Results for 'Nikos Kapitsinis'
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- The importance of practices of collective care: Exploring directions for an alternative productive paradigm fitting our times’ social, economic and ecological requirements.Ioannis Rigkos-Zitthen &NikosKapitsinis -forthcoming -Thesis Eleven.The Anthropocene is characterized by multiple crises associated with the infinite accumulation of growth on a planet of finite resources. Productive labour and the 8-h working model contribute to this contradiction. We argue for the reduction of productive labour in favour of reproductive labour accumulated through practices of collective care. The latter can heal the damage capital accumulation produces. Collective care brings into light various social practices often invisible to production, allows for a new understanding of nonhuman agency, and challenges (...) the dominant ethical disposition around work. We advocate for a new power equilibrium between productive and reproductive labour. (shrink)No categories
- Nikos Papastergiadis: The Cultures Of The South As Cosmos.Nikos Papastergiadis -2017 -Nordic Journal of Aesthetics 25 (52).As the Global South is increasingly interpenetrated by neo-liberal and authoritarian regimes the idea of the South as a site of emancipatory resistance and exotic cultural difference has ended. This article offers an alternative route into the cultures of the South. It focuses on the shifting forms of the South in contemporary visual art and outlines the possibilities of non-coercive forms of cultural exchange and the cartographies of a cosmopolitanism from below. This perspective on the South is most evident in (...) the stories of embodied solidarity that stand in contrast to top down visions of socio-economic development and cultural homogenization. (shrink)
- II—Niko Kolodny: Comment on Munoz-Dardé's‘Liberty's Chains’.Niko Kolodny -2009 -Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):197-212.Munoz-Dardé (2009) argues that a social contract theory must meet Rousseau's ‘liberty condition’: that, after the social contract, each ‘nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before’. She claims that Rousseau's social contract does not meet this condition, for reasons that suggest that no other social contract theory could. She concludes that political philosophy should turn away from social contract theory's preoccupation with authority and obedience, and focus instead on what she calls the ‘legitimacy’ of social arrangements. I (...) raise questions about each of these claims. (shrink)
- Why Be Rational?Niko Kolodny -2005 -Mind 114 (455):509-563.Normativity involves two kinds of relation. On the one hand, there is the relation of being a reason for. This is a relation between a fact and an attitude. On the other hand, there are relations specified by requirements of rationality. These are relations among a person's attitudes, viewed in abstraction from the reasons for them. I ask how the normativity of rationality—the sense in which we ‘ought’ to comply with requirements of rationality—is related to the normativity of reasons—the sense (...) in which we ‘ought’ to have the attitudes what we have conclusive reason to have. The normativity of rationality is not straightforwardly that of reasons, I argue; there are no reasons to comply with rational requirements in general. First, this would lead to ‘bootstrapping’, because, contrary to the claims of John Broome, not all rational requirements have ‘wide scope’. Second, it is unclear what such reasons to be rational might be. Finally, we typically do not, and in many cases could not, treat rational requirements as reasons. Instead, I suggest, rationality is only apparently normative, and the normativity that it appears to have is that of reasons. According to this ‘Transparency Account’, rational requirements govern our responses to our beliefs about reasons. The normative ‘pressure’ that we feel, when rational requirements apply to us, derives from these beliefs: from the reasons that, as it seems to us, we have. (shrink)
- Love as valuing a relationship.Niko Kolodny -2003 -Philosophical Review 112 (2):135-189.At first glance, love seems to be a psychological state for which there are normative reasons: a state that, if all goes well, is an appropriate or fitting response to something independent of itself. Love for one’s parent, child, or friend is fitting, one wants to say, if anything is. On reflection, however, it is elusive what reasons for love might be. It is natural to assume that they would be nonrelational features of the person one loves, something about her (...) in her own right. According to the “quality theory,” for example, reasons for love are the beloved’s personal attributes, such as her wit and beauty. In J. David Velleman’s provocative and ingeniously argued proposal, the reason for love is the beloved’s bare Kantian personhood, her capacity for rational choice and valuation.1 But no such nonrelational feature works. To appreciate just one difficulty, observe that whatever nonrelational feature one selects as the reason for love will be one that another person could, or actually does, possess. The claim that nonrelational features are reasons for love implies, absurdly, that insofar as one’s love for Jane is responsive to its reasons, it will accept any relevantly similar person as a replacement. (shrink)
- The pecking order: social hierarchy as a philosophical problem.Niko Kolodny -2023 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.Our political thinking is driven, far more than philosophers recognize, by a concern for social equality and, more specifically, a concern to avoid relations of inferiority. Niko Kolodny argues that, in order to make sense of the most familiar ideas in our political thought and discourse - the justification of the state, democracy, and rule of law, as well as objections to paternalism and corruption - we cannot merely appeal to freedom (as libertarians like Nozick do) or to distributive fairness (...) (as liberals like Rawls do). We must, instead, appeal directly to claims against inferiority, that no one stands above or below. (shrink)No categories
- Rule Over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy.Niko Kolodny -2014 -Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (4):287-336.
