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According tomoralintuitionism, at least somemoral seeming states are justification-conferring. The primary defense of this view currently comes from advocates of the standard account, who take the justification-conferring power of amoral seeming to be determined by its phenomenological credentials alone. However, the standard account is vulnerable to a problem. In brief, the standard account implies thatmoral knowledge is seriously undermined by those commonplacemoral disagreements in which both agents have equally (...) good phenomenological credentials supporting their disputedmoral beliefs. However, it is implausible to think that commonplace disagreement seriously underminesmoral knowledge, and thus it is implausible to think that the standard account ofmoralintuitionism is true. (shrink)

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In recent work, Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer‐Landau (2020) develop a new social version ofmoralintuitionism that promises to explain why ourmoral intuitions are trustworthy. In this paper, we raise several worries for their account and present some general challenges for the broader class of views we call SocialMoralIntuitionism. We close by reflecting on Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer‐Landau's comparison between what they call the “perceptual practice” and the “moral intuition practice”, which (...) we take to raise some difficult normative and meta‐normative questions for theorists of all stripes. (shrink)

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According tomoralintuitionism,moral properties are objective, but our cognitions of them are not always based on premises. In this paper, I develop a novel version ofmoralintuitionism and argue that this newintuitionism is worthy of closer attention. The intuitionistic theory I propose, while inspired by the early twentieth-centuryintuitionism of W. D. Ross, avoids the alleged errors of his view. Furthermore, unlike Robert Audi's contemporary formulation ofintuitionism, my (...) theory has the resources to account for the noninferential character of particular, as opposed to merely general,moral beliefs. I achieve this result by avoiding the appeal to self-evidence to explain the possibility of noninferentialmoral knowledge. (shrink)

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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed and progressively refined an argument againstmoralintuitionism—the view on which somemoral beliefs enjoy non-inferential justification. He has stated his argument in a few different forms, but the basic idea is straightforward. To start with, Sinnott-Armstrong highlights facts relevant to the truth ofmoral beliefs: such beliefs are sometimes biased, influenced by various irrelevant factors, and often subject to disagreement. Given these facts, Sinnott-Armstrong infers that manymoral beliefs are false. (...) What then shall we think of our ownmoral beliefs? Either we have reason to think some of ourmoral beliefs are reliably formed or we have no such reason. If the latter, ourmoral beliefs are unjustified. If we have reason to think somemoral beliefs are reliably formed, then those beliefs are not non-inferentially justified, because then we’ll have reason to accept something—namely, that they are reliably formed—that entails or supports those beliefs. But then, either way, ourmoral beliefs are not non-inferentially justified, and somoralintuitionism is false. This paper takes issue with Sinnott-Armstrong’s interesting and widely discussed argument, which we here call the Empirical Defeat Argument (EDA). According to us, the EDA does not defeatmoralintuitionism. In section 1, we will set out the argument, briefly reviewing the rationale Sinnott-Armstrong offers for the premises. Then, in section 2, we identify a critical but dubious epistemological assumption concerning the nature of defeat that undergirds the argument. Finally, in section 3, we will defend our challenge to the EDA by answering two objections. (shrink)

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Moral philosophers have given increased attention tomoralintuitionism in recent years. Despite articulations ofmoralintuitionism that should be taken more seriously than they have been, dissenters continue to express opposition. Among the most frequent criticisms ofmoralintuitionism are the Mysteriousness and Dogmatism Objections. The Mysteriousness Objection chargesmoral intuitionists with postulating a mysterious faculty of knowing. The Dogmatism Objection accusesmoral intuitionists of relying on dogmatic assertions which are (...) not, or cannot be, proven or adequately argued for. In this dissertation I defendmoralintuitionism against both attacks. By drawing on resources going back to eighteenth-century intuitionists, I show that a carefully articulatedmoralintuitionism neither requires a mysterious faculty of knowing nor invites dogmatism. I first investigate themoralintuitionism of four eighteenth-century British philosophers which anticipates and begins to address the Mysteriousness and Dogmatism Objections. Both critics of and adherents tomoralintuitionism in the contemporary period have largely ignored themoralintuitionism of these eighteenth-century thinkers. Two significant contributions of this chapter are that it gives serious attention to themoralintuitionism of the eighteenth-centurymoral intuitionists, and it prepares for utilizing their views in answering objections to contemporarymoralintuitionism. Next, I briefly explicate a plausible version of a moderatemoralintuitionism against which the Mysteriousness and Dogmatism Objections are evaluated. Finally, I set out the details of each of these objections and respond to them. The sustained attention I give to these objections is a further significant contribution of this dissertation. I conclude that the Mysteriousness and Dogmatism Objections are not successful attacks onmoralintuitionism. (shrink)

