Results for 'Nathan Drapela'
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- A matter of taste: Nietzsche and the structure of affective response.NathanDrapela -2020 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):85-103.ABSTRACTNietzsche’s work is filled with references to taste. He frequently expresses his own judgements of taste and criticizes or praises individuals and groups on account of their taste. Some recent attempts to account for Nietzsche’s understanding of taste argue that Nietzsche understands affective response, when guided by good taste, as being appropriate to, or merited by, the intrinsic features of the object. This is in direct contrast to anti-realist accounts of Nietzsche’s taste, according to which his evaluative judgements have no (...) special epistemic status. In this article, I argue against objectivist or universalist readings of Nietzsche’s judgements of taste. However, in doing so I aim to show that affective responses do not thereby turn out to be arbitrary. Nietzsche suggests that by engaging with one’s affective responses, one can organizes them into a coherent and unified taste. This process of unification is central to Nietzsche’s understanding of value and self-creation. (shrink)No categories
- Do Your Own Research.Nathan Ballantyne,Jared B. Celniker &David Dunning -2024 -Social Epistemology 38 (3):302-317.This article evaluates an emerging element in popular debate and inquiry: DYOR. (Haven’t heard of the acronym? Then Do Your Own Research.) The slogan is flexible and versatile. It is used frequently on social media platforms about topics from medical science to financial investing to conspiracy theories. Using conceptual and empirical resources drawn from philosophy and psychology, we examine key questions about the slogan’s operation in human cognition and epistemic culture.
- Nonexistence.Nathan Salmon -1998 -Noûs 32 (3):277-319.
- Knowing Our Limits.Nathan Ballantyne -2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.Changing our minds isn't easy. Even when we recognize our views are disputed by intelligent and informed people, we rarely doubt our rightness. Why is this so? How can we become more open-minded, putting ourselves in a better position to tolerate conflict, advance collective inquiry, and learn from differing perspectives in a complex world? -/-Nathan Ballantyne defends the indispensable role of epistemology in tackling these issues. For early modern philosophers, the point of reflecting on inquiry was to understand (...) how our beliefs are often distorted by prejudice and self-interest, and to improve the foundations of human knowledge. Ballantyne seeks to recover and modernize this classical tradition by vigorously defending an interdisciplinary approach to epistemology, blending philosophical theorizing with insights from the social and cognitive sciences. -/- Many of us need tools to help us think more circumspectly about our controversial views. Ballantyne develops a method for distinguishing between our reasonable and unreasonable opinions, in light of evidence about bias, information overload, and rival experts. This method guides us to greater intellectual openness--in the spirit of skeptics from Socrates to Montaigne to Bertrand Russell--making us more inclined to admit that sometimes we don't have the right answers. With vibrant prose and fascinating examples from science and history, Ballantyne shows how epistemology can help us know our limits. (shrink)
- The Logic of What Might Have Been.Nathan Salmon -1989 -Philosophical Review 98 (1):3-34.The dogma that the propositional logic of metaphysical modality is S5 is rebutted. The author exposes fallacies in standard arguments supporting S5, arguing that propositional metaphysical modal logic is weaker even than both S4 and B, and is instead the minimal and weak metaphysical-modal logic T.
- Existence.Nathan Salmon -1987 -Philosophical Perspectives 1:49-108.
- Illogical Belief.Nathan Salmon -1989 -Philosophical Perspectives 3:243-285.A sequel to the author’s book /Frege’s Puzzle/ (1986).
- Against the reduction of modality to essence.Nathan Wildman -2018 -Synthese 198 (S6):1455-1471.It is a truth universally acknowledged that a claim of metaphysical modality, in possession of good alethic standing, must be in want of an essentialist foundation. Or at least so say the advocates of thereductive-essence-firstview, according to which all modality is to be reductively defined in terms of essence. Here, I contest this bit of current wisdom. In particular, I offer two puzzles—one concerning the essences of non-compossible, complementary entities, and a second involving entities whose essences are modally ‘loaded’—that together (...) strongly call into question the possibility of reducing modality to essence. (shrink)
- HowNot to Derive Essentialism from the Theory of Reference.Nathan Ucuzoglu Salmon -1979 -Journal of Philosophy 76 (12):703-725.A thorough critique (extracted from the author’s 1979 doctoral dissertation) of Kripke’s purported derivation, in footnote 56 of his philosophical masterpiece /Naming and Necessity/, of nontrivial modal essentialism from the theory of rigid designation.
