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Physicalism, the thesis that everything is physical, is one of the most controversial problems in philosophy. Its adherents argue that there is no more important doctrine in philosophy, whilst its opponents claim that its role is greatly exaggerated. In this superb introduction to the problem Daniel Stoljar focuses on three fundamental questions: the interpretation, truth and philosophical significance ofphysicalism. In answering these questions he covers the following key topics: -/- (i)A brief history ofphysicalism and its (...) definitions, (ii)what a physical property is and howphysicalism meets challenges from empirical sciences, (iii)'Hempel’s dilemma’ and the relationship betweenphysicalism and physics, (iv)physicalism and key debates in metaphysics and philosophy of mind, such as supervenience, identity and conceivability, and (v)physicalism and causality. -/- Additional features include chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary of technical terms, makingPhysicalism ideal for those coming to the problem for the first time. (shrink)

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This paper challenges the viability of argument from supervenience in defense of a physicalist position on the place of qualia, the subjective properties of consciousness, in a physical or material world.Physicalism, being an ontological thesis that asserts that the only things that really exist are either physical entities or properties, affirms that every mental attribute must be a physical attribute. However, the existence of a quale as an attribute of a mental state falsifies this affirmation. The physicalist argues (...) that qualia supervene on the physical properties in the human body, and that any problem about qualia is, just like any other scientific problem, resolvable scientifically, either in principle or in practice. This paper argues that supervenience is merely a report of the nature of reality, and not a justificatory ontological affirmation that qualia supervene on physical properties. The paper begins with a short description ofphysicalism and an account of qualia as distinctive character of consciousness. It further articulates and examines the physicalists’ use of the argument from supervenience to establish that qualia supervene on the physical elements in the world. The concluding part shows the errors in the argument from supervenience, and its implication for the truth ofphysicalism. (shrink)

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A Physicalist Manifesto is a full treatment of the comprehensive physicalist view that, in some important sense, everything is physical. Andrew Melnyk argues that the view is best formulated by appeal to a carefully worked-out notion of realization, rather than supervenience; that, so formulated,physicalism must be importantly reductionist; that it need not repudiate causal and explanatory claims framed in non-physical language; and that it has the a posteriori epistemic status of a broad-scope scientific hypothesis. Two concluding chapters argue (...) in detail that contemporary science provides no significant empirical evidence againstphysicalism and some considerable evidence for it. Written in a brisk, candid and exceptionally clear style, this 2003 book should appeal to professionals and students in philosophy of mind, metaphysics and philosophy of science. (shrink)

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Jaegwon Kim’s argument against non-reductivephysicalism is well known. Many philosophers take Kim’s argument to also apply to emergentism. But this does not necessarily follow. In this paper, I will first briefly show why Kim’s argument against non-reductivephysicalism need not apply to emergentism. Next, I will present a physicalistic account of emergentism offered by Jason Megill in his paper “A Defense of Emergence.” This will be followed by an examination of some of the limitations of Megill’s account, (...) in particular, his failure to adequately account for the causal powers of higher level physical properties independent of realization. Finally, I will offer a suggestion on how Megill might avoid the difficulties raised by appealing to the concept of wide realization espoused by Robert Wilson in his paper “Two Views of Realization.” The overarching theme of the paper centers on the idea that the realization requirement is where the action is, in terms of making emergentism compatible withphysicalism, and is capable of being tinkered with by the emergentist and physicalist alike. (shrink)

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The physicalist credo is that the world is physical. But some phenomena, such as minds, morals, and mathematics, appear to be nonphysical. While an uncompromisingphysicalism would reject these, a conciliatoryphysicalism needn’t if it can account for them in terms of an underlying physical basis. Any such account must refer to the nonphysical. But won’t this unavoidable reference to the nonphysical conflict with the physicalist credo? This essay aims to clarify this problem and introduce a novel solution (...) that relies on a distinction between “circumstantial” facts that are based in the circumstances and “acircumstantial” facts that are not. This is used in two ways. First,physicalism is restricted to circumstantial facts: only they must have a physical basis that does not refer to the nonphysical. Second, facts accounting for the nonphysical are not restricted to the circumstantial: they may refer to the nonphysical if they are acircumstantial. Facts about how the physical accounts for the nonphysical therefore do not conflict with the physicalist’s credo. This provides a credible answer to whatphysicalism could be. (shrink)

