The Effects of Fraud and Lawsuit Revelation on U.S. Executive Turnover and Compensation.Obeua S.Persons -2006 -Journal of Business Ethics 64 (4):405-419.detailsThis study investigates the impact of fraud/lawsuit revelation on U.S. top executive turnover and compensation. It also examines potential explanatory variables affecting the executive turnover and compensation among U.S. fraud/lawsuit firms. Four important findings are documented. First, there was significantly higher executive turnover among U.S. firms with fraud/lawsuit revelation in the Wall Street Journal than matched firms without such revelation. Second, although on average, U.S. top executives received an increase in cash compensation after fraud/lawsuit revelation, this increase is smaller than (...) that of matched non-fraud/lawsuit firms. Third, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to change top executive when chief executive officer (CEO) was not the board chairman and CEO had been on the board for a short time. Fourth, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation when profitability was low, firms were involved in fraud, the compensation committee size was small, and the board met more often. These findings indicate that although, in general, U.S. fraud/lawsuits firms did not reduce their executive cash compensation, those involved in fraud were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation than to change their top executives. The finding, that ethical standards is not a significant factor for U.S. executive turnover nor compensation reduction, suggests that ethics appears to play no part in the board’s decisions, and that U.S. firms may have ethical standards in writing but they do not implement nor enforce the standards. (shrink)
Author's personal copy.Michael S. North -unknowndetailsThe present study investigates whether people can infer the preferences of others from spontaneous facial expressions alone. We utilize a paradigm that unobtrusively records people's natural facial reactions to relatively mundane stimuli while they simultaneously report which ones they find more appealing. Videos were then presented to perceivers who attempted to infer the choices of the target individuals—thereby linking perceiver inferences to objective outcomes. Perceivers demonstrated above-chance ability to infer target preferences across four different stimulus categories: people (attractiveness), cartoons (humor), (...) paintings (decorative appeal), and animals (cuteness). While perceivers' subjective ratings of expressivity varied somewhat between targets, these ratings did not predict the relative “readability” of the targets. The findings suggest that noncommunicative, natural facial behavior by itself suffices for certain types interpersonal prediction, even in low-emotional contexts. (shrink)
Treating Patients asPersons: A Capabilities Approach to Support Delivery of Person-Centered Care.Vikki A. Entwistle &Ian S. Watt -2013 -American Journal of Bioethics 13 (8):29-39.detailsHealth services internationally struggle to ensure health care is “person-centered” (or similar). In part, this is because there are many interpretations of “person-centered care” (and near synonyms), some of which seem unrealistic for some patients or situations and obscure the intrinsic value of patients’ experiences of health care delivery. The general concern behind calls for person-centered care is an ethical one: Patients should be “treated aspersons.” We made novel use of insights from the capabilities approach to characterize person-centered (...) care as care that recognizes and cultivates the capabilities associated with the concept ofpersons. This characterization unifies key features from previous characterisations and can render person-centered care applicable to diverse patients and situations. By tying person-centered care to intrinsically valuable capability outcomes, it incorporates a requirement for responsiveness to individuals and explains why person-centered care is required independently of any contribution it may make to health gain. (shrink)
Moreno's personality theory and its relationship to psychodrama: a philosophical, developmental and therapeutic perspective.Rozei Telias -2019 - New York, NY: Routledge.detailsParallels between Moreno's biography and his theory of self -- Moreno's philosophical- theological perception of the self -- Moreno's theory of the development of the self -- The significance of the concept of "role" in Moreno's theory -- The personality theory viewed through psychodrama -- An integrative and critical discussion and analysis of Moreno, personality theory and psychodrama.
