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The aim of this paper is to show that KimÕs ‘supervenience argumentÕ is at best inconclusive and so fails to provide an adequate challenge tononreductivephysicalism. I shall argue, first, that KimÕs argument rests on assumptions that thenonreductive physicalist is entitled to regard as question-begging; second, that even if those assumptions are granted, it is not clear that irreducible mental causes fail to satisfy them; and, third, that since the argument has the overall structure of (...) a reductio, which of its various premises one performs the reductio on remains open to debate in an interesting way. I shall finally suggest that the issue of reductive vs.nonreductivephysicalism is best contested not in the arena of mental causation but in that in which the issues pertaining to theory and property reduction are currently being debated. (shrink)

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Throughout the 1990s, Jaegwon Kim developed a line of argument that what purport to benonreductive forms ofphysicalism are ultimately untenable, since they cannot accommodate the causal efficacy of mental states. His argument has received a great deal of discussion, much of it critical. We believe that, while the argument needs some tweaking, its basic thrust is sound. In what follows, we will lay out our preferred version of the argument and highlight its essential dependence on a (...) causal-powers metaphysic, a dependence that Kim does not acknowledge in his official presentations of the argument.i We then discuss two recent physicalist strategies for preserving the causal efficacy of the mental in the face of this sort of challenge, strategies that (ostensibly) endorse a causal powers metaphysics of properties while offering distinctive accounts of the physical realization of mental properties. We argue that neither picture can be satisfactorily worked out, and that seeing why they fail strongly suggests thatnonreductivephysicalism and a causal powers metaphysic are not compatible, as our original argument contends. Since we also believe that robust realism concerning mental causation should not be abandoned, we take the argument of this paper to strongly motivate an account on which the mental is unrealized by and ontologically emergent from the physical. In a final section, we sketch what an ontologically emergentist account of the mental might look like. (shrink)

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Nonreductivephysicalism is currently one of the most widely held views about the world in general and about the status of the mental in particular. However, the view has recently faced a series of powerful criticisms from, among others, Jaegwon Kim. In several papers, Kim has argued that the nonreductivist's view of the mental is an unstable position, one harboring contradictions that push it either to reductivism or to eliminativism. The problems arise, Kim maintains, when we consider the (...) causal powers that mental properties are held to carry on the nonreductivist's view and the causal transactions into which mental events are said to enter. My aim here is less than that of defendingnonreductivephysicalism against all of Kim's criticisms. I wish primarily to call into question the claim thatnonreductivephysicalism is committed to emergentism with respect to the causal powers of the mental. As subsidiary points, I shall offer a limited defense of nonreductivism against two related objections that Kim raises. However, even if my conclusions are correct, problems remain for the nonreductivist's treatment of mental causation. I shall close the paper with a brief discussion of these difficulties. (shrink)

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Libertarian free will is, roughly, the view that the same agential states can cause different possible actions.Nonreductivephysicalism is, roughly, the view that mental states cause actions to occur, while these actions also have sufficient physical causes. Though libertarian free will andnonreductivephysicalism have overlapping subject matter, and while libertarian free will is currently trending at the same time asnonreductivephysicalism is a dominant metaphysical posture, there are few sustained expositions of (...) anonreductive physicalist model of libertarian free will – indeed some tell against such an admixture. This paper concocts such a blend by articulating and defending, with some caveats, anonreductive physicalist model of libertarian free will. (shrink)

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Closure is the central premise in one of the best arguments forphysicalism—the argument from causal overdetermination. According to Closure, at every time at which a physical event has a sufficient cause, it has a sufficient physical cause. This principle is standardly defended by appealing to the fact that it enjoys empirical support from numerous confirming cases (and no disconfirming cases) in physics. However, in recent literature on mental causation, attempts have been made to provide a stronger argument for (...) it. This essay argues that, insofar as these attempts are successful, they actually establish a far stronger closure principle. Worryingly, the acceptance of this stronger principle presents a new problem for the most popular form ofphysicalism, that ofnonreductivephysicalism. The problem shall be referred to as the 'Problem of Strong Closure.'. (shrink)