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I focus on Fodor’s model of the relationship between special sciences and basic physics, and on a criticism of this model, that it implies that the causal stability of, e.g., the mental in its production of behaviour is nothing short of a miraculous coincidence. David Papineau and Graham Macdonaldendorse this criticism. But it is far less clear than they assume that Fodor’s picture indeed involves coincidences, which in any case their injection of a teleological supplement cannot explain. Papineau’s and Macdonald’s (...) problem is subtly different from a similar one presented by Adrian Cussins. This is no more effective against Fodor’s picture, but the kind of account of the relation between the physical and the psychological which could constitute a solution to Cussins’ problem is one which, for independent reasons, a physicalist of Fodor’s stripe ought to provide. (shrink)

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The paper offers a general critique ofphysicalism and of one variety of nonphysicalism, arguing that such theses are untenable. By distinguishing between the absolute conception of reality and the causal completeness of physics it shows that the 'explanatory gap' is not merely epistemic but metaphysical. It defends the essential subjectivity and unity of consciousness and its inseparability from a self-conscious autonomous rational and moral being. Casting a favourable light on dualism freed from misconceptions, it suggests that the only (...) plausible way forward in the search for an understanding of both physical and mental reality is a recognition of the mind as a metaphysically distinct entity. (shrink)

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FlatPhysicalism is a theory of through and through type reductivephysicalism, understood in light of recent results in the conceptual foundations of physics. In FlatPhysicalism, as in physics, so-called "high level" concepts and laws are nothing but partial descriptions of the complete states of affairs of the universe. "Flatphysicalism" generalizes this idea, to form a reductive picture in which there is no room for levels, neither explanatory nor ontological. The paper explains how phenomena (...) that seem to be cases of multiple realization of special sciences kinds by physical kinds are fully explains in a reductive physicalist way. Finally, the paper exemplifies the fruitfulness of this reductive approach by showing how it can account even for a case of high-level anomaly in a deterministic universe (for example anomaly of the mental, should this turn our to be a fact about the world) - a result that may be called AnomalousPhysicalism. (shrink)

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Carnap opposes physicalist language to phenomenal language. His elementary physicalist sentences convey descriptions which physicists still regard as phenomenal and subjective. A second orderphysicalism (principle of special relatively) is required in order to express physical laws. Carnap makes the phenomenal language a proper part of the physicalist language. This relation is compared to the relation that general relativity establishes between geometry and physiscs.

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Many physicalists are vague about how defining‘physical property’fits in with characterizingphysicalism. We determine the proper relation of these tasks. Employing panpsychism as a yardstick, we argue that defining‘physical property’and characterizingphysicalism are subject to contradictory conditions of adequacy. We conclude that these tasks should be kept neatly apart. Exploiting this insight, we save physicalists from an apparently disastrous anti‐physicalist argument, we propose and defend a viable definition of‘physical property’, and we argue that the standard characterization of (...) class='Hi'>physicalism is flawed. We propose an improved account. (shrink)

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Andrew Botterell has offered a fine response to my article, "Supervenience and Psycho-Physical Dependence". In my original article, I argued that Donald Davidson's brand of supervenience should be understood as a relation between predicates rather than properties, that this formulation captures a form of psycho-physical dependence that eludes other forms of supervenience, and that, as such, it might be useful to revisit Davidsonian supervenience as a means of expressing a plausible form ofphysicalism. Botterell's reply centres on offering support (...) for the following two claims: that the distinction between properties and predicates "is irrelevant to issues concerningphysicalism and supervenience" ; and that predicate supervenience is unhelpful to formulating a plausible form ofphysicalism. I think the first claim is false, but not for reasons that are readily apparent in the original article. My reaction to the second claim is more complicated. (shrink)

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This chapter contains sections titled: FormulatingPhysicalism JustifyingPhysicalism Objecting toPhysicalism.