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Persons and Properties: A Sartrean Perspective on Love's Object.Gary Foster -2018 -European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):82-94.detailsIt is often said that to love someone we must love her for her own sake. But what does this mean? Various answers have been offered up by philosophers. Alan Soble's ‘aggregate’ view of identity focuses on properties of the beloved as key to understanding love's basis and, in a less direct way, its object. This view does not give us a clear distinction betweenpersons and properties. David Velleman's view makes this distinction more clearly but creates a gap (...) between properties and personhood. Jean-Paul Sartre's view which emphasizes embodiment, addresses the main deficiencies of both of these former views. (shrink)
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Zamakhsharī’s Approach to the Art of Compliment as a Change of Style and Transition betweenPersons in his work al-Kashshāf.İslam Batur -2025 -van İlahiyat Dergisi 12 (21):72-89.detailsIn this article, the art of compliment, which Zamakhsharī considered as a stylistic change and transition betweenpersons in his work titled al-Kashshāf, was examined. In general, compliment is the art of creating a difference in style by changing direction within an expression, and serves the purposes of attracting attention and emphasizing. Zamakhsharī states that the art of compliment has two main functions: The first is to highlight the verses and capture the listener's attention by altering the routine of (...) speech. The second is a semantic dimension related to the context of the speech. Zamakhsharī regards the art of compliment, which had previously been considered mostly within the science of Ma‘ānī, as a subfield of the science of Bayān and significantly demonstrates its impact on Arabic rhetoric. Zamakhsharī categorizes compliment into three types: compliment from the absent (third person) to the addressee (second person), compliment from the addressee (second person) to the absent (third person), and compliment from the absent (third person) to the speaker (first person). In addition to these, an examination of the author’s study reveals that he also addresses the types of compliment from the speaker (first person) to the absent (third person), from the speaker (first person) to the addressee (second person), and from the addressee (second person) to the speaker (first person). These varieties are used effectively in the Qur’ān in different contexts. It is understood that Zamakhsharī believes that the art of compliment is not limited to pronoun changes, but should be considered in a broad scope as stylistic changes and enrichment of narration in general. Therefore, Zamakhsharī examined and analyzed the verses of the Qur’ān accordingly. Points such as drawing attention and emphasis, adding semantic depth, stylistic richness, effective communication, variety, and dynamism are summarizations of Zamakhsharī’s comments on compliment. On the other hand, Zamakhsharī notes that compliment is not merely a superficial stylistic change but rather deepens the meaning of the verses and keeps the listener’s attention engaged. Zamakhsharī emphasizes the influence of this art on Arabic rhetoric by detailing the different types and functions of compliment. His approaches to the art of compliment have had a significant impact on subsequent scholars and have dominated Arabic rhetoric for an extended period. Although Zamakhsharī’s contributions to the art of compliment are significant, they have also faced some criticism. Ibn al-Athīr, in his book al-Mathal al-Sāʾir, opposes Zamakhsharī’s view that the purpose of compliment is to keep the listener’s attention engaged, arguing instead that this approach could detract from the quality of the speech. According to Ibn al-Athīr, compliment should be used not merely for stylistic variation but to reflect the depth of meaning. His criticisms brought about various objections in the literature, and many scholars have argued Zamakhsharī’s approach to the art of compliment. This article aims to reveal Zamakhsharī’s analysis of the art of compliment and its place in Arabic rhetoric. (shrink)