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This chapter presents a partial argument for a Christian version ofnonreductivephysicalism. Its structure is based on the view that a Christian anthropology at a minimum must be: consonant with Scripture and at least a part of the Christian tradition; not in conflict with widely accepted science, and preferably supported by science; and internally coherent. The argument of the chapter, then, intentionally draws from biblical studies and theology, and from (a bit of) cognitive neuroscience. The impact of (...) cognitive neuroscience on current theories of human nature can be summarized roughly as follows: all of the human capacities once attributed to the mind or soul are being fruitfully studied as brain processes. Both theological and scientific developments are “resonant” withnonreductivephysicalism. Finally, the chapter discusses resources for showing thatnonreductivephysicalism is a more coherent philosophical position than reductivephysicalism. (shrink)

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Nonreductivephysicalism faces serious problems regarding causal exclusion, causal heterogeneity, and the nature of realization. In this paper I advance solutions to each of those problems. The proposed solutions all depend crucially on embracing modal counterpart theory. Hence, the paper’s thesis: counterpart theory savesnonreductivephysicalism. I take as my inspiration the view that mental tokens are constituted by physical tokens in the same way statues are constituted by lumps of clay. I break from other philosophers (...) who have pursued this line, however, in that I hold that constitution is identity. Much of the value of the comparison to statues and lumps is that it calls to mind the resources used to defend constitution-as-identity, most notably that of counterpart theory. Along the way, I discuss the virtues of a trope ontology, modal objections to token identity theories, the prospects of conditional analyses of causal powers, the subset account of realization, and the grounding problem. I also endorse a novel, empirical argument in favor of counterpart theory. (shrink)

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I have argued that a strong kind ofphysicalism based on the strict implication thesis can consistently reject both eliminativism and reductionism (in any nontrivial sense). This piece defends that position against objections from Andrew Melnyk, who claims that either my formulation doesn't entailphysicalism, or it must be interpreted in such a way that the mental is after all reducible to the physical. His alternatives depend on two interesting assumptions. I argue that both are mistaken, thereby, making (...) this kind ofnonreductivephysicalism clearer and more clearly defensible. (shrink)

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It is often argued that higher-level special-science properties cannot be causally efficacious since the lower-level physical properties on which they supervene are doing all the causal work. This claim is usually derived from an exclusion principle stating that if a higher-level property F supervenes on a physical property F* that is causally sufficient for a property G, then F cannot cause G. We employ an account of causation as difference-making to show that the truth or falsity of this principle is (...) a contingent matter and derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which a version of it holds. We argue that one important instance of the principle, far from undermining non-reductivephysicalism, actually supports the causal autonomy of certain higher-level properties. (shrink)

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This chapter aims to develop an argument in support of the basic mentality thesis. A “counting” argument is constructed in the chapter that poses a problem for the identity thesis. Then, the chapter extends the “counting” argument in a way that exposes a problem for the dependence (mind grounded in physical) thesis. The basic strategy of a counting argument is to show that there is a greater quantity of members of the one category than of some other. To illustrate, the (...) chapter considers the categories integers and reals. These categories both have infinitely many members. To further illustrate the categorical difference between the physical and nonphysical, it also considers building a Lego tower. The divide between physical and nonphysical properties involves much more than a mere difference with respect to complexity of psychological content. Next, the chapter justifies the basic mentality thesis by considering the main arguments for standardphysicalism (reductive ornonreductive). (shrink)

