Works by P. Roth
102 found
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| Paul A. Roth [72] | Paul Roth [18] | Philip Roth [12] | Phillip H. Roth [7] |
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- Essentially narrative explanations.Paul A. Roth -2017 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 62 (C):42-50.
- The philosophical structure of historical explanation.Paul Andrew Roth -2020 - Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.This book develops a philosophical structure for historical explanation that resolves disputes about the scientific status of history that have persisted since the nineteenth century. It does this by showing why historical explanations must take the form of a narrative and by making their logic explicit. The books formulates a unique positive account of the logic of narrative explanations. This logic reveals how the rational evaluation of narrative explanation becomes possible. The book also develops a nonrealist (irrealist) metaphysics and epistemology (...) of history--that is, it argues that there exists no one fixed past but many pasts. It includes a novel reading of Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, displaying how Kuhn offers a narrative explanation of theory change in science. The book situates narrative explanations within a naturalistic framework. Naturalism regards all canons of rational inquiry as evolving and contingent. The book also argues for the general philosophical significance of historical explanation. The first four chapters defuse methodological and the metaphysical objections to narrative explanations. The final three chapters explore how narrative explanations relate to other sciences. It will be of interest to researchers in historiography, theory of history, philosophy of history, philosophy of science, philosophy of social science, and epistemology"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)
- The Pasts.Paul A. Roth -2012 -History and Theory 51 (3):313-339.ABSTRACTThis essay offers a reconfiguration of the possibility‐space of positions regarding the metaphysics and epistemology associated with historical knowledge. A tradition within analytic philosophy from Danto to Dummett attempts to answer questions about the reality of the past on the basis of two shared assumptions. The first takes individual statements as the relevant unit of semantic and philosophical analysis. The second presumes that variants of realism and antirealism about the past exhaust the metaphysical options . This essay argues that both (...) of these assumptions should be rejected. It develops as an alternative an irrealist account of history, a view based in part on work by Leon Goldstein and Ian Hacking. On an irrealist view, historical claims ought to be treated as subject to the same conditions and caveats that apply to any theory of empirical or scientific knowledge. Irrealism argues for pasts as made and not found. The argument emphasizes the priority of classification over perception in the order of understanding and so verification. Because nothing a priori anchors practices of classification, no sense can be attached to claims that some single structure must or does determine what events take place in human history. Irrealism denies to realism the very intelligibility of any imagined view from nowhere, that is, a determinately configured past subsisting sub specie aeternitatis. A plurality of pasts exists because constituting a past always depends to some degree on socially mediated negotiations of a fit between descriptions and experience. (shrink)
- How Narratives Explain.Paul Roth -1989 -Social Research: An International Quarterly 56.
- (1 other version)Beyond understanding: the career of the concept of understanding in the human sciences.Paul A. Roth -forthcoming -Philosophy of the Social Sciences.
- Narrative Explanations: The Case of History.Paul A. Roth -1988 -History and Theory 27 (1):1-13.The very idea of narrative explanation invites two objections: a methodological objection, stating that narrative structure is too far from the form of a scientific explanation to count as an explanation, and a metaphysical objection, stating that narrative structure situates historical practice too close to the writing of fiction. Both of these objections, however, are illfounded. The methodological objection and the dispute regarding the status of historical explanation can be disposed of by revealing their motivating presupposition: the plausibility of an (...) exclusivist explication of explanation which appeals either to the unity-of-method thesis or some implicit notion of analytic equivalence, both problematic philosophical doctrines. The metaphysical objection fails with the rejection of the idea, in Mink's phrase, of an "untold story." The argument against history as an "untold story" develops from Danto's image of an Ideal Chronicler recording ideal events. A consequence of rejecting this view is that it no longer makes sense to speak of historical narratives as true or false. However, this failure engenders no special problem for assessing the objectivity or explanatory utility of narratives qua explanations. (shrink)
