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What is consciousness? brentano suggests that consciousness is a simple binary relation between a self and an object. in this paper, i offer a textual clarification and a qualified philosophical defense of brentano's suggestion. in part i, i indicate the ordinary facts of subjective experience that any adequate theory of consciousness must account for. in part ii, i argue on textual grounds that brentano's theory has been misunderstood by chisholm. in part iii, i argue that brentano's theory meets the conditions (...) of an adequate theory. (shrink)

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Gun violence in American and Canadian schools is an ongoing tragedy that goes substantially beyond its roots in the interlocking emotional and behavioral issues of mental health and bullying. In light of the need for effective policy development, Dianne T. Gereluk, J.Kent Donlevy, and Merlin B. Thompson examine gun violence in schools from several relevant perspectives in this article. The authors consider the principle of standard of care as it relates to parents, teachers, and community members in a (...) particular school's context. They posit that normative principles may provide a procedural mechanism appropriate for policymakers and practitioners when contemplating and implementing heightened security measures. Finally, they propose Rawlsian reasonableness as an effective and deliberative democratic process that reduces emotional, reactive responses to school shootings. Through these overlapping concepts, the authors advocate for purposeful discussions regarding gun violence in schools based on the unique pragmatic, educational, social, political, and contextual circumstances of individual schools and their surrounding communities. (shrink)

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Corruption devours profits, people, and the planet. Ethical leaders promote ethical behaviors. We develop a first-stage moderated mediation theoretical model, explore the intricate relationships between ethical leadership and employee ethical behaviors, and treat ethical climate and organizational justice as dual mediators and leaders’ moral attentiveness as a moderator. We investigate leadership from two perspectives—leaders’ self-evaluation of moral attentiveness and members’ perceptions of ethical leadership. We theorize: These dual mediation mechanisms are more robust for high moral leaders than low moral leaders. (...) Our three-wave data collected from multiple sources, 236 members and 98 immediate supervisors in the Republic of Iraq, support our theory. Specifically, ethical leadership robustly impacts organizational justice’s intensity and magnitude, leading to high employee ethical behaviors when leaders’ moral attentiveness is high than low. However, ethical leadership only influences the ethical climate’s intensity but has no impact on the magnitude when leaders’ moral attentiveness is high than low. Therefore, organizational justice is a more robust mediator than the ethical climate in the omnibus context of leader moral attentiveness. Our findings support Western theory and constructs, demonstrating a new theory for Muslims in Arabic’s emerging markets. Individual decision-makers apply their values as a lens to frame their concerns in the immediate and omnibus contexts to maximize their expected utility and ultimate serenity-happiness. Ethical leadership trickles down to employee ethical behaviors, providing practical implications for improving the ethical environment, corporate social responsibility, leader-member exchange, business ethics, and economic potentials in the global competitive markets. (shrink)

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This paper defends a purely semantic notionof what is said against various recent objections. Theobjections each cite some sort of linguistic,psychological, or epistemological fact that issupposed to show that on any viable notion of what aspeaker says in uttering a sentence, there ispragmatic intrusion into what is said. Relying on amodified version of Grice's notion, on which what issaid must be a projection of the syntax of the utteredsentence, I argue that a purely semantic notion isneeded to account for the (...) linguistically determinedinput to the hearer's inference to what, if anything,the speaker intends to be conveying in uttering thesentence. (shrink)

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A timely collection of advanced, original material in the area of statistical methodology motivated by geometric problems, dedicated to the influential work of Kanti V. Mardia This volume celebrates Kanti V. Mardia's long and influential career in statistics. A common theme unifying much of Mardia’s work is the importance of geometry in statistics, and to highlight the areas emphasized in his research this book brings together 16 contributions from high-profile researchers in the field. Geometry Driven Statistics covers a wide range (...) of application areas including directional data, shape analysis, spatial data, climate science, fingerprints, image analysis, computer vision and bioinformatics. The book will appeal to statisticians and others with an interest in data motivated by geometric considerations. Summarizing the state of the art, examining some new developments and presenting a vision for the future, Geometry Driven Statistics will enable the reader to broaden knowledge of important research areas in statistics and gain a new appreciation of the work and influence of Kanti V. Mardia. (shrink)

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This paper contests social psychology’s emphasis on the biased, erroneous, and constructed nature of social cognition by: showing how the extent of bias and error in classic research is overstated; summarizing research regarding the accuracy of social beliefs; and describing how social stereotypes sometimes improve person perception accuracy. A Goodness of Judgment Index is also presented to extract evidence regarding accuracy from research focusing on bias. We conclude that accuracy is necessary for understanding social cognition.