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It is often argued that higher-level special-science properties cannot be causally efficacious since the lower-level physical properties on which they supervene are doing all the causal work. This claim is usually derived from an exclusion principle stating that if a higher-level property F supervenes on a physical property F* that is causally sufficient for a property G, then F cannot cause G. We employ an account of causation as difference-making to show that the truth or falsity of this principle is (...) a contingent matter and derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which a version of it holds. We argue that one important instance of the principle, far from undermining non-reductivephysicalism, actually supports the causal autonomy of certain higher-level properties. (shrink)

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Physicalism, a topic that has been central to modern philosophy of mind and metaphysics, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of essays, first published in 2001, offers a series of perspectives on (...) this important doctrine and brings depth and breadth to the philosophical debate. A group of distinguished philosophers, comprising both physicalists and their critics, consider a wide range of issues including the historical genesis and present justification ofphysicalism, its metaphysical presuppositions and methodological role, its implications for mental causation, and the account it provides of consciousness. (shrink)

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Some of the objections most frequently raised against the thesis ofphysicalism can be summarized as follows: The notions of the biological and social sciences, as e. g. organic whole and Gestalt, means and ends, leadership and hierarchical order, the entire structure and meaning of these scientific systems, are of a type essentially different from those of physics. Consequently they can not be expressed by means of the mathematical language used by physics, and it is “logically impossible” to reduce (...) these sciences to physics. (shrink)

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To earn the title “ontological physicalist,” one must endorse an entailment thesis of the following sort: the physical properties that are had, together with the causal laws, determine which higher-level properties are had. I argue that if this thesis is to capture all that is essential to physicalist intuitions, the relevant set of causal laws must be restricted to purely physical laws. But then it follows that higher-level properties are physical properties. The conclusion is that one cannot consistently be an (...) ontological physicalist while endorsing property pluralism. (shrink)

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As substance dualism fell out of favor, philosophers became increasingly interested in making sense of mind in purely physicalist terms. Along the way, the physicalist project has hit a few snags. Perhaps the most popular challenge was presented by Frank Jackson’s Mary’s Room thought experiment, wherein Mary, a brilliant color scientist, comes to know all of the physical facts about color whilst confined to a black-and-white room. Once released, Mary is presented with a ripe tomato. The intuition is that Mary, (...) upon seeing a colored object for the first time, has learned something new, but what she has learned apparently cannot be accounted for byphysicalism, thereby leaving an explanatory gap between mind and matter. There are those, like Joseph Levine, who believe the explanatory gap to be a necessary consequence of any physicalist theory of mind. I disagree, and in this dissertation, I aim to show that at least one physicalist theory of mind can close the gap. However, it requires embracing a theory that physicalists are hesitant to embrace: panpsychism. (shrink)

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As a first pass,physicalism is the doctrine that there is nothing over and above the physical. Much recent philosophical work has been devoted to spelling out what this means in more rigorous terms and to assessing the case for the view. What follows is a survey of such work. I begin by looking at competing accounts of what is meant by nothing over and above and then turn to how the physical should be understood. Once we are clear (...) on the options for formulating the physicalist thesis, we will look at the leading argument for the view. Along the way, I will suggest avenues for further exploration. (shrink)

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I shall argue in this article that there are certain objectual and methodological boundaries imposed by the nature of physics that all formulations ofphysicalism based on physical theories should respect. Therefore, empiricalphysicalism – i.e., the sort ofphysicalism that is eager to accept all the entities included in some future, ideal and complete physical theory and all entities dependent on them (see Jeffrey Poland and Janice Dowell) – is already committed to the exclusion of certain (...) sorts of entities from its ontological inventory and it is far less tolerant than one might expect. After having presented my argument, I shall describe four plausible boundaries to what can be studied by physics. The boundaries will contribute to constructing a new version ofphysicalism, i.e., physicsphysicalism, whose acceptance is entailed by the acceptance of empiricalphysicalism. Finally, I shall briefly deal with three objections against my strategy and I shall evaluate the consequences of the acceptance of my conclusions for both physicalists and non-physicalists. (shrink)

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How couldphysicalism be true of a world in which there are no fundamental physical phenomena? A familiar answer, due to Barbara Gail Montero and others, is thatphysicalism could be true of such a world if that world does not contain an infinite descent of mentality. Christopher Devlin Brown has produced a counterexample to that solution. We show how to modify the solution to accommodate Brown’s example:physicalism could be true of a world without fundamental physical (...) phenomena if that world does not contain an infinite descent of mentally constituted mentality. This solution is independently plausible and is available to physicalists of virtually all significant varieties. (shrink)