- What Makes Free Will Free: The Impossibility of Predicting Genuine Creativity.Nikos Erinakis -2020 -Conatus 5 (1):55.In this paper I argue that Mill’s ‘Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity’ regarding the human will and action cannot apply on all cases, and that the human mind has potentially the capacity to create freely a will or action that, no matter what kind of knowledge we possess, cannot be predicted. More precisely, I argue against Mill’s attempt of conjunction between the freedom of the will and the ‘Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity’ while I attempt a comparison with the relevant Kantian approach. (...) I then claim that a will cannot be free and be predicted at the same time, as both the elements of freedom and unpredictability of the will are founded on the very process of its formulation as an outcome of genuine creativity. I, thus, attempt to propose a more substantially free view of free will and action than the ones presented by the prominent conceptions. (shrink)No categories
- The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny -2008 -European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.Niko Kolodny It is often said that there is a special class of norms, ‘rational requirements’, that demand that our attitudes be related one another in certain ways, whatever else may be the case.1 In recent work, a special class of these rational requirements has attracted particular attention: what I will call ‘requirements of formal coherence as such’, which require just that our attitudes be formally coherent.2 For example, we are rationally required, if we believe something, to believe what it (...) entails. And we are rationally required, if we intend an end, to intend what we take to be necessary means to it. The intuitive idea is that formally incoherent attitudes give rise to a certain normative tension, or exert a kind of rational pressure on each another, and this tension, or pressure, is relieved just when one of the attitudes is revised. As John Broome observes, these requirements are, by their nature, ‘wide scope’, which is to say that there is no particular attitude that one must have or lack in order to satisfy them. This is because they require just formal coherence, and there is no particular attitude that one must have or lack in order to be formally coherent. (shrink)
- Ifs and Oughts.Niko Kolodny &John MacFarlane -2010 -Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.We consider a paradox involving indicative conditionals (‘ifs’) and deontic modals (‘oughts’). After considering and rejecting several standard options for resolv- ing the paradox—including rejecting various premises, positing an ambiguity or hidden contextual sensitivity, and positing a non-obvious logical form—we offer a semantics for deontic modals and indicative conditionals that resolves the paradox by making modus ponens invalid. We argue that this is a result to be welcomed on independent grounds, and we show that rejecting the general validity of modus (...) ponens is compatible with vindicating most ordinary uses of modus ponens in reasoning. (shrink)
- Platonic Drama and its Ancient Reception.Nikos G. Charalabopoulos -2012 - Cambridge University Press.As prose dramatic texts Plato's dialogues would have been read by their original audience as an alternative type of theatrical composition. The 'paradox' of the dialogue form is explained by his appropriation of the discourse of theatre, the dominant public mode of communication of his time. The oral performance of his works is suggested both by the pragmatics of the publication of literary texts in the classical period and by his original role as a Sokratic dialogue-writer and the creator of (...) a fourth dramatic genre. Support comes from a number of pieces of evidence, from a statue of Sokrates in the Academy to a mosaic of Sokrates in Mytilene, which point to a centuries-old tradition of treating the dialogues in the context of performance literature and testify to the significance of the image of 'Plato the prose dramatist' for his original and subsequent audiences. (shrink)
- Rule Over None I: What Justifies Democracy?Niko Kolodny -2014 -Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (3):195-229.