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Jaegwon Kim argued thatnonreductivephysicalism faces the “exclusion problem” for higher-level causation, mental causation in particular. Roughly, the charge is that given the presumptive ubiquity of physical causation, there cannot be irreducible mental causes for physical effects. Since there are mental causes, Kim concluded thatnonreductivephysicalism should be rejected in favor of a more reductionist alternative according to which mental causes are just physical causes differently described. But why should mental causes be “excluded” in (...) this way? Unfortunately, Kim had less to say about this than one might expect. After reviewing some of Kim’s proposals, I suggest that the exclusion problem should be premised on nothing more or less than Occamist, simplicity-based considerations. I apply this conception of the exclusion problem to some prominent responses to Kim’s critique ofnonreductivephysicalism and argue that this conception mandates reconsidering the success of these responses. (shrink)

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Jaegwon Kim’s Exclusion Problem holds that thenonreductive physicalist position is untenable. If the mental and the physical are distinct and both cause their effects, then it seems that their effects were caused twice over. I argue that thenonreductive physicalist should reject the Exclusion principle—a position called Causal Compatibilism. I appeal to our concepts of causal sufficiency and difference making in order to distinguish cases of mental causation, epiphenomenalism, and overdetermination. I appeal to James Woodward’s Interventionist framework (...) to individuate causal difference-makers. Mental causation involves two sufficient causes but only one difference-maker. Given that overdetermination involves two sufficient causes and two difference-makers, the Exclusion principle fails to distinguish between overdetermination and mental causation and so, it is false. I conclude that by rejecting the Exclusion principle, thenonreductive physicalist can get out of the Exclusion Problem. (shrink)

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This essay examines Nancey Murphy’s commitment to downward causation and develops a critique of that notion based upon the distinction between the causal relevance of a higher-level event and its causal efficacy. I suggest the following: (1)nonreductivephysicalism lacks adequate resources upon which to base an assertion of real causal power at the emergent, supervenient level; (2) supervenience’snonreductive nature ought not obscure the fact that it affirms an ontological determination of higher-level properties by those at (...) the lower level; and (3) the notion of divine self-renunciation, while consonant with Murphy’s claim of supervenient, divine action, is nonetheless problematic. Throughout, I claim that the question of the causal efficacy of a level is logically independent from the assertion of its conceptual or nomological nonreducibility. (shrink)

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It has been argued thatnonreductivephysicalism leads to epiphenominalism about mental properties: the view that mental events cannot cause behavioral effects by virtue of their mental properties. Recently, attempts have been made to develop accounts of causal relevance for irreducible properties to show that mental properties need not be epiphenomenal. In this paper, I primarily discuss the account of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit. I show how it can be developed to meet several obvious objections and to (...) capture our intuitive conception of degrees of causal relevance. However, I argue that the account requires large-scale miraculous coincidence for there to be causally relevant mental properties. I also argue that the same problem arises for two apparently very different accounts of causal relevance. I suggest that this result does not show that these accounts, on appropriate readings, are false. Therefore, I tentatively conclude that we have reason to believe that irreducible mental properties are causally irrelevant. Moreover, given that there is at leastprima facie evidence that mental properties can be causally relevant, my conclusion casts doubt onnonreductive physicalist theories of mental properties. (shrink)

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The aim of this paper is to show that Kim’s ‚supervenience argument’ is at best inconclusive and so fails to provide an adequate challenge tononreductivephysicalism. I shall argue, first, that Kim’s argument rests on assumptions that thenonreductive physicalist is entitled to regard as question-begging; second, that even if those assumptions are granted, it is not clear that irreducible mental causes fail to␣satisfy them; and, third, that since the argument has the overall structure of a (...) reductio, which of its various premises one performs the reductio on remains open to debate in an interesting way. I shall finally suggest that the issue of reductive vs.nonreductivephysicalism is best contested not in the arena of mental causation but in that in which the issues pertaining to theory and property reduction are currently being debated. (shrink)