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Many authors have taken up the challenge of formulatingphysicalism as a supervenience thesis. These endeavors have met with varying response, but it seems that the general consensus still remains that a supervenience thesis that is both sufficient and necessary forphysicalism has yet to be developed. Terence Horgan¹ and Jaegwon Kim² have most famously argued that supervenience theses are not sufficiently strong forphysicalism. Nonetheless, several recent articles suggest that there are philosophers who still hold out (...) hope for some type of supervenience of the mental upon the physical being, if not both sufficient and necessary, at least necessary forphysicalism.³ In this paper, I will 1) investigate some of the motivation for finding a supervenience thesis that characterizesphysicalism, 2) briefly review the types of supervenience theses that have been proposed as necessary (or necessary and sufficient) forphysicalism, and 3) investigate in some detail the recent supervenience thesis proposed by Frank Jackson and expounded upon by Gene Witmer. Jackson, in his recent book, claims to have a supervenience thesis that is both necessary and sufficient forphysicalism. (shrink)

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Physicalism is construed as an extreme form of reductive materialism, along the lines of thomas nagel's well-known characterization. without intending to undermine materialism, it's argued that the defense ofphysicalism, adjusted to meet graduated difficulties, typically fails to take account of the fact that purely formal considerations regarding predication do not relieve us of the need to demonstrate the propriety of making certain predications of entities of certain sorts; also, that shifting from predications made of persons and the (...) like to predications of events and states obscures, without resolving, the ontological problem of predicating these properties of these entities. an alternative form of materialism is sketched. (shrink)

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Imagine a very fi ne grid or graph on which dots are placed at various coordinates so that, as a consequence, this or that shape materializes there. Depending on the coordinates of the dots, different shapes will appear, and for every shape there will be a pattern in the coordinates that guarantees its appearance. Take, for example, the diagonal line that slopes rightward and upward at an angle of 45 degrees from the origin. This line is bound to make an (...) appearance so long as the coordinates satisfy the condition or pattern that as they move away from the origin, (0,0), the coordinates are progressively larger pairs of equal numbers: (1,1), (3,3), and so on. In the world of such dots and shapes, it is going to be in principle possible, for any array of dots that realizes a relevant shape, to derive the presence of the shape from the numerical coordinates of the dots. More particularly, it is going to be possible to derive that shape without reliance on anything other than, fi rst, the empirical fact that the given array of coordinates instantiates this or that pattern; and second, the a priori knowable fact that the pattern guarantees the presence of the shape in question. The nature of the shapes on any grid—if indeed there are any relevant shapes present—is going to be a priori derivable from the positions of the dots; it is going to be possible in principle to derive the one from the other. The simplest and most appealing version ofphysicalism parallels this sort of doctrine about dots and shapes (Pettit 1994, 1995). It holds that just as the positions of the dots determine the nature of the shapes a priori, so the way the natural world is physically organized a priori determines the way it presents itself in psychological and other terms. The way things are physically confi gured entails the presence of psychological and other realities, and it does this without reliance on anything other than what a.. (shrink)

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Physicalism is the idea that everything either is physical or is nothing over and above the physical. For this formulation ofphysicalism to have determinate content, it should be identified what the “physical” refers to; i.e. the body problem. Some other closely related theses, especially the ones employed in the causal arguments for different versions ofphysicalism, and more especially the causal closure thesis, are also subject to the body problem. In this paper, I do two things. (...) First, I explore the structure of causal arguments forphysicalism that represents a general argument. To do this, the premises and the conclusion of the general argument are given exact formulations. Second, drawing on those premises, especially the causal closure thesis, I propose a naturalistic formulation of the physical that satisfies the requirements any formulation of the physical is expected to fulfill. Following this proposal, we also have a recursive algorithm to recognize the set of all physical events. (shrink)

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How should ‘the physical’ be defined for the purpose of formulatingphysicalism? In this paper I defend a version of the via negativa according to which a property is physical just in case it is neither fundamentally mental nor possibly realized by a fundamentally mental property. The guiding idea is thatphysicalism requires functionalism, and thus that being a type identity theorist requires being a realizer-functionalist. In §1 I motivate my approach partly by arguing against Jessica Wilson's no (...) fundamental mentality constraint. In §2 I set out my preferred definition of ‘the physical’ and make my case thatphysicalism requires functionalism. In §3 I defend my proposal by attacking the leading alternative account of ‘the physical,’ the theory-based conception. Finally, in §4 I draw on my definition, together with Jaegwon Kim's account of intertheoretic reduction, to defend the controversial view thatphysicalism requires a prioriphysicalism. (shrink)