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RobertPersons’s Conference and the Salic Law debate in France, 1584–1594.M. J. M. Innes -2019 -History of European Ideas 45 (3):421-435.detailsABSTRACTThis article discusses the French debate of the 1580s over the status of the Salic Law and its influence upon an important text in English political thought, RobertPersons’s Conference about the next Succession to the Crowne of Ingland. Polemicists on both sides of the conflict between Henri of Navarre and the Catholic League, from Pierre de Belloy to the pseudonymous ‘Rossaeus’, sought to explain the French royal succession using a concept of custom drawn from Roman law. Custom offered (...) these thinkers a way to explain the Salic Law’s peculiar limitation of the succession to males descended agnatically, but it could also be taken to imply that the people, from whom it originated, were in some way superior to the king. The concept was exploited most effectively by Rossaeus, who translated what had been a legal discourse into a freer language of political naturalism. Rossaeus’s interpretation of custom was adapted and exploited by RobertPersons in the Conference about the next Succession to the Crowne of Ingland. While, then, much of the Conference’s contemporary influence derived from how its argument mapped onto English constitutional geography, it originated as a continuation of League political thought. (shrink)
(1 other version)Artificial intelligence and African conceptions of personhood.C. S. Wareham -2021 -Ethics and Information Technology 23 (2):127-136.detailsUnder what circumstances if ever ought we to grant that Artificial Intelligences (AI) arepersons? The question of whether AI could have the high degree of moral status that is attributed to humanpersons has received little attention. What little work there is employs western conceptions of personhood, while non-western approaches are neglected. In this article, I discuss African conceptions of personhood and their implications for the possibility of AIpersons. I focus on an African account of (...) personhood that is prima facie inimical to the idea that AI could ever be ‘persons’ in the sense typically attributed to humans. I argue that despite its apparent anthropocentrism, this African account could admit AI aspersons. (shrink)
Author's personal copy.Don Ross -unknowndetailsAddiction may or may not be a highly prevalent condition, but the concept of addiction is undeniably ubiquitous. From the people who cheerfully and publicly announce their addiction to coffee, or chocolate, or shopping, to those who ruefully and perhaps only in very special settings admit their addiction to alcohol or drugs, ‘‘addiction” is an oft-invoked explanatory frame for the presentation and characterization of individual behavior. Lately, it has even been applied to the behavior of super-personal entities, as in America’s (...) ‘‘addiction” to oil. Although the ubiquity of the concept is surely a sign of its usefulness, it also gives one pause; can a term of such broad application really have precise meaning (compare the word ‘‘thing”)? And if not—if there is nothing that all the ‘‘addicted” entities above have in common—then why is the concept so apparently useful, and what is it useful for? Such questions may seem tailor made for Ivory Tower semantic analysis, but in fact the matter is much more urgent than that. For we live in a world where involuntary commitments and other coercive measures are sometimes considered justified in the course of dealing with addictedpersons. Why is this so? What could be wrong with addictedpersons that would justify such treatment? And why is the word extended to apply topersons for whom such treatment would presumably not be justified? These are some of the several questions asked by the authors of Midbrain Mutiny, and they have not just scientific, but also political and philosophical motivations for wanting to answer them. So what is an addict? One possible definition—one that would seem to accord with the widespread use of the term—is an agent with abnormal preferences, in the sense that the addict is willing to pay far more, and to pay for far higher quantities of a good than is the average consumer. Here we should think not just of the novelist maniacally devoted to the twin pleasures of writing and alcohol, but also of the late Steve Irwin ‘‘addicted” to contact with dangerous animals, or of the infinitely more prosaic CEO who devotes all of her time to work.. (shrink)
The right of children to be loved.S. Matthew Liao -2006 -Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (4):420–440.detailsA number of international organizations have claimed that children have a right to be loved, but there is a worry that this claim may just be an empty rhetoric. In this paper, I seek to show that there could be such a right by providing a justification for this right in terms of human rights, by demonstrating that love can be an appropriate object of a duty, and by proposing that biological parents should normally be made the primary bearers of (...) this duty, while all other ablepersons in appropriate circumstances have the associate duties to help biological parents discharge their duties. I also consider some policy implications of this right. (shrink)
Prospects for a Naturalist Libertarianism: O’Connor’sPersons and Causes.John Bishop -2003 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):228-243.detailsThere is an alternative reconciliatory naturalist position that rejects each key feature of this “libertarian agent-causationist” view. Taking the features in reverse order, this alternative.