- Neuronal correlates of subjective visual perception.Nikos K. Logothetis &Jeffrey D. Schall -1989 -Science 245:761-63.
- Philosophia kai historia tēs epistēmēs.Nikos Augelēs -1993 - Thessalonikē: [S.N.].No categories
- Why Be Disposed to Be Coherent?Niko Kolodny -2008 -Ethics 118 (3):437-463.My subject is what I will call the “Myth of Formal Coherence.” In its normative telling, the Myth is that there are “requirements of formal coherence as such,” which demand just that our beliefs and intentions be formally coherent.1 Some examples are.
- Single units and conscious vision.Nikos K. Logothetis -1998 -Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B-Biological Sciences 353:1801-1818.Logothetis, N.K.: Single units and conscious vision. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B-Biological Sciences 353, 1801-1818 (1998) Abstract.
- Which relationships justify partiality? The case of parents and children.Niko Kolodny -2010 -Philosophy and Public Affairs 38 (1):37-75.
- Death and the Afterlife.Niko Kolodny (ed.) -2013 - New York, US: Oup Usa.We normally take it for granted that other people will live on after we ourselves have died. Even if we do not believe in a personal afterlife in which we survive our own deaths, we assume that there will be a "collective afterlife" in which humanity survives long after we are gone. Samuel Scheffler maintains that this assumption plays a surprising - indeed astonishing - role in our lives.
- State or process requirements?Niko Kolodny -2007 -Mind 116 (462):371-385.rational requirements are narrow scope. The source of our disagreement, I suspect, is that Broome believes that the relevant rational requirements govern states, whereas I believe that they govern processes. If they govern states, then the debate over scope is sterile. The difference between narrow- and wide-scope state requirements is only as important as the difference between not violating a requirement and satisfying one. Broome's observations about conflicting narrow-scope state requirements only corroborate this. Why, then, have we thought that there (...) was an important difference? Perhaps, I conjecture, because there is an important difference between narrow- and wide-scope process requirements, and we have implicitly taken process requirements as our topic. I clarify and try to defend my argument that some process requirements are narrow scope, so that if there were reasons to conform to rational requirements, there would be implausible bootstrapping. I then reformulate Broome's observations about conflicting narrow-scope state requirements as an argument against narrow-scope process requirements, and suggest a reply. (shrink)
- Instrumental reasons.Niko Kolodny -2018 - In Daniel Star,The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.Often our reason for doing something is an "instrumental reason": that doing that is a means to doing something else that we have reason to do. What principles govern this "instrumental transmission" of reasons from ends to means? Negatively, I argue against principles often invoked in the literature, which focus on necessary or sufficient means. Positively, I propose a principle, "General Transmission," which answers to two intuitive desiderata: that reason transmits to means that are "probabilizing" and "nonsuperfluous" with respect to (...) the relevant end. I then apply General Transmission to the debate over "detachment": whether "wide-scope" reason for a material conditional or disjunction implies "narrow-scope" reason for the consequent or disjuncts. (shrink)
- What is rivalling during binocular rivalry?Nikos K. Logothetis,David A. Leopold &D. L. Sheinberg -1996 -Nature 30 (6575):621-624.
