The ethical case for non-directed postmortem sperm donation.Nathan Hodson &Joshua Parker -2020 -Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (7):489-492.detailsIn this article we outline and defend the concept of voluntary non-directed postmortem sperm donation. This approach offers a potential means of increasing the quantity and heterogeneity of donor sperm. This is pertinent given the present context of a donor sperm shortage in the UK. Beyond making the case that it is technically feasible for dead men to donate their sperm for use in reproduction, we argue that this is ethically permissible. The inability to access donor sperm and the suffering (...) this causes, we argue, justifies allowing access to sperm donated after death. Moreover, it is known that individuals and couples have desires for certain sperm donor characteristics which may not be fulfilled when numbers of sperm donors are low. Enacting these preferences contributes significantly to the well-being of intended parents, so we argue that this provides apro tantoreason for respecting them. Finally, we explore the benefits and possible disadvantages of such a system for the various parties affected. (shrink)
Postmortem non-directed sperm donation: quality matters.Joshua Parker &Nathan Hodson -2021 -Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (4):263-264.detailsIn our paper ‘The ethical case for non-directed postmortem sperm donation’ we argued that it would be ethical for men to donate sperm after death for use by strangers. In their thoughtful response Fredrick and Ben Kroon lay out practical concerns regarding our proposal. They raise issues regarding the quality of sperm collected postmortem based on empirical studies. Second, they claim that concerns about quality would make women unlikely to use sperm collected after death. In this response we explore issues (...) of sperm quality in both living and dead donors. We consider whether there might be ways to ensure quality in both. Finally, we question whether quality should be a barrier to women choosing to use sperm donated after death. (shrink)
How should institutions help clinicians to practise greener anaesthesia: first-order and second-order responsibilities to practice sustainably.Joshua Parker,Nathan Hodson,Paul Young &Clifford Shelton -forthcoming -Journal of Medical Ethics.detailsThere is a need for all industries, including healthcare, to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. In anaesthetic practice, this not only requires a reduction in resource use and waste, but also a shift away from inhaled anaesthetic gases and towards alternatives with a lower carbon footprint. As inhalational anaesthesia produces greenhouse gas emissions at the point of use, achieving sustainable anaesthetic practice involves individual practitioner behaviour change. However, changing the practice of healthcare professionals raises potential ethical issues. The purpose of (...) this paper is twofold. First, we discuss what moral duties anaesthetic practitioners have when it comes to practices that impact the environment. We argue that behaviour change among practitioners to align with certain moral responsibilities must be supplemented with an account of institutional duties to support this. In other words, we argue that institutions and those in power have second-order responsibilities to ensure that practitioners can fulfil their first-order responsibilities to practice more sustainably. The second goal of the paper is to consider not just the nature of second-order responsibilities but the content. We assess four different ways that second-order responsibilities might be fulfilled within healthcare systems: removing certain anaesthetic agents, seeking consensus, education and methods from behavioural economics. We argue that, while each of these are a necessary part of the picture, some interventions like nudges have considerable advantages. (shrink)
Differences between sperm sharing and egg sharing are morally relevant.Nathan Hodson -2022 -Journal of Medical Ethics 49 (1):60-64.detailsSperm sharing arrangements involve a man (‘the sharer’) allowing his sperm to be used by people seeking donor sperm (‘the recipients’) in exchange for reduced price in vitro fertilisation. Clinics in the UK have offered egg sharing since the 1990s and the arrangement has been subjected to regulatory oversight and significant ethical analysis. By contrast, until now no published ethical or empirical research has analysed sperm sharing. Moreover the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) does not record the number of (...) sperm sharing arrangements taking place.This paper describes the sperm sharing process providing an analysis of all the UK clinics advertising sperm sharing services. The ethical rationale for egg sharing is described: reducing the number of women exposed to the risks of stimulation and retrieval. This advantage is absent in sperm sharing where donation has no physical drawbacks. The key adverse social and emotional outcome of gamete sharing arises when the sharer’s own treatment is unsuccessful and the recipient’s is successful. This outcome is more likely in sperm sharing than in egg sharing given sperm from sharers can be used by up to 10 families whereas shared eggs only go to one other family.Given its morally relevant differences from egg sharing, sperm sharing requires its own ethical analysis. The HFEA should begin recording sperm sharing arrangements in order to enable meaningful ethical and policy scrutiny. (shrink)
