Companies' Use of Whistle-Blowing to Detect Fraud: An Examination of Corporate Whistle-Blowing Policies. [REVIEW]Gladys Lee &NeilFargher -2013 -Journal of Business Ethics 114 (2):283-295.detailsIn order to provide an effective whistle-blowing system, it is expected that companies would provide employees with a high level of disclosure regarding the whistle-blowing process. This study investigates variation in the extent of whistle-blowing disclosures. As a measure of whistle-blowing implementation, this study further examines the provision of a hotline channel. The results suggest that the extent of whistle-blowing disclosures is positively associated with the permissibility of anonymous reporting and organisational support for whistle-blowing, the number of external directors on (...) the audit committee, and the existence of concentrated shareholdings. The mere existence of whistle-blowing disclosures could simply be symbolic. The findings also indicate a greater likelihood of the provision of hotlines when companies are larger in size, have a higher level of current inventory, are cross-listed in the US, and permit anonymous reporting. (shrink)
Virtual Reality: Digital or Fictional?Neil McDonnell &Nathan Wildman -2019 -Disputatio 11 (55):371-397.detailsAre the objects and events that take place in Virtual Reality genuinely real? Those who answer this question in the affirmative are realists, and those who answer in the negative are irrealists. In this paper we argue against the realist position, as given by Chalmers (2017), and present our own preferred irrealist account of the virtual. We start by disambiguating two potential versions of the realist position—weak and strong— and then go on to argue that neither is plausible. We then (...) introduce a Waltonian variety of ictionalism about the virtual, arguing that this sort of irrealist approach avoids the problems of the realist positions, fits with a unifying theory of representational works, and offers a better account of the phenomenology of engaging in virtual experiences. (shrink)
Putting the Luck Back Into Moral Luck.Neil Levy -2019 -Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):59-74.detailsMidwest Studies In Philosophy, EarlyView.
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Harming by Failing to Benefit.Neil Feit -2017 -Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):809-823.detailsIn this paper, I consider the problem of omission for the counterfactual comparative account of harm. A given event harms a person, on this account, when it makes her worse off than she would have been if it had not occurred. The problem arises because cases in which one person merely fails to benefit another intuitively seem harmless. The account, however, seems to imply that when one person fails to benefit another, the first thereby harms the second, since the second (...) person would have been better off if the first had benefited her. I argue that the cases of failing to benefit at issue are in fact cases of harming. They are cases of preventive harm. I also argue that we can explain away the intuition that no harm occurs in these cases, and that the relevant implication of the counterfactual comparative account is consistent with a variety of plausible views about the moral significance of harm. (shrink)
Appraising Economic Theories: Studies in the Methodology of Research Programs.Mark Blaug &Neil de Marchi (eds.) -1991 - Edward Elgar.detailsPapers produced for a conference of economists, economic methodologists and historians of economics, convened to reflect on the question of whether MSRP - the methodology of scientific research programmes - has proved useful in the light of 20 years' experience.
Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements.Neil Sinclair -2012 -Biology and Philosophy 27 (5):639-662.detailsThis paper applies the theory of teleosemantics to the issue of moral content. Two versions of teleosemantics are distinguished: input-based and output-based. It is argued that applying either to the case of moral judgements generates the conclusion that such judgements have both descriptive (belief-like) and directive (desire-like) content, intimately entwined. This conclusion directly validates neither descriptivism nor expressivism, but the application of teleosemantics to moral content does leave the descriptivist with explanatory challenges which the expressivist does not face. Since teleosemantics (...) ties content to function, the paper also offers an account of the evolutionary function of moral judgements. (shrink)
Authentic decision-making capacity in hard medical cases.Giles Newton-Howes,Neil Pickering &Greg Young -2019 -Clinical Ethics 14 (4):173-177.detailsBecause autonomy is regarded as central to modern bioethics; there is a considerable focus on the criteria by which autonomy may be judged. The most significant criterion used in day-to-day practic...