- Mistakes.Paul A. Roth -2003 -Synthese 136 (3):389-408.A suggestion famously made by Peter Winch and carried through to present discussions holds that what constitutes the social as a kind consists of something shared – rules or practices commonly learned, internalized, or otherwise acquired by all members belonging to a society. This essays argues against the explanatory efficacy of appeals to this shared something as constitutive of a social kind by examining a violation of social norms or rules, viz., mistakes. I argue that an asymmetric relation exists between (...) the notion of mistakes and that of the social. In particular, mistakes do not presuppose a concept of the social, but the concept of the social requires prior specification of a category of mistakes. But no such prior specification proves possible. The very notion of a mistake is so inchoate that it makes it impossible to provide the kind of regimentation required for a rule-governed domain. Thus, there may be recognized mistakes even in the absence of a unified system or common knowledge of norms.Later writers attempt to avoid Winch's over-strong assumption that something shared and internal constitutes the social but cannot. Extending recent work by Stephen Turner, I argue that ``the social'' is not a domain that is susceptible to lawlike treatment, but rather a heterogeneous, motley collection. For absent the assumption of a shared something, no social object exists to be explained. So, I conclude, we have at present no clear way of marking out the social as a coherent or unified domain of inquiry. (shrink)
- Hearts of darkness: 'perpetrator history' and why there is no why.Paul A. Roth -2004 -History of the Human Sciences 17 (2-3):211-251.Three theories contend as explanations of perpetrator behavior in the Holocaust as well as other cases of genocide: structural, intentional, and situational. Structural explanations emphasize the sense in which no single individual or choice accounts for the course of events. In opposition, intentional/cutltural accounts insist upon the genocides as intended outcomes, for how can one explain situations in which people ‘step up’ and repeatedly kill defenseless others in large numbers over sustained periods of time as anything other than a choice? (...) Situational explanations offer a type of behavioral account; this is how people act in certain environments. Critical to the situational account as I discuss it is the ‘Asch paradigm’, i.e. experimentally attested conditions for eliciting conformityof behavior regardlesss of available evidence of prior beliefs. In what follows, I defend what I term above a version of situational explanations of perpetrator behavior. Moreover, I maintain that the factors that explain provide an understanding as well. While not committed to the complete irrelevance or exclusion of cultural or structural factors, nonetheless situational analyses can account both for what happened and why. A cardinal virtue of this version of situational explanations consists in showing how shallow the problem of understanding turns out to be for such cases. (shrink)
- Corrigendum.Stephen Turner,Deborah Tollefsen,Paul Roth,Mark Risjord,Kareem Khalifa &David Henderson -2023 -Philosophy of the Social Sciences 53 (2):163-163.
- The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of the Social Sciences.Stephen P. Turner &Paul Andrew Roth (eds.) -2003 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell._The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of the Social Sciences _collects newly commissioned essays that examine fundamental issues in the social sciences.
- The epistemology of "epistemology naturalized".Paul Roth -1999 -Dialectica 53 (2):87–110.Quine's “Epistemology Naturalized” has become part of the canon in epistemology and excited a widespread revival of interest in naturalism. Yet the status accorded the essay is ironic, since both friends and foes of philosophical naturalism deny that Quine makes a plausible case that the methods of naturalism can accommodate the problems of epistemology.
- Ways of pastmaking.Paul A. Roth -2002 -History of the Human Sciences 15 (4):125-143.Riddles of induction – old or new, Hume’s or Goodman’s – pose unanswered challenges to assumptions that experiences logically legitimate expectations or classifications. The challenges apply both to folk beliefs and to scientific ones. In particular, Goodman’s ‘new riddle’ famously confounds efforts to specify how additional experiences confirm the rightness of currently preferred ways of organizing objects, i.e. our favored theories of what kinds there are.1 His riddle serves to emphasize that neither logic nor experience certifies accepted groupings of objects (...) into kinds.2 Hacking strongly endorses Goodman’s riddle and its chief consequences – nature does not dictate any organizing scheme to us, and different schemes need have no connection to one another. (shrink)
- The silence of the norms: The missing historiography of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Paul A. Roth -2013 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4):545-552.History has been disparaged since the late 19th century for not conforming to norms of scientific explanation. Nonetheless, as a matter of fact a work of history upends the regnant philosophical conception of science in the second part of the 20th century. Yet despite its impact, Kuhn’s Structure has failed to motivate philosophers to ponder why works of history should be capable of exerting rational influence on an understanding of philosophy of science. But all this constitutes a great irony and (...) a mystery. The mystery consists of the persistence of a complete lack of interest in efforts to theorize historical explanation. Fundamental questions regarding why an historical account could have any rational influence remain not merely unanswered, but unasked. The irony arises from the fact that analytic philosophy of history went into an eclipse where it remains until this day just around the time that the influence of Kuhn’s great work began to make itself felt. This paper highlights puzzles long ignored regarding the challenges a work of history managed to pose to the epistemic authority of science, and what this might imply generally for the place of philosophy of history vis-à-vis the problems of philosophy. (shrink)
- The Philosophy of Social Science in the Twentieth Century: Analytic Traditions: Reflections on the Rationalitätstreit.Paul Roth -2011 - In Ian Jarvie Jesus Zamora Bonilla,The Sage Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences. SAGE Publications. pp. 103.
