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Abstract:Open-mindedness is typically at the top of any list of the intellectual or "epistemic" virtues. Yet, providing an account that simultaneously explains whyopen-mindedness is an epistemically valuable trait to have and how such a trait is compatible with full-blooded belief turns out to be a challenge. Building on the work of William Hare and Jonathan Adler, I defend a view ofopen-mindedness that meets this challenge. On this view,open-mindedness is (...) primarily an attitude toward oneself as a believer, rather than toward any particular belief. To beopen-minded is to be aware of one's fallibility as a believer, and to acknowledge the possibility that anytime one believes something, one could be wrong. In order to see that such an attitude is epistemically valuable even to an already virtuous agent, some details of the skills and habits of theopen-minded agent are elucidated. (shrink)

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Open-mindedness is generally regarded as an intellectual virtue because its exercise reliably leads to truth. However, some theorists have argued thatopen-mindedness’s truth-conduciveness is highly contingent, pointing out that it is either not truth-conducive at all under certain scenarios or no better than dogmatism or credulity in others. Given such shaky ties to truth, it would appear that the status ofopen-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is in jeopardy. In this paper, I propose to (...) defendopen-mindedness against these challenges. In particular, I show that the challenges are ill-founded because they misconstrue the nature ofopen-mindedness and fail to consider the requisite conditions of its application. With a proper understanding ofopen-mindedness and of its requirements, it is clear that recourse to it is indeed truth-conducive. (shrink)

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Open-mindedness is widely regarded as an epistemic virtue and, more recently, a moral one: its exercise is supposed to be conducive not only to the acquisition of epistemic goods such as truth, knowledge, and understanding, but also to the development of moral goods such as the promotion of social cohesion and the fostering of people’s respect and care for one another. This glossy view ofopen-mindedness, however, has come under challenge. Critics have argued that adopting a (...) default stance of openness can be detrimental to our epistemic and moral selves, especially in today’s world where fake news, attacks on the idea of truth, and blatant lies abound. The articles in this symposium by Howard Curzer and Jessica Gottlieb and by Matt Ferkany represent some of these challenges. Concerned with the question of when it is safe to exerciseopen-mindedness, both seek to identify the potential hazards that may arise as a result beingopen-minded and to propose ways to curtail those hazards. In this paper, I will assess each of their arguments in turn. (shrink)

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Open-mindedness is an under-explored topic in virtue epistemology, despite its assumed importance for the field. Questions about it abound and need to be answered. For example, what sort of intellectual activities are central to it? Can one beopen-minded about one's firmly held beliefs? Why should we strive to beopen-minded? This paper aims to shed light on these and other pertinent issues. In particular, it proposes a view that construesopen-mindedness as engagement, that (...) is, a willingness to entertain novel ideas in one's cognitive space and to accord them serious consideration. (shrink)

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Isopen-mindedness a moral virtue? Surprisingly, this question has not received much attention from philosophers. In this paper, we fill this lacuna by arguing that there are good grounds for thinking that it is. In particular, we show that the extant account ofopen-mindedness as a moral virtue faces an objection that appears to show that exercising the character trait may not be virtuous. To offset this objection, we argue that a much stronger argument can be (...) made for the case thatopen-mindedness is a moral virtue by appealing to the notion of moral understanding. Specifically, we provide a new rationale as to why we should exerciseopen-mindedness and offer several arguments to allay the concern that doing so can at times cause us to be in an epistemically and morally weaker position. (shrink)

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It’s intuitive to think that (a) the more sure you are of something, the harder it’ll be to change your mind about it, and (b) you can’t beopen-minded about something if you’re very sure about it. If these thoughts are right, then, with minimal assumptions, it follows that you can’t be in a good position to both escape echo chambers and be rationally resistant to fake news: the former requiresopen-mindedness, but the latter is inimical to (...) it. I argue that neither thought is true and that believing them will get us all mixed up. I show that you can beopen-minded and have confidently held beliefs, and that beliefs in which you are less sure are not, thereby, more fragile. I close with some reflections on the nature of rational belief change andopen-mindedness and a brief sketch about what might actually help us in the fight against misinformation and belief polarization …. [please read below the rest of the article]. (shrink)