The Importance of Awareness.Neil Levy -2013 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):221-229.detailsA number of philosophers have recently argued that agents need not be conscious of the reasons for which they act or the moral significance of their actions in order to be morally responsible for them. In this paper, I identify a kind of awareness that, I claim, agents must have in order to be responsible for their actions. I argue that conscious information processing differs from unconscious in a manner that makes the following two claims true: (1) an agent’s values (...) ought to be identified with attitudes of which she is conscious, because having a value entails having a set of dispositions produced by conscious attitudes alone, and (2) that only actions settled upon by conscious deliberation are deeply attributable to agents, because only such actions express the agent’s evaluative stance. (shrink)
Zarathustra’s metaethics.Neil Sinhababu -2015 -Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):278-299.detailsNietzsche takes moral judgments to be false beliefs, and encourages us to pursue subjective nonmoral value arising from our passions. His view that strong and unified passions make one virtuous is mathematically derivable from this subjectivism and a conceptual analysis of virtue, explaining his evaluations of character and the nature of the Overman.
Betraying Trust.Collin O'Neil -2017 - In Paul Faulkner & Thomas Simpson,The Philosophy of Trust. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 70-89.detailsTrust not only disposes us to feel betrayed, trust can be betrayed. Understanding what a betrayal of trust is requires understanding how trust can ground an obligation on the part of the trusted person to act specifically as trusted. This essay argues that, since trust cannot ground an appropriate obligation where there is no prior obligation, a betrayal of trust should instead be conceived as the violation of a trust-based obligation to respect an already existing obligation. Two forms of trust (...) are evaluated for their potential to ground such a second-order obligation. One form counts as a gift to the trusted person only because it does not involve an expectation of trustworthiness; the other form cannot count as a gift but confers an honor because it does include an expectation of trustworthiness. Only trust that confers an honor generates a second-order obligation whose violation would be a betrayal of trust. -/- . (shrink)
Multiversism and Concepts of Set: How Much Relativism Is Acceptable?Neil Barton -2016 - In Francesca Boccuni & Andrea Sereni,Objectivity, Realism, and Proof. FilMat Studies in the Philosophy of Mathematics. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. pp. 189-209.detailsMultiverse Views in set theory advocate the claim that there are many universes of sets, no-one of which is canonical, and have risen to prominence over the last few years. One motivating factor is that such positions are often argued to account very elegantly for technical practice. While there is much discussion of the technical aspects of these views, in this paper I analyse a radical form of Multiversism on largely philosophical grounds. Of particular importance will be an account of (...) reference on the Multiversist conception, and the relativism that it implies. I argue that analysis of this central issue in the Philosophy of Mathematics indicates that Radical Multiversism must be algebraic, and cannot be viewed as an attempt to provide an account of reference without a softening of the position. (shrink)
The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality.Neil Sinhababu -2011 -Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (6):1-13.detailsChristine Korsgaard argues that Humean views of both action and rationality jointly imply the impossibility of irrational action, allowing us only to perform actions that we deem rational. Humeans can answer Korsgaard’s objection if their views of action and rationality measure agents’ actual desires differently. What determines what the agent does are the motivational forces that desires produce in the agent at the moment when she decides to act, as these cause action. What determines what it is rational to do (...) should be the agent’s dispositional desire strengths, as our normative intuitions respond to these. (shrink)