Legal personality of robots, corporations, idols and chimpanzees: a quest for legitimacy.S. M. Solaiman -2017 -Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (2):155-179.detailsRobots are now associated with various aspects of our lives. These sophisticated machines have been increasingly used in different manufacturing industries and services sectors for decades. During this time, they have been a factor in causing significant harm to humans, prompting questions of liability. Industrial robots are presently regarded as products for liability purposes. In contrast, some commentators have proposed that robots be granted legal personality, with an overarching aim of exonerating the respective creators and users of these artefacts from (...) liability. This article is concerned mainly with industrial robots that exercise some degree of self-control as programmed, though the creation of fully autonomous robots is still a long way off. The proponents of the robot’s personality compare these machines generally with corporations, and sporadically with, inter alia, animals, and idols, in substantiating their arguments. This article discusses the attributes of legal personhood and the justifications for the separate personality of corporations and idols. It then demonstrates the reasons for refusal of an animal’s personality. It concludes that robots are ineligible to bepersons, based on the requirements of personhood. (shrink)
Illness and the paradigm of lived body.S. Kay Toombs -1988 -Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 9 (2).detailsThis paper suggests that the paradigm of lived body (as it is developed in the works of Merleau-Ponty, Sartre and Zaner) provides important insights into the experience of illness. In particular it is noted that, as embodiedpersons, we experience illness primarily as a disruption of lived body rather than as a dysfunction of biological body. An account is given of the manner in which such fundamental features of embodiment as bodily intentionality, primary meaning, contextural organization, body image, gestural (...) display, lived spatiality and temporality, are disrupted in illness causing a concurrent disorganization of the patient's self and world. The paradigm of lived body has important applications for medical practice. It provides a fuller account of illness than does the prevailing reductionist Cartesian paradigm of body, more directly addresses the existential predicament of illness, and orients the clinical focus around the personhood of the patient. (shrink)
Author's personal copy.Daniel M. Wegner -unknowndetailsIt has been proposed that inferring personal authorship for an event gives rise to intentional binding, a perceptual illusion in which one’s action and inferred effect seem closer in time than they otherwise would (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). Using a novel, naturalistic paradigm, we conducted two experiments to test this hypothesis and examine the relationship between binding and self-reported authorship. In both experiments, an important authorship indicator – consistency between one’s action and a subsequent event – was manipulated, and (...) its effects on binding and self-reported authorship were measured. Results showed that action-event consistency enhanced both binding and self-reported authorship, supporting the hypothesis that binding arises from an inference of authorship. At the same time, evidence for a dissociation emerged, with consistency having a more robust effect on self-reports than on binding. Taken together, these results suggest that binding and self-reports reveal different aspects of the sense of authorship. Ó 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)
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What Does Nietzsche Mean by "the Same" in His Theory of Eternal Recurrence?Paul S. Loeb -2022 -Journal of Nietzsche Studies 53 (1):1-33.detailsIn this article, I examine the linguistic features in Nietzsche's presentations that have led readers to assume that “the same” means numerical identity. I also evaluate the following argument about personal identity that has been used to support this assumption: if we are not numerically identical to our recurring counterparts, then we have no reason to be concerned about the prospect of reliving our lives and Nietzsche's theory cannot have any of the existential significance he ascribes to it. My conclusion (...) is that Nietzsche actually has in mind a complete qualitative identity that includes all spatiotemporal properties. Thus, the supporting argument fails because the problem of persistence through change over time is not relevant to a theory in whichpersons are neither recurring at a later time nor undergoing any change when they recur. (shrink)
The Doctrine of Informed Consent Doesn’t Need Modification for Supported Decision Making.Manuel Trachsel &Paul S. Appelbaum -2021 -American Journal of Bioethics 21 (11):27-29.detailsIn their fine overview of supported decision making forpersons with dynamic cognitive and functional impairments “at the margins of autonomy,” Peterson, Karlawish, and Largent query whether...
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Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person.Mitchell S. Green &John N. Williams (eds.) -2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.detailsG. E. Moore observed that to assert, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' would be 'absurd'. Over half a century later, such sayings continue to perplex philosophers. In the definitive treatment of the famous paradox, Green and Williams explain its history and relevance and present new essays by leading thinkers in the area.