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Key Concepts in World Philosophies, edited by Sarah Flavel and Chiara Robbiano, offers a comprehensive exploration of philosophies beyond the Western canon, particularly from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This review essay examines the book’s chief thematic clusters: embodiedness,open-mindedness, and Eurocentrism. Through forty-five chapters, the book challenges traditional notions of philosophy by emphasizing the embodied nature of philosophical inquiry, advocating foropen-mindedness and flexibility in approaching diverse perspectives, and critiquing Eurocentric biases. The book constitutes an (...) invaluable resource for diversifying and decolonizing the teaching of comparative and cross-cultural philosophy. (shrink)

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The current debate about disagreement has as rivals those who take the steadfast view and those who affirm conciliationism. Those on the steadfast side maintain that resolute commitment to a belief is reasonable despite peer disagreement. Conciliationists say that peer disagreement necessarily undermines warrant for one’s belief. This article discusses the relevance ofopen‐mindedness to the matter of peer disagreement. It shows how both the steadfast and the conciliatory perspective are consistent with a robust and substantive display of (...)open‐mindedness. However, it also turns out that there are more ways to displayopen‐mindedness on the steadfast view than on the conciliatory view. (shrink)

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What makes an intellectual virtue a virtue? A straightforward and influential answer to this question has been given by virtue-reliabilists: a trait is a virtue only insofar as it is truth-conducive. In this paper I shall contend that recent arguments advanced by Jack Kwong in defence of the reliabilist view are good as far as they go, in that they advance the debate by usefully clarifying ways in how best to understand the nature ofopen-mindedness. But I shall (...) argue that these considerations do not establish the desired conclusions thatopen-mindedness is truth-conducive. To establish these much stronger conclusions we would need an adequate reply to what I shall call Montmarquet’s objection. I argue that Linda Zagzebski’s reply to Montmarquet’s objection, to which Kwong defers, is inadequate. I conclude that it is contingent ifopen-mindedness is truth-conducive, and if a necessary tie to truth is what makes an intellectual virtue a virtue, then the status ofopen-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is jeopardised. We either need an adequate reliabilist response to Montmarquet’s objection, or else seek alternative accounts of what it is that makes a virtue a virtue. I conclude by briefly outlining some alternatives. (shrink)

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This paper introduces the notion ofopen‐mindedness before proceeding to outline its value to the practical activity of nursing. An argument is constructed to point to the desirability of the development of a virtue ofopen‐mindedness in nurses in order to complement evidence‐based practice. Attention is drawn to two failures ofopen‐mindedness (the vices of closed‐mindedness and credulousness), which have the potential both to restrict autonomous practice and to cause harm.

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William Hare has made fundamental contributions to philosophy of education. Among the most important of these contributions is his hugely important work onopen-mindedness. In this paper I explore the several relationships that exist between Hare’s favored educational ideal (open-mindedness) and my own (critical thinking). I argue that while both are of central importance, it is the latter that is the more fundamental of the two.

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To beopen-minded is to be willing to revise or entertain doubts about one’s beliefs. Commonly regarded as an intellectual virtue, and often too as a moral virtue,open-mindedness is a trait that is generally desirable for a person to have. However, in the major theistic traditions, absolute commitment to one’s religious beliefs is regarded as virtuous or ideal. But one cannot be completely resolved about an issue and at the same time beopen to revising (...) one’s beliefs about it. It appears, then, that religious devotion is inconsistent withopen-mindedness. The more religiously devout a person is, the more firmly she will hold to her convictions. And the stronger her belief commitments, the lessopen-minded she will be regarding these beliefs. So there appears to be a paradox here, where from the standpoint of religious devotion, it is virtuous to display an intellectual vice, namely closed-mindedness. I discuss this problem and explore some potential routes of escape from the paradox. (shrink)

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In a free society, it is common to hear the request that one â ~keep anopen mind.â Just what exactly is it, however, to keep anopen-mind? How doesopen-mindedness function? How does it square with important personal commitments? These issues are particularly acute when it comes to matters of religious belief in whichopen-mindedness can sound to the pious a bit too much like doubt. Certainly, in a discipline whose discourse remains rational (...) dialogue, effort should be spent discerning the contours of this virtue, especially in light of its formal role in establishing responsiveness to new inquiries in matters philosophical and religious. This book provides a collection of essays serving to promote conversation aboutopen-mindedness, its virtue, and its role and application in problems in the philosophy of religion in particular. (shrink)

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A philosophical conception ofopen-minded inquiry first emerges in western philosophy in the work of Socrates. This paper develops an interpretation of Socraticopen-mindedness drawing primarily on Socratic ideas about (i) the requirements of serious argument, and (ii) the nature of human wisdom. This account is defended against a number of objections which mistakenly interpret Socrates as defending, teaching, or inducing skepticism, and neglecting the value of expert wisdom. The ongoing significance of Socraticopen-mindedness as (...) an ideal of inquiry is brought out through examination of a notorious Canadian case in the context of forensic pathology. (shrink)

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Open-mindedness appears to be a cognitive disposition: anopen-minded person is disposed to gain, lose, and revise beliefs in a particular, reasonable way. It is also a moral virtue, for we blame, for example, the man who quickly comes to think a new neighbor untrustworthy because he drives the wrong car or wears the wrong clothes—for his closed-mindedness. Howopen–mindedness could be a moral virtue is a puzzle, though, because exercises of moral virtues are (...) expressions of moral concern, whereas gaining, losing, and revising beliefs are not actions and so cannot be actions taken out of moral concern. Solving this puzzle is the purpose of this essay. (shrink)

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Critical thinking is widely regarded as one of the main objectives of education in general terms, and also of science education. The idea of thinking critically, that is, to evaluate adequately and eventually embrace a certain claim only if there are good reasons for it, however, seems to contradict some popular conceptions about other educational ideal:open-mindedness. The purpose of this essay is to discuss how critical thinking andopen-mindedness are not exclusionary ideals, and how those (...) ideas are important for science education. (shrink)

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William Hare;Open-mindedness in the Classroom, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 251–259, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14.

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This paper proposes to examine Daniel Cohen’s recent attempt to apply virtues to argumentation theory, with special attention given to his explication of howopen-mindedness can be regarded as an argumentational or critical virtue. It is argued that his analysis involves a contentious claim aboutopen-mindedness as an epistemic virtue, which generates a tension for agents who are simultaneously both an arguer and a knower (or who strive to be both). I contend that this tension can (...) be eased or resolved by clarifying the nature ofopen-mindedness and by construingopen-mindedness in terms of its function. Specifically, a willingness to take a novel viewpoint seriously is sufficient for makingopen-mindedness both an epistemic and a critical virtue. (shrink)

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Whetheropen-mindedness (OM) counts as an admirable epistemic aim of education has been a surprisingly contentious matter. Skeptics point out that OM is only contingently truth-conducive and thatopen-minded students may be maladaptive to the hostile epistemic environment outside school. Here, Seunghyun Lee contends that, while these critiques are not without merit, they overlook the possibility of epistemic inhospitality within classrooms, and so mischaracterize the significance ofopen-mindedness in education. Viewing malicious forms of credibility influence (...) — namely from echo chambers and epistemic preemption — as a serious deterrent against our educational efforts, Lee argues that these epistemic practices point to the necessity ofopen-mindedness in education and, simultaneously, to its difficulty. He concludes by analyzing and offering potential strategies for classroom-based instruction. (shrink)

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In his account of phenomenological psychopathology, Karl Jaspers advocates for the central role of subjective experience, something which he maintains cannot be accessed through intellectual effort, but through “empathic understanding” alone. In contradistinction to Jaspers’ account, I propose that phenomenology, as a process of inquiry and investigation, is fundamentally epistemological. Accordingly, I offer an intellectual virtue characterization of phenomenological psychopathology, usingopen-mindedness to illustrate the close conceptual links between the phenomenological endeavor and the intellectual virtues. By introducing the (...) intellectual virtue lexicon into the phenomenological psychopathology discourse, I then offer three preliminary recommendations for the training and education of phenomenological clinicians. Centering the educational recommendations on the psychiatric interview, I suggest that good questioning, listening, and reflecting necessarily require cultivation for intellectually virtuous phenomenological inquiry. (shrink)