Epistemic restraint and the vice of curiosity.Neil C. Manson -2012 -Philosophy 87 (2):239-259.detailsIn recent years there has been wide-ranging discussion of epistemic virtues. Given the value and importance of acquiring knowledge this discussion has tended to focus upon those traits that are relevant to the acquisition of knowledge. This acquisitionist focus ignores or downplays the importance of epistemic restraint: refraining from seeking knowledge. In contrast, in many periods of history, curiosity was viewed as a vice. By drawing upon critiques of curiositas in Middle Platonism and Early Christian philosophy, we gain useful insights (...) into the value and importance of epistemic restraint. The historical discussion paves the way for a clarification of epistemic restraint, one that distinguishes the morally relevant features of epistemic process, content, purpose, and context. Epistemic restraint is identified as an important virtue where our epistemic pursuits pose risks and burdens, where such pursuits have opportunity costs, where they are pursued for vicious purposes. But it is in the social realm where epistemic restraint has most purchase, epistemic restraint is important both because privacy is important and because being trusted are important. Finally, some suggestions are offered as to why epistemic restraint has not received the contemporary attention that it deserves. (shrink)
Visual Narrative Structure.Neil Cohn -2013 -Cognitive Science 37 (3):413-452.detailsNarratives are an integral part of human expression. In the graphic form, they range from cave paintings to Egyptian hieroglyphics, from the Bayeux Tapestry to modern day comic books (Kunzle, 1973; McCloud, 1993). Yet not much research has addressed the structure and comprehension of narrative images, for example, how do people create meaning out of sequential images? This piece helps fill the gap by presenting a theory of Narrative Grammar. We describe the basic narrative categories and their relationship to a (...) canonical narrative arc, followed by a discussion of complex structures that extend beyond the canonical schema. This demands that the canonical arc be reconsidered as a generative schema whereby any narrative category can be expanded into a node in a tree structure. Narrative “pacing” is interpreted as a reflection of various patterns of this embedding: conjunction, left-branching trees, center-embedded constituencies, and others. Following this, diagnostic methods are proposed for testing narrative categories and constituency. Finally, we outline the applicability of this theory beyond sequential images, such as to film and verbal discourse, and compare this theory with previous approaches to narrative and discourse. (shrink)
Propositional clothing and belief.Neil Sinclair -2007 -Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):342-362.detailsMoral discourse is propositionally clothed, that is, it exhibits those features – such as the ability of its sentences to intelligibly embed in conditionals and other unasserted contexts – that have been taken by some philosophers to be constitutive of discourses that express propositions. If there is nothing more to a mental state being a belief than it being characteristically expressed by sentences that are propositionally clothed then the version of expressivism which accepts that moral discourse is propositionally clothed (‘quasi-realism’) (...) is self-refuting. Fortunately for quasi-realists, this view of belief, which I label ‘minimalism’, is false. I present three arguments against it and dismiss two possible defences (the first drawn from the work of Wright, the second given by Harcourt). The conclusion is that the issue between expressivists and their opponents cannot be settled by the mere fact that moral discourse wears propositional clothing. (shrink)
The Surprising Truth About Disagreement.Neil Levy -2020 -Acta Analytica 36 (2):137-157.detailsConciliationism—the thesis that when epistemic peers discover that they disagree about a proposition, both should reduce their confidence—faces a major objection: it seems to require us to significantly reduce our confidence in our central moral and political commitments. In this paper, I develop a typology of disagreement cases and a diagnosis of the source and force of the pressure to conciliate. Building on Vavova’s work, I argue that ordinary and extreme disagreements are surprising, and for this reason, they carry information (...) about the likelihood of error. But deep disagreement is not surprising at all, and token deep disagreements do not put pressure on us to conciliate. However, a pattern of deep disagreements points to a different concern: not the problem of disagreement but the problem of irrelevant influences. Deep disagreement constitutes some pressure to examine the foundations from which we reason, rather than to conciliate on our central moral and political claims. (shrink)
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Expressivist Explanations.Neil Sinclair -2012 -Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):147-177.detailsIn this paper I argue that the common practice of employing moral predicates as explaining phrases can be accommodated on an expressivist account of moral practice. This account does not treat moral explanations as in any way second-rate or derivative, since it subsumes moral explanations under the general theory of program explanations (as defended by Jackson and Pettit). It follows that the phenomenon of moral explanations cannot be used to adjudicate the debate between expressivism and its rivals.