- Protention in Husserl’s Phenomenology.Nikos Soueltzis -2021 - Springer Verlag.Every attempt to examine our consciousness’s passive life and its dynamic in its various forms inevitably intersects with our primal awareness of the future. Even though Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness enjoys a certain fame, his conception of our primordial relation to the future has not been adequately accounted for. The book at hand aims to offer a close study of Husserl’s view of protentional consciousness and to trace its unique contribution to our overall awareness of time. It offers an extensive (...) analysis of various aspects of protention by investigating its connection to different fields and levels of experience. To achieve such a task, the book stresses the need to enrich the familiar formal account of protention with a material one. Thus, alongside issues pertaining exclusively to the form of protention, such as its relation to fulfillment as well as its double-intentional structure, various other dimensions are discussed, such as the phenomena of disappointment and correction as well as the role hyle plays in both of them. In the same vein, special attention is given to the relation between protentional consciousness and affectivity, thus shedding light on the dynamic unity of our living-present. What this study purports to show is that Husserl’s phenomenology is equipped to offer a solid account of the thinnest and subtlest ways in which we are aware of the future in our experiential life. (shrink)
- How Does Coherence Matter?Niko Kolodny -2007 -Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.Recently, much attention has been paid to ‘rational requirements’ and, especially, to what I call ‘rational requirements of formal coherence as such’. These requirements are satisfied just when our attitudes are formally coherent: for example, when our beliefs do not contradict each other. Nevertheless, these requirements are puzzling. In particular, it is unclear why we should satisfy them. In light of this, I explore the conjecture that there are no requirements of formal coherence. I do so by trying to construct (...) a theory of error for the idea that there are such requirements. (shrink)
- Cryptomarkets as a libertarian counter-conduct of resistance.Nikos Sotirakopoulos -2018 -European Journal of Social Theory 21 (2):189-206.Cryptomarkets function as self-regulating forms of governance, close to what Hayek would describe as a spontaneous order. At the same time, in cases like the online market Silk Road, they construct an identity that portrays their illegal activities as operating within a framework of individual rights and voluntary transactions. As has already been examined in the wider literature, the political and economic philosophy of libertarianism has been mobilized by participants in such markets in order to provide a moral theoretical background (...) to their activities. This article examines: (1) why libertarianism indeed provides a suitable narrative for such activities and how the theoretical work of Foucault on power and resistance (and, more specifically, his notion of ‘counter-conduct’) can help us understand the contentious relationship between the state and cryptomarkets; and (2) how libertarian practices such as the ones taking place in cryptomarkets are at odds with neoliberal governmentality. (shrink)No categories
- Promises and Practices Revisited.Niko Kolodny &R. Jay Wallace -2003 -Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (2):119-154.Promising is clearly a social practice or convention. By uttering the formula, “I hereby promise to do X,” we can raise in others the expectation that we will in fact do X. But this succeeds only because there is a social practice that consists (inter alia) in a disposition on the part of promisers to do what they promise, and an expectation on the part of promisees that promisers will so behave. It is equally clear that, barring special circumstances of (...) some kind, it is morally wrong for promisers to fail to do what they have promised to do. What is perhaps less clear is how the moral wrongness that is involved when promises are broken is related to the social practice that makes promising possible in the first place. (shrink)
- 1. Ueber eine Hesychglosse.Nikos A. Bees -1918 -Philologus: Zeitschrift für Antike Literatur Und Ihre Rezeption 75 (1-4):463-465.No categories
- 2. Zu einer Randnotiz der Pausaniashandschrift Va.Nikos A. Bees -1918 -Philologus: Zeitschrift für Antike Literatur Und Ihre Rezeption 75 (1-4):231-231.No categories
- Hērakleitos: kērygma gia stasē zōēs.Nikos Dendrinos -1996 - Athēna: Ekdoseis Papazēsē.Export citation
Bookmark - Processualité de l'être social dans la philosophie du jeune Lukács.Nikos Foufas -2021 - Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Implementation of Belief Change Operators Using BDDs.Nikos Gorogiannis &Mark D. Ryan -2002 -Studia Logica 70 (1):131-156.While the theory of belief change has attracted a lot of interest from researchers, work on implementing belief change and actually putting it to use in real-world problems is still scarce. In this paper, we present an implementation of propositional belief change using Binary Decision Diagrams. Upper complexity bounds for the algorithm are presented and discussed. The approach is presented both in the general case, as well as on specific belief change operators from the literature. In an effort to gain (...) a better understanding of the empirical efficiency of the algorithms involved, a fault diagnosis problem on combinational circuits is presented, implemented and evaluated. (shrink)
- Which relationships justify.Niko Kolodny -unknownWe have, or at least we take ourselves to have, reason for patterns of action and emotion toward our parents, siblings, friends, spouses, children, and others with whom we have significant ties.1 This partiality involves seeing to it that both these relatives and our relationships to them fare well, as well as respecting both in our decisions. It also involves feeling certain positive emotions (e.g., joy, relief, gratitude) when they fare well or are properly regarded, and feeling certain negative emotions (...) (e.g., grief, anxiety, resentment) when they fare poorly or are not properly regarded. Famously, these reasons for partiality are agent-relative. I have reason to be partial to my relatives, whereas you do not, and you have reason to be partial to your relatives, whereas I do not. Less often noted, these reasons support requirements that are owed to our relatives. When we breach these requirements, we wrong our relatives, if not.. (shrink)
- Kratos kai politikē.Nikos Kotzias -1993 - Athēna: Ekdoseis "Nea Synora"-A.A. Livanē.