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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues thatmoral disagreement and widespreadmoral bias pose a serious problem formoralintuitionism. Seneca’s view that we just recognise the good could be criticised using a similar argument. His approach to argumentation offers a way out, one that may serve as a model for a revisionaryintuitionism.

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Over the last decade there have been various attempts to use empirical data about people’s dispositions to choose to undermine variousmoral positions by arguing that our judgements about what to do are unreliable. Usually they are directed at non-consequentialists by consequentialists, but they have also been directed at allmoral theories by skeptics about morality. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has been one of the leading proponents of such general skepticism. He has argued that empirical results particularly undermine intuitionist (...) class='Hi'>moral epistemology. This paper is an attempt to look at what intuitionists should say in response. Consider the following argument : Regress (R1) If any person S is ever justified in believing a normative claim that p then S must be able to infer p from other beliefs of S. (shrink)

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Moralintuitionism is the view that we can know or justifiably believe somemoral facts directly, without inferring them from other evidence or proof. Whileintuitionism is frequently dismissed as implausible, the theory has received renewed interest in the literature.See Robert Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The NewIntuitionism (London: Continuum, 2011); Michael Huemer, EthicalIntuitionism (New York: (...) Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Sabine Roeser,Moral Emotions and Intuitions (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Russ Shafer-Landau,Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003); Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.), EthicalIntuitionism: Re-evaluations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002). Several philosophers have defended updated intuitionistic theories and argue that the theory is not as objectionable as previously alleged.Contemporary reformulations ofmoralintuitionism ar. (shrink)

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In “TrustingMoral Intuitions” we argued thatmoral intuitions are trustworthy due to their being the outputs of a cognitive practice, with social elements, in good working order. Backes, Eklund, and Michelson present several criticisms of our defense of a socially consciousmoralintuitionism. We respond to these criticisms, defending our claim that social factors enhance the epistemic credentials ofmoral intuitions, answering worries pertaining to the reliability of themoral intuition practice, and addressing (...) concerns about both the individuation of this practice and the good conditions for its implementation. (shrink)

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The aim of this paper is to defendmoralintuitionism, in its new formulations, against the criticism that there is something objectionably non-natural about its conception ofmoral properties. The force of this complaint depends crucially on what it means to be a non-natural property. I consider a number of ways of drawing the natural/non-natural distinction and argue that, once the notion of 'non-natural property' is sufficiently clarified, it fails to figure in a compelling argument against (...) class='Hi'>moralintuitionism. (shrink)

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Attributions ofmoral knowledge are common in everyday life. We say that we know that some actions are morally right or wrong, permitted or required. Yet, how do we know suchmoral claims?Moralintuitionism is a family of theories inmoral epistemology that tries to answer this question. Intuitionists are not skeptics aboutmoral knowledge. They think that there aremoral truths for us to know, and further, that knowledge of these truths (...) is possible. What distinguishesintuitionism from other anti-skepticalmoral epistemologies is the idea that we can know somemoral truths directly, without inferring them from premises. According to many intuitionists, it is possible for us to know that keeping promises is morally right even if we do not hold this belief on the basis of further evidence or proof. Whileintuitionism was popular in the early twentieth century, it was since dismissed as implausible. Recently, there has been renewed interest inintuitionism. Philosophers have defended updated versions of the theory and argue that the view has been misunderstood. This chapter considers the merits ofintuitionism inmoral epistemology. In what follows, I examine different ways of being an intuitionist and indicate the relative strengths and weaknesses of various approaches withinintuitionism. (shrink)