Bawa-Garba ruling is not good news for doctors.Nathan Hodson -2019 -Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (1):15-16.detailsAlthough some doctors celebrated when the Court of Appeal overturned Hadiza Bawa-Garba’s erasure from the medical register, it is argued here that in many ways the ruling is by no means good news for the medical profession. Doctors’ interests are served by transparent professional tribunals but the Court of Appeal’s approach to the GMC Sanctions Guidance risks increasing opacity in decision-making. Close attention to systemic factors in the criminal trial protects doctors yet the Court of Appeal states that the structural (...) circumstances surrounding Bawa-Garba’s failings were only of peripheral relevance to her conviction. Public confidence in the profession is undermined when convicted doctors return to work because the public de facto do not understand the nuance of gross negligence manslaughter law. Rather than changing the law to make the regulator more lenient towards doctors, it would be better to ensure that doctors are only convicted of gross negligence manslaughter when their conduct is so serious that they ought to be struck off. (shrink)
Confused out of care: unanticipated consequences of a ‘Hostile Environment’.Rose Glennerster &Nathan Hodson -2020 -Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (3):163-167.detailsThe UK’s 2014 Immigration Act aimed to create a ‘Hostile Environment’ for migrants to the UK. One aspect of this was the restriction of access to secondary care for overseas visitors to the UK, although it remains the case that everybody living in the UK has the legal right to access primary care. In this paper, we argue that the effects of this policy extend beyond secondary care, including preventing eligible people from registering with a General Practice, although as an (...) unintended consequence. This problem arises from misinterpretation of policy wording, misleading GP websites and gatekeeping behaviour from front-line staff, even though there are no grounds in the current guidelines or law to support this. Free access to primary healthcare among refugees and asylum seekers living in deprived populations is particularly important in protecting patient health, given the burden of ill-health in this population and the multiple barriers to accessing early intervention they face. The medical profession has a duty to communicate their rights to this patient group—their legal entitlement to access free healthcare, and the vital importance of doing so. (shrink)
A care ethics approach to theGender Kidney Donation Gap.Nathan Hodson -2019 -Nursing Ethics 26 (7-8):2185-2194.detailsMany studies have shown that women are more likely than men to be living kidney donors, and the discrepancy is particularly marked in heterosexual couples: wives are more likely than husbands to donate a kidney to their spouse. This ‘ Gender Kidney Donation Gap’ can be understood in terms of Carol Gilligan’s claims about gender differences in ethical decision-making style, making it appropriate to analyse responses to this imbalance using an ethic of care. This article centres the vast majority of (...) living donors, those who donate in the context of a significant pre-existing relationship. A cost-neutral approach is unfair on donors who make society richer and healthier by helping a loved one. However, models of kidney sale fail to offer an acceptable alternative, either (a) compelling donors to sell into a pool where they do not know the recipient or (b) allowing affluent individuals unfair access to kidneys. Drawing on surrogacy law in England and Wales, a model of compensation is proposed that includes a range of non-financial benefits. This option celebrates donation and expresses gratitude to all donors while avoiding the pitfalls of the marketplace, with an emphasis on fair treatment of donors. Nevertheless, if more generous treatment led to a 10% increase in directed donation, then it would be equivalent to doubling ‘altruistic’ stranger donations. As long as the Gender Kidney Donation Gap persists, the best response is to minimise the discomfort and disruption caused to donors by their profound act of kindness. (shrink)
Regulatory justice following gross negligence manslaughter verdicts: Nurse/doctor differences.Nathan Hodson -2020 -Nursing Ethics 27 (1):247-257.detailsTwo professionals who treated Jack Adcock before his death were convicted of gross negligence manslaughter, receiving 24-month suspended sentences. His nurse, Isabel Amaro, was erased from the nursing register; but after reviews in the High Court and Court of Appeal, his doctor, Hadiza Bawa-Garba, was merely suspended. This article explores the proposition that nurses are at greater risk of erasure than doctors after gross negligence manslaughter through a close reading of the guidance for medical and nursing tribunals informed by analysis (...) from the High Court and Court of Appeal in the Bawa-Garba cases. Examination of the relevant sections of the guidance for medical and nursing tribunals reveals no significant differences. An outline of the conduct that amounted to breach of duty of care by Amaro and Bawa-Garba shows that their conduct could satisfy the thresholds for erasure given in their professions’ respective guidelines for tribunals. Both presented similar mitigating evidence, although this cannot be weighed heavily in a professional tribunal setting. Thus, Amaro was treated more harshly than Bawa-Garba without a simple explanation. However, I suggest