Institutional Conscientious Objection to Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada: A Critical Analysis of the Personnel-Based Arguments.NicholasAbernethy -2023 -Canadian Journal of Bioethics / Revue canadienne de bioéthique 6 (2):43-52.detailsDebate rages over whether Canadian provincial and territorial governments should allow healthcare institutions to conscientiously object to providing medical assistance in dying (MAiD). This issue is likely to end up in court soon through challenges from patients, clinicians, or advocacy groups such as Dying With Dignity Canada. When it does, one key question for the courts will be whether allowing institutional conscientious objection (ICO) to MAiD respects (i.e., shows due regard for) the consciences of the objecting healthcare institutions, understood as (...) unitary entities. This question has been thoroughly explored elsewhere in the academic literature. However, another key question has been underexplored. Specifically, precedent set by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General) suggests that the courts will consider whether allowing ICO to MAiD respects the consciences of the personnel within objecting healthcare institutions. My answer to this question is no, by which I mean that allowing ICO to MAiD shows undue disregard for some consciences and undue regard for others. To justify this answer, I analyze the arguments that hold that allowing ICO in healthcare respects the consciences of the personnel within objecting healthcare institutions. My conclusion is that none of these personnel-based arguments succeed in the case of ICO to MAiD. Some fail because they are wrong about the nature of conscience and complicity. Others fail because they contradict the arguments’ proponents’ positions on conscientious objection by individual healthcare providers. Still others fail because they are internally inconsistent. (shrink)
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Russell’s Idealist Apprenticeship.Nicholas Griffin -1991 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.detailsBased mainly on unpublished papers this is the first detailed study of the early, neo-Hegelian period of Bertrand Russell's career. It covers his philosophical education at Cambridge, his conversion to neo-Hegelianism, his ambitious plans for a neo-Hegelian dialectic of the sciences and the problems which ultimately led him to reject it.
Neo-Confucian ecological humanism: an interpretive engagement with Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692).Nicholas S. Brasovan -2017 - Albany, New York: SUNY Press.detailsAddresses Ming Dynasty philosopher Wang Fuzhis neo-Confucianism from the perspective of contemporary ecological humanism. In this novel engagement with Ming Dynasty philosopher Wang Fuzhi (16191692),Nicholas S. Brasovan presents Wangs neo-Confucianism as an important theoretical resource for engaging with contemporary ecological humanism. Brasovan coins the term person-in-the-world to capture ecological humanisms fundamental premise that humans and nature are inextricably bound together, and argues that Wangs cosmology of energy (qi) gives us a rich conceptual vocabulary for understanding the continuity that (...) exists between persons and the natural world. The book makes a significant contribution to English-language scholarship on Wang Fuzhi and to Chinese intellectual history, with new English translations of classical Chinese, Mandarin, and French texts in Chinese philosophy and culture. This innovative work of comparative philosophy not only presents a systematic and comprehensive interpretation of Wangs thought but also shows its relevance to contemporary discussions in the philosophy of ecology. This is a fine study of Wang Fuzhis complex and fascinating neo-Confucian cosmology. I learned an immense amount about one of Chinas last great Confucian intellectuals. John Berthrong, author of Expanding Process: Exploring Philosophical and Theological Transformations in China and the West. (shrink)
Journeys through philosophy: a classical introduction.Nicholas Capaldi,Eugene Kelly &Luis E. Navia (eds.) -1980 - Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books.detailsWhen Journeys Through Philosophy first appeared in 1977, it quickly established a reputation as one of the most complete and versatile introductory philosophy textbooks for the beginning student. Combining carefully chosen selections from the original works of many eminent philosophers with invaluable commentaries designed to illuminate the ideas of these great minds, and an extensive section on how one should read philosophy, the editors have answered the instructional needs of students and teachers alike. The revised edition contains selections by Denis (...) Diderot, Kierkegaard, Irving Kristol, Paul Kurtz, George Moore, William Paley, Jean-Paul Sarte, and John Wisdom, in addition to many of the excerpts from classical and contemporary thinkers found in the earlier edition. The highly acclaimed section on how to read philosophy is complemented by the addition of new introductions. Journeys Through Philosophy is surely destined to become the introductory philosophy textbook for our times. (shrink)
Is It Possible and Sometimes Desirable for States to Forgive?Nicholas Wolterstorff -2013 -Journal of Religious Ethics 41 (3):417-434.detailsAfter discussing at some length the nature of interpersonal forgiveness and its relation to punishment, the author addresses the main question of the essay: are states the sorts of entities that can forgive; and if they are, is it sometimes desirable that they forgive? The author argues that states can forgive and very often do; and that sometimes it is desirable that they do so. The essay closes by considering the complexities that arise when the state wants to forgive but (...) the victim does not, and conversely. (shrink)
Unpopular Essays on Technological Progress.Nicholas Rescher -1980 - University of Pittsburgh Press.detailsNicholas Rescher examines a number of controversial social issues using the intellectual tools of the philosopher, in an attempt to clarify some of the complexities of modern society, technology, and economics. He elucidates his thoughts on topics such as: whether technological progress leads to greater happiness; environmental problems; endangered species, costly scientific research on the frontiers of knowledge, medical/moral issues on the preservation of life; and crime and justice, among others.