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This paper provides a novel critique of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s influential argument against epistemologicalmoralintuitionism, the view that some people are non-inferentially justified in believing somemoral propositions. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, this view experienced a revival, which coincided with an increasing interest in empirical research on intuitions. The results of that research are seen by some as casting serious doubt on the reliability of ourmoral intuitions. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, empirical evidence shows (...) that ourmoral beliefs have a high error rate in general, which creates a need for inferential confirmation for every singlemoral belief. His argument involves the problematic assumption that it is reasonable for informedmoral believers to ascribe a high probability of error to every particularmoral belief unless the believer has some special evidence that this particularmoral belief belongs to a class that has a lower probability of error than the class ofmoral beliefs. Focussing on the non-moral example that Sinnott-Armstrong uses in the latest reformulation of his argument, the “Californian wine example”, I argue that apart from exceptional circumstances, the description ofmoral agents as ascribing correctness probabilities to theirmoral beliefs is odd, ERROR reveals an awkward picture of how agents relate to theirmoral beliefs and ERROR is problematic from the perspective ofmoral competence. This critique goes deeper than the worries raised by other critics to earlier versions of the argument, and part of it applies tomoralintuitionism as well. (shrink)

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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued againstmoralintuitionism, according to which some of ourmoral beliefs are justified without needing to be inferred from any other beliefs. He claims that any prima facie justification some non-inferredmoral beliefs might have enjoyed is removed because many of ourmoral beliefs are formed in circumstances where either (1) we are partial, (2) others disagree with us and there is no reason to prefer ourmoral judgement to theirs, (...) (3) we are emotional in a way that clouds our judgement, (4) the circumstances are conducive to illusion, or (5) the source of ourmoral beliefs is unreliable or disreputable. I take issue with the elements of Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument that centre on (1) to (3) and (5), concluding that his case againstmoralintuitionism is unpersuasive. (shrink)

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In this paper, I argue against the view, most eloquently advocated by Dieter Schönecker, that Kant is what I call a “sensualist intuitionist.” Kant’s text does not accommodate a sensualist intuitionist reading; the fact of reason is cognized by reason, not intuition. I agree with Schönecker that the feeling of respect for themoral law makes us feel its obligatory character, but I disagree that this feeling constitutes cognition of the normative content of themoral law. We do (...) not cognize the validity of themoral law through feeling. I argue instead for what I take to be the standard view: We feel through respect for themoral law the limiting and humiliating effect that rational cognition of themoral law has on our sensibility. (shrink)

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Coveringmoral intuition, self-evidence, non-inferentiality,moral emotion and seeming states, Hossein Dabbagh defends the epistemology ofmoralintuitionism. His line of analysis resists the empirical challenges derived from empiricalmoral psychology and reveals the seeming-based account ofmoralintuitionism as the most tenable one. TheMoral Epistemology ofIntuitionism combines epistemologicalintuitionism with work in neuroethics to develop an account of the role thatmoral intuition and emotion play in (...)moral judgment. The book culminates in a convincing argument about the value of understandingmoralintuitionism in terms of intellectual seeming and perceptual experience. (shrink)

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ABSTRACT:Most medical learned societies have endorsed both "equivalence" between all forms of withholding or withdrawing treatment and the "discontinuity" between euthanasia and practices to withhold or withdraw treatment. While the latter are morally acceptable insofar as they consist in letting the patient die, the former constitutes an illegitimate act of actively interfering with a patient's life. Themoral distinction between killing and letting die has been hotly debated both conceptually and empirically, most notably by experimental philosophers, with inconclusive results. (...) This article employs a "revisionary" intuititionist perspective to discuss the results of a clinical ethics study about intensivists' perceptions of withhold or withdraw decisions. The results show that practitioners'moral experience is at odds with both the discontinuity and equivalence theses. This outcome allows us to revisit certain concepts, such as intention and causal relationship, that are prominent in the conceptual debate. Intensivists also regard end-of-life decisions as being on a scale from least to most active, and whether they regard active forms of end-of-life decisions as ethically acceptable depends on the overarching professional values they endorse: the patient's best chances of survival, or the patient's quality of life. (shrink)