Respect women, promote health and reduce stigma: ethical arguments for universal hepatitis C screening in pregnancy.Marielle S. Gross,Alexandra R. Ruth &Sonja A. Rasmussen -2020 -Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (10):674-677.detailsIn the USA, there are missed opportunities to diagnose hepatitis C virus (HCV) in pregnancy because screening is currently risk-stratified and thus primarily limited to individuals who disclose history of injection drug use or sexually transmitted infection risks. Over the past decade, the opioid epidemic has dramatically increased incidence of HCV and a feasible, well-tolerated cure was introduced. Considering these developments, recent evidence suggests universal HCV screening in pregnancy would be cost-effective and several professional organisations have called for updated national (...) policy. Historically, universal screening has been financially disincentivised on the healthcare system level, particularly since new diagnoses may generate an obligation to provide expensive treatments to a population largely reliant on public health resources. Here, we provide ethical arguments supporting universal HCV screening in pregnancy grounded in obligations to respect forpersons, beneficence and justice. First, universal prenatal HCV screening respects pregnant women aspersons by promoting their long-term health outside of pregnancy. Additionally, universal screening would optimise health outcomes within current treatment guidelines and may support research on treatment during pregnancy. Finally, universal screening would avoid potential harms of risk-stratifying pregnant women by highly stigmatised substance use and sexual behaviours. (shrink)
Engelhardt on the Common Morality in Bioethics.Ana S. Iltis -2018 -Conatus 3 (2):49.detailsContemporary bioethics is, at least in part, the product of biomedical and sociopolitical changes in the middle to latter part of the 20th century. These changes prompted reflection on deep moral questions at a time when traditional sources of moral guidance no longer were widely respected and, in some cases, were being rejected. In light of this, scholars, policy makers, and clinicians sought to identify a common morality that could be used amongpersons with different moral commitments to resolve (...) disputes and guide clinical practice and health policy. The concept of the common morality remains important in bioethics. This essay considers the common morality in light of the work of H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. (shrink)
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Altruism, morality, and economic theory.Edmund S. Phelps (ed.) -1975 - New York: Russell Sage Foundation.detailsPresents a collection of papers by economists theorizing on the roles of altruism and morality versus self-interest in the shaping of human behavior and institutions. Specifically, the authors examine why somepersons behave in an altruistic way without any apparent reward, thus defying the economist's model of utility maximization. The chapters are accompanied by commentaries from representatives of other disciplines, including law and philosophy.
Persons and Their Bodies: The Körper/Leib Distinction and Helmuth Plessner’s Theories of Ex-centric Positionality and Homo absconditus.Hans-Peter Krüger -2010 -Journal of Speculative Philosophy 24 (3):256-274.detailsIn German discussions over the last twenty years of the difference between what it is to be a body (in German: Leibsein) and what it is to have a body (Körperhaben), many have been concerned to remind us that we owe this conceptual distinction to the philosophical anthropologist Helmuth Plessner. He introduces the distinction in an essay from 1925—written in collaboration with the Dutch behavioral researcher Frederick Jacob Buytendijk—“Die Deutung des mimischen Ausdrucks. Ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom Bewusstsein des anderen (...) Ichs” (“The Interpretation of Mimetic Expressions: A Contribution to Understanding One’s Consciousness of Other Subjects”). Buytendijk later explained that it was Plessner who worked out the .. (shrink)
SomePersons in Plutarch'sMoralia.G. W. Bowersock -1965 -Classical Quarterly 15 (02):267-.detailsPlutarch of Chaeronea was a voluminous writer whose experience of the Graeco-Roman world of his own day was quite as comprehensive as his knowledge of earlier ages. The ancient historian is often daunted by the sheer bulk of Plutarch's work and prefers customarily to concentrate his attention upon the Lives, which, if not history, at least contain much historical matter.
Who Is Afraid of Numbers?S. Matthew Liao -2008 -Utilitas 20 (4):447-461.detailsIn recent years, many non-consequentialists such as Frances Kamm and Thomas Scanlon have been puzzling over what has come to be known as the Number Problem, which is how to show that the greater number in a rescue situation should be saved without aggregating the claims of the many, a typical kind of consequentialist move that seems to violate the separateness ofpersons. In this article, I argue that these non-consequentialists may be making the task more difficult than necessary, (...) because allowing aggregation does not prevent one from being a non-consequentialist. I shall explain how a non-consequentialist can still respect the separateness ofpersons while allowing for aggregation. (shrink)