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Consumer involvement in clinical research is an essential component of a comprehensive response during emergent health challenges. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the moderation of research policies and regulation to facilitate research may raise ethical issues. Meaningful, diverse consumer involvement can help to identify practical approaches to prioritize, design, and conduct rapidly developed clinical research amid current events. Consumer involvement might also elucidate the acceptability of flexible ethics review approaches that aim to protect participants whilst being sensitive to the challenging context (...) in which research is taking place. This article describes the main ethical challenges arising from pandemic research and how involving consumers and the community could enable resolution of such issues. (shrink)

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I thank my critics for time, thought, and effort put into their commentaries. Since obviously I can’t respond to everything, I will try to address what strike me as the most important questions they ask and objections they raise. I think I have decent answers to some questions and decent responses to some objections, in other cases it seems enough to clarify the relevant view, and in still others I need to modify the view in question. One complication, which I (...) won’t elaborate on, is that the views under consideration have evolved, or at least changed, over the years, so that my critics are aiming at a moving target, albeit a slowly moving one. Before responding, I will sketch some of the main ideas behind my view, including their unifying motivation, and mention a few key distinctions that are particularly relevant to topics addressed by my critics. (shrink)

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It is widely though not universally accepted what speakers refer to in using demonstratives or “discretionary” (as opposed to “automatic”) indexicals depends on their intentions. Even so, people tend not to appreciate the consequences of this claim for the view that demonstratives and most indexicals refer as a function of context: these expressions suffer from a “character deficiency.” No wonder I am asked from time to time why I resist the temptation to include speaker intentions as a parameter of context. (...) So I thought it would be a good idea to compile some of the scattered statements of my main reasons for this evidently radical view. (shrink)

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There are many mean and nasty things to say about mean and nasty talk, but I don't plan on saying any of them. There's a specific problem about slurring words that I want to address. This is a semantic problem. It's not very important compared to the real-world problems presented by bigotry, racism, discrimination, and worse. It's important only to linguistics and the philosophy of language.

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What would it mean to apply quantum theory, without restriction and without involving any notion of measurement and state reduction, to the whole universe? What would realism about the quantum state then imply? This book brings together an illustrious team of philosophers and physicists to debate these questions. The contributors broadly agree on the need, or aspiration, for a realist theory that unites micro- and macro-worlds. But they disagree on what this implies. Some argue that if unitary quantum evolution has (...) unrestricted application, and if the quantum state is taken to be something physically real, then this universe emerges from the quantum state as one of countless others, constantly branching in time, all of which are real. The result, they argue, is many worlds quantum theory, also known as the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. No other realist interpretation of unitary quantum theory has ever been found. Others argue in reply that this picture of many worlds is in no sense inherent to quantum theory, or fails to make physical sense, or is scientifically inadequate. The stuff of these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained, nor are the worlds precisely defined; ordinary ideas about time and identity over time are compromised; no satisfactory role or substitute for probability can be found in many worlds theories; they can't explain experimental data; anyway, there are attractive realist alternatives to many worlds. Twenty original essays, accompanied by commentaries and discussions, examine these claims and counterclaims in depth. They consider questions of ontology - the existence of worlds; probability - whether and how probability can be related to the branching structure of the quantum state; alternatives to many worlds - whether there are one-world realist interpretations of quantum theory that leave quantum dynamics unchanged; and open questions even given many worlds, including the multiverse concept as it has arisen elsewhere in modern cosmology. A comprehensive introduction lays out the main arguments of the book, which provides a state-of-the-art guide to many worlds quantum theory and its problems. (shrink)

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What bothers people about reliabilism as a theory of justified belief? It has yet to be formulated adequately, but most philosophical theories have that problem. People seem to be bothered by the very idea of reliabilism, with its apparent disregard for believers’ rationality and responsibility. Yet its supporters can’t seem to understand its opponents complaints. I believe that the conflict can be clarified, if not resolved, by drawing certain important distinctions.

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1. Sentences have implicatures. (11, 14, 19)** 2. Implicatures are inferences. (12. 14) 3. Implicatures can’t be entailments. 4. Gricean maxims apply only to implicatures. (16, 17) 5. For what is implicated to be figured out, what is said must be determined first. (12, 13) 6. All pragmatic implications are implicatures. 7. Implicatures are not part of the truth-conditional contents of utterances. (20) 8. If something is meant but unsaid, it must be implicated. (20) 9. Scalar “implicatures” are implicatures. (11) (...) 10. Conventional “implicatures” are implicatures. (shrink)

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© 2017. The American Astronomical Society. All rights reserved.We present new observations of the low-mass companion to HD 984 taken with the Gemini Planet Imager as a part of the GPI Exoplanet Survey campaign. Images of HD 984 B were obtained in the J and H bands. Combined with archival epochs from 2012 and 2014, we fit the first orbit to the companion to find an 18 au orbit with a 68% confidence interval between 14 and 28 au, an eccentricity (...) of 0.18 with a 68% confidence interval between 0.05 and 0.47, and an inclination of 119°with a 68% confidence interval between 114°and 125°. To address the considerable spectral covariance in both spectra, we present a method of splitting the spectra into low and high frequencies to analyze the spectral structure at different spatial frequencies with the proper spectral noise correlation. Using the split spectra, we compare them to known spectral types using field brown dwarf and low-mass star spectra and find a best-fit match of a field gravity M6.5 ±1.5 spectral type with a corresponding temperature of K. Photometry of the companion yields a luminosity of log=2.88 ± 0.07 dex with DUSTY models. Mass estimates, again from DUSTY models, find an age-dependent mass of 34 ±1 to 95 ±4 M Jup. These results are consistent with previous measurements of the object. (shrink)

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From widespread unemployment and mounting international hostilities, every day we are swept into more political chaos--so one brave man looks to the Star Wars universe for answers to our most urgent problems. "You can't stop the change -- anymore than you can stop the sun from setting." Anakin Skywalker was never able to live with this wisdom shared by his mother on the day he left home to train as a Jedi Knight. That failure led him to becoming the fearsome (...) villain we all know as Darth Vader. We're living in a time of unprecedented and rapid change. An age of chaos. Democracies are in decline worldwide. Dictators are ascendant. Civic organizations are crumbling. People feel lonelier and more rudderless than in any other time in recent history. We've tried to slow down, and in some cases we, like Anakin, have tried stop the change, but failed at every turn. The fears that come with living in an age of disruption have produced public anger, and that anger has swelled movements of hate. Author StephenKent believes part of the solution is hiding in plain sight. A story that binds together multiple generations with a common language, a moral framework, and a sense of wonder. It's Star Wars. What if we looked to Star Wars for more than just entertainment? How the Force Can Fix the World takes this challenge on by analyzing the core principles of the Star Wars franchise: HOPE, CHOICE, HUMILITY, EMPATHY, REDEMPTION, BALANCE and rejecting FEAR. Together, these are the Star Wars roadmap for living better lives, and maybe even fostering a better politics. The path that we're on -- where fear leads to anger, and anger to hatred -- will only end in suffering. But Star Wars shows us the way back from the brink. Shared stories of virtue that are beloved across cultures and political divides are hard to come by, but Star Wars is one such story. Turn on the news; things are pretty broken right now -- but the Force can fix the world. (shrink)

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Puzzles about sentences containing expressions of certain sorts, such as predicates of personal taste, epistemic modals, and ‘know’, have spawned families of views that go by the names of Contextualism and Relativism. In the case of predicates of personal taste, which I will be focusing on, contextualist views say that the contents of sentences like “Uni is delicious” and “The Aristocrats is hilarious” vary somehow with the context of utterance. Such a sentence semantically expresses different propositions in different contexts, depending (...) on what standard or perspective (or whose standard or perspective) is implicitly adverted to. According to relativist views, the propositional content of such a sentence is fixed, but what it takes for that proposition to be true varies somehow with the context, depending on the relevant standard or perspective. I will argue that such views are neither well supported by the data nor well motivated by the puzzles themselves. Even so, there is an element of truth in each. I will sketch an alternative view, dubbed Radical Invariantism, according to which the appearance of context sensitivity is illusory. Rather than impute either kind of context sensitivity to these sentences or to their contents, Radical Invariantism says that these sentences are distinguished by what they don’t do. Because they are not explicitly relativized, they leave a certain semantic slack. They fall short of fully expressing a proposition, instead expressing merely a “propositional radical.” We can explain away the appearance of semantic context sensitivity pragmatically, by taking into account facts about how, and under what conditions, speakers who use or encounter these sentences manage to pick up the slack. This can occur in either of two ways. Speakers either take a certain standard or perspective as understood, or else they treat the sentence as if it expresses a standard- or perspective-independent proposition even though it does not.. (shrink)

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Proper names seem simple on the surface. Indeed, anyone unfamiliar with philosophical debates about them might wonder what the fuss could possibly be about. It seems obvious why we need them and what we do with them, and that is to talk about particular persons, places, and things. You don't have to be as smart as Mill to think that proper names are simply tags attached to individuals. But sometimes appearances are deceiving.

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We hardly ever mean exactly what we say. I don’t mean that we generally speak figuratively or that we’re generally insincere. Rather, I mean that we generally speak loosely, omitting words that could have made what we meant more explicit and letting our audience fill in the gaps. Language works far more efficiently when we do that. Literalism can have its virtues, as when we’re drawing up a contract, programming a computer, or writing a philosophy paper, but we generally opt (...) for efficiency over explicitness. In.. (shrink)

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The purpose of this paper is to pick up the threads of a debate about the ontology of becoming in spacetime that was triggered by a provocative article published by Nicholas Maxwell in 1985. This debate is itself merely a recent episode in a long dialogue that goes back at least as far as the time of Parmenides and Heraclitus. Here is the question around which this debate centres: is change or becoming the distinguishing feature of the natural or physical (...) world, as suggested obscurely by Heraclitus and argued at length by Aristotle? Or is our usual uncritical belief in the reality of change the product of some sort of perceptual illusion or intellectual error, as believed by Parmenides and a small host of recent authors such as Gödel and Julian Barbour? I won’t be able to solve the whole of this momentous problem here. However, I intend both to set aside a few unwarranted assumptions which have for a long time dogged our thinking about the puzzle of becoming, and to assemble some tools which should aid in finding a solution to it. In particular, I will argue that we can do much better than is usually supposed in identifying structures which can both “live” within Minkowski spacetime and represent objective becoming. I shall also discuss whether such structures would necessarily contradict the Principle. (shrink)

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Influenced by the Wittgensteinian slogan “Don’t look for the meaning, look for the use,” ordinary language philosophers aimed to defuse various philosophical problems by analyzing key words in terms of what they are used to do or the conditions for appropriately using them. Although Moore, Grice and Searle exposed this error – mixing pragmatics with semantics – it still gets committed, now to a different end. Nowadays the aim is to reckon with the fact that the meanings of a great (...) many sentences underdetermine what we would normally mean in using them – even if the sentence is free of indexicality, ambiguity, and vagueness. This can be so because the sentence expresses a “minimal” proposition or even because it doesn’t fully express any proposition. Many theorists are led to defend “truth-conditional pragmatics” (or linguistic “contextualism”), to find a hidden indexical in every syntactic nook or semantic cranny, or otherwise to pay undue respect to seemingly semantic intuitions and intentions. This paper identifies various such moves and explains what’s regressive about them. (shrink)

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This article makes a number of points about reference, both speaker reference and linguistic reference. The bottom line is simple: reference ain't easy — at least not nearly as easy as commonly supposed. Much of what speakers do that passes for reference is really something else, and much of what passes for linguistic reference is really nothing more than speaker reference. Referring is one of the basic things we do with words, and it would be a good idea to understand (...) what that involves and requires before worrying about the linguistic means by which this is done. (shrink)

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Epistemic possibilities are relative to bodies of information, or perspectives. To claim that something is epistemically possible is typically to claim that it is possible relative one’s own current perspective. We generally do this by using bare, unqualified epistemic possibility (EP) sentences, ones that don’t mention our perspective. The fact that epistemic possibilities are relative to perspectives suggests that these bare EP sentences fall short of fully expressing propositions, contrary to what both contextualists and relativists take for granted. Although they (...) rightly reject propositional invariantism, the implausible view that a bare EP sentence expresses the same classical (absolutely true or absolutely false) proposition in any context, they maintain that a change in perspective shifts either the sentence’s propositional content (to a proposition involving a different perspective) or its truth-value (the same perspectivally neutral proposition now evaluated from a different perspective). I deny that the semantic contents of bare EP sentences shift at all. But I also deny that these contents have truth-values. Rather, according to the radical invariantism I defend, these contents are not full-fledged propositions but merely propositional radicals. Only explicitly relativized EP sentences manage fully to express propositions, and these perspective-involving propositions are the only EP propositions there are. Nevertheless, bare EP sentences are perfectly capable of being used to assert EP propositions, because utterances of them implicitly allude to the relevant perspective. Various problem cases challenge radical invariantism to explain pragmatically which perspective is read into the utterance of a given bare EP sentence. Unlike contextualism and relativism, it can do this without having to resort to any semantic bells and whistles.. (shrink)

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Even though it’s based on a bad argument, there’s something to Strawson’s dictum. He might have likened ‘referring expression’ to phrases like ‘eating utensil’ and ‘dining room’: just as utensils don’t eat and dining rooms don’t dine, so, he might have argued, expressions don’t refer. Actually, that wasn’t his argument, though it does make you wonder. Rather, Strawson exploited the fact that almost any referring expression, whether an indexical, demonstrative, proper name, or definite description, can be used to refer to (...) different things in different contexts. This fact, he argued, is enough to show that what refers are speakers, not expressions. Here he didn’t take seriously the perfectly coherent view that an expression’s reference can vary with context. So, he concluded, what varies from context to context is not what a given expression refers to but what a speaker uses it to refer to. Strawson went on to suggest that there are several dimensions of difference between various sorts of referring expressions: degree of dependence on context, degree of “descriptive meaning,” and being governed by a general convention vs. an expressionspecific one. But despite these differences, he insisted that regardless of kind, referring expressions don’t themselves refer — speakers use them to refer. (shrink)

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A word, phrase, or sentence is ambiguous if it has more than one meaning. The word 'light', for example, can mean not very heavy or not very dark. Words like 'light', 'note', 'bear' and 'over' are lexically ambiguous. They induce ambiguity in phrases or sentences in which they occur, such as 'light suit' and 'The duchess can't bear children'. However, phrases and sentences can be ambiguous even if none of their constituents is. The phrase 'porcelain egg container' is structurally ambiguous, (...) as is the sentence 'The police shot the rioters with guns'. Ambiguity can have both a lexical and a structural basis, as with sentences like 'I left her behind for you' and 'He saw her duck'. (shrink)

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Think of linguistification by analogy with personification: attributing linguistic properties to nonlinguistic phenomena. For my purposes, it also includes attributing nonlinguistic properties to linguistic items, i.e., treating nonlinguistic properties as linguistic. Linguistification is widespread. It has reached epidemic proportions. It needs to be eradicated. That’s important because the process of communication is not simply a matter of one person putting a thought into words and another decoding them back into the same thought. Much of what a speaker means cannot be (...) traced to what his words mean or to their possibly context-sensitive semantic contents. Words carry information all right, but that information hardly determines what speakers mean in uttering them. They leave plenty of pragmatic gaps and sometimes even semantic slack. I’ll mention various reasons for that, but the important thing is to recognize how much people exploit extralinguistic information in communicating and to avoid confusing this process with semantic context sensitivity. To appreciate the limitations of semantics, we shouldn’t fall for the fallacy of misplaced information or for the more specific fallacies enumerated below. (shrink)

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If you think that semantic minimalism is the only alternative to contextualism but you’d rather do without Cappelen and Lepore’s mysteriously minimal “propositions,” you can. You just have to recognize that being semantically incomplete does not make a sentence context-sensitive. You don’t have to go through the ritual of repeatedly incanting things like this: “John is ready” expresses the proposition that John is ready. Instead, you can opt for Radical Minimalism and suppose that “John is ready” and its ilk fall (...) short of semantically expressing propositions – their semantic contents are propositional “radicals.” Now C&L think they’ve addressed Radical Minimalism and offered objections to it. So they find it strange and bizarre that I think they haven’t. In fact, they persist in confusing semantic incompleteness with context sensitivity. If they appreciated the difference, they might even welcome the opportunity to adopt a form of semantic minimalism that does without the minimal propositions that everyone but them find incredible (pun intended). (shrink)

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In my commentary on Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore’s aptly titled book, Insensitive Semantics, I stake out a middle ground between their version of Semantic Minimalism and Contextualism. My kind of Semantic Minimalism does without the “minimal propositions” posited by C&L. It allows that some sentences do not express propositions, even relative to contexts. Instead, they are semantically incomplete. It is not a form of contextualism, since being semantically incomplete is not a way of being context-sensitive. In their reply to (...) my commentary, C&L seem to miss this point. Exaggerating the force of their slippery slope argument, they continue to suppose that contextualism is the only alternative to their version of minimalism. They contend that I haven’t replied to their central criticism, but in fact they haven’t replied to mine. (shrink)

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This paper motivates using explicit methods in linguistics by attempting to estimate the size of a linguistic data set. Such estimations are difficult because redundant data can easily pad the data set. To address this, I offer some explicit operationalizations of the data and their features. But for linguistic data, negative associations don’t indicate true redundancy, and yet for many measures they can be mathematically impossible to ignore. It is proven that this troublesome phenomenon has positive Lebesgue measure, is monotonically (...) increasing, and that these two features hold robustly in four different ways. (shrink)

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In this paper, I examine William Whewell’s (1794–1866) ‘Discoverer’s Induction’, and argue that it 21 supplies a strikingly accurate characterization of the logic behind many statistical methods, exploratory 22 data analysis (EDA) in particular. Such methods are additionally well-suited as a point of evaluation of 23 Whewell’s philosophy since the central techniques of EDA were not invented until after Whewell’s death, 24 and so couldn’t have influenced his views. The fact that the quantitative details of some very general 25 methods (...) designed to suggest hypotheses would so closely resemble Whewell’s views of how theories 26 are formed is, I suggest, a strongly positive comment on these views. (shrink)

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Suppose that I stand firmly in what Alasdair MacIntyre describes as the Thomistic tradition of moral enquiry. I try my best to recover a historical understanding of Aquinas's teachings, and I refuse to let my philosophical opponents set the terms of debate. Now suppose that you yourself are one of my opponents: a Buddhist, a Jew, a Muslim or perhaps a secular humanist. Finally, suppose that I have always found you a considerate neighbour, a friendly and responsible colleague, and a (...) reliable contributor to worthy causes: you run the neighbourhood recycling programme, do volunteer work at an AIDS hospice, and serve as den mother of your son's Cub Scout troop. All of my experience suggests that you are, by commonly accepted standards, morally admirable; but you don't believe in God, or at least your own understanding of God and God's law differs significantly from my own. Am I, as a loyal Thomist, able to acknowledge your virtues? Or must I dismiss them all as merely apparent? (shrink)

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Sherlock Holmes is reputed to have once remarked impatiently to his earnest but plodding colleague Watson, “How often have I said to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?” In Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity, Tim Maudlin offers us a thorough and provocative argument based on this methodological principle. Maudlin insists that all explanations of the mysterious non-local correlations of quantum mechanics must by now be rejected except one: distant events in quantum (...) systems really are “causally implicated” in a way that directly challenges the theory of relativity. Physicists and philosophers of science have made virtually every conceivable move to avoid this unsettling conclusion, including tinkering with the basic formalism or interpretation of the theory, and Arthur Fine’s oddly postmodernist recommendation that we should abandon as outmoded “essentialism” all hope of explaining the correlations. However, the threat to relativity just won’t go away. Maudlin argues that we should have paid better attention in the first place to J. S. Bell, who “concluded that violations of [his] inequality demonstrate that the world is not locally causal.... Instead of trying to deny these non-local influences, we should begin to study the role such influences must play in generating the phenomena”. (shrink)

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Stanley’s insightful new book refines his earlier formulation of intellectualism. Indeed, it does a whole lot more, but leaves open some tough questions. He makes a powerful case for the view that knowing how to do something is to know, of a certain way, that one could do that thing in that way. But he says surprisingly little about what ways are, and how they might differ, depending on the kind of case. And he doesn't exclude the possibility that in (...) some cases what one knows in knowing-how is a way of doing something rather than a fact about a way of doing it. (shrink)

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The late Sir George Hill in the first volume of his monumental History of Cyprus remarks that the Cypriot syllabary is found in use until the third century B.C. This, it may be noted, is the traditional opinion which for some sixty years has stood the test of time. I read therefore with interest on p. 330 of the same volume, among the addenda, that ‘pottery with incised inscriptions, discovered in 1939 in an excavation four miles from Nicosia, shows that (...) the syllabary continued to be used as late as the first century B.C.’ Sir George Hill in effect is here accepting the claim of Mrs. E. H. Dohan and Professor R. G.Kent, which he has hitherto ignored, that the syllabary survived until 50 B.C. Now this is an important claim, partly because it would add from two to three centuries to the life-span of a script already in possession of a long and reputable lineage; more particularly because, if true, it will convict the ancient Cypriot, admittedly a conservative individual, of a degree of conservatism with which I find it hard to credit even him. That there should still have been men in the hinterland of the island under the governorship of Cicero so little affected by the impact of the whole Hellenistic age that they were prepared to write Greek in a manner so uncouth and preserve, incidentally, certain elements of their old Arcadian tongue, is to my thinking highly improbable. A fresh examination of the evidence on which Mrs. Dohan and ProfessorKent based their claim is clearly called for. (shrink)

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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Madness, Reason, and PrideRichard G.T. Gipps, PhD (bio)MadnessQuestions such as “what’s madness?” or “what’s reason?” carry no singular sense about with them wherever they go—which isn’t to say that, asked out of a particular interest in a particular context, they can’t be perfectly intelligible. Garson (2023) is wise to this when he follows “what is madness?” with “as opposed to what?”, even if this latter question itself hardly enjoys (...) a clear sense in the initial context of his asking. What counts as a satisfactory answer to “what’s x?” varies, so that sometimes we’ll be satisfied with a name, at other times by information about something’s genus, origin, function, or composition. Things get notoriously tricky when in the philosophical context the question is asked with a presumption of intelligibility despite ‘x’ being, say, an abstract noun formed from an adjective (‘consciousness’ out of ‘conscious’; ‘happiness’ out of ‘happy’; ‘madness’ out of ‘mad,’ etc.). For “what is?” questions are typically most perspicuously mooted when what’s being pursued are enquiries into (what we might call) the ‘essential nature’ of (what philosophers used to call) ‘substances’ or (of what are more ordinarily called) types of ‘thing’ or ‘entity.’ Invoke, by taking one’s lead from the fact that an ‘x’ is grammatically speaking a substantive, the specter of substance, and you can endlessly baffle yourself by now pondering the mysteries of the putative thing. (Vide discussions of “the nature of consciousness.”) Hence the boon of instead pursuing questions of an ‘opposed to what?’ sort; hence Wittgenstein considering using the Earl ofKent’s “I’ll teach you differences” (King Lear) as a motto for his Investigations. Rather more reflective wisdom regarding ‘x’ may thus be gained when we learn to contrast it with ‘y’ and ‘z’ than when peering into x’s non-existent constitution or groping for its never-instituted genus.Later, I make the case that Garson’s conception of reason itself might suffer from a form of substantialization and that, if I’m right in this, troubling implications follow for his approach to madness. But let’s begin by considering his enquiry into the relation of madness, idiocy and reason. So perhaps we’re reflecting on matters legal, and considering—since we’d hitherto been inclined to take ‘reason’ as univocal—what justifies our different treatments of the insane, the intellectually subnormal, and the normal. Or perhaps—proceeding from the same inclination—we’re puzzled by how someone may boast an exceptional IQ or demonstrate marvelous formal rationality (i.e., make deductions of a sort which would please the logician if no-one else) and yet still be quite mad. And then we realize that at which Garson’s Late Moderns seem to have been gesturing: The lack of reason qua intelligence in idiocy is a different [End Page 307] species from the lack of reason qua sanity in madness. An amethyst is lifeless in a different manner than an expired possum (it was never living, never moribund); the arational lack reason in a different sense than do the irrational (and a baobab cannot jump to conclusions.) There is, say his Late Modern theorists, something ‘perverse’ rather than simply deficient about the irrationality of madness.Now an important part of Garson’s thesis has it that “idiocy is a better candidate for the opposite of reason than madness.” One of the reasons for his making this claim is that he follows his Late Moderns in claiming that madness has reason somehow alive within it, albeit in an unconventional or surprising form. I return to his own explication of this below. Consider first, though, the different thought-referencing descriptions under which the speech acts of the thought-disordered, the speech-disordered, the delusional, and the learning disabled subject may be brought. The sufferer of speech disorder has difficulty with fluency or sound production, but once we get used to this we can find our way to the bona fide rational thought immanent within their discourse. The speech acts of the intellectually impaired subject aren’t chaotic, but instead want for invention and richness; they fail to express... (shrink)

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Bu çalışmanın amacı,kent kültürü ve kentlilik bilincinin gelişmesi noktasında kentin merkezi ve yerel yönetimlerine ait kurum ve kuruluşlarının, Erzincan Binali Yıldırım Üniversitesi akademik personelini ne derecede dikkate aldıklarını belirlemek, akademik personelinkent kültürü ve kentlilik bilincinin gelişimi konusundaki algı düzeylerini ortaya çıkarmak ve araştırma bulgularına dayalı olarak önerilerde bulunmaktır. Araştırmanın çalışma evrenini, Erzincan Binali Yıldırım Üniversitesi’nde görev yapan 1.086 akademik personel oluşturmaktadır. Çalışmaya Erzincan ilçelerinde bulunan yüksekokul ve meslek yüksekokulları zaman darlığı ve ulaşım zorluklarından dolayı dahil edilmemiştir. (...) Gerek yerleşkede gerekse yerleşke dışında bulunan tüm fakülte, yükse okul ve meslek yüksek okullarına anket formları elden ulaştırılmıştır. Tıp fakültesi ve Sağlık Hizmetleri yüksekokulu yöneticilerinin çalışmaya katkı vermek istememelerinden dolayı bu iki birim kapsamdışı tutulmuştur. Anket formları 268 kişi tarafından doldurulmuştur. Veri toplama aracı olarak nicel araştırma tekniği olan tarama deseni (anket deseni) kullanılmıştır. Anket soruları Belli ve Aydın’ın (2017) “Kent Kültürü ve Kentlilik Bilincinin Oluşumunda Üniversitelerin Rolü: Mustafa Kemal Üniversitesi Örneği” adlı çalışmasından alınmıştır. Araştırmada elde edilen verilerin çözümlenmesinde, sosyal bilimlerde istatistiksel analiz için oldukça yaygın olarak tercih edilen SPSS programı kullanılmıştır. Araştırma sonucuna göre; Erzincan Binali Yıldırım Üniversitesi akademik personeline,kent kültürü ve kentlilik bilincinin geliştirilmesi konusunda kentte yer alan diğer paydaşlar tarafından (merkezi ve yerel yönetimlere ait kurum ve kuruluşlar) hak ettikleri değerin verilmediği sonucu ortaya çıkmıştır. (shrink)

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Some secrets are fine to keep to ourselves, and others are not. At first glance, Clark’s secret seems to be fine, but it may not be if we look further into it. We all know Clark’s big secret: he is Superman. Secrets always belong to someone. This is one of the things that distinguish secrets from information we simply don’t have. Secrecy is morally neutral and can be used for good or bad ends. One other closely linked concept we must (...) distinguish from secrecy is privacy. ClarkKent is a citizen (sort of), but Superman is purely a public persona. In Superman, vol. 2, #2 (February 1987), Lex Luthor figured out Superman’s secret. Superman has confided his true identity to the Kents and Lana. In Clark’s case, there are several reasons for his secret, but the most compelling one is to protect his loved ones. (shrink)

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According toKent Bach (forthcoming), our book, Insensitive Semantics (IS), suffers from its 'implicit endorsement' of (1): (1) Every complete sentence expresses a proposition (this is Propositionalism, a fancy version of the old grammar school dictum that every complete sentence expresses a complete thought) (Bach (ms.)) In response (C&L, forthcoming), we claim to be unaware of endorsing (1). No argument in IS depends on (1), we say. We don't claim to have shown that that there couldn't be grammatical sentences (...) the semantic contents of which are not propositional. (shrink)

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In the early days, before Superman's full array of superpowers “developed,” ClarkKent's reporter persona was necessary for gathering information. Although he was pretty tough and fast, Superman didn't yet have the flight, the super‐hearing, the super‐vision, or the super‐intelligence that he would later have. The strategies that explain why a mere mortal or even a Golden Age Superman might not be up to meeting the demands of the S‐principle full time won’t apply to today's Superman. We may face (...) a choice: either we say goodbye to Clark or we abandon the S‐Principle. ClarkKent and Superman: We've had glimpses of worlds in which one exists without the other. But they're both normally there, and occasionally at odds. Jor‐El wants Superman to embrace his destiny as Earth's savior, Martha wants Clark to find a life for himself, and Lex wants Superman to leave and let humanity find its own path. (shrink)

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Lois is so easily deceived by Clark’s glasses and mild‐mannered demeanor because identity isn’t nearly as clear as we’d like to believe. In fact, may be there is a strong sense in which ClarkKent and Superman really are two different people. Memory isn't the right place to look for identity, unless we want to agree that Superman losing his memory would mean that he was, in effect, dead. If we look at personal identity as something we just kind (...) of make up about ourselves and others, basically as just using names to avoid confusion and complexity, then we can start to give Lois some slack for never realizing that Superman and Clark aren't the same person. When we name things, we give them a common‐sense version of identity, and Superman and Clark are given two different identities by society and even themselves. (shrink)