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Most philosophers of mind nowadays espouse two metaphysical views:NonreductivePhysicalism and the causal efficacy of the mental. Throughout this work I will refer to the conjunction of both claims as the Causal Autonomy of the Mental. Nevertheless, this position is threatened by a number of difficulties which are far more serious than one would imagine given the broad consensus that it has generated during the last decades. This paper purports to offer a careful examination of some of (...) these difficulties and show the considerable efforts that one has to undertake in order to try to overcome them. The difficulties examined will concern only metaphysical problems common to all special science properties but not specific of mental properties. So, in proposing a functionalist version ofNonreductivePhysicalism in what follows, I will not attempt to answer to well known objections such as the absent qualia argument and the like. This should not be interpreted as a limitation! in the scope of this work. On the contrary, in dealing with more general objections we will try to evaluate a position which entails (under common assumptions) the Causal Autonomy of the Mental, namely:NonreductivePhysicalism plus the causal efficacy of special science properties. (shrink)

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With a few exceptions, F. H. Bradley has become a forgotten figure in the history of philosophy. The author argues that Bradley's thoughts on relations are at least relevant to assessing the status ofnonreductivephysicalism as a comprehensive metaphysic and, moreover, that they can be seen to raise some nontrivial challenges tononreductivephysicalism so understood. In pursuing this line of thought, he considers two of Bradley's regresses in Appearance and Reality —the better known "chain" (...) regress and the lesser known "fission" regress—and explains their relevance tononreductivephysicalism. (shrink)

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Eleonore Stump has recently argued that Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy of mind is consistent with anonreductive physicalist approach to human psychology. Iargue that by examining Aquinas’s account of the subsistence of the rational soul we can see that Thomistic dualism is inconsistent withphysicalism of every variety. Specifically, his reliance on the claim that the mind has an operation per se spells trouble for any physicalist interpretation. After offering Stump’s reading of Aquinas and her case for the supposed (...) consistency withnonreductivephysicalism, I use Aquinas’s discussion of the mind’s operation per se to argue that the human mind is incapable of being physically realized. To support this general argument, I offer a detailed examination of Stump’s use of two criteria ofphysicalism drawn from contemporary functional analyses of the mind and argue that both are inconsistent with Aquinas’s theory. (shrink)

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This essay examines Nancey Murphy's commitment to downward causation and develops a critique of that notion based upon the distinction between the causal relevance of a higher‐level event and its causal efficacy. I suggest the following: (1)nonreductivephysicalism lacks adequate resources upon which to base an assertion of real causal power at the emergent, supervenient level; (2) supervenience'snonreductive nature ought not obscure the fact that it affirms an ontological determination of higher‐level properties by those at (...) the lower level; and (3) the notion of divine self‐renunciation, while consonant with Murphy's claim of supervenient, divine action, is nonetheless problematic. Throughout, I claim that the question of the causal efficacy of a level is logically independent from the assertion of its conceptual or nomological nonreducibility. (shrink)

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It has been noted in recent literature (e.g., Ross & Spurrett 2004, Kim 2006, McLaughlin 2006 and Cohen 2005) that functionalism can be separated into two varieties: one that emphasizes the role state, the other that emphasizes the realizer state. The former is called “role functionalism” while the latter has been called “realizer functionalism” (Ross & Spurrett 2004, Kim 2006, Cohen 2005) or “filler functionalism” (McLaughlin 2006). The separation between role functionalism and realizer functionalism mars the distinction traditionally made between (...) functionalism and the identity theory, because realizer functionalism can be seen as the synthesis of functionalism and the identity theory. In this paper, I begin with an analysis of the distinction between role and realizer functionalism. I shall further develop realizer functionalism as a viable, or arguably the best, explanatory model for the mind-brain relation. Finally, I will argue that under realizer functionalism, we can give an account of how mind is placed in the material world without at the same time giving up on the autonomy of psychology. The autonomy of psychology is tantamount to the thesis that mental properties are not type-identical with, nor type-reducible to, physical properties of the brain. In the philosophical debate on reductive andnonreductivephysicalism, reductivism seems to be gaining the upper hand these days. In the final section of this paper, Ishall sketch my defense ofnonreductivephysicalism. I believe that the current enthusiasm for reductionism is misguided, and I shall show that under realizer functionalism, reductionism in the sense of reductive explanation, i.e., providing explanation of the psychological in terms of the underlying physical properties, is not a feasible project. (shrink)