that the Nursing and Midwifery Council’s Conduct and Competence Committee made a mistaken ‘presumption of erasure’ for gross negligence manslaughter and misinterpreted the sway that sentencing remarks should hold over tribunals. Both of these types of error were criticised by the Court of Appeal in Bawa-Garba. Furthermore, the Conduct and Competence Committee did not flesh out its analysis of ‘public confidence’ or acknowledge Lord Hoffmann’s caution against ending ‘useful’ careers for the sake of public confidence, but Bawa-Garba’s legal team ensured these arguments were taken into account by the Medical Professional Tribunal. The Conduct and Competence Committee’s failures are not inherent to Nursing and Midwifery Council procedure or policy. Rather Amaro’s self-representation appears to have impaired her access to justice. Tribunals must accept their right, and responsibility, to reach their own conclusions. (shrink)
Commitment devices: beyond the medical ethics of nudges.Nathan Hodson -2023 -Journal of Medical Ethics 49 (2):125-130.detailsCommitment devices (CDs) can help people overcome self-control problems to act on their plans and preferences. In these arrangements, people willingly make one of their options worse in order to change their own future behaviour, often by setting aside a sum of money that they will forfeit it if they fail to complete the planned action. Such applications of behavioural science have been used to help people stick to healthier lifestyle choices, overcome addictions and adhere to medication; they are acceptable (...) to many patients and even relatively small sums can be effective. Some authors have objected to the use of nudges in healthcare. Engelen has listed nine potential objections to nudges in relation to means (why nudge rather than persuade?), ends (what action is being promoted?) and agents (who is nudging whom?). These objections are shown to lack force in the context of CDs. Instead, an analysis specific to the ethical issues in CDs is employed. CDs exclude certain groups including so-called ‘naifs’ and risk increasing health inequality. CDs may promote the wrong behaviour and people might legitimately change their minds. Intermediaries might encounter perverse incentives. Approaches to overcoming these problems are described and eight key ethical considerations for those considering implementing CDs in the future are described. Altogether this paper illustrates the advantages of appraising the ethics of behavioural science in medicine on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)
Discharge policies for homeless people and immigrants: Compromising professional ethics.Nathan Hodson &Rose Glennerster -2020 -Nursing Ethics 27 (5):1355-1363.detailsDischarging a homeless patient from hospital raises ethical issues which are compounded when the patient is from outside the United Kingdom. This article begins with an extended case study of a 30-year-old homeless man from Lithuania describing his complex medical and social needs. It is best practice for all homeless patients to have their housing needs planned for prior to discharge, but this is made more difficult by the United Kingdom’s ‘hostile environment’ policy which creates a subclass of homeless people (...) who are not eligible for support. This means healthcare professionals discharge patients back to homelessness, even when this is likely to adversely affect their health and dignity both directly and indirectly through impairing access to care for chronic conditions. Policies in health and social care which compel professionals to treat some patients with second-class care undermine the ethics of healthcare professions. (shrink)
Is one narrative enough? Analytical tools should match the problems they address.Nathan Hodson &Susan Bewley -2021 -Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (5):357-359.detailsJeff Nisker describes his personal experience of a diagnosis of advanced prostate cancer and the kindnesses he received from friendly doctors. He claims that this narrative account supports the promotion of Prostate Specific Antigen (PSA) screening for asymptomatic men and impugns statisticians, mistakenly thinking that their opposition to PSA screening derives from concerns about financial cost. The account inadvertently demonstrates the danger of over-reliance on a single ethical tool for critical analysis. In the first part of this response, we describe (...) the statistical evidence. The most reliable Cochrane meta-analyses have not shown that PSA screening saves lives overall. Moreover, the high false positive rate of PSA screening leads to overinvestigation which results in unnecessary anxiety and increased cases of unnecessary sepsis, urinary incontinence and sexual dysfunction. Then we describe how narrative ethics alone is an insufficient tool to make claims about policies, such as PSA screening, which have hidden harms. Although Nisker’s story-telling is compelling and evokes emotions, narrative ethics of this sort have an inherent bias against people who would be harmed by the counterfactual. Particular care must be taken to look for and consider those untellable stories. Ethicists who only consider narratives which are readily at hand risk harming those who are voiceless or protected by the status quo. PSA screening is the wrong tool to reduce prostate cancer deaths and narrative ethics is the wrong tool to appraise this policy. It is vital that the correct theoretical tools are applied to the medical and ethical questions under scrutiny. (shrink)