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In this paper, I defend a non-skeptical intuitionist approach tomoral epistemology from recent criticisms. Starting with Sinnott-Armstrong's skeptical attacks, I argue that a familiar sort of skeptical argument rests on a problematic conception of the evidential grounds of ourmoral judgments. The success of his argument turns on whether we conceive of the evidential grounds of ourmoral judgments as consisting entirely of non-normative considerations. While we cannot avoid skepticism if we accept this conception of our (...) evidential grounds, that's because accepting this conception of our evidential grounds is tantamount to accepting the skeptic's conclusion. We have nothing to fear from arguments for skepticism from skepticism. (shrink)

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In this dissertation I discuss the epistemology of ethicalintuitionism, in particular the claim that maturemoral agents possess self-evidentmoral knowledge. Traditional intuitionists such as W.D. Ross have claimed that by reflection, we can acquire knowledge of our basicmoral duties such as the duty of veracity or benevolence. Recent defenders ofintuitionism such as Robert Audi have further developed this theory and argued that adequate understanding can be sufficient formoral knowledge. I (...) criticize this view and argue that such accounts fail to make a convincing case for a foundationalistmoral epistemology. Instead, I propose to separate the question of how we acquiremoral knowledge from an account that justifiesmoral beliefs. In response to the first issue, I draw an analogy between ourmoral intuitions and chosmkian linguistics; in both areas, I argue, human beings possess a universal, unconscious and (partly) inaccessible system of rules that explains how we come to learn language and to makemoral judgments. In regards to the justificatory issue, I address recent evolutionary debunking arguments designed to undermine the claim that ourmoral judgments track stance-independent truths. I try to show that this conclusion only follows under the assumption of an instrumentalist interpretation ofmoral reasoning which the intuitionist is not forced to accept. (shrink)

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This chapter criticizesmoralintuitionism, which claims that somemoral beliefs are justified independently of any ability to infer them from other beliefs. It definesmoralintuitionism, and argues that beliefs need confirmation when they are partial, controversial, emotional, or formed in circumstances that are conducive to illusion or unreliability. Empirical research is cited to show thatmoral beliefs are subject to these problems and, hence, need confirmation by some inference, somoral (...) class='Hi'>intuitionism cannot solve the skeptical regress problem. (shrink)

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The study ofmoral decision-making presents to us two approaches for understanding such choices. The cognitive and the neurocognitive approaches postulate that reason and reasoning determinesmoral judgments. On the other hand, the intuitionist approaches postulate that automated intuitions mostly dominatemoral judgments. There is a growing concern that neither of these approaches by itself captures all the key aspects ofmoral judgments. This paper draws on models from neurocognitive research and social-intuitionist research areas to propose (...) an integrative cognitive–intuitive model ofmoral decision-making. The model suggests thatmoral decision-making includes five interdependent, yet functionally distinct steps, issue framing, pre-processing,moral judgment,moral reflection, andmoral intent. The model proposes a cognitive–intuitive view ofmoral judgment and it describes how emotion regulation, perceivedmoral intensity, and perceived ethical climate constructs impact the formation ofmoral intent. The paper discusses the theories that link emotions tomoral judgment and implications of the model for future research and its implication for managers. (shrink)

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We review the state of the art inmoral psychology to answer 6 questions: 1) Where domoral beliefs and motivations come from? 2) How doesmoral judgment work? 3) What is the evidence for the social intuitionist model? 4) What exactly are themoral intuitions? 5) How does morality develop? And 6) Why do people vary in their morality? We describe the intuitionist approach tomoral psychology. The mind makes rapid affective evaluations of everything (...) it encounters, and these evaluations (intuitions) shape and push subsequentmoral reasoning. This approach tomoral judgment has a variety of implications formoral philosophy and for the law in that it questions common assumptions about the reliability and causal efficacy of private, conscious reasoning. (shrink)