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This essay addresses three problems facing a physicalist (as opposed to dualist) account of the person. First, how can such an account fail to be reductive if mental events are neurological events and such events are governed by natural laws? Answering this question requires a reexamination of the concept of supervenience. Second, what is the epistemological status of nonreductivephysicalism? Recent philosophy of science can be used to argue that there is reasonable scientific evidence forphysicalism. Third, the (...) soul has traditionally been seen as that which enables human beings to relate to God. What accounts for this capacity in a physicalist theory of the person? This essay argues that the same faculties that enable higher cognitive and emotional experience also account for the capacity for religious experience. (shrink)

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It is often said that there are two varieties of identity theory. Type-identity theorists interpretphysicalism as the claim that every property is identical to a physical property, while token-identity theorists interpret it as the claim that every particular is identical to a physical particular. The aim of this paper is to undermine the distinction between the two. Drawing on recent work connecting generalized identity to truth-maker semantics, I demonstrate that these interpretations are logically equivalent. I then argue that (...) each has the resources to resolve problems facing the other. (shrink)

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There is no single version ofphysicalism. There is no single argument forphysicalism. There is, accordingly, no standard answer concerning the implications ofphysicalism for the causation of human action by mental states. This chapter begins by describing a preferred version ofphysicalism and its implications about the connection between subjects' mental states and what they do, and thereby for the determination and predictability of our actions. This serves as a precursor for a short discussion (...) of the implications ofphysicalism for the possibility of free action. The chapter also discusses an anomalousphysicalism that holds it is a mistake in principle to identify the mental and the physical, in the sense of identifying mental and physical kinds. At first blush, this kind ofphysicalism might seem good news for those who worry about the implications ofphysicalism for freedom. However, it is shown that the good news is not that good. (shrink)

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Groundphysicalism is the view that higher-level properties, such as phenomenal and normative properties, are fully grounded in the fundamental physical properties. Like other non-identity physicalists, ground physicalists face the causal exclusion problem. In this paper, I introduce a new worry for the ground physicalist: the metaphysical exclusion problem. According to the metaphysical exclusion problem, there is something deeply problematic about certain properties having more than one full ground. Furthermore, the causal and metaphysical exclusion problems are shown to work (...) together to create the strengthened exclusion problem, which is significantly more difficult to resist than the causal exclusion problem alone. I then set out a solution to the strengthened exclusion problem that draws on the underexplored notion of indeterministic grounding. I conclude that the ability of indeterministic grounding to solve the strengthened exclusion problem provides us with a new reason to accept indeterministic groundphysicalism. (shrink)

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This chapter considers potential applications of grounding to the formulation ofphysicalism. I begin with an overview of competing conceptions of the physical and ofphysicalism. I then consider whether groundingphysicalism overcomes well-known and seemingly fatal problems with superveniencephysicalism. I conclude that while groundingphysicalism improves upon superveniencephysicalism in certain respects, it arguably falls victim to some of the same difficulties.

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In 1932, Rudolf Carnap published his article “Psychology in a Physical Language.” The article prompted a critical response by the Gestalt psychologist Karl Duncker. The exchange is marked by mutual lack of comprehension. In this paper I will provide a contextualized explication of the exchange. I will show that Carnap’sphysicalism was deeply rooted in the psychophysical tradition that also informed Gestalt psychological research. By failing to acknowledge this, Carnap missed out on the possibility to enter into a serious (...) debate and to forge an alliance with a like-minded psychologist at the time. I conclude by suggesting that the kind ofphysicalism practiced by Gestalt psychologists deserves to be taken seriously by current philosophy of psychology. (shrink)

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Philosophers have traditionally treatedphysicalism as an empirically informed metaphysical thesis. This approach faces a well-known problem often referred to as Hempel’s dilemma: formulations ofphysicalism tend to be either false or indeterminate. The generally preferred strategy to address this problem involves an appeal to a hypothetical complete and ideal physical theory. After demonstrating that this strategy is not viable, I argue that we should redefinephysicalism as an interdisciplinary research program seeking to explain the mental in (...) terms of the physical that encompasses the physical sciences, the psychological and brain sciences, and philosophy. Redefiningphysicalism in this way improves upon previous reconstructive accounts while avoiding the indeterminacy associated with orthodox forms of futuristphysicalism. (shrink)