Lying, Trust, and Gratitude.Collin O'neil -2012 -Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (4):301-333.detailsAmong the various methods of deceit, lying is often thought to be a special affront on the grounds that it invites the victim’s trust. Such an explanation is incomplete without an account of the moral significance of trust. This article distinguishes two morally problematic relations to trust, betrayals and abuses, and, appealing to the idea that we should be grateful to be trusted, attempts to explain these wrongs as violations of distinct demands of gratitude for trust. Only the wrong of (...) abuse, not betrayal, is useful for distinguishing methods of deceit. Although lying commits an abuse of trust, it turns out that it is really the broader category of deceit by means of communication that is special in this way. -/- . (shrink)
Rorty, Liberal Democracy, and Religious Certainty.Neil Gascoigne -2019 - Springer Verlag.detailsThis book asks whether there any limits to the sorts of religious considerations that can be raised in public debates, and if there are, by whom they are to be identified. Its starting point is the work of Richard Rorty, whose pragmatic pluralism leads him to argue for a politically motivated anticlericalism rather than an epistemologically driven atheism. Rather than defend Rorty’s position directly, Gascoigne argues for an epistemological stance he calls ‘Pragmatist Fideism’. The starting point for this exercise in (...) what Rorty calls ‘Cultural Politics’ is an acknowledgement that one must appeal to both secularists and those with religious commitments. In recent years ‘reformed’ epistemologists have aimed to establish a parity of epistemic esteem between religious and perceptual beliefs by exploiting an analogy in respect of their mutual vulnerability to sceptical challenges. Through an examination of this analogy, and in light of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, this book argues that understood correctly the ‘parity’ argument in fact lends epistemological support to the argument that religious considerations should not be raised in public debate. The political price paid—paying the price of politics—is worth it: the religious thinker is provided with a good reason for maintaining that their practices and beliefs are not undermined by other forms of religious life. (shrink)
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Structural Relativity and Informal Rigour.Neil Barton -2022 - In Gianluigi Oliveri, Claudio Ternullo & Stefano Boscolo,Objects, Structures, and Logics, FilMat Studies in the Philosophy of Mathematics. Springer. pp. 133-174.detailsInformal rigour is the process by which we come to understand particular mathematical structures and then manifest this rigour through axiomatisations. Structural relativity is the idea that the kinds of structures we isolate are dependent upon the logic we employ. We bring together these ideas by considering the level of informal rigour exhibited by our set-theoretic discourse, and argue that different foundational programmes should countenance different underlying logics (intermediate between first- and second-order) for formulating set theory. By bringing considerations of (...) perturbations in modal space to bear on the debate, we will suggest that a promising option for representing current set-theoretic thought is given by formulating set theory using quasi-weak second-order logic. These observations indicate that the usual division of structures into \particular (e.g. the natural number structure) and general (e.g. the group structure) is perhaps too coarse grained; we should also make a distinction between intentionally and unintentionally general structures. (shrink)
On Representations of Intended Structures in Foundational Theories.Neil Barton,Moritz Müller &Mihai Prunescu -2022 -Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (2):283-296.detailsOften philosophers, logicians, and mathematicians employ a notion of intended structure when talking about a branch of mathematics. In addition, we know that there are foundational mathematical theories that can find representatives for the objects of informal mathematics. In this paper, we examine how faithfully foundational theories can represent intended structures, and show that this question is closely linked to the decidability of the theory of the intended structure. We argue that this sheds light on the trade-off between expressive power (...) and meta-theoretic properties when comparing first-order and second-order logic. (shrink)
(1 other version)The Popperian Legacy in Economics: Papers Presented at a Symposium in Amsterdam, December 1985.Neil de Marchi -1988 - Cambridge University Press.detailsThis volume examines why Sir Karl Popper's view of empirical falsifiability as the distinguishing characteristic of science has found appeal among economists.
Conformal Invariance of the Newtonian Weyl Tensor.Neil Dewar &James Read -2020 -Foundations of Physics 50 (11):1418-1425.detailsIt is well-known that the conformal structure of a relativistic spacetime is of profound physical and conceptual interest. In this note, we consider the analogous structure for Newtonian theories. We show that the Newtonian Weyl tensor is an invariant of this structure.
