Between Psychology and Psychotherapy : A Poetics of Experience.Miller Mair -1989 - Routledge.detailsIn this highly original and thought-provoking work the lateMiller Mair puts forward his ideas for a new psychology. First published in 1989, he deals with issues of fundamental importance to the future of a psychology guided by genuine enquiry and concern rather than mere professional self-interest. Crossing and re-crossing boundaries between psychology, psychotherapy and philosophy, and between ‘science’ and ‘art’, he demonstrates the linkages between the personal and the impersonal, subject and object, inside and outside, with a daring (...) not previously risked by anyone working in the area. Dr Mair stresses the importance of a poetic approach in psychology and psychotherapy, and the need to explore and understand the nature of psychology through an imaginative freedom of language. He emphasizes that a poetic awareness and attentiveness is fundamental to any pursuit of understanding of ourselves or others. This is a very personal book, concerned with _personal knowledge_, but it is meant for anyone who seeks to understand themselves and others, and what is involved in coming to such understanding. Focusing on ordinary human experience, and moving towards literary and artistic modes of expression, the author invites you to enter in, follow what _you_ think and feel, as he proposes a radical revision of much that is accepted in psychology and in psychotherapy. (shrink)
Protecting Communities in Pharmacogenetic and Pharmacogenomic Research.Charles Weijer &P. B.Miller -unknowndetailsThe existing EELS literature has usefully identified the scope of ethical issues posed by pharmacogenetic and pharmacogenomic research. The time has come for in-depth examination of particular ethical issues. The involvement of racial and ethnic communities in pharmacogenetic and pharmacogenomic research is contentious precisely because it touches upon the science and politics of studying racial and ethnic difference. To date, the ethics literature has not seriously taken account of the fact that such research impinges upon the interests of communities, and (...) that taking such interests seriously requires that we both protect and empower communities in research. We propose a framework that rests upon the recognition that communities are heterogeneous human associations and differing policies are appropriate for differing communities. Community consent and consultation and community consultation alone are neither appropriate nor required for all pharmacogenetic and pharmacogenomic research. Rather, application of these policy protections must take into account particulars of both planned research and the communities involved. (shrink)
Should Differences in Income and Wealth Matter?: Volume 19, Part 1.Ellen Frankel Paul,Fred D.Miller &Jeffrey Paul (eds.) -2002 - Cambridge University Press.detailsIs there a moral obligation to reduce differences in income and wealth? There is an egalitarian tradition that condemns these differences, particularly as they arise in free-market capitalist society, as unfair or unjust. The opponents of this view argue that the material disparities of capitalist society have been brought about by voluntary mechanisms and thus accord with the freely exercised liberties of its citizens. They conclude that capitalist inequality is not vulnerable to the ethical complaints of its critics. They maintain (...) that the standard of living achieved as a by-product of the marketplace and its inequalities could not be adequately reproduced under egalitarian institutions. The essays in this volume, written by prominent economists, philosophers, and academic lawyers, assess the empirical and theoretical questions raised by inequalities of income and wealth. (shrink)
Freedom, Reason, and the Polis: Volume 24, Part 2: Essays in Ancient Greek Political Philosophy.David Keyt &Fred D.Miller (eds.) -2007 - Cambridge University Press.detailsWhat is the nature of law? Does our obligation to obey the law extend to unjust laws? From what source do lawmakers derive legitimate authority? What principles should guide us in the design of political institutions? The essays in this collection, written by prominent contemporary philosophers, explore how these questions were addressed by ancient political thinkers, including the Pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics and Epicureans. Classical theories of human nature and their implications for political theory are examined, as is (...) the meaning of freedom and coercion in Plato's thought. Plato's idea that philosophers should be political rulers receives scrutiny, too. Other essays ask what we can learn from ancient thinkers like Aristotle about the principles of constitutional design or the limits of political obligation. (shrink)
Should trainee doctors use the developing world to gain clinical experience? The annual Varsity Medical Debate – London, Friday 20th January, 2012.Barnabas J. Gilbert,CalumMiller,Fenella Corrick &Robert A. Watson -2013 -Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 8:1-4.detailsThe 2012 Varsity Medical Debate between Oxford University and Cambridge University provided a stage for representatives from these famous institutions to debate the motion “This house believes that trainee doctors should be able to use the developing world to gain clinical experience.” This article brings together many of the arguments put forward during the debate, centring around three major points of contention: the potential intrinsic wrong of ‘using’ patients in developing countries; the effects on the elective participant; and the effects (...) on the host community. The article goes on to critically appraise overseas elective programmes, offering a number of solutions that would help optimise their effectiveness in the developing world. (shrink)
A Most Unlikely God: A Philosophical Enquiry into the Nature of God.BarryMiller -1996 - University of Notre Dame Press.detailsThe sequel to From Existence to God, this text offers a portrait of God that contrasts sharply with that provided by perfect-being theology. It exposes the absurdity of this view and shows how radically God differs from even the most exalted of his creatures.