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Essential tomoral epistemicintuitionism of the sort proposed by W. D. Ross in the 1930s is the claim that there are self-evidentmoral propositions that we can be justified in believing solely on the basis of understanding them. Recently,intuitionism in this sense is enjoying something of a renaissance. It is receiving considerable sympathetic attention from such prominent ethicists as Robert Audi, Jonathan Dancy, Brad Hooker, and David McNaughton. ;Of particular interest, I think, is Audi's (...) claim that the most plausible intuitionisms will be what he calls "reflectionist" intuitionisms. By this he means that they will take advantage of what is most plausible in John Rawls's reflective-equilibrium-stylemoral epistemology, namely, the claim that the extent to which ourmoral beliefs approach reflective equilibrium---a kind of multi-level integration or coherence---determines, at least in part, how justified we are in holding them. ;In this dissertation I explore the possibility and plausibility of amoral epistemology that is both intuitionist and reflectionist. I develop an objection to Audi's reflectionistintuitionism, and I propose a response in terms of a new account of the relation between intuitive justification and self-evidence. I then consider the implications of this new account concerning whether intuitive justification should be conceived in generalist or particularist, apriorist or aposteriorist, internalist or externalist terms. Finally, I consider whether the resulting sketch of intuitive justification is consistent with any plausible theory of the structure of epistemic justification. In doing so, I say more than has so far been said about the respective roles of both reflectionism andintuitionism in a plausible reflectionistintuitionism. I take the view that the reflectionistintuitionism that emerges from these trials is a new theory built on old foundations which merits consideration in themoral epistemic field. (shrink)

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IntroductionEthical intuitionists have never known quite what to make of the emotions. Generally speaking, these philosophers fall into two camps: rational intuitionists andmoral sense theorists. And by my lights, neither camp has been able to tell a convincing story about the exact role and significance of emotion inmoral judgment. Rational intuitionists are for the most part too dismissive of the emotions, either regarding emotions as little more than distractions tomoral judgment,Samuel Clarke, for instance, after (...) naming our “faculties of reason and will, whereby [we] are enabled to distinguish good from evil,” laments that these faculties are sometimes “imposed upon and deceived in matters of good and evil, right and wrong… by absurd passions and corrupt or partial affections” (A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God, the Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation (Glasgow: Richard Griffin and Co., 1823), pp. 166-167). (shrink)

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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Christian Ethics and Commonsense Morality: An Intuitionist Account by Kevin JungAleksandar S. SantracChristian Ethics and Commonsense Morality: An Intuitionist Account Kevin Jung NEW YORK AND LONDON: ROUTLEDGE, 2014. 202 PP. $145.00In Christian Ethics and Commonsense Morality: An Intuitionist Account, Kevin Jung boldly constructs and defends a commonsense morality of intuition as a plausible ethical theory against both postmodern constructivist ethical systems and narrow objectivist theories. Following the antifoundationalist (...) ethical methods of postmodern approaches to reality and morality in chapter 1 and a moderate defense of realism in chapter 2, Jung attempts to save both objectivity and de-feasibility ofmoral realistic accounts, offering some modern reinterpretations ofmoral realism in chapters 3 and 4. All these forms of Wittgensteinian conceptions of realism unsatisfactorily lead to infinite regress in justifying claims because they are grounded only in the wishes, interests, and sentiments of the individual culture and society (60).After a brief introduction to the unique role of emotions in ethical theories, his investigation leads to reconciliation between objectivist naturalistic ethics [End Page 192] and theological forms of ethical theories. Theological ethicists can remain committed tointuitionism (objectivist and naturalistic forms of common morality) refined by particular religious expressions of morality (112).Intuitionism, broadly defined in chapter 7, is described as "initial appearances" (118);moral truths, according to Jung's intuitionist account, are "mediately self-evident" (128), not "immediately," because it still requires careful reflection and cognitive searching for objectivist grounds of morality. Jung's affirmation of the plausibility ofintuitionism seems to be a final blow to all forms of postmodern and skeptical accounts of antifoundationalist forms of ethical theories; he successfully defends an intuitionist account of morality against its naturalist and religious critics.The last chapter offers three types of relationship between commonsense morality and Christian morality. The identity model reduces Christian morality to commonsense morality. The two-tier model considers Christian morality to be a superior form of morality with instrumental value of commonsense morality. And, finally, integration, Jung's favorite model, considers commonsense morality as neither identical nor subordinate but central to Christian morality (163). With this he affirms that Christian morality is unique not because of differences inmoral beliefs but because "it is fully committed to recognizing the oneness of humanity and the universally accessible nature of basicmoral truths for all human beings" (166). Jung's reflection is exceptionally insightful. Building the case as a good lawyer, he leads us to the defenseless nature of constructivist postmodernmoral theories and their revisions as well as to a commitment of Christian morality to the objective commonsense morality. On this view, even heroicmoral acts based on obedience to God (such as Christian sacrificial love) might be compatible with commonsense morality. It is surprising, however, that Jung never consulted or quoted Bernard Gert's account of the common morality, especially when discussing differences betweenmoral duty and ideals (167). Additionally, Jung's argument that Christian morality is unexceptional sincemoral knowledge can be obtained through multiple sources in which God also reveals his will (178) does not sufficiently probe into the distinctiveness of God's sometimes radical demands of Jews/Christians (e.g., Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac), which come not from intuitionist accounts of objective natural reason or common sense but from faith. Christian saints are not heroes of generalmoral example but heroes of faith, a qualitatively different realm of human experience. Still, audiences interested in all aspects of ethics will greatly benefit from this superb engagement with recent discussions. [End Page 193]Aleksandar S. SantracWashington Adventist UniversityCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

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This paper outlines and defends a moderateintuitionism. The point of departure is theintuitionism of W. D. Ross (1930) in The Right and the Good, conceived as ethically pluralist and epistemologically rationalist. The paper articulates a conception of self-evidence – including mediate as well as immediate kinds – appropriate to a moderateintuitionism, explores some of the resources and varieties of that position, and considers some problems and prospects for a rationalist version ofintuitionism. The (...) final section addresses the issue of how best to conceive the nature and grounds of prima facie duty, the problem of whetherintuitionism can adequately deal with conflicts of prima facie duties, and the question of how satisfactorily a moderateintuitionism can account for the epistemic status ofmoral judgments of overall duty and their connection with rational action. (shrink)

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As artificial intelligence (AI) continues to advance, one key challenge is ensuring that AI aligns with certain values. However, in the current diverse and democratic society, reaching a normative consensus is complex. This paper delves into the methodological aspect of how AI ethicists can effectively determine which values AI should uphold. After reviewing the most influential methodologies, we detail an intuitionist research agenda that offers guidelines for aligning AI applications with a limited set of reliablemoral intuitions, each underlying (...) a refined cooperative view of AI. We discuss appropriate epistemic tools for collecting, filtering, and justifyingmoral intuitions with the aim of reducing cognitive and social biases. The proposed methodology facilitates a large collective participation in AI alignment, while ensuring the reliability of the consideredmoral judgments. (shrink)

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Rationalism about the psychology ofmoral judgment holds, among other things, that the justifyingmoral reasons we have for our judgments are also the causally effective reasons for why we make those judgments. This can be called the ‘effectiveness’-thesis regardingmoral reasoning. The theory that best exemplifies the thesis is the traditional conscious reasoning-paradigm. Current empiricalmoral psychology, however, poses a serious challenge to this thesis: it argues that in fact, emotional reactions are necessary and sufficient (...) to account formoral judgment, and that typically,moral reasoning is a matter of mere confabulation. In this survey, the empirical challenge to this thesis made by the ‘social intuitionist’ model ofmoral judgment and reasoning is discussed. The model claims thatmoral reasoning is essentially ineffective and, psychologically speaking, a matter of mere post hoc-rationalizations of cognitively impenetratable gut reactions. Several interpretations of this evidence are discussed and it is shown that there is room for a psychology ofmoral reasoning that can account for the available empirical evidence and yet does not have to give up the most central elements of a normative picture ofmoral reasoning. (shrink)

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It seems impossible that organisms selected to maximize their genetic legacy could also bemoral agents in a world in which taking risks for strangers is sometimes morally laudable. Brian Zamulinski argues that it is possible if morality is an evolutionary by-product rather than an adaptation.EvolutionaryIntuitionism presents a new evolutionary theory of human morality. Zamulinski explains the evolution of foundational attitudes, whose relationships to acts constitutemoral facts. With foundational attitudes and the resultingmoral facts (...) in place, he shows how they ground a plausible normative morality, give answers to meta-ethical questions, and provide an account ofmoral motivation. He explains the nature ofmoral intuitions and, thus, of our access to themoral facts. He shows that the theory makes confirmed empirical predictions, including the observable variation inmoral views. The combination ofintuitionism and evolutionary ethics enables Zamulinski to overcome the standard objections to both.EvolutionaryIntuitionism is a unified theory of human morality that explains how an objective morality could develop naturally in a physical world like ours, among organisms like us. (shrink)