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Against Peter Gardner, this article re-asserts a conception ofopen-mindedness as not requiring either the indecision or neutrality of persons concerning their beliefs, but rather a willingness on their part to form or revise beliefs in the light of evidence and argument. This conception, it will be argued, yields an educational ideal which is both important and coherent. It not only avoids the difficulties which Gardner sees as inherent in the promotion ofopen-mindedness in children, but (...) also avoids some of the dangers implicit in his own view. (shrink)

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There was once a princess called Sophia,whose philosophy museum was superior.But most of the storesbecame locked behind doors,which led to collective amnesia.Then along came a band of ajar‐minders,who decided to issue remindersof the treasures insidethat hadn't yet died,and opened the doors to all finders.

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Closed-mindedness is a characteristic trait of irresponsible believers. For this reason and others, educators should actively discourage closed-mindedness in their students. One way to do this is to cultivate its opposing virtue:open-mindedness. Drawing on the work of William Hare, Danielle Diver defends the status ofopen-mindedness as an epistemic virtue and explains why it is truth-conducive, even in epistemically hostile environments. Diver goes on to argue thatopen-mindedness is fundamental to the (...) practice of philosophy and that teaching philosophy in schools, especially through the methods of Philosophy for Children (P4C), is an effective way to cultivateopen-mindedness in students. Teaching philosophy therefore has a valuable role to play in the education of responsible believers. (shrink)

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Open-mindedness enjoys widespread recognition as an intellectual virtue. This is evident, among other ways, in its appearance on nearly every list of intellectual virtues in the virtue epistemology literature.1 Despite its popularity, however, it is far from clear what exactlyopen-mindedness amounts to: that is, what sort of intellectual orientation or activity is essential to it. In fact, there are ways of thinking aboutopen-mindedness that cast serious doubt on its status as an intellectual (...) virtue. Consider the following description, from Robert Roberts and Jay Wood (2007), of a ‘bright college freshman, taking an introductory course in philosophy.’ Given this student’s ‘taste for ideas,’ she .. (shrink)

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William Hare defends ‘open-mindedness’ against a number of popular attacks.

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This paper argues thatopen-mindedness is a corrective virtue. It serves as a corrective to the epistemic vice of confirmation bias. Specifically,open-mindedness is the epistemically virtuous disposition to resist the negative effects of confirmation bias on our ability to reason well and to evaluate evidence and arguments. As part of the defense and presentation of our account, we explore four discussions ofopen-mindedness in the recent literature. All four approaches have strengths and shed (...) light on aspects of the virtue ofopen-mindedness. Each mentions various symptoms of confirmation bias and some explore aspects of the corrective role ofopen-mindedness. However, ours is the first to explicitly identifyopen-mindedness as a corrective virtue to the specific epistemic vice of confirmation bias. We show how the corrective account also permits a response to the concern thatopen-mindedness might not actually count as a virtue. (shrink)

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Academic research is increasingly centering on interdisciplinary work. Strong interdisciplinary research (SIR), involving researchers from very different fields, such as scientists and humanists, is often encouraged, if not required, by funding agencies. I argue that two intellectual virtues,open-mindedness and intellectual humility, are crucial for overcoming obstacles to SIR and achieving success. In part I, I provide a primer on intellectual virtue and the two virtues in question. In part II, I distinguish SIR from weak interdisciplinary research (WIR), (...) which involves research teams from neighboring fields, such as physics and chemistry, and from disciplinary research (DR), which involves researchers from the same discipline. I also outline what counts as success in SIR, and explain why it’s more challenging to attain than in WIR and DR. In part III, I explain how both intellectual virtues are essential for achieving success in SIR and for overcoming obstacles that can arise in its pursuit. (shrink)

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This paper gives a new and richer account ofopen-mindedness as a moral virtue. I argue that the main problem with existing accounts is that they derive the moral value ofopen-mindedness entirely from the epistemic role it plays in moral thought. This view is overly intellectualist. I argue thatopen-mindedness as a moral virtue promotes our flourishing alongside others in ways that are quite independent of its role in correcting our beliefs. I close (...) my discussion by distinguishingopen-mindedness from what some might consider its equivalent: empathy and tolerance. (shrink)

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How should we respond to extremist views that we know are false? This paper proposes that we should be intellectually humble, but notopen-minded. We should own our intellectual limitations, but be unwilling to revise our beliefs in the falsity of the extremist views. The opening section makes a case for distinguishing the concept of intellectual humility from the concept ofopen-mindedness, arguing thatopen-mindedness requires both a willingness to revise extant beliefs and other-oriented engagement, (...) whereas intellectual humility requires neither. Building on virtue-consequentialism, the second section makes a start on arguing that intellectually virtuous people of a particular sort—people with ‘effects-virtues’—would be intellectually humble, but notopen-minded, in responding to extremist views they knew were false. We suggest that while intellectual humility andopen-mindedness often travel together, this is a place where they come apart. (shrink)

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This paper explores howopen-mindedness and its exercise can be social in nature. In particular, it argues that an individual can be regarded asopen-minded even though she does not conduct all of the intellectual tasks as required byopen-mindedness _by herself;_ that is, she delegates some of these tasks to her epistemic peers. Thinking aboutopen-mindedness in such social terms not only opens up the possibility that there are different and surprising ways (...) for an individual to beopen-minded, but can also help offset some recent criticisms raised againstopen-mindedness and its status as an intellectual virtue. (shrink)

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Most people believe that we have a duty to gather evidence on both sides of central moral and political controversies, in order to fulfil our epistemic responsibilities and come to hold justified cognitive attitudes on these matters. I argue, on the contrary, that to the extent to which these controversies require special expertise, we have no such duty. We are far more likely to worsen than to improve our epistemic situation by becoming better informed on these questions. I suggest we (...) do better to embrace the views of experts who are also morally wise. I argue that this is likely to lead to more accurate beliefs about these political and moral controversies; in any case, it will avoid the incoherence and irrationality which are the likely consequence ofopen-minded evidence gathering. (shrink)

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In this article four anxieties expressed by Peter Gardner about our conception ofopen-mindedness and its educational implications are examined. It is argued that none of Gardner's anxieties undermine our view thatopen-mindedness requires neither neutrality nor indecision with respect to a matter in question, but rather thatopen-mindedness is compatible with holding of beliefs and commitments about such matters provided that the beliefs and commitments are formed and held in such a way that (...) they areopen to revision in the light of evidence and argument. (shrink)

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Epistemologists have long worried that the willingness ofopen-minded people to reconsider their beliefs in light of new evidence is both a condition of improving their beliefs and a risk factor for losing their grip on what they already know. In this paper I introduce and attempt to resolve a moral variation of this puzzle: A willingness to engage people having strange or (to us) repugnant moral ideals looks like a condition of broadening our moral horizons, but also a (...) risk factor for doing the wrong thing or becoming bad. I pursue a contractualist line according to which such hazardous engagement is a virtue only when it matters to our interlocutors whether they can justify themselves to us on terms we can accept—and for our sake or for the sake of their own virtue, not instrumentally or to get something out of us. When it does not so matter, openness can be unintelligent or gullible, i.e. not virtuous. (shrink)