Thoreau’s Stoicism inLetters to Various Persons: The Spiritual Direction of Harrison Blake.Matteo Stettler -2023 -Journal of Speculative Philosophy 37 (2):165-196.detailsIn the present contribution, the author contends, first, that “the perfect piece of Stoicism” that Emerson wanted to make out of Thoreau’s philosophical correspondence with his disciple Harrison Blake in Letters to VariousPersons (1865) was neither concerned with a personality stereotype, as Sophia Thoreau feared, nor with the specifically Stoic way of living, as Richardson and Risinger have claimed in response. This first edition of Thoreau’s correspondence was in fact meant to be representative of that generally philosophical “art (...) of living well” to which Thoreau was entirely committed. Second, the author provides a comparative analysis of Thoreau’s philosophical letters to his pupil and Seneca’s epistolary with Lucilius, in order to ascertain precisely how Thoreau’s letter-writing itself, apart from Emerson’s framing of it, might have been informed by his knowledge and interest in Stoic epistolary practices. (shrink)
Kant’s Metaphors forPersons and Community.Diana E. Axelsen -1989 -Philosophy and Theology 3 (4):301-321.detailsI argue that, although it is probably not possible to construct a thoroughly consistent interpretation of Kantian metaphors, there is a perspective in Kant’s later writings which provides a framework for selecting and sorting central metaphors. Following a discussion of the work or Lakoff and Johnson on metaphor, I provide an examination of Kant’s distinction between noumenon and phenomenon as an example of a metaphor grounded upon spatio-temporal experience, and conclude with suggestions concerning the role of metaphor in Kant’s account (...) of personhood and community. (shrink)
The State of Ohio’s Auditors, the Enumeration of Population, and the Project of Eugenics.Cameron Graham,Martin E. Persson,Vaughan S. Radcliffe &Mitchell J. Stein -2023 -Journal of Business Ethics 187 (3):565-587.detailsIn 1856, the State of Ohio began an enumeration of its population to count and identify people with disabilities. This paper examines the ethical role of the accounting profession in this project, which supported the transatlantic eugenics movement and its genocidal attempts to eliminate disabledpersons from the population. We use a theoretical approach based on Levinas who argued that the self is generated through engagement with the Other, and that this engagement presupposes a responsibility to and for the (...) Other. We show that successive waves of legislation relied on State and County auditors along with Township clerks and assessors to conduct the mechanics of the enumeration of the population, which focused on the identification, categorization, and counting of the disabled people of the State. We argue that the accounting-based technologies of enumeration and reporting objectify the enumeratedpersons and deny the auditor’s pre-existing ethical obligation to this new Other. We show how the financial expertise and structures of the State were engaged in the execution of this mandate, which remained in place for over a century and supported a program of institutionalization. We consider the ramifications of this for our understanding of the ethical role of public sector accounting in the United States over this period, which has been under-explored. (shrink)
God(s) Personal and Transpersonal: On the Masks of the Divine.William Desmond -2008 - InGod and the Between. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 191–204.detailsThis chapter contains section titled: Personal God(s)and Plurivocal Manifestation Monotheistic and Polytheistic Personalizations Beyond Person, Beyond Mask The Gods of Philosophers: Masks of the Impersonal or Transpersonal?
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Negligence in the Air.Michael S. Moore &Heidi M. Hurd -2002 -Theoretical Inquiries in Law 3 (2).detailsThe article examines what has come to be known as "the risk analysis" in Anglo-American tort law and contract law. The risk analysis essentially consists of: viewing negligence as a relational concept, so that a defendant is never simply negligent tout cour, but is negligent only with respect to certainpersons and certain harms — other harms suffered by otherpersons are said not to be "within the risk" that makes the defendant negligent; and the supplanting of proximate (...) cause doctrine with doctrines of duty, the duty question being determined by the question of whether a certain person and a certain harm are within the risk that makes a defendant negligent. The article aims to explode entirely the risk analysis. After beginning with an examination of the historical roots of the risk analysis, we then seek to show that the risk analysis is: conceptually incoherent because it seeks to isolate a risk that makes someone negligent; normatively undesirable because it allows quite blameworthy actors not to pay for the harms they culpably cause; and descriptively inaccurate of the cases decided on the more traditional, proximate cause bases. (shrink)