(2 other versions)Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2006.08.35.Dorothea Frede,Brad Inwood &JonMiller -unknowndetailsLanguage and Learning is the latest volume to emerge from the Symposium Hellenisticum conference series. Like its predecessors, this book's alliterative title is a guide to its contents, which in this case examine a range of issues involving the philosophical treatment of language by Hellenistic philosophers (or, in a couple of cases, those preceding or following them), a topic that has been strangely neglected by specialists. And as with other volumes in the series, Language and Learning features a healthy blend (...) of relatively junior scholars and the most senior scholars in the field, all of whom were given expert guidance by the editors. Given the interest of the topic and the high quality of the contributions, it is a welcome addition to the literature on ancient philosophy. (shrink)
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The ethics of peer review in bioethics.David Wendler &FranklinMiller -2014 -Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (10):697-701.detailsA good deal has been written on the ethics of peer review, especially in the scientific and medical literatures. In contrast, we are unaware of any articles on the ethics of peer review in bioethics. Recognising this gap, we evaluate the extant proposals regarding ethical standards for peer review in general and consider how they apply to bioethics. We argue that scholars have an obligation to perform peer review based on the extent to which they personally benefit from the peer (...) review process. We also argue, contrary to existing proposals and guidelines, that it can be appropriate for peer reviewers to benefit in their own scholarship from the manuscripts they review. With respect to bioethics in particular, we endorse double-blind review and suggest several ways in which the peer review process might be improved. (shrink)
Developing Conceptions of Responsive Intentional Agents.Henry Wellman &JoanMiller -2006 -Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):27-55.detailsWe argue that folk psychology and folk morality both develop from the same core conception of persons, namely a concept of a responsive intentional agent. Key features of this conception are evident in infancy and develop universally in the preschool years across cultures and languages. Even these early understandings develop, shaped and specified via processes of cognitive construction intertwined with cultural constructs of persons provided within interactive culturally constituted, communicative experiences of childhood. The result is culturally variable endpoints of social (...) cognitive development, that is, culturally variable folk psychologies and folk moralities. We underwrite this argument with data from studies of theory of mind understandings, moral judgments, person description and explanation, and autobiographical memory, research that spans from infancy to adulthood and includes a variety of cultural communities. (shrink)
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“Paid to Produce Data:” Research Participation as the Labor of Generating Valuable Health Data.Robert C.Miller &Marielle S. Gross -2019 -American Journal of Bioethics 19 (9):50-52.detailsVolume 19, Issue 9, September 2019, Page 50-52.
The ‘Slippery Slope’ argument: Uses and misuses:Miller Slippery slopes.ArthurMiller -2007 -Think 5 (14):43-50.detailsWe are often warned against stepping onto ‘slippery slopes’ — dangerously slick slides leading down to where the really bad stuff lies. But, as ArthurMiller here explains, these warnings often exaggerate the risk of a slip.
Moral scepticism.Leonard-G.Miller -1961 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22:239-245.detailsTHE MORAL SCEPTIC IS ONE WHO BELIEVES MORALITY CANNOT BE\nJUSTIFIED AND THEREFORE THERE ARE GOOD REASONS FOR BEING\nSUSPICIOUS OF IT, AND FURTHER, THAT ONE WHO CONTINUES TO\nMAINTAIN A MORAL POSITION IS BEING UNREASONABLE. THE AUTHOR\nMAINTAINS THAT EVEN THOUGH THE CONCEPT OF JUSTIFICATION\nDOES NOT APPLY, THE SCEPTIC IS MISTAKEN IN DRAWING THE\nCONCLUSIONS HE DOES. THE SCEPTIC CONTENDS THAT IN THE\nABSENCE OF REASONS, IT IS UNREASONABLE TO BELIEVE. IT IS\nCONCLUDED THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO REASON US FROM MORALITY\nINTO SCEPTICISM. (STAFF).