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ABSTRACT This essay has three goals. The first is to introduce the notion of fundamentality and to argue thatphysicalism can usefully be conceived of as a thesis about fundamentality. The second is to argue for the advantages of fundamentalityphysicalism over modal formulations and that fundamentalityphysicalism is what many who endorse modal formulations ofphysicalism had in mind all along. Third, I describe what I take to be the main obstacle for a fundamentality-oriented formulation (...) ofphysicalism: ‘the problem of abstracta’, which asks how physical can accommodate phenomena such as mathematics and universals, and which modal formulations do not face. I canvas three solutions: the inapt for ground solution, the concrete restriction, and the contingency restriction. (shrink)

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It is widely held that (1) there are autonomous levels of organization above that of the macromolecule and that (2) at least sometimes macromolecular processes are best explained in terms of such autonomous kinds. I argue that molecular developmental biology honors neither of these claims, and I show that the only way they can be rendered consistent with a minimalphysicalism is through the adoption of controversial claims about causation and explanation which undercut the force of these two antireductionism (...) claims. (shrink)

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Canphysicalism (or materialism) be non-reductive? I provide an opinionated survey of the debate on this question. I suggest that attempts to formulate non-reductivephysicalism by appeal to claims of event identity, supervenience, or realization have produced doctrines that fail either to be physicalist or to be non-reductive. Then I treat in more detail a recent attempt to formulate non-reductivephysicalism by Derk Pereboom, but argue that it fares no better.

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Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity ofphysicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special category of concepts of experiences, phenomenal concepts, which are conceptually independent from physical/functional concepts. It is held by a large number of philosophers that since the conceptual independence of (...) phenomenal concepts does not imply the metaphysical independence of phenomenal properties,physicalism is safe. This paper distinguishes between two versions of this novel physicalist strategy –Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) – depending on how it cashes out “conceptual independence,” and argues that neither helps the physicalist cause. A dilemma for PCS arises: cashing out “conceptual independence” in a way compatible withphysicalism requires abandoning some manifest phenomenological intuitions, and cashing it out in a way compatible with those intuitions requires droppingphysicalism. The upshot is that contra Brian Loar and others, one cannot “have it both ways.”. (shrink)

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The problem of nonreflectors perceived as colored is the central problem for Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's)physicalism. Vision scientists and other interested parties need to consider the motivation for their account of “productancephysicalism.” Is B&H's theory motivated by scientific concerns or by philosophical interests intended to preserve a physicalist account of color as a posteriori necessary?

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My project in this paper is to provide a plausible idea of Christ’s suffering and death in terms of two theories of the human person. One is dualism. Dualism is the view that a human person is composed of two substances, that is, a soul and a body, and he (strictly speaking) is identical with the soul. On the other hand,physicalism is the view that a human person is numerically identical with his body. I will argue that dualism (...) is not successful in explaining Christ’s passion for some reasons. Rather,physicalism, as I shall argue, provides a better explanation of how Christ’s physical suffering and death are real just like everyone else’s, so it is philosophically and theologically more plausible than dualism. (shrink)

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The most common definitions of the physical lead to a problem forphysicalism. If the physical is the objects of physics, then unique objects of other sciences are not physical and, if the causal closure of the physical is accepted, cannot cause changes in the physical. That means unique objects of chemistry, the Earth sciences, and biology cannot causally affect physical states. Butphysicalism’s most reliable claim, the nomological dependence of nonphysical entities and properties on the physical, can (...) be accepted by a naturalism that avoids such problems. (shrink)

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Colours appear to instantiate a number of structural properties: for instance, they stand in distinctive relations of similarity and difference, and admit of a fundamental distinction into unique and binary. Accounting for these structural properties is often taken to present a serious problem for physicalist theories of colour. This paper argues that a prominent attempt by Byrne and Hilbert to account for the structural properties of the colours, consistent with the claim that colours are types of surface spectral reflectance, is (...) unsuccessful. Instead, it is suggested that a better account of the structural properties of the colours is provided by a form of non-reductivephysicalism about colour: a naïve realist theory of colour, according to which colours are superficial mind-independent properties. (shrink)