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With a few exceptions, F.H. Bradley has become a forgotten figure in the history of philosophy. I argue that Bradley’s thoughts on relations are at least relevant to assessing the status ofnonreductivephysicalism as a comprehensive metaphysic and, moreover, that they can be seen to raise some nontrivial challenges tononreductivephysicalism so understood. In pursuing this line of thought, I consider two of Bradley’s regresses in Appearance and Reality – the better-known “chain” regress and (...) the lesser known “fission” regress – and explain their relevance tononreductivephysicalism. (shrink)

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Abtract: This article argues that the debate between reductive andnonreductive physicalists is best characterized as a disagreement about which properties are natural. Among other things, natural properties are those that characterize the world completely. All physicalists accept the “completeness of physics,” but this claim contains a subtle ambiguity, which results in two conceptions of natural properties. Reductive physicalists should assert, whilenonreductive physicalists should deny, that a single set of low-level physical properties is natural in both of (...) these senses. This way of drawing the distinction succeeds where previous approaches have failed and illuminates why the debate about reductionism is important. (shrink)

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An analysis and rebuttal of Jaegwon Kim's reasons for takingnonreductivephysicalism to entail the causal irrelevance of mental features to physical phenomena, particularly the behaviour of human bodies.

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In this paper, I investigate how different views about the vertical and horizontal structure of reality affect the debate between reductive andnonreductivephysicalism. This debate is commonly assumed to hinge on whether there are high-level, special-science properties that are distinct from low-level physical properties and whether the alleged multiple realizability of high-level properties establishes this. I defend a metaphysical interpretation ofnonreductive physicalismin the absence of both of these assumptions. Adopting an independently motivated, discipline-relative account of (...) natural properties and appealing to a phenomenon I call “multiple determinativity,” in which a single physical property simultaneously realizes different kinds of special-science properties, is sufficient to show that some special-science properties are irreducible to physical properties and thatnonreductivephysicalism is not merely a terminological variant of reductivephysicalism. (shrink)

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Most versions of the knowledge argument say that, since scientists observing my brain wouldn't know what my consciousness "is like," consciousness isn't describable as a physical process. Although this argument unwarrantedly equates the physical with the empirically observable, we can conclude, not that consciousness is nonphysical but that consciousness isn't identical with anything empirically observable. But what kind of mind&endash;body relation would render possible this empirical inaccessibility of consciousness? Even if multiple realizability may allow a distinction between consciousness and its (...) physical substrata, why does this distinction make consciousness empirically unobservable? The reason must be that the emotions motivating attention direction, partly constitutive of phenomenal states, are executed, not undergone by self-organizing processes actively appropriating and replacing needed physical substrata; we feel motivations by generating them. But all consciousness is motivated; visual cortex activation is unconscious of red unless the emotional limbic system and anterior cingulate motivatedly "look for" red. Experiencing entails executing motivations. Experimenters do know what subjects' brain events "are like" ---; but from the standpoint of the experimenter's motivational processes. (shrink)

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This paper assesses Fodor’s well-known argument from multiple realizability tononreductivephysicalism. Recent work has brought out that the empirical case for cross-species multiple realizability is weak at best and so we consider whether the argument can be rebooted using a “thin” notion of intraspecies multiple realizability, taking individual neural firing patterns to be the realizers of mental events. We agree that there are no prospects for reducing mental events to individual neural firing patterns. But there are more (...) plausible candidates for the neural realizers of mental events out there, namely, global neural properties such as the average firing rates of neural populations, or the local field potential. The problem for Fodor’s argument is that those global neural properties point towards reductive versions ofphysicalism. (shrink)

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No detailed description available for "Emergence or Reduction?".

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This book collects twelve original articles, arranged in three sections, plus an introduction.