- Syzētēseis.Nikos Matsoukas -1974No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- I Cheat Therefore I Exist? The BCCI Scandal in Context.Nikos Passas -forthcoming -International Perspectives on Business Ethics.Export citation Bookmark
- (1 other version)Time and Development in Kripke's “Naming and Necessity”.Niko Strobach -1998 -Theoria 13 (3):503-517.In this article, I want to focus on time and development in Kripke’s “Naming and Necessity” by considering two topics: (1) the evolution of scientific knowledge; (2) the evolution of biographies. In connection with (1) I suggest the introduction of a sentence operator for epistemic possibility and argue that some of Kripke’s strong metaphysical statements are finely counterbalanced by rather “Popperian” epistemological considerations. In connection with (2) I consider the idea of exploiting necessity of origin for a crossworld identity criterion.
- Many-Valued Multiple-Expert modal models.Nikos Tzevelekos -2007 - In Jean-Yves Béziau & Alexandre Costa-Leite,Perspectives on Universal Logic. Milan, Italy: Polimetrica. pp. 351.
- The Epistemology Of Heart-Mind In The Spiritual Teachings Of Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi.Nikos Yiangou -2012 -Kanz Philosophia : A Journal for Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism 2 (1):123.No categories
- The Ruins Of Love : Ibn ‘Arabi’s Poetics of Perplexity.Nikos Yiangou -2012 -Kanz Philosophia : A Journal for Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism 2 (2):347.No categories
- Astrology, piety and poverty: seven anonymous poems in Vaticanus gr. 743.Nikos Zagklas -2016 -Byzantinische Zeitschrift 109 (2):895-918.Name der Zeitschrift: Byzantinische Zeitschrift Jahrgang: 109 Heft: 2 Seiten: 895-918.No categories
- More than a Theory: A New Map of Social Thought.Nikos Kalampalikis &Valérie Haas -2008 -Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38 (4):449-459.In this article we revisit two different temporal phases related to the main publication of Serge Moscovici's book La Psychanalyse, son image et son public together with two key promissing notions of the theory, cognitive polyphasia and anchoring. The first phase, initiated by the durkheimian cercle, will give us the occasion to retrieve the traces of the fascinating intellectual debate about collective psychology that was involved in producing ¨frontier¨ propositions and renewing their perspectives in today's light, namely throught cognitive polyphasia. (...) The second phase, more recent, inspired by classical and modern research into the social representation's field, will serve us as a basis for a new hypothesis about anchoring. We will attempt to suggest that traditional familiarization allocated to anchoring can also work in the opposite sense, transmitting and guaranteeing the non-familiar, establishing strangeness. Finally, we are arguing that social representations are more than a simple theory, just as the symbol is always more than what it symbolizes. (shrink)
- Do associative duties matter?Niko Kolodny -2002 -Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (3):250–266.
- Instantiating abstract argumentation with classical logic arguments: Postulates and properties.Nikos Gorogiannis &Anthony Hunter -2011 -Artificial Intelligence 175 (9-10):1479-1497.