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Open-mindedness appears as a potential intellectual virtue from the beginning of the rise of the literature on intellectual virtues. It often takes up a special role, sometimes thought of as a meta-virtue rather than a first-order virtue: as an ingredient that makes other virtues virtuous. Jason Baehr has attempted to give a unified account ofopen-mindedness as an intellectual virtue. He argues that the conceptual core ofopen-mindedness lies in the fact that a person (...) departs, moves beyond, or transcends a certain default cognitive standpoint. Two of his main aims are to show that (1) one does not need to assume a doxastic conflict or disagreement to be at the heart ofopen-mindedness—that is, there are also instances where the virtue ofopen-mindedness is needed when there is no opposing view to be considered—and (2) that not all forms ofopen-mindedness include rational assessment—that is, sometimes beingopen-minded is not about weighing evidence for and against a claim. So, his main aim is to show that there are various situations that affordopen-mindedness, in each of which a slightly different kind ofopen-mindedness is called for. To unify all these different kinds ofopen-mindedness is then the goal of his work. He arrives at the following definition ofopen-mindedness (OM): anopen-minded person is characteristically (a) willing and (within limits) able (b) to transcend a default cognitive standpoint (c) in order to take up or take seriously the merits of (d) a distinct cognitive standpoint. In this article, I take seriously Baehr’s suggestion of how to understandopen-mindedness as an intellectual virtue and argue that the crux lies in formulating how we can be able to transcend a default cognitive standpoint. This is not as obvious as it has been taken to be in the literature onopen-mindedness. Biases, overconfidence, and wishful thinking are difficult exactly because we don’t know that we are engaging in them. That is, they are systematically hidden from our consciousness, otherwise they would not be a bias, overconfidence, or wishful thinking. Hence, the crux of makingopen-mindednessopen-minded is to see how it is possible to make something of one’s own mind visible that is systematically hidden from oneself. I argue that this problem can be solved by looking at research on attention. I base my considerations in this article on Sebastian Watzl’s account of attention, which essentially holds that paying attention is an activity of foregrounding and backgrounding mental contents. That is, attention is the activity of structuring mental contents into a priority structure of foreground and background. If I pay attention to the scene in front of me, I foreground the black letters on my screen, and I background the coffee cup next to them. In this way, I create a priority structure between the letters (as they appear to me) and the coffee cup (as it appears to me). I argue that what allows us to make something of our own mind visible that is systematically hidden from us is a special way of paying attention, hence a special way of foregrounding and backgrounding the involved mental contents. That is, the crux of what enables us to transcend a default cognitive standpoint, the conceptual core ofopen-mindedness, is a special kind of attention, which I will call ‘open-minded attention’ (OMA). The claim of this article is not thatopen-minded attention fully describes the virtue ofopen-mindedness (OMA is not sufficient foropen-mindedness). Rather, what I try to show is that in all cases ofopen-mindedness it turns out thatopen-minded attention is the necessary component that ensures that we can indeed get rid of prior biases, that is, transcend also those implicit beliefs and expectations that are systematically hidden from us (OMA is necessary foropen-mindedness). (shrink)

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In this article, I explore how older people can experience the tensions between ‘keeping anopen mind’ at older age, intergenerational shifts in cultural norms, and social separation between generations— interpreting this phenomenologically as a rupture in the intergenerational habitus. Drawing on engaged phenomenological insights from qualitative interviews, as well as Beauvoir’s and Mannheim’s theories of intergenerationality, I explore structural factors which pose specific obstacles to intergenerational relationships andopen-mindedness at older age. I phenomenologically review the conditions (...) of possibility for beingopen to the perspectives of younger people. In particular, I attend to a moment of ‘hesitation’ (Al-Saji, 2014) experienced by participants during which they felt aware of intergenerational differences. I consider and analyse phenomenologically the different affective responses that are possible when moments of generational difference manifest in a tangible intergenerational encounter. (shrink)

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In this paper, I argue that recent discussions of culprit-based epistemic injustices can be framed around the intellectual character virtue ofopen-mindedness. In particular, these injustices occur because the people who commit them are closed-minded in some respect; the injustices can therefore be remedied through the cultivation of the virtue ofopen-mindedness. Describing epistemic injustices this way has two explanatory benefits: it yields a more parsimonious account of the phenomenon of epistemic injustice and it provides the (...) underpinning of a virtue-theoretical structure by which to explain what it is that perpetrators are culpable for and how virtues can have normative explanatory power. (shrink)

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