- Demonstrating and Necessity.Nathan Salmon -2002 -Philosophical Review 111 (4):497-537.My title is meant to suggest a continuation of the sort of philosophical investigation into the nature of language and modality undertaken in Rudolf Carnap’s Meaning and Necessity and Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity. My topic belongs in a class with meaning and naming. It is demonstratives—that is, expressions like ‘that darn cat’ or the pronoun ‘he’ used deictically. A few philosophers deserve particular credit for advancing our understanding of demonstratives and other indexical words. Though Naming and Necessity is concerned (...) with proper names, not demonstratives, it opened wide a window that had remained mostly shut in Meaning and Necessity but that, thanks largely to Kripke, shall forevermore remain unbarred. Understanding of demonstrative semantics grew by a quantum leap in David Kaplan’s remarkable work, especially in his masterpiece “Demonstratives” together with its companion “Afterthoughts.” In contrast to the direct-reference propensities of these two contemporary figures, Gottlob Frege, with his uncompromisingly thoroughgoing intensionalism, shed important light on the workings of demonstratives in “Der Gedanke”—more specifically, in a few brief but insightful remarks from a single paragraph concerning tense and temporal indexicality. (shrink)
- Being of Two Minds: Belief with Doubt.Nathan Salmon -1995 -Noûs 29 (1):1-20.
- Maternal Autonomy and Prenatal Harm.Nathan Robert Howard -2023 -Bioethics 37 (3):246-255.Inflicting harm is generally preferable to inflicting death. If you must choose between the two, you should generally choose to harm. But prenatal harm seems different. If a mother must choose between harming her fetus or aborting it, she may choose either, at least in many cases. So it seems that prenatal harm is particularly objectionable, sometimes on a par with death. This paper offers an explanation of why prenatal harm seems particularly objectionable by drawing an analogy to the all-or-nothing (...) problem. It then argues that this analogy offers independent support for the ‘voluntarist’ view that at least some parental role obligations are grounded in the choice to be a parent. (shrink)
- Nonconscious Influences from Emotional Faces: A Comparison of Visual Crowding, Masking, and Continuous Flash Suppression.Nathan Faivre,Vincent Berthet &Sid Kouider -2012 -Frontiers in Psychology 3.
- Are General Terms Rigid?Nathan Salmon -2004 -Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (1):117 - 134.On Kripke’s intended definition, a term designates an object x rigidly if the term designates x with respect to every possible world in which x exists and does not designate anything else with respect to worlds in which x does not exist. Kripke evidently holds in Naming and Necessity, hereafter N&N (pp. 117–144, passim, and especially at 134, 139–140), that certain general terms – including natural-kind terms like ‘‘water’’ and ‘‘tiger’’, phenomenon terms like ‘‘heat’’ and ‘‘hot’’, and color terms like (...) ‘‘blue’’ – are rigid designators solely as a matter of philosophical semantics (independently of empirical, extra-linguistic facts). As a consequence, Kripke argues, identity statements involving these general terms are like identity statements involving proper names (e.g., ‘‘Clark Kent=Superman’’) in that, solely as a matter of philosophical semantics, they express necessary truths if they are true at all. But whereas it is reasonably clear what it is for a (first-order) singular term to designate, Kripke does not explicitly say what it is for a general term to designate. General terms are standardly treated in modern logic as predicates, usually monadic predicates. There are very forceful reasons – due independently to Church and Godel, and ultimately to Frege – for taking predicates to designate their semantic extensions. But insofar as the extension of the general term ‘‘tiger’’ is the class of actual tigers (or its characteristic function), it is clear that the term does not rigidly designate its extension, since the class of tigers in one possible world may differ from the class of tigers in another. What, then, is it for ‘‘tiger’’ to be rigid? (shrink)
- Recent work on intellectual humility: A philosopher’s perspective.Nathan Ballantyne -forthcoming -Journal of Positive Psychology 17.Intellectual humility is commonly thought to be a mindset, disposition, or personality trait that guides our reactions to evidence as we seek to pursue the truth and avoid error. Over the last decade, psychologists, philosophers, and other researchers have begun to explore intellectual humility, using analytical and empirical tools to understand its nature, implications, and value. This review describes central questions explored by researchers and highlights opportunities for multidisciplinary investigation.
- Can Confirmation Bias Improve Group Learning?Nathan Gabriel &Cailin O'Connor -unknownConfirmation bias has been widely studied for its role in failures of reasoning. Individuals exhibiting confirmation bias fail to engage with information that contradicts their current beliefs, and, as a result, can fail to abandon inaccurate beliefs. But although most investigations of confirmation bias focus on individual learning, human knowledge is typically developed within a social structure. We use network models to show that moderate confirmation bias often improves group learning. However, a downside is that a stronger form of confirmation (...) bias can hurt the knowledge producing capacity of the community. (shrink)
- (1 other version)How to Become a Millian Heir.Nathan Salmon -1989 -Noûs 23 (2):211-220.
- Sustained Invisibility through Crowding and Continuous Flash Suppression: A Comparative Review.Nathan Faivre,Vincent Berthet &Sid Kouider -2015 - In Julien Dubois & Nathan Faivre,Invisible, but how?: the depth of unconscious processing as inferred from different suppression techniques. Lausanne, Switzerland: Frontiers Media SA.No categories
- Antecedents of Duty Orientation and Follower Work Behavior: The Interactive Effects of Perceived Organizational Support and Ethical Leadership.Nathan Eva,Alexander Newman,Qing Miao,Dan Wang &Brian Cooper -2018 -Journal of Business Ethics 161 (3):627-639.Drawing on social exchange theory, the present study seeks to understand how ethical leaders channel followers’ responses to positive treatment from the organization into a dutiful mindset, resulting in in-role and extra-role performance. Specifically, it examines the influence of perceived organizational support on both followers’ job performance and organizational citizenship behaviors, and the mediating effects of duty orientation on such relationships. In addition, it examines whether the mediated effects are contingent on the ethical leadership exhibited by the team leader. Based (...) on multi-source, multi-level data obtained from 233 employees in 60 teams from the Chinese public sector, we found that ethical leadership moderated the mediated relationship between perceived organizational support and follower work behaviors through duty orientation, such that this relationship was stronger in the presence of higher ethical leadership. (shrink)
- How Gene–Culture Coevolution Can—but Probably Did Not—Track Mind-Independent Moral Truth.Nathan Cofnas -2023 -Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):414-434.I argue that our general disposition to make moral judgments and our core moral intuitions are likely the product of social selection—a kind of gene–culture coevolution driven by the enforcement of collectively agreed-upon rules. Social selection could potentially track mind-independent moral truth by a process that I term realist social selection: our ancestors could have acquired moral knowledge via reason and enforced rules based on that knowledge, thereby creating selection pressures that drove the evolution of our moral psychology. Given anthropological (...) evidence that early humans designed rules with the conscious aim of preserving individual autonomy and advancing their collective interests, the theory of realist social selection appears to be attractive for moral realists. The goal of evolutionary debunking arguments should be to show not that our moral beliefs are the product of natural selection, but that realist social selection did not occur. (shrink)
- On Designating.Nathan Salmon -2005 -Mind 114 (456):1069-1133.A detailed interpretation is provided of the ‘Gray's Elegy’ passage in Russell's ‘On Denoting’. The passage is suffciently obscure that its principal lessons have been independently rediscovered. Russell attempts to demonstrate that the thesis that definite descriptions are singular terms is untenable. The thesis demands a distinction be drawn between content and designation, but the attempt to form a proposition directly about the content (as by using an appropriate form of quotation) inevitably results in a proposition about the thing designated (...) instead of the content expressed. In light of this collapse, argues Russell, the thesis that definite descriptions are singular terms must accept that all propositions about a description's content represent it by means of a higher-level descriptive content, so that knowledge of a description's content is always ‘by description’, not ‘by acquaintance’. This, according to Russell, renders our cognitive grip on definite descriptions inexplicable. Separate responses on behalf of Fregeans and Millians are offered. (shrink)
- Carl Cohen's 'kind' arguments for animal rights and against human rights.Nathan Nobis -2004 -Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (1):43–59.Carl Cohen's arguments against animal rights are shown to be unsound. His strategy entails that animals have rights, that humans do not, the negations of those conclusions, and other false and inconsistent implications. His main premise seems to imply that one can fail all tests and assignments in a class and yet easily pass if one's peers are passing and that one can become a convicted criminal merely by setting foot in a prison. However, since his moral principles imply that (...) nearly all exploitive uses of animals are wrong anyway, foes of animal rights are advised to seek philosophical consolations elsewhere. I note that some other philosopher's arguments are subject to similar objections. (shrink)
- Analyticity and Apriority.Nathan Salmon -1993 -Philosophical Perspectives 7:125-133.
- Refining the law of practice.Nathan J. Evans,Scott D. Brown,Douglas J. K. Mewhort &Andrew Heathcote -2018 -Psychological Review 125 (4):592-605.No categories
- Online affective manipulation.Nathan Wildman,Natascha Rietdijk &Alfred Archer -2022 - In Michael Klenk & Fleur Jongepier,The Philosophy of Online Manipulation. Routledge. pp. 311-326.The aim of this chapter is broadly exploratory: we want to better understand online affective manipulation and what, if anything, is morally problematic about it. To do so, we begin by pulling apart various forms of online affective manipulation. We then proceed to discuss why online affective manipulation is properly categorized as manipulative, as well as what is wrong with (online) manipulation more generally. Building on this, we next argue that, at its most extreme, online affective manipulation constitutes a novel (...) form of affective injustice that we call affective powerlessness. To demonstrate this, we introduce the notions of affective injustice and affective powerlessness and show how several forms of online affective manipulation leave users in this state. The upshot is that this chapter gives us a better grip on the nature of online affective manipulation, as well some tools to help us understand when and why it is morally problematic. (shrink)
- Tragic Flaws.Nathan Ballantyne -2022 -Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):20-40.In many tragic plays, the protagonist is brought down by a disaster that is a consequence of the protagonist's own error, his or her hamartia, the tragic flaw. Tragic flaws are disconcerting to the audience because they are not known or fully recognized by the protagonist—at least not until it is too late. In this essay, I take tragic flaws to be unreliable belief-forming dispositions that are unrecognized by us in some sense. I describe some different types of flaws and (...) consider what we might do about them. Then I examine three types of policies for managing our tragic flaws: doxastic, dispositional, and methodological. (shrink)
- Model flexibility analysis does not measure the persuasiveness of a fit.Nathan J. Evans,Zachary L. Howard,Andrew Heathcote &Scott D. Brown -2017 -Psychological Review 124 (3):339-345.No categories
- Descartes on Necessity and the Laws of Nature.Nathan Rockwood -2022 -Journal of Analytic Theology 10:277-292.This paper is on Descartes’ account of modality and, in particular, his account of the necessity of the laws of nature. He famously argues that the necessity of the “eternal truths” of logic and mathematics depends on God’s will. Here I suggest he has the same view about the necessity of the laws of nature. Further, I argue, this is a plausible theory of laws. For philosophers often talk about something being nomologically or physically necessary because of the laws of (...) nature, but this necessity is thought to be metaphysically contingent. However, they struggle to explain how the laws could be genuinely necessary while being metaphysically contingent. The chief advantage of Descartes view, I argue, is that God’s will can plausibly explain both the necessity of the laws and the contingency of the laws. So, Descartes’ theistic account of laws provides a plausible explanation, perhaps the best explanation, of the contingent-necessity of laws of nature. (shrink)
- Doctoral Dissertations.WilliamNathan Ballantyne,Why We Disagree &Why It Matters -2013 -Review of Metaphysics 67 (1):247-272.
- Factors influencing verbal learning from films under varying conditions of audience participation.Donald N. Michael &Nathan Maccoby -1953 -Journal of Experimental Psychology 46 (6):411.
- The living God: basal forms of personal religion.Nathan Söderblom -1933 - New York: AMS Press. Edited by Yngve Brilioth.Training and inspiration in primitive religion.--Religion as method. Yoga.--Religion as psychology. Jinism and Hinayana.--Religion as devotion. Bhakti.--Religion with a salvation fact. Mahayana. Bhakti in Buddhism.--Religion as fight against evil. Zarathustra.--Socrates. The religion of good conscience.--Religion as revelation in history.--The religion of incarnation.--Continued revelation.
- Where the ethical action also is: a response to Hardman and Hutchinson.Nathan Emmerich -2022 -Journal of Medical Ethics 48 (11):884-886.InWhere the ethical action is, Hardman and Hutchinson make some interesting and compelling points about the way in which ‘the ethical’—various values and various kinds of values—are embedded in everyday life, including the everyday life one finds in clinical interactions, understood as scientific or scientifically informed activities. However, even when one considers ‘the ethical’ from within the horizon of understanding adopted in their essay, they neglect several important features of healthcare and medical education. In this rejoinder, I argue that a (...) fuller understanding would go some way to indicating the complexity of ethics and ‘ethical action’ in the clinic, as well as the nature of and need for ‘expert’ analysis and philosophical reflection on the ethical questions that modern healthcare continues to engender. (shrink)
- Strong cognitivist weaknesses.Nathan Hauthaler -2023 -Analytic Philosophy 64 (2):161-176.Marušić & Schwenkler (Analytic Philosophy, 59, 309) offer a simple and elegant defense of strong cognitivism about intention: the view that an intention to φ is a form of belief that one will φ. I show that their defense fails: however simple and elegant, it fails to account for various aspects about intention and its expression, and faces distinctive challenges of its own, including a dilemma and counterexample. These also undermine Marušić & Schwenkler's claim to a best-explanation type of account (...) and recommend alternatives to strong cognitivism altogether. (shrink)No categories
- A comparison of conflict diffusion models in the flanker task through pseudolikelihood Bayes factors.Nathan J. Evans &Mathieu Servant -2020 -Psychological Review 127 (1):114-135.No categories
- Systematic and random sources of variability in perceptual decision-making: Comment on Ratcliff, Voskuilen, and McKoon (2018).Nathan J. Evans,Gabriel Tillman &Eric-Jan Wagenmakers -2020 -Psychological Review 127 (5):932-944.No categories
- We should not take abortion services for granted.Nathan Emmerich -2023 -Clinical Ethics 18 (1):1-2.
- Between Past and Present: An Essay on History.Alan Donagan,Nathan Rotenstreich &Martin Buber -1959 -Philosophical Review 68 (4):550.No categories
- Invisible, but how? The Depth of Unconscious Processing as Inferred From Different Suppression Techniques.Julien Dubois &Nathan Faivre -2015 - In Julien Dubois & Nathan Faivre,Invisible, but how?: the depth of unconscious processing as inferred from different suppression techniques. Lausanne, Switzerland: Frontiers Media SA.No categoriesExport citation
Bookmark - A Comment on "The Risky Business of Assessing Research Risk".Nicole Glaser,Nathan Kuppermann,James Marcin &Walton Schalick -2007 -American Journal of Bioethics 7 (11):5-6.
- A Comment on “The Risky Business of Assessing Research Risk”.Nicole Glaser,Nathan Kuppermann,James Marcin &Walton O. Schalick Iii -2007 -American Journal of Bioethics 7 (11):W5-W6.
- Acetaminophen (Tylenol): Johnson & Johnson and Consumer Safety.John Trinkhaus,JayNathan,Leona Beane &Barton Meltzer -1997 -Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 25 (1):49-57.Controversies associated with the use of Tylenol are not new to Johnson & Johnson. Reported cases of poisoning in 1982 and 1986 raised serious concerns about both the life of the analgesic and the well-being of consumers. In 1994, the results of two clinical studies raised product safety concerns about acetaminophen-based over-the-counter analgesics, suggesting development of hepatotoxicity, and an increased risk of end-stage renal disease. The alarm created by the studies is not of the same magnitude as the 1980s poisonings (...) and the circumstances differed in that the findings did not only apply to acetaminophen-based analgesics; nonetheless, the implications of the latter are equally significant. Still operating by the same company credo, how Johnson & Johnson has handled the link between acetaminophen and hepatotoxicity and ESRD is of interest ; in particular, management's efforts to reassure both consumers and company shareholders. (shrink)
- The Role of Haptic Expectations in Reaching to Grasp: From Pantomime to Natural Grasps and Back Again.Robert L. Whitwell,Nathan J. Katz,Melvyn A. Goodale &James T. Enns -2020 -Frontiers in Psychology 11.When we reach to pick up an object, our actions are effortlessly informed by the object’s spatial information, the position of our limbs, stored knowledge of the object’s material properties, and what we want to do with the object. A substantial body of evidence suggests that grasps are under the control of “automatic, unconscious” sensorimotor modules housed in the “dorsal stream” of the posterior parietal cortex. Visual online feedback has a strong effect on the hand’s in-flight grasp aperture. Previous work (...) of ours exploited this effect to show that grasps are refractory to cued expectations for visual feedback. Nonetheless, when we reach out to pretend to grasp an object (pantomime grasp), our actions are performed with greater cognitive effort and they engage structures outside of the dorsal stream, including the ventral stream. Here we ask whether our previous finding would extend to cued expectations for haptic feedback. Our method involved a mirror apparatus that allowed participants to see a “virtual” target cylinder as a reflection in the mirror at the start of all trials. On “haptic feedback” trials, participants reached behind the mirror to grasp a size-matched cylinder, spatially coincident with the virtual one. On “no-haptic feedback” trials, participants reached behind the mirror and grasped into “thin air” because no cylinder was present. To manipulate haptic expectation, we organized the haptic conditions into blocked, alternating, and randomized schedules with and without verbal cues about the availability of haptic feedback. Replicating earlier work, we found the strongest haptic effects with the blocked schedules and the weakest effects in the randomized uncued schedule. Crucially, the haptic effects in the cued randomized schedule was intermediate. An analysis of the influence of the upcoming and immediately preceding haptic feedback condition in the cued and uncued random schedules showed that cuing the upcoming haptic condition shifted the haptic influence on grip aperture from the immediately preceding trial to the upcoming trial. These findings indicate that, unlike cues to the availability of visual feedback, participants take advantage of cues to the availability of haptic feedback, flexibly engaging pantomime, and natural modes of grasping to optimize the movement. (shrink)
- On the culpable ignorance of group agents: the group justification thesis.Nathan W. Biebel -forthcoming -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.People are often responsible for what they do, but they also often possess an excuse. One of the most common excuses is ignorance. Not all ignorance constitutes an excuse, however, for some ignorance is culpable and culpable ignorance is no excuse. But what about group agents? In our everyday practices, we blame group agents constantly. But if groups can be blameworthy, they plausibly can also be excused. Surely one such excuse is ignorance. But, as with individual agents, some group ignorance (...) is also surely culpable. How should we understand the culpable ignorance of group agents? In this paper, I argue for two conditional claims that together constitute what I call the Group Justification Thesis, which is a group-agent adaptation of the Justification Thesis put forth by Biebel [(2018). ‘Epistemic Justification and the Ignorance Excuse.’ Philosophical Studies 175 (12): 3005–3028]: (i) A group agent is excused because of ignorance only if that ignorance is justified, and (ii) a group agent is culpable despite being ignorant only if that ignorance is not justified. One interesting upshot of this view is that a group agent can be culpably ignorant even though none of the members are culpable for their ignorance. (shrink)No categories
- Virtue Ethics in the Conduct and Governance of Social Science Research.Nathan Emmerich (ed.) -2018 - Emerald.This collection focuses on virtue theory and the ethics of social science research. A moral philosophy that has been relatively neglected in the domain of research ethics, virtue ethics has much to offer those who wish to go beyond the difficulties generated by the biomedical model of research ethics and positively engage with the ethics of social scientific research. As the chapters contained in this volume show, the perspective provided by virtue ethics also exhibits a certain affinity with the emerging (...) discourse regarding research integrity. Contributors develop various facets of virtue ethics in order to illuminate a range of issues in the practice and governance of social science, including integrity, the ethics of ethical review, ethics education, and the notion of phrónēsis (wisdom). (shrink)
- On Content.Nathan Salmon -1992 -Mind 101 (404):733-751.