- Harmony as Ideology: Questioning the Diversity–Stability Hypothesis.Nikos Nikisianis &Georgios P. Stamou -2015 -Acta Biotheoretica 64 (1):33-64.The representation of a complex but stable, self-regulated and, finally, harmonious nature penetrates the whole history of Ecology, thus contradicting the core of the Darwinian evolution. Originated in the pre-Darwinian Natural History, this representation defined theoretically the various schools of early ecology and, in the context of the cybernetic synthesis of the 1950s, it assumed a typical mathematical form on account of α positive correlation between species diversity and community stability. After 1960, these two aforementioned concepts and their positive correlation (...) were proposed as environmental management tools, in the face of the ecological crisis arising at the time. In the early 1970s, and particularly after May’s evolutionary arguments, the consensus around this positive correlation collapsed for a while, only to be promptly restored for the purpose of attaching an ecological value on biodiversity. In this paper, we explore the history of the diversity–stability hypothesis and we review the successive terms that have been used to express community stability. We argue that this hypothesis has been motivated by the nodal ideological presuppositions of order and harmony and that the scientific developments in this field largely correspond to external social pressures. We conclude that the conflict about the diversity–stability relationship is in fact an ideological debate, referring mostly to the way we see nature and society rather than to an autonomous scientific question. From this point of view, we may understand why Ecology’s concepts and perceptions may decline and return again and again, forming a pluralistic scientific history. (shrink)
- What Makes Threats Wrong?Niko Kolodny -2017 -Analytic Philosophy 58 (2):87-118.No categories
- Commentary on Aristotle, ›Prior Analytics‹ (Book II): Critical Edition with Introduction and Translation.Nikos Agiotis (ed.) -2021 - Boston: De Gruyter.This study contributes substantially to research on Aristotelian logic in Byzantium. It includes a critical edition of the commentary by Leo Magentenos, the Metropolitan of Mytilene (twelfth c.?) on Book II of the Prior Analytics along with an edition of the syllogism diagram attributed to this work in the manuscript tradition of this work.
- ‘Who decided this?’: Negotiating epistemic and deontic authority in systemic family therapy training.Nikos Bozatzis,Georgios Abakoumkin,Eleftheria Tseliou &Katerina Nanouri -2022 -Discourse Studies 24 (1):94-114.In this article we illustrate how trainers and trainees negotiate epistemic and deontic authority within systemic family therapy training. Adult education principles and postmodern imperatives have challenged trainers’ and trainees’ asymmetries regarding knowledge and power, normatively implicated by the institutional training setting. Up-to-date, we lack insight into how trainers and trainees negotiate epistemic and deontic rights in naturally occurring dialog within training. Drawing from discursive psychology and conversation analysis, we present an analysis of eight transcribed, videotaped training seminars from a (...) systemic family therapy training program, featuring three trainers and eleven trainees. Our analysis highlights the dilemmatic ways in which participants resist and affirm the normatively implicated trainers’ deontic and epistemic authority. Trainers are shown as mitigating directives and trainees as resisting them, with both displaying knowing, while attending to concerns about symmetry. We discuss our findings’ implications for systemic family therapy training. (shrink)No categories
- The biopolitics of CFS/ME.Nikos Karfakis -2018 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 70:20-28.No categories
- In vivo brain connectivity: Optimization of manganese enhanced MRI for neuronal tract tracing.Nikos Logothetis -manuscriptmanganese (Mn2+) enhanced MRI (MEMRI) to study neuronal connectivity in vivo opens the possibility to these studies. However, several drawbacks exist that challenge its applicability. High Mn2+ concentrations produce cytotoxic effects that can perturb the circuits under study. In the other hand, the MR signal is..Export citation Bookmark
- Myocardial and cerebral perfusion studies in animal models.Nikos Logothetis -unknownIn-vivo phenotyping of genetically engineered mouse models for amyotrophic lateral sclerosis is established by combining BT-MRI and CASL G. Vanhoutte1, E. Storkebaum2, P. Carmeliet2, A. Van der Linden1.Export citation Bookmark
- Quantifying nature: ideological representations in the concept of diversity.Nikos Nikisianis &George P. Stamou -2011 -History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 33 (3).
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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