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This paper explores the generally overlooked relevance of an important contemporary debate in mainstream epistemology to philosophers working within ethics on questions concerningmoral knowledge. It is argued that this debate, between internalists and externalists about the accessibility of epistemic justification, has the potential to be both significantly influenced by, and have a significant impact upon, the study ofmoral knowledge. Themoral sphere provides a particular type of strong evidence in favour of externalism, and mainstream epistemologists (...) might benefit from paying attention to this fact. At the same time, the terrain ofmoral epistemology (approached as a sub-field of metaethics) needs to be reshaped by the realisation that externalists can steal the thunder of intuitionists when it comes to knowledge constituted by seemingly self-evident beliefs.1. (shrink)

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Hume bequeathed to rational intuitionists a problem concerningmoral judgment and the will – a problem of sufficient severity that it is still cited as one of the major reasons whyintuitionism is untenable.1 Stated in general terms, the problem concerns how an intuitionistmoral theory can account for the intimate connection betweenmoral judgment andmoral motivation. One reason that this is still considered to be a problem for intuitionists is that it is widely (...) assumed that the early intuitionists made little progress towards solving it. In this essay, I wish to challenge this assumption by examining one of the more subtle intuitionist responses to Hume, viz., that offered by Thomas Reid. For reasons that remain unclear to me, Reid's response to Hume on this issue has been almost entirely neglected. I shall argue that it is nonetheless one that merits our attention, for at least two reasons. In the first place, Reid's response to Hume's challenge to rationalintuitionism bears a close affinity to the type of response that he offers to Hume's broadly skeptical challenge to realist views regarding our perception of the external world. Since Reid's strategy in the latter case is widely regarded as exhibiting significant promise, it is natural to wonder whether, when applied to themoral domain, this type of strategy displays similar promise.2 I will suggest that it does. That is, I will suggest that since Reid's broadly nativist position in perception is one well worth considering, then so also is his broadly nativist account ofmoral motivation. Second, Reid's position regardingmoral motivation represents an intriguing attempt to blend a broadly intuitionist view with important insights from the sentimentalist tradition. In this respect, Reid's view is a genuine hybrid position unlike that offered by other intuitionists such as Richard Price. The synthetic character of Reid's position, I claim, gives it a unique type of theoretical richness, since it incorporates some very attractive features of both rationalintuitionism and sentimentalism. (shrink)

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Over the course of human history there appears to have been a global shift inmoral values towards a broadly ‘liberal’ orientation. Huemer argues that this shift better accords with a realist than an antirealist metaethics: it is best explained by the discovery of mind-independent truths through intuition. In this article I argue, contra Huemer, that the historical data are better explained assuming the truth ofmoral antirealism. Realism does not fit the data as well as Huemer suggests, (...) whereas antirealists have underappreciated resources to explain the relevant historical dynamics. These resources include an appeal to socialization, to technological and economical convergences, to lessons learned from history, to changes induced by consistency reasoning and to the social function ofmoral norms in overcoming some of the cooperation problems that globalizing societies face. I point out that the realist’s explanans has multiple shortcomings, that the antirealist’s explanans has several explanatory virtues, and conclude that the latter provides a superior account of the historical shift towards liberal values. (shrink)