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The activism we don’t appreciate: Your HonorKent, my mother is a feminist and votes even if she doesn’t know she’s oppressed Resumen: Broncano mantiene que ocupar una situación de opresión no garantiza la lucidez necesaria para identificar la propia situación como injusta. Esta posición nos advierte que nos vamos a encontrar con casos de personas oprimidas que no tienen conocimiento sobre su situación de injusticia ni una actitud crítica hacia la misma. Lo que me interesa analizar en este (...) comentario es cómo afecta esto a la agencia política de esas personas. La conclusión que quiero evitar es la siguiente: Cuando no escuchamos a alguien que está oprimida pero que no conoce su situación de opresión, no la estamos traicionando como agente política, no la estamos silenciando como posible activista. En este comentario propongo un análisis de las quejas que nos permite escapar de esa conclusión. Las quejas de muchas mujeres han de entenderse como acción política, una acción política que no está necesariamente acompañada de conocimiento sobre la injusticia que sufren. Una vez entendemos sus quejas como activismo, ya no podemos excluir a estas mujeres como sujetos políticos en la lucha contra el sexismo. Este análisis de las quejas nos lleva a concluir que estas mujeres sí que pueden ser traicionadas como agentes políticas, aunque no tengan conocimiento de su situación de injusticia. Las traicionamos cuando no entendemos sus quejas como resistencia. Abstract: Broncano thinks that being oppressed does not guarantee knowing that you are oppressed. This view warns us that we are going to find people who are oppressed and who don’t have knowledge about their oppression nor a critical attitude towards their situation. What concerns me here is how this view affects the political agency of those people. The conclusion I want to avoid is as follows: When we don’t listen to someone who is oppressed but who doesn’t know their position as oppressed, we are not betraying them qua a political agent, we are not silencing them as a potential activist. I propose an analysis of complains that allows us to escape that conclusion. I propose that the complains expressed by many women should be understood as a political action, one that is not necessarily accompanied by knowledge of the injustice they are suffering. Once we see their complains as activism, we cannot exclude these women from the fight against sexism and deny their political agency. Under this analysis, women can be betrayed qua political agents even when they don’t have knowledge of their unjust situation. We betray them when we don’t understand their complains as resistance. Palabras clave: Conocimiento, agencia política, activismo, resistencia, quejas. Keywords: Knowledge, political agency, activism, resistance, complains. (shrink)

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Sosyal bilimler disiplininde erkeklik, multidisipliner bir alana işaret etmektedir. Erkekliğin hem bilim alanında hem de gündelik yaşamda nelere tekabül ettiğini anlamak için cinsiyete dair fikirlerin pratik zeminlerine bakılmalıdır. Toplumsal cinsiyet çalışmalarında, çoğunlukla kadınların sosyal ezilmişliklerine vurgular yapılmaktadır. Erkeklik çalışmaları tarihsel, kültürel ve toplumsal bir kurgu olarak, eril iktidarın kaynaklarına ışık tutmayı amaçlayan bir çalışma alanıdır. Erkekliğin kültürden ve dinden bağımsız bir olgu olarak düşünülmesi mümkün gözükmemektedir. Kadınlığa dair araştırmaların gelişimi içinde erkeklerin varlığı ihmal edilmektedir. Kadınların ezilmişliği nasıl yaşadığını anlamanın bir (...) yolu olarak bu çalışma, erkeklerin eril iktidar konumlarını nasıl sürdürdüklerini ve tahakkümlerini nasıl inşa ettiklerini anlama çabasıdır. Kadınlar, erkekliğin inşa sürecinde anne, cinsel partner, kız arkadaş, iş yeri arkadaşı vb. olarak merkezi bir öneme sahiptir. Sadece ataerkilliğin kurbanı olarak değil, ataerkil düzenin inşasında önemli bir kurucu olarak kadınların cinsiyetle ilişkili dinsel pratiklerine bakılması, erkekliğin sosyal kurgusunun nasıl oluştuğunun anlaşılmasına katkılar sunmaktadır. İslam dini özelinde toplumsal cinsiyet normlarının ve egemen erkeklik düşüncesinin dinsel zeminleri, kadınların erkeklik algıları ekseninde irdelenmektedir. Erkekliğin İslam dinindeki tasniflerinin, kadınlar tarafından nasıl anlaşıldığı, kadınların sosyal yaşamlarında nasıl karşılık bulduğunu, kadınların ezilmişlik ve dışlanmışlıklarında erkeklik-din ilişkisinin nasıl bir rol oynadığını sorgulayan bu araştırma, sahada toplanan veriler ışığında bazı sonuçlar çıkarmaktadır. Sahada yapılan görüşmeler neticesinde, kadın öğreticilerin erkeklere dönük feminist bir yaklaşıma sahip olmadıkları söylenebilir. Erkekler hakkında konuşurken, erkekleri tanımlarken ya da erkeklerin kadınları dışladığı tutum ve davranışlar tartışılırken dahi, feminist ideolojinin tanımlamalarına yer verilmediği görülmektedir. Elde edilen diğer bir sonuç, katılımcıların kıt akıllı, uğursuz ve şer sembolü biçimindeki eril tanımlamaların kadınları belli kalıplara sıkıştırılarak dizayn edilmeye çalışıldıklarının farkında olmalarıdır. Bu açılardan araştırmanın literatüre katkı sunacağı düşünülmektedir. (shrink)

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