- What Kinds of Comparison Are Most Useful in the Study of World Philosophies?Nathan Sivin,Anna Akasoy,Warwick Anderson,Gérard Colas &Edmond Eh -2018 -Journal of World Philosophies 3 (2):75-97.Cross-cultural comparisons face several methodological challenges. In an attempt at resolving some such challenges,Nathan Sivin has developed the framework of “cultural manifolds.” This framework includes all the pertinent dimensions of a complex phenomenon and the interactions that make all of these aspects into a single whole. In engaging with this framework, Anna Akasoy illustrates that the phenomena used in comparative approaches to cultural and intellectual history need to be subjected to a continuous change of perspectives. Writing about comparative (...) history, Warwick Anderson directs attention to an articulation between synchronic and diachronic modes of inquiry. In addition, he asks: If comparative studies require a number of collaborators, how does one coordinate the various contributors? And how does one ensure that the comparison is between separate entities, without mutual historical entanglement? Finally, how does comparative history stack up against more dynamic approaches, such as connected, transnational, and postcolonial histories? Gérard Colas, for his part, claims that comparisons cannot allow one to move away from the dominant Euroamerican conceptual framework. Should this indeed be the case, we should search for better ways of facilitating a “mutual pollination” between philosophies. Finally, Edmond Eh first asserts that Sivin fails to recognize the difference between comparisons within cultures and comparisons between cultures. He then argues that the application of generalism is limited to comparisons of historical nature. (shrink)
- Sefer Leḳeṭ reshimot: be-ʻinyan ʻolamo shel ben Torah: kolel amarot ṿe-hanhagot mi-gedole ha-dorot.Nathan Ṿakhṭfoigel -2017 - [Israel]: [Mekhon Meʼir ʻeyne ḥakhamim].Export citation Bookmark
- Sefer Leḳeṭ reshimot: be-ʻinyene Purim: kolel amarot ṿe-hanhagot mi-gedole ha-dorot.Nathan Ṿakhṭfoigel -2000 - Laiḳṿud (540 Fifth St., Lakewood 08701): Mishpaḥat Heksṭer.Export citation Bookmark
- Rational engagement, emotional response and the prospects for progress in animal use ‘debates’.Nathan Nobis -2013This paper is designed to help people rationally engage moral issues regarding the treatment of animals, specifically uses of animals in medical and psychological experimentation, basic research, drug development, education and training, consumer product testing and other areas.
- Differences between sperm sharing and egg sharing are morally relevant.Nathan Hodson -2022 -Journal of Medical Ethics 49 (1):60-64.Sperm sharing arrangements involve a man (‘the sharer’) allowing his sperm to be used by people seeking donor sperm (‘the recipients’) in exchange for reduced price in vitro fertilisation. Clinics in the UK have offered egg sharing since the 1990s and the arrangement has been subjected to regulatory oversight and significant ethical analysis. By contrast, until now no published ethical or empirical research has analysed sperm sharing. Moreover the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) does not record the number of (...) sperm sharing arrangements taking place.This paper describes the sperm sharing process providing an analysis of all the UK clinics advertising sperm sharing services. The ethical rationale for egg sharing is described: reducing the number of women exposed to the risks of stimulation and retrieval. This advantage is absent in sperm sharing where donation has no physical drawbacks. The key adverse social and emotional outcome of gamete sharing arises when the sharer’s own treatment is unsuccessful and the recipient’s is successful. This outcome is more likely in sperm sharing than in egg sharing given sperm from sharers can be used by up to 10 families whereas shared eggs only go to one other family.Given its morally relevant differences from egg sharing, sperm sharing requires its own ethical analysis. The HFEA should begin recording sperm sharing arrangements in order to enable meaningful ethical and policy scrutiny. (shrink)
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
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Area Editors:
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Gwen Bradford
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David Chalmers
James Chase
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Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
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Jonathan Ichikawa
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