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Knowing only what is empirically knowable can't by itself entail knowledge of what consciousness "is like." But if dualism is to be avoided, the question arises: how can a process be completely empirically unobservable when all of its components are completely observable? The recently emerging theory of self-organization offers resources with which to resolve this problem: Consciousness can be an empirically unobservable process because the emotions motivating attention are experienced only from the perspective of the one whose phenomenal states are (...) executed by the self-organizing processes which themselves constitute the consciousness. I argue that a self-organizing process can differ from the sum of its (empirically observable) substrata because, rather than just being realized by them, it actively rearranges the background conditions under which alternative component causal sequences can realize the self-organizing pattern into the future. (shrink)

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This essay addresses three problems facing a physicalist (as opposed to dualist) account of the person. First, how can such an account fail to be reductive if mental events are neurological events and such events are governed by natural laws? Answering this question requires a reexamination of the concept of supervenience. Second, what is the epistemological status ofnonreductivephysicalism? Recent philosophy of science can be used to argue that there is reasonable scientific evidence forphysicalism. Third, (...) the soul has traditionally been seen as that which enables human beings to relate to God. What accounts for this capacity in a physicalist theory of the person? This essay argues that the same faculties that enable higher cognitive and emotional experience also account for the capacity for religious experience. (shrink)

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Some claim that Non- reductivePhysicalism is an unstable position, on grounds that NRP either collapses into reductivephysicalism, or expands into emergentism of a robust or ‘strong’ variety. I argue that this claim is unfounded, by attention to the notion of a degree of freedom—roughly, an independent parameter needed to characterize an entity as being in a state functionally relevant to its law-governed properties and behavior. I start by distinguishing three relations that may hold between the degrees (...) of freedom needed to characterize certain special science entities, and those needed to characterize their composing physical entities; these correspond to what I call ‘reductions’, ‘restrictions’, and ‘eliminations’ in degrees of freedom. I then argue that eliminations in degrees of freedom, in particular—when strictly fewer degrees of freedom are required to characterize certain special science entities than are required to characterize their composing physical entities—provide a basis for making sense of how certain special science entities can be both physically acceptable and ontologically irreducible to physical entities. (shrink)

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This book addresses a tightly knit cluster of questions in the philosophy of mind. There is the question: Are mental properties identical with physical properties? An affirmative answer would seem to secure the truth ofphysicalism regarding the mind, i.e., the belief that all mental phenomena obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena. If the answer is negative, then the question arises: Can this solely in virtue of relation be understood as some kind of dependence short of identity? And (...) answering this requires answering two further questions. Exactly what sort of dependence on the physical doesphysicalism require, and what is needed for a property or phenomenon to qualify as physical? -/- It is argued that multiple realizability still provides irresistible proof (especially with the possibility of immaterial realizers) that mental properties are not identical with any properties of physics, chemistry, or biology. After refuting various attempts to formulatenonreductivephysicalism with the notion of realization, a new definition ofphysicalism is offered. This definition shows how it could be that the mental depends solely on the physical even if mental properties are not identical with those of the natural sciences. Yet, it is also argued that the sort of psychophysical dependence described is robust enough that if it were to obtain, then in a plausible and robust sense of ‘physical’, mental properties would still qualify as physical properties. (shrink)

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How should thought and consciousness be understood within a view of the world as being through-and-through physical? Many philosophers have proposed non-reductive, levels-based positions, according to which the physical domain is fundamental, while thought and consciousness are higher-level processes, dependent on and determined by physical processes. In this book, Kevin Morris's careful philosophical and historical critique shows that it is very difficult to make good metaphysical sense of this idea - notions like supervenience, physical realization, and grounding all fail to (...) articulate a viable non-reductive, levels-basedphysicalism. Challenging assumptions about the mind-body problem and providing new perspectives on the debate overphysicalism, this accessible and comprehensive book will interest scholars working in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science. (shrink)

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