- Real True Facts: A Reply to Currie and Swaim.Fons Dewulf &Paul A. Roth -2022 -Journal of the Philosophy of History 16 (2):207-225.
- Siegel on naturalized epistemology and natural science.Paul A. Roth -1983 -Philosophy of Science 50 (3):482-493.What is the relation of epistemology, understood as the study of the evaluation of knowledge claims, and empirical psychology, understood as the study of the causal generation of a person's beliefs? Quine maintains that the relation is one of “mutual containment”.Epistemology in its new setting, conversely, is contained in natural science, as a chapter of psychology. … We are studying how the human subject of our study posits bodies and projects his physics from his data, and we appreciate that our (...) position in the world is just like his. Our very epistemological enterprise, therefore, and the psychology wherein it is a component chapter, and the whole of natural science wherein psychology is a component book—all this is our own construction or projection from stimulations like those we were meting out to our epistemological subject. There is thus reciprocal containment, though containment in different senses: epistemology in natural science and natural science in epistemology. (shrink)
- Will the real scientists please stand up? dead ends and live issues in the explanation of scientific knowledge.Paul A. Roth -1996 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (1):43-68.
- Truth in interpretation: The case of psychoanalysis.Paul A. Roth -1991 -Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (2):175-195.This article explores and attempts to resolve some issues that arise when psychoanalytic explanations are construed as a type of historical or narrative explanation. The chief problem is this: If one rejects the claim of narratives to verisimilitude, this appears to divorce the notion of explanation from that of truth. The author examines, in particular, Donald Spence's attempt to deal with the relation of narrative explanations and truth. In his critique of Spence's distinction between narrative truth and historical truth, the (...) author develops some suggestions regarding the role of truth in narrative explanations. (shrink)
- Naturalism without Fears.P. Roth -2006 - In Stephen P. Turner & Mark W. Risjord,Handbook of Philosophy of Anthropology and Sociology. Boston: Elsevier. pp. 683--708.
- Introduction. Ghosts and the Machine: Issues of Agency, Rationality, and Scientific Methodology in Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science.Stephen P. Turner &Paul A. Roth -2003 - In Stephen P. Turner & Paul Andrew Roth,The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 1–17.This chapter contains sections titled: The Origins of the Philosophy of Social Science Winch's Triad The Legitimation of “Continental” Philosophy Enter Davidson Rational Choice: The Scientization of the Intentional Philosophy of Social Science Today Notes.
- Theories of nature and the nature of theories.Paul A. Roth -1980 -Mind 89 (355):431-438.
- Varieties and vagaries of historical explanation.Paul A. Roth -2008 -Journal of the Philosophy of History 2 (2):214-226.For the better part of the 20th century, expositions of issues regarding historical explanation followed a predictable format, one that took as given the nonequivalence of explanations in history and philosophical models of scientific explanation. Ironically, at the present time, the philosophical point of note concerns how the notion of science has itself changed. Debates about explanation in turn need to adapt to this. This prompts the question of whether anything now still makes plausible the thought that history must make (...) some forced choice with regard to the type of science it is and an associated explanatory form. The discussion that follows sketches the alternative forms of explanation between which historians were to pick, and indicates why each proves unsatisfactory. Examination of these issues allows identification of a conception of historical explanation that does not require the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions that engender previous dichotomous characterizations. (shrink)
- Paradox and indeterminacy.Paul A. Roth -1978 -Journal of Philosophy 75 (7):347-367.