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This thesis sets out an argument in defence ofmoral objectivism. It takes Mackie as the critic of objectivism and it ends by proposing that the best defence of objectivism may be found in what I shall call Kantianintuitionism, which brings together elements of theintuitionism of Ross and a Kantian epistemology. The argument is fundamentally transcendental in form and it proceeds by first setting out what we intuitively believe, rejecting the sceptical attacks on those beliefs, (...) and by then proposing a theory that can legitimize what we already do believe. Chapter One sets out our intuitive understanding of morality: that morality is cognitive,moral beliefs can be true or false; that morality is real, we do not construct it; that morality is rational, we can learn about it by rational investigation; and that morality places us under an absolute constraint. The chapter ends by clarifying the nature of that absolute demand and by arguing that the critical idea within morality is the idea of duty. In Chapter Two Mackie’s sceptical attack on objectivism is examined. Four key arguments are identified: thatmoral beliefs are relative to bfferent agents; that morality is based upon on non-rational causes; that the idea ofmoral properties or entities is too queer to be sustainable; and thatmoral objectivism involves queer epistemological commitments. Essentially all of these arguments are shown to be ambiguous; however it is proposed that Mackie has an underlying epistemological and metaphysical theory, scientific empiricism, which is hostile to objectivism and a theory that many find attractive for reasons that are independent of morality. Chapter Three explores the nature ofmoral rationality and whether scientific empiricism can use the idea of reflective equilibrium to offer a reasonable account ofmoral rationality. It concludes that, while reflective equilibrium is a useful account ofmoral rationality, it cannot be effectively reconciled with scientific empiricism. In order to function effectively as a rational process, reflective equilibrium must be rationally constrained by ourmoral judgements and ourmoral principles. Chapter Four begins the process of exploring some alternative epistemologies and argues that the only account that remains true to objectivism and the needs of reflective equilibrium is the account ofintuitionism proposed by Ross. However this account can be developed further by drawing upon number of Kantian ideas and using them to supplement Ross’sintuitionism. So Chapter Five draws upon a number of Kant's ideas, most notably some key notions from the Critique of Judgement. These ideas are: that we possess a rational will that is subject to theMoral law and determined by practical reason; that we possess a faculty of judgement which enables us to become aware ofmoral properties and that these two faculties together with the third faculty of thought can function to constitute themoral understanding. Using these ideas the thesis explores whether they can serve to explain how intuitions can be rational and how objectivism can be justified. (shrink)

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It is a central tenet of ethicalintuitionism as defended by W. D. Ross and others thatmoral theory should reflect the convictions of maturemoral agents. Hence,intuitionism is plausible to the extent that it corresponds to our well-consideredmoral judgments. After arguing for this claim, I discuss whether intuitionists offer an empirically adequate account of ourmoral obligations. I do this by applying recent empirical research by John Mikhail that is based on (...) the idea of a universalmoral grammar to a number of claims implicit in W. D. Ross’s normative theory. I argue that the results at least partly vindicateintuitionism. (shrink)

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According to pluralistic intuitionist theories, some of ourmoral beliefs are non-inferentially justified, and these beliefs come in both an a priori and an a posteriori variety. In this paper I present new support for this pluralistic form ofintuitionism by examining the deeply social nature ofmoral inquiry. This is something that intuitionists have tended to neglect. It does play an important role in an intuitionist theory offered by Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer-Landau (forth), but whilst they (...) invoke the social nature ofmoral inquiry in order to argue that ordinarymoral intuitions are trustworthy, my argument focuses on what I will call the ‘frontiers’ ofmoral inquiry. I will show that inclusive and cooperative dialogue is necessary atmoral inquiry’s frontiers, and that intuitionists can expect such dialogue to result in both a priori and a posteriorimoral beliefs. (shrink)

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This paper aims to extend the dialogue between socialintuitionism and the genetic perspectives ofmoral psychology, pointing out the contributions and limitations of each one to advance in the understanding of the formulation and transformation ofmoral judgments. An examination of how the relations between the subject and the object of knowledge have been approached in the light of the contributions of constructivist psychological tradition has been proposed. The relations between emotions, reasoning, and the specific social (...) situation in which such cognitive processes take place it will be examined, taking up particularly the contributions of cultural psychology. By critically examining the three theoretical perspectives, it was possible to point out their contributions and limitations, as well as to appreciate the undoubted contribution of socialintuitionism tomoral psychology, its limitations and to elucidate the theses that shape this theory. It is precisely by examining the relationships, convergences and profound differences between socialintuitionism, constructivism, and cultural psychology in their approaches tomoral judgment that it is possible to contribute to promoting their revision and elucidation. (shrink)

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