Unequal Vividness and Double Effect.Neil Sinhababu -2013 -Utilitas 25 (3):291-315.detailsI argue that the Doctrine of Double Effect is accepted because of unreliable processes of belief-formation, making it unacceptably likely to be mistaken. We accept the doctrine because we more vividly imagine intended consequences of our actions than merely foreseen ones, making our aversions to the intended harms more violent, and making us judge that producing the intended harms is morally worse. This explanation fits psychological evidence from Schnall and others, and recent neuroscientific research from Greene, Klein, Kahane, and Schaich (...) Borg. It explains Mikhail and Hauser’s “universal moral grammar” and an interesting phenomenon about Double Effect cases noted by Bennett. When unequally vivid representations determine our decisions, we typically misjudge the merits of our options and make mistakes. So if Double Effect is a product of unequal vividness, it is likely to be mistaken. This argument, I claim, fits Berker’s specifications for good empirically grounded arguments in ethics. (shrink)
Atypical Acquisition.Neil Smith &Ianthi Tsimpli -2021 - In Nicholas Allott, Terje Lohndal & Georges Rey,A Companion to Chomsky. Wiley. pp. 377–390.detailsFor more than 60 years, Chomsky has been an intellectual Colossus bestriding the worlds of language, philosophy, and the cognitive sciences, and focusing attention on the whole field and emphasizing the crucial importance of domains overlooked by the mainstream. One such area is the study of first‐language acquisition. This chapter considers “atypical acquisition” to cover two conceptually related situations. First, it covers a variety of cases where there is an obvious “poverty of the stimulus” in that children either receive or (...) perceive no linguistic input at the essential early stages referred to as critical periods. Second, it covers where there is rather the opposite situation. The chapter presents atypicality in language acquisition that stems from the learner's atypical neurological profile rather than environmental or input properties. It focuses on Developmental Language Disorder, Autism Spectrum Disorder, and the case of the polyglot‐savant Christopher to exemplify atypical acquisition. (shrink)
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Gp’s lp.Neil Tennant -2019 - In Can Başkent & Thomas Macaulay Ferguson,Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag. pp. 481-506.detailsThis study takes a careful inferentialist look at Graham Priest’s Logic of Paradox. I conclude that it is sorely in need of a proof-system that could furnish formal proofs that would regiment faithfully the “naïve logical” reasoning that could be undertaken by a rational thinker within LP.
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Sri Aurobindo, the perfect and the good.RobertNeil Minor -1978 - Calcutta: Minerva.detailsStudy on the thought and activities of a mystic philosopher of India.
Judging the Secret Thoughts of All: Functional Neuroimaging, ‘Brain Reading’, and the Theological Ethics of Privacy1.Neil Messer -2021 -Studies in Christian Ethics 34 (1):17-35.detailsOf the many futuristic prospects offered by neuroscience, one of the more controversial is ‘brain reading’: the use of functional neuroimaging to gain information about subjects’ mental states or thoughts. This technology has various possible applications, including ‘neuromarketing’ and lie detection. Would such applications violate subjects’ privacy rights? Conversely, if God knows and judges all our secret thoughts, do Christians have any stake in defending a right to mental privacy? This article argues that God’s knowledge of us is different not (...) only in degree but in kind from the knowledge sought through brain reading. This view of divine knowledge supports a theological account of privacy, richer and broader in scope than standard accounts of privacy rights, which can aid the ethical analysis of the use of brain reading technology for purposes such as marketing and lie detection. (shrink)
An Aristotelian Defence of Affirmative Action: Alasdair MacIntyre, Sandra Day O'Connor and Grutter v. Bollinger.Neil Dhingra &Campbell Scribner -2021 -Journal of Philosophy of Education 55 (1):83-98.detailsJournal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 55, Issue 1, Page 83-98, February 2021.
Explaining Public Participation in Environmental Governance in China.Neil Munro -2021 -Environmental Values 30 (4):453-475.detailsThis article uses nationwide survey data to answer two questions: who participates in environmental governance in China and why? First it explores the social structural characteristics that distinguish participants, finding that city dwellers, the more educated and those with higher incomes and higher social status are more likely to participate, while women, the elderly, those with rural residence registration and migrants are less likely. It then tests two main explanations as to why people participate in environmental governance: instrumentality and identity. (...) Participation is associated with attention to conservation issues, the perceived effectiveness of local environmental governance, knowledge of environmental problems, reading newspapers and magazines, voting in local elections, identification with a middle-class lifestyle and observance of Western holidays. Combining the analyses into a structural model shows that instrumental and identity-related variables account for nearly all of the social structural variation in participation. Participation is thus a function both of instrumental considerations and identities. (shrink)
Ethical Subjectivism and Expressivism.Neil Sinclair -2020 - Cambridge University Press.detailsEthical subjectivists hold that moral judgements are descriptions of our attitudes. Expressivists hold that they are expressions of our attitudes. These views cook with the same ingredients – the natural world, and our reactions to it – and have similar attractions. This Element assesses each of them by considering whether they can accommodate three central features of moral practice: the practicality of moral judgements, the phenomenon of moral disagreement, and the mind-independence of some moral truths. In the process, several different (...) versions of subjectivism are distinguished and key expressivist notions such as 'moral attitudes' and 'expression' are examined. Different meanings of 'subjective' and 'relative' are examined and it is considered whether subjectivism and expressivism make ethics 'subjective' or 'relative' in each of these senses. (shrink)
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Nietzsche's Pragmatism: A Study on Perspectival Thought by Pietro Gori.Neil Sinhababu -2022 -Journal of Nietzsche Studies 53 (1):104-110.detailsPietro Gori dedicates Nietzsche’s Pragmatism “To the wanderers and Good Europeans,” and Anglophone wanderers into Sarah de Sanctis’s translation will indeed find good European Nietzsche scholarship. The table of contents is a helpful map of the book, with five chapters consisting of twenty-eight sections on a sequence of philosophical and interpretive topics. Perspectival thought, addressed in the subtitle, is the explicit topic of the third chapter. Pragmatism, mentioned in the title, is the explicit topic of the fifth and final chapter. (...) While both topics also are discussed in many other places, the overall focus is on Nietzsche’s views of epistemology and truth.The first chapter discusses Nietzsche’s views of... (shrink)
Relational Child, Relational Brain: Development and Therapy in Childhood and Adolescence.Robert Gerald Lee &Neil Harris (eds.) -2011 - Gestalt Press.detailsVolume II in the Evolution of Gestalt series, _Relational Child, Relational Brain_ continues the development of the paradigm shift that places human development in a field that is deeply complex and fundamentally one of interconnection, taking us away from the limiting view of us as separate individuals. It builds on the foundation of contemporary views of relational neurodevelopment and the profound influence of relationship on brain growth. It shows how, particularly in the first two years of life, but continuing across (...) the whole of childhood and adolescence into early adulthood, the relational field is the context of child development. The focus then broadens out to examine the intersubjective influence of community, culture, and social and physical support. Backed by neurobiological and related research, it offers many examples of relational Gestalt practice with children, adolescents, and their families, with stories of loss, trauma, isolation, and other adversities. Not just an invaluable resource for child and adolescent therapists, _Relational Child, Relational Brain_ goes beyond the Esalen Study Conference from which it emerged and is a further invitation and challenge to apply relational Gestalt practice as a coherent and effective way forward in the troubled world of today. (shrink)
Belie the belief? Prompts and default states.Neil Levy -forthcoming -Religion, Brain and Behavior.detailsSometimes agents sincerely profess to believe a claim and yet act inconsistently with it in some contexts. In this paper, I focus on mismatch cases in the domain of religion. I distinguish between two kinds of representations: prompts and default states. Prompts are representations that must be salient to agents in order for them to play their belief-appropriate roles, whereas default states play these roles automatically. The need for access characteristic of prompts is explained by their vehicles: prompts are realized (...) in symbolic systems or even artifacts that make them inapt for automatic regulation of inference and behavior. I argue that some mismatch cases are explained by the fact that agents often report the contents of prompts when they report their beliefs, but behavior is controlled by prompts only when they are made salient to agents. I show that a number of otherwise puzzling findings in the cognitive science of religion, concerning belief intuitiveness, are illuminated by the distinction. (shrink)
Consent in Clinical Research.Collin O'Neil -2017 - In Peter Schaber & Andreas Müller,The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 297-310.detailsThis article addresses two areas of continuing controversy about consent in clinical research: the question of when consent to low risk research is necessary, and the question of when consent to research is valid. The article identifies a number of considerations relevant to determining whether consent is necessary, chief of which is whether the study would involve subjects in ways that would (otherwise) infringe their rights. When consent is necessary, there is a further question of under what conditions consent is (...) valid or successful in waiving a right. The most influential account of validity conditions is non-moralized, in the sense that the conditions make no essential reference to whether the researcher soliciting consent has obtained it in a way that wrongs the subject. The article examines the implications of this account, and compares it with recent accounts that moralize some of the validity conditions. -/- . (shrink)