- The object of understanding.Paul A. Roth -2000 - In K. R. Stueber & H. H. Kogaler,Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Human Sciences. Boulder: Westview Press. pp. 243--269.
- Speaking of Facts: or, Reality without Realism.Paul A. Roth -2024 -Journal of the Philosophy of History 18 (2):152-172.This paper provides a concise overview and summary of the positions on facts, events, and realism in the philosophy of history as developed in my work. This summary is then used to clarify and resolve confusions on these points found in various essays contained in the volume The Poverty of Anti-Realism.
- Redrawing the Lines: Analytic Philosophy, Deconstruction, and Literary Theory.Paul A. Roth -1991 -Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 49 (2):180-182.
- Politics and epistemology: Rorty, MacIntyre, and the ends of philosophy.Paul A. Roth -1989 -History of the Human Sciences 2 (2):171-191.In this paper, I examine how a manifest disagreement between Richard Rorty and Alasdair MacIntyre concerning the history of philosophy is but one of a series of deep and interrelated disagreements concerning, in addition, the history of science, the good life for human beings, and, ultimately, the character of and prospects for humankind as well. I shall argue that at the heart of this series of disagreements rests a dispute with regard to the nature of rationality. And this disagreement concerning (...) the norms of rationality, despite its theoretical and practical importance, is one which is, or so I argue, irresolvable. Moreover, the series of disagreements which I examine in the context of the debate between Rorty and MacIntyre is not peculiar or idiosyncratic to them. Their dispute reflects presumptions common to contemporary analytical philosophy. And while analytical philosophers have not made discussions of human nature one of their characteristic concerns, I indicate that such concerns do play a central role in the controversy which I examine. Differences of opinion concerning the political and social nature of human beings are reflected up and down the philosophical line. My argument is in no way concerned with issues of psychological priority or causality (e.g. whether having certain views disposes one psychologically to accepting other views). What I establish are the logical relations, and the points of philosophical contention, among certain epistemo logical and political theses. In Part I, I rehearse Rorty's epistemological views and examine how these views are connected to his views on morality and human nature. In Part II, I begin with MacIntyre's position concerning the virtues and modern moral philosophy and then reconstruct, ex pede Herculem, his views on rationality. Part III examines the prospects of reconciling the perspectives discussed in the first two sections. (shrink)
- (1 other version)History and the manifest image: Hayden white as a philosopher of history1.Paul A. Roth -2013 -History and Theory 52 (1):130-143.
- The disappearance of the empirical: Some reflections on contemporary culture theory and historiography.Paul Roth -2007 -Journal of the Philosophy of History 1 (3):271-292.This paper surveys the parallel fates of the notion of the empirical in philosophy of science in the 20th century and the notion of experience as evidence in one important line of debate in historiography/philosophy of history. The focus concerns the presumably crucial role some notion of the empirical plays in the assessment of knowledge claims. The significance of 'the empirical' disappears on the assumption that theories either determine what counts as experience or explain away any apparently discordant evidence. One (...) consequence of this has been the suggestion that the analysis of meaning somehow replaces or supplants that played by evidence qua fact. This dispute impacts in parallel ways the turf wars between philosophers of science and practitioners of science studies as well as disputes in historiography between literary theorists and those not so kindly disposed. The parallels suggest why historiographic debate has stalled for three decades. (shrink)
- Hayden White and the Aesthetics of Historiography.Paul A. Roth -1992 -History of the Human Sciences 5 (1):17-35.