Reason, Tradition, and the Good: Macintyre's Tradition-Constituted Reason and Frankfurt School Critical Theory.JefferyNicholas -2012 - Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.detailsIntroduction: the question of reason -- The Frankfurt School critique of reason -- Habermas's communicative rationality -- Macintyre's tradition-constituted reason -- A substantive reason -- Beyond relativism: reasonable progress and learning from -- Conclusion: toward a Thomistic-Aristotelian critical theory of society.
Selection for delayed maturity.Nicholas Blurton Jones &Frank W. Marlowe -2002 -Human Nature 13 (2):199-238.detailsHumans have a much longer juvenile period (weaning to first reproduction, 14 or more years) than their closest relatives (chimpanzees, 8 years). Three explanations are prominent in the literature. (a) Humans need the extra time to learn their complex subsistence techniques. (b) Among mammals, since length of the juvenile period bears a constant relationship to adult lifespan, the human juvenile period is just as expected. We therefore only need to explain the elongated adult lifespan, which can be explained by the (...) opportunity for older individuals to increase their fitness by providing for grandchildren. (c) The recent model by Kaplan and colleagues suggests that longevity and investment in "embodied capital" will coevolve, and that the need to learn subsistence technology contributed to selection for our extended lifespan.We report experiments designed to test the first explanation: human subsistence technology takes many years to learn, and spending more time learning it gives reproductive benefits that outweight lost time. Taking away some of this time should lead to deficits in efficiency. We paid Hadza foragers to participate in tests of important subsistence skills. We compared efficiency of males and females at digging tubers. They differ greatly in time spent practicing digging but show no difference in efficiency. Children who lost "bush experience" by spending years in boarding school performed no worse at digging tubers or target archery than those who had spent their entire lives in the bush. Climbing baobab trees, an important and dangerous skill, showed no change with age among those who attempted it. We could show no effects of practice time.These findings do not support what we label "the practice theory," but we discuss ways in which the theory could be defended; for example, some as-yet-untested skill may be greatly impaired by loss of a few years of the juvenile period. Our data also show that it is not safe to assume that increases in skill with age are entirely due to learning or practice; they may instead be due to increases in size and strength. (shrink)
Epistemic Issues in Pragmatic Perspective.Nicholas Rescher -2017 - Lanham: Lexington Books.detailsThis book presents a nonstandard approach to epistemology. Where standard epistemology generally focuses on the certain knowledge the Greeks called epistêmê, the present focus is on some less assured modes of information. Its deliberations focus on such cognitively suboptimal processes as conjecture, guesswork, and plausible supposition.
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Essays in the History of Philosophy.Nicholas Rescher -1995detailsThis is a collection of essays in the history of philosophy, ranging from the cosmic evolution in Anaximander, through Leibniz on creation, to the present state of American philosophy.
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Is Philosophy a Guide to Life?Nicholas Rescher -1983 -Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 5:1-15.detailsPhilosophers traditionally see the task of philosophy as providing rational guidance to thought and action—as answering “the big questions” about the world, ourselves, and our place in its scheme of things. But does philosophy provide such answers? The motto of Phi Beta Kappa, America’s oldest academic confraternity, is the proud dictum “Philosophy is the guide of life”. But is this claim defensible? Does philosophy indeed provide a satisfactory guide to decision and action in the practical affairs of life?
Optimalism and the Rationality of the Real.Nicholas Rescher -2006 -Review of Metaphysics 59 (3):503-516.detailsIS THE REAL RATIONAL? Can we ever manage to explain the nature of reality—the make-up of the universe as a whole? Is there not an insuperable obstacle here—an infeasibility that was discerned already by Immanuel Kant who argued roughly as follows.
The Friendship Model of Filial Obligations.Nicholas Dixon -1995 -Journal of Applied Philosophy 12 (1):77-87.detailsABSTRACT This paper [1] is a defence of a modified version of Jane English's model of filial obligations based on adult children's friendship with their parents. Unlike the more traditional view that filial obligations are a repayment for parental sacrifices, the friendship model puts filial duties in the appealing context of voluntary, loving relationships. Contrary to English's original statement of this view, which is open to the charge of tolerating filial ingratitude, the friendship model can generate obligations to help our (...) parents even if we are no longer friendly with them. Joseph Kupfer has pointed out several ways in which parent‐child relationships differ from peer friendships; but his arguments do not preclude our enjoying a type of friendship with our parents. In response to Christina Hoff Sommers, who objects that feelings of friendship toward our parents are too flimsy a ground for filial duties, the friendship model can provide a plausible, robust account of filial obligations. As for adult children who have never formed friendships with their loving, caring parents, and refuse to give them much‐needed assistance, they can be criticised by moral considerations independent of but compatible with the friendship model. (shrink)
Brandom and the brutes.Nicholas Griffin -2018 -Synthese 195 (12):5521-5547.detailsBrandom’s inferentialism offers, in many ways, a radically new approach to old issues in semantics and the theory of intentionality. But, in one respect at least, it clings tenaciously to the mainstream philosophical tradition of the middle years of the twentieth century. Against the theory’s natural tendencies, Brandom aligns it with the ’linguistic turn’ that philosophy took in the middle of the last century by insisting, in the face of considerable opposing evidence, that intentionality is the preserve of those who (...) can offer and ask for reasons and thus of language users alone. In this paper, I argue that there is no good reason for giving inferentialism a linguistic twist, and that, in doing so, Brandom is forced to make claims which are implausible in themselves and lead him, in the attempt to mitigate them, to a number of doubtful expedients. (shrink)
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