the perspective of Kant and Wittgenstein.Wp Mendonca -1990 -Kant Studien 81 (3):339-359.Export citation Bookmark
- Physicalism, Introspection, andPsychophysics: The Carnap/Duncker Exchange.Uljana Feest -2017 - In Marcus P. Adams, Zvi Biener, Uljana Feest & Jacqueline Anne Sullivan,Eppur Si Muove: Doing History and Philosophy of Science with Peter Machamer: A Collection of Essays in Honor of Peter Machamer. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 113-125.In 1932, Rudolf Carnap published his article “Psychology in a Physical Language.” The article prompted a critical response by the Gestalt psychologist Karl Duncker. The exchange is marked by mutual lack of comprehension. In this paper I will provide a contextualized explication of the exchange. I will show that Carnap’s physicalism was deeply rooted in the psychophysical tradition that also informed Gestalt psychological research. By failing to acknowledge this, Carnap missed out on the possibility to enter into a serious debate (...) and to forge an alliance with a like-minded psychologist at the time. I conclude by suggesting that the kind of physicalism practiced by Gestalt psychologists deserves to be taken seriously by current philosophy of psychology. (shrink)
- Psychophysical law-like connections and their problems.Ted Honderich -1981 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 24 (October):277-303.
- Psychophysical scaling: Context and illusion.Stanley Coren -1992 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (3):563-564.
- Toward Relativization of Psychophysical "Relativity".Steven M. Rosen -1976 -Perceptual and Motor Skills 42:843-850.A paradoxical feature of Weber's law is considered. The law presumably states a principle of psychophysical relativity, yet a pre-relativistic physical measurement model has been traditionally employed. Classical physics, Einsteinian relativity, and a newer interpretation of the relativity concept are discussed. Their relation topsychophysics is examined. The domain wherein Weber's law breaks down is noted as suggestively similar to that in which physicists report relativistic effects. A tentative hypothesis is offered to stimulate further thought about a more meaningful (...) integration ofpsychophysics with modern physical science. (shrink)
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
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Area Editors:
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Gwen Bradford
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James Chase
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Susana Nuccetelli
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