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I will argue that the ontological doctrine ofphysicalism inevitably entails the denial that there is anything conceptual in logic and mathematics. The elements of a formal system, even if they are tagged by suggestive names, are merely meaningless parts of a physically existing machinery, which have nothing to do with concepts, because they have nothing to do with the actual things. The only situation in which they can become meaning-carriers is when they are involved in a physical theory. (...) But in this role they refer to elements of the physical reality, i.e. they represent a physical concept. “Mathematical concepts” are just idols, that philosophy can completely deny and physics can completely ignore. (shrink)

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This chapter will discuss the relation ofphysicalism to social ontology, and explores problems that social ontology raises forphysicalism.Physicalism is often understood to be the view that all facts—the social ones included—are physical facts, or at least are exhaustively determined by physical facts. While this view is widely endorsed, social phenomena challengephysicalism in several ways, both challenging the coherence of claims ofphysicalism and raising potential counterexamples.

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The article critically examines Jaegwon Kim’s bookPhysicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). It recognizes the »near enough type ofphysicalism« involving functional reduction and covering the relational properties of qualia. Its intrinsic qualites are left out, but since it is qualia’s differences and similarities that matter, i.e. which affect our cognition and behaviour, this is, according to Kim, “no big loss”. While appreciating the book’s effort to offer an intelligible physicalistic theory of the (...) world, the paper concludes that it fails to do so. (shrink)

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The following dissertation is an examination of arguments againstphysicalism.Physicalism is a thesis in the philosophy of mind that is constituted by two central claims: the ontological claim that everything that exists is ontologically physical and that human beings are among such things; the explanatory claim that all facts about human beings and all explanations of their behaviour are dependent on and determined by physical facts and explanations. It has frequently been asserted that there are properties that (...) escape capture in physicalist accounts of human behaviour, thereby undermining . Such properties are usually thought to be lacking causal powers, and hence have been called "epiphenomenal." The epiphenomenalist objections have long been thought to represent a serious obstacle tophysicalism. My aim is to show that the objections that are motivated by epiphenomenal properties are unconvincing. ;My discussion proceeds in two stages. In the first stage I examine the epiphenomenalist objections in detail and show that in their most persuasive forms they demonstrate thatphysicalism has certain explanatory inadequacies. The critics ofphysicalism believe that these shortcomings lead to the denial of the explanatory completeness ofphysicalism, and I try to make their case as charitably as I can. In the second stage of the argument I invoke the relation of psycho-physical supervenience and show that the desired conclusion does not follow, even if we admit thatphysicalism has certain explanatory failings. The overall conclusion of this dissertation is that the epiphenomenalist objections tophysicalism are completely undermined and hence that properties which were thought to be epiphenomenal do not represent a serious obstacle tophysicalism as was previously thought. My intention is that this discussion push forward work in the philosophy of mind and point the way to a more adequate articulation ofphysicalism. (shrink)

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The issue of materialism has recently been raised again. Mr. Putnam argues against philosophical behaviorism [4]. Such a position holds, as he construes it, that statements like ‘Jones is angry’ can be analyzed in solely behavioral terms. When one argues against philosophical behaviorism, he might be expected to distinguish this metaphysical position from behavior science. Putnam, however, does not make the distinction. Consequently he argues against both. I shall first state the distinction between these two different things, namely, philosophical behaviorism (...) and behavior science, as I see it. The behavior scientist adopts the thesis that in principle it is possible to predict future behavior on the basis of data concerning environmental, behavioral, and physiological variables. All three of these he considers in physical terms. The behavior scientist thus speaks about physical objects and properties of such. Talking in such terms, he believes that it is in principle possible to coordinate to statements asserting that person X has or is in state of mind Y another statement, employing only the above mentioned physical terms, such that either both are true or both are false. The reasons for the behavior scientist's program are the well known quandaries involved in the observation of other people's minds and the need for intersubjective verification in science. One can further distinguish between a narrower and a broader view of behavior science. The former restricts itself to environmental and behavioral variables at what some call the macro level; the latter includes, or even concentrates upon, physiological variables. As scientists neither the behaviorist nor the physiologist asks or answers philosophical questions, either epistemological or ontological, about minds, bodies, and mental contents. (shrink)

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