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Persson's Merely PossiblePersons.Krister Bykvist &Tim Campbell -2020 -Utilitas 32 (4):479-487.detailsAll else being equal, creating a miserable person makes the world worse, and creating an ecstatic person makes it better. Such claims are easily justified if it can be better, or worse, for a person to exist than not to exist. But that seems to require that things can be better, or worse, for a person even in a world in which she does not exist. Ingmar Persson defends this seemingly paradoxical claim in his latest book, Inclusive Ethics. He argues (...) thatpersons that never exist are merely possible beings for whom non-existence is worse than existence with a good life. We argue that Persson's argument, as stated in his book, has false premises and is invalid. We reconstruct the argument to make it valid, but the premises remain highly problematic. Finally, we argue, one can make sense of our procreative obligations without letting merely possible beings into the moral club. (shrink)
(1 other version)Is Menkiti’s Normative Personhood Inclusive? The Case of Mentally DisabledPersons.Evaristus Matthias Eyo -2023 -Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 12 (2):55-72.detailsIn this essay, I argue that Menkiti’s normative personhood is exclusionary, and logically inadequate, especially regarding mentally disabledpersons. My argument is that Menkiti’s account of personhood as a moral-political theory does not possess the resources to accommodate and account for mentally disabledpersons because of its rigid process of transformation, which requires moral excellence. An inclusive moral theory, I argue, should be able to accommodate all members of the moral community irrespective of their ability, but rather, their (...) capacity for relationships. Tapping into the intellectual resources of conversational thinking, I propose another conception of personhood predicated on moral status as the basis for personhood. With this method, I query the inclusiveness of Menkiti’s conception and demonstrate that a relational alternative option that bases moral status on the human capacity for relationships might be more inclusive. Here, personhood is anchored on the capacity for relationships, not the ability to exude moral excellence. I then contend that this moral status conception of personhood possesses the needed resources to account for all because it is inclusive and egalitarian, riding on the crest of Ezumezu logic, which is also both egalitarian and inclusive. (shrink)
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The fallout: What happens to whistleblowers and those accused but exonerated of scientific misconduct?James S. Lubalin &Jennifer L. Matheson -1999 -Science and Engineering Ethics 5 (2):229-250.detailsCurrent DHHS regulations require that policies and procedures developed by institutions to handle allegations of scientific misconduct include provisions for “undertaking diligent efforts to protect the positions and reputations of thosepersons who, in good faith, make allegations.” Analogously, institutions receiving PHS funds are required to protect the confidentiality of those accused of such misconduct or, failing that, to restore their reputations if the allegations are not confirmed. Based on two surveys, one of whistleblowers and one of individuals accused (...) but exonerated of scientific misconduct, this paper examines how well the system works to protect both sets of participants in cases of alleged misconduct. Contrary to popular impressions created by notorious cases, substantial minorities of both whistleblowers and exonerated scientists experience no adverse outcomes at the time the allegations are made and pursued. During this period, however, whistleblowers report more negative outcomes and more severe negative outcomes than their accused but exonerated counterparts. In the longer run, majorities of both groups report little impact on different aspects of their careers or professional activities, though those who report any impacts generally report negative ones. The accused but exonerated, however, appear to fare worse than whistleblowers in impacts on several aspects of their personal lives; their mental health, physical health, self-esteem, and self-identity. (shrink)
The Injustice of Hell.S. Kershnar -2005 -International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 58 (2):103-123.detailsThis essay aims to establish two theses. First, hell is unjust. Second, God ought not (or perhaps cannot) impose hell on human beings. In support of these theses, Stephen Kershnar argues that human beings do not deserve hell because they either cannot cause an infinite amount of harm or are not responsible for doing so. Also, since humans don’t have infinitely bad characters, hell can’t be deserved on the basis of character. Since humans don’t deserve hell, God may not (or (...) perhaps cannot) impose unjust punishments and hence may not (or cannot) send or allowpersons to go to hell. (shrink)
Persons as Weakly Emergent: An Alternative Reading of Vasubandhu's Ontology ofPersons.Itsuki Hayashi -2016 -Philosophy East and West 66 (4):1218-1230.detailsAccording to the Buddhist doctrine of Two Truths, there are nopersons in our final ontology, but there arepersons in our conventional ontology. What does it mean to say thatpersons exist conventionally? The Ābhidharmikas say that ultimately there are psychophysical tropes, called dharmas, certain collections or combinations of which are conventionally taken to bepersons. We would then ask: what kind of reality is conventional reality, and what is the metaphysical relation between conventional reality (...) and ultimate reality as pertains topersons?Recently there have been various attempts to understand Buddhist philosophy by using contemporary analytical methods and theories. Among the prominent scholars in this... (shrink)