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The ‘Mind-Upload’ hypothesis, a radical version of the Brain-in-a-Vat thought experiment, asserts that a wholemind can safely be transferred from a brain to a digital device, after being exactly encoded into substrate independent informational patterns. Prima facie, MU seems the philosophical archenemy of the EmbodiedMind theory, which understands embodiment as a necessary and constitutive condition for the existence of amind and its functions. In truth, whether and why MU and EM are ultimately (...) incompatible is unobvious. This paper, which aims to answer both questions, will not simply confirm that MU and EM actually are incompatible. It will also show the true reason of their incompatibility: while EM implies that amind’s individual identity is contingent upon the details of its physical constituents, MU presupposes that minds can be relocated from one material vessel to another. A systematic comparison between these conflicting assumptions reveals that the real shortcoming of MU is not the one usually discussed by the philosophical literature: it has nothing to do with MU’s functionalist or computationalist prerequisites, and is only secondarily related to the artificial implementability of consciousness; the real problem is that MU presupposes that minds could still be individuated and numerically identified while being reduced to immaterial formal patterns. EM seems committed to refute this assumption, but does it have sufficient resources to succeed? (shrink)

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A counter analysis of David Chalmers' claims about the possibility ofmind uploading within the context of the Singularity event.

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One of the more radical transhumanist proposals for future human being envisions the uploading of our minds to a digital substrate, trading our dependence on frail, degenerating “meat” bodies for the immortality of software existence. Yet metaphor studies indicate that our use of metaphor operates in our bodily inhabiting of the world, and a phenomenological approach emphasizes a “hybridity” to human being that resists traditionalmind/body dichotomies. Future scenarios envisioningmind uploading and disembodied artificial intelligence (AI) share an (...) apocalyptic category with more traditional religious eschatologies, though they differ markedly in content; therefore, the insights of embodied cognition and their uptake in technological innovation are considered as they apply to theological concerns. Theology often functions in debates over the technological future to critique or to caution. However, theologians may learn from their technological dialogue partners when it comes to the future of embodiment and its implications for the construction and practice of theology. (shrink)

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Optimists aboutmind-uploading believe that we can survive uploading. Pessimists aboutmind-uploading, on the other hand, believe that we cannot survive uploading. An under-explored middle ground between the two is a selective form of optimism, which claims that we can survive some forms of uploading, such as gradual replacement uploading, but not others, such as scan-and-copy uploading. Is selective optimism about uploading a rational stance? In this paper I argue that the answer is yes. The paper has a (...) negative and a positive part. First, I defuse an objection against selective optimism from Wiley and Koene (2016). Wiley and Koene argue that gradual replacement uploading is metaphysically equivalent to scanand-copy uploading, and hence optimism about the former and pessimism about the latter is unfounded. I show that Wiley and Koene's case for the supposed metaphysical equivalence fails, since there is a significant metaphysical contrast between the two types of uploading involving immanent causation. In the second part of the paper, I present a positive case for selective optimism about gradual uploading building on this contrast in immanent causation. (shrink)

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Mind uploading involves two technological approaches: brain simulation and brain replacement. To achieve immortality, these approaches must metaphysically satisfy the requirements of phenomenal consciousness and personal identity. This paper finds that to meet these requirements, brain simulation presupposes the truth of role functionalism for mental states and ultra-role-functionalism for identity, while brain replacement presupposes the truth of realizer functionalism for both mental states and identity. To adjudicate these functionalist theories based not only on a priori considerations but also on (...) empirical evidence, this paper introduces a confirmation process that moves from empirical observation (i.e., sensory substitution) to science (i.e., sensorimotor enactivism) and then to metaphysics. It finds that realizer functionalism aligns better with empirical observation than role functionalism. If realizer functionalism is a more reasonable theory, it would imply that brain simulation is impossible, while brain replacement remains a possibility. However, realizer functionalism is an empirically constrained metaphysics. While it commits to the metaphysical possibility of brain replacement, our analysis, based on relevant neuroscientific research, argues that it is unlikely to possess such a nomological possibility. Therefore, whether through brain simulation or brain replacement, it is unlikely that humans could achieve immortality throughmind uploading. (shrink)

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This chapter sets aside the question of whether a Singularity will occur, to focus on the closely related issue of MU, specifically as presented by one of its most articulate proponents, David Chalmers. The fundamental premise of Chalmers' arguments about MU is some strong version of the Computational Theory ofMind (CTM). The chapter proceeds in the following fashion: first, it recalls Chalmers' main arguments; second, it argues that the ideas of MU and CTM do not take seriously enough (...) the fact that consciousness is a biological phenomenon, as pointed out in different contexts by both John Searle and Jerry Fodor, among others; third, it stipulates for the sake of argument that MU is somehow possible, and show that it would, at best, amount to a sort ofmind cloning, but most certainly not to a preservation of anyone's consciousness in a medium different from one's own brain. (shrink)