- The End of Histories? Review Essay of Alexander Rosenberg’s How History Gets Things Wrong: the Neuroscience of Our Addiction to Stories.Mariana Imaz-Sheinbaum &Paul A. Roth -forthcoming -Journal of the Philosophy of History:1-9.Alex Rosenberg’s latest book purports to establish that narrative history cannot have any epistemic value. Rosenberg argues not for the replacement of narrative history by something more science-like, but rather the end of histories understood as an account of human doings under a certain description. This review critiques three of his main arguments: 1) narrative history must root its explanations in folk psychology, 2) there are no beliefs nor desires guiding human action, and 3) historical narratives are morally and ethically (...) pernicious. Rosenberg’s book reprises themes about action explanation he first rehearsed 40 years ago, albeit with neuroscience rather than sociobiology now “preempting” explanations that trade on folk psychological notions. Although Rosenberg’s argument strategy has not altered, the review develops a number of reasons as to why his approach now lacks any plausibility as a strategy for explaining histories, much less a successful one. (shrink)
- Made or Found? On Genesis and Genealogy.Paul A. Roth -2024 -Analysis 84 (2):345-357.No categories
- Searleworld.Paul A. Roth -2012 -History and Theory 51 (1):123-142.ABSTRACTJohn Searle's most recent effort to account for human social institutions claims to provide a synthesis of the explanatory and the normative while simultaneously dismissing as confused and wrongheaded theorists who held otherwise. Searle, although doubtless alert to the usual considerations for separating the normative and the explanatory projects, announces at the outset that he conceives of matters quite differently. Searle's reason for reconceiving the field rests on his claim that both ends can be achieved by a single “underlying principle (...) of social ontology”. This principle, he maintains, proves basic both to any explanation of how the social arises and sustains itself as well as to all justifications of core common norms, for example, human rights. His approach transforms what previously appeared to be ontological/explanatory questions completely into semantic/conceptual issues. By situating language as constitutive of the social, and intentionality as a necessary conceptual precursor to language, Searle claims to join by semantic necessity philosophical projects that the philosophical tradition that he rejects held distinct. Searle's notion of the social comes for free once one has language as a conventional cloak for prelinguistic, semantically well‐formed intentional contents, individual and collective. But upon examination, Searle's key argument for displacement of the tradition depends upon the viability of his linguistic mechanism, and that in turn requires prelinguistic necessity for all forms of intentionality. But he can produce no compelling connection, conceptual or empirical, to establish the role that collective intentionality supposedly must play. (shrink)
- Kitcher's two cultures.Paul A. Roth -2003 -Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (3):386-405.
- The epistemology of science after Quine.Paul A. Roth -2005 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos,The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. New York: Routledge. pp. 3.
- Editor’s Introduction:“What Does History Matter to...?”.Paul A. Roth -2011 -Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (3):301-307.
- Ghosts and the Machine: Philosophy of Social Science in Contemporary Perspective.S. Turner &P. Roth -2003 - In Stephen P. Turner & Paul Andrew Roth,The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 1--17.
- Symposium: Does Cross-Cultural Philosophy Stand in Need of a Hermeneutic Expansion?Douglas L. Berger,Hans-Georg Moeller,A. Raghuramaraju &Paul A. Roth -2017 -Journal of World Philosophies 2 (1):121-143.Does cross-cultural philosophy stand in need of a hermeneutical expansion? In engaging with this question, the symposium focuses upon methodological issues salient to cross-cultural inquiry. Douglas L. Berger lays out the ground for the debate by arguing for a methodological approach, which is able to rectify the discipline’s colonial legacies and bridge the hermeneutical distance with its objects of study. From their own perspectives, Hans-Georg Moeller, Paul Roth and A. Raghuramaraju analyze whether such a processual and hermeneutically-sensitive approach can indeed (...) open up new hermeneutic horizons. Their responses shed light upon cross-cultural philosophy’s continued embedment in Euroamerican professional philosophy and how the locality of its knowledge-seeking endeavors may indeed have repercussions on attempts to bridge temporal and spatial distances. (shrink)No categories
- Analytic Philosophy of History.Paul Roth -2016 -Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 37 (2):351-374.
- Testing normative naturalism: The problem of scientific medicine.Ronald Munson &Paul Roth -1994 -British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):571-584.Laudan's normative naturalism' claims to account for the success of science by construing theories and other claims as methodological rules interpreted as defeasible hypothetical imperatives for securing cognitive ends. We ask two questions regarding the adequacy for medicine of Laudan's meta- methodology. First, although Laudan denies that general aims can be assigned to a science, we show that this is not the case for medicine. Second, we argue that Laudan's account yields mixed results as a tool for evaluating methodological rules (...) in medicine. These shortcomings call into question the adequacy of normative naturalism as a meta-methodology for science. (shrink)
- Chaos, Clio, and Scientistic Illusions of Understanding.Paul A. Roth &Thomas A. Ryckman -1995 -History and Theory 34 (1):30-44.A number of authors have recently argued that the mathematical insights of "chaos theory" offer a promising formal model or significant analogy for understanding at least some historical events. We examine a representative claim of each kind regarding the application of chaos theory to problems of historical explanation. We identify two lines of argument. One we term the Causal Thesis, which states that chaos theory may be used to plausibly model, and so explain, historical events. The other we term the (...) Convergence Thesis, which holds that, once the analogy between history and chaos theory is properly appreciated, any temptation to divide history from the rest of science should be greatly lessened. We argue that the proffered analogy between chaos theory and history falls apart upon closer analysis. The promised benefits of chaos theory vis-à-vis history are either fantastic or, at best, an extremely loose heuristic which, while retaining nothing of the considerable intrinsic interest of nonlinear dynamics, easily seduces the unwary into taking at face value terms and concepts that have a specifically precise meaning only within the confines of mathematical theory. (shrink)
- Logic and Translation.Paul A. Roth -1982 -Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):154-163.
- On missing Neurath's boat: Some reflections on recent Quine literature.Paul A. Roth -1984 -Synthese 61 (2):205-231.
- The bureaucratic turn: Weber contra Hempel in Fuller's social epistemology.Paul A. Roth -1991 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 34 (3-4):365 – 376.Like the positivists, Fuller is concerned to demarcate and systematically evaluate scientific claims and practices. Fuller corrects and reforms the positivist enterprise in light of his sociological naturalism. What Fuller's analysis brings to the fore is how the naturalization of epistemology makes the power?knowledge relation into an epistemological issue. Yet, in his writings. Fuller is radically divided with respect to how to react to this fact. Specifically, Fuller vacillates between, on the one hand, a concern for democratizing norms and, on (...) the other hand, a Machiavellian impulse for the maximization of the norms of knowledge production. I argue that his commitment to being both a democratizer and a Machiavellian is inconsistent, and, moreover, that his argument for democratizing normative pursuits rules out, in fact, his more Machiavellian proclivities regarding how most efficiently to realize the norms of knowledge production. (shrink)
- What does the sociology of scientific knowledge explain?: or, when epistemological chickens come home to roost.Paul A. Roth -1994 -History of the Human Sciences 7 (1):95-108.
- Diskurse über induzierte pluripotente Stammzellforschung und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Gestaltung sozialkompatibler Lösungen – eine interdisziplinäre Bestandsaufnahme.Vasilija Rolfes,Helene Gerhards,Janet Opper,Uta Bittner,Phillip H. Roth,Heiner Fangerau,Ulrich M. Gassner &Renate Martinsen -2017 -Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft Und Ethik 22 (1):65-86.Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik Jahrgang: 22 Heft: 1 Seiten: 65-86.
- Holocaust studies: what is to be learned?Mark S. Peacock &Paul A. Roth -2004 -History of the Human Sciences 17 (2-3):1-13.
- Special Issue: Selected Papers from the ENPOSS Meeting, Venice 3-4 September 2013.Julie Zahle,Byron Kaldis,Alban Bouvier,Paul Roth,Eleonora Montuschi,James Bohman,Stephen Turner,Alison Wylie &Jesus Zamora-Bonilla -2014 -Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (1).Export citation
Bookmark - Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Time.Paul A. Roth -2002 -Common Knowledge 8 (2):418-419.
- Responses to 'in defense of relativism'.Robert Ackermann,Brian Baigrie,Harold I. Brown,Michael Cavanaugh,Paul Fox-Strangways,Gonzalo Munevar,Stephen David Ross,Philip Pettit,Paul Roth,Frederick Schmitt,Stephen Turner &Charles Wallis -1988 -Social Epistemology 2 (3):227 – 261.
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
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