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Mind uploading—the transference ofmind from a biological brain to a computer— offers the alluring possibility of immortality. This paper provides a novel challenge tomind uploading, focusing on the distinction between abstract objects and concrete individuals. Uploads are abstract objects, while currently, persons are concrete indi- viduals. This presents a dilemma: if themind is concrete, uploading it to a computer is impossible. Alternatively, ifmind uploading is feasible, the resulting abstractupload cannot (...) be numerically identical to the original person. Furthermore, by dif- ferentiating survival from persistence, this paper argues that concrete persons might survive as abstract uploads, but only in a highly restricted sense, without preserving their numerical identity. Despite these philosophical hurdles, practical reasons for consideringmind uploading as life nears its end still need to be acknowledged. (shrink)

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From a behaviorist perspective, the desire toupload “minds” is already being realized on a mass, hyper-industrial scale thanks to the convergence of cognitive computing and Big Data. The accusation is that the “mind” is not an entity that exists intracranially. Instead, it is conceived as a process of individuation, which occurs in different modes and numbers. Some narratives ofmind-uploading and technics in popular culture are explored: Transcendence (2014, dir. Wally Pfister) and Player Piano by Kurt (...) Vonnegut. The discussed issues consider Bernard Stiegler’s phenomenological notion of originary default and Thierry Bardini’s analysis of junk. Several questions are raised regarding miscalculations, accidents, in addition to Nicolas Agar’s discussion on the end of humanity, and Daniel Dennett’s Multiple Drafts theory within the context of exteriorization, which is considered as constitutive of interiority. (shrink)

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The function of the brain is intricately woven into the fabric of time. Functions such as (i) storing and accessing past memories, (ii) dealing with immediate sensorimotor needs in the present, and (iii) projecting into the future for goal-directed behavior are good examples of how key brain processes are integrated into time. Moreover, it can even seem that the brain generates time (in the psychological sense, not in the physical sense) since, without the brain, a living organism cannot have the (...) notion of past nor future. When combined with an evolutionary perspective, this seemingly straightforward idea that the brain enables the conceptualization of past and future can lead to deeper insights into the principles of brain function, including that of consciousness. In this paper, we systematically investigate, through simulated evolution of artificial neural networks, conditions for the emergence of past and future in simple neural architectures, and discuss the implications of our findings for consciousness andmind uploading. (shrink)

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This chapter focuses on how life after uploading will differ from life today. These differences are substantial: people will be able to alter their shape and appearance, travel at the speed of light, live comfortably throughout the solar system, and even dwell in artificial realities of their own design. It's important to note, however, that these differences are fundamentally superficial. We will laugh, cry, love, despair, strive for goals, and sometimes fall short. We will care for our friends and family, (...) seek reassurance when in doubt, make music, work hard and take breaks, as people have done for thousands of years. In the end, despite all the changes to our bodies, environments, and capabilities ‐ we will still be human. (shrink)

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The aim here is to implement intelligence in an engineered processing substrate – a machinemind, as it were. This solution is clearly related to work in artificial intelligence (AI) and shares many of its analytical requirements and synthesis goals, but the objective is unambiguously to make individual human minds independent of a single substrate. Brain–machine interfaces require adaptations for communication to be possible, emphasizing either the machine or the brain. Brain emulation on general‐purpose computers is convenient, because model (...) functions can be modified easily. Ultimately, a mature emulation demands a suitable computing substrate. Theoretical debates occasionally focus on the question of determinism and computation in the Von Neumann sense. ARPANET (the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network) useful for university projects and for the military, but it was not immediately obvious what sort of civilian applications would thrive on such a computer network. (shrink)

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Kann man das ewige Leben auf technischem Weg realisieren? Lässt sich der Geist eines Menschen als dynamische Datenstruktur abspeichern und jenseits des vergänglichen Körpers als funktionsfähige Einheit erhalten? Solche technischen Utopien sind mittlerweile nicht nur spielerisches Motiv in Literatur und Film, sondern auch ernsthaftes Ziel von Informatikern und Tech-Start-ups. Ist dieses Vorhaben durchführbar? Welche Auswirkungen hätte eine erfolgreiche Implementierung desMind-Uploads für unsere Vorstellungen von menschlicher Individualität und personaler Identität? Wie ist das Projekt ethisch zu bewerten und wie verhält (...) es sich zur christlichen Hoffnung auf eine Auferstehung und ein sich daran anschliessendes ewiges Leben? Der Band beleuchtet diese Fragen aus philosophischer, theologischer und sozialethischer Perspektive"-- Back cover. (shrink)

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It’s fashionable to maintain that in the near future we can become immortal by uploading our minds to artificial computers.Mind uploading requires three assumptions: that we can construct realistic computational simulations of human brains; that realistic computational simulations of human brains would have conscious minds like those possessed by the brains being simulated; that the minds of the simulated brains survive through the simulation. I will argue that the first two assumptions are implausible and the third is false. (...) Therefore, we will notupload ourmind to computers and, most likely, we will notupload anything resembling ourmind to computers. (shrink)

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Humans have long wondered whether they can survive the death of their physical bodies. Some people now look to technology as a means by which this might occur, using terms such 'whole brain emulation', 'mind uploading', and 'substrate independent minds' to describe a set of hypothetical procedures for transferring or emulating the functioning of a humanmind on a synthetic substrate. There has been much debate about the philosophical implications of such procedures for personal survival. Most participants to (...) that debate assume that the continuation of identity is an objective fact that can be revealed by scientific enquiry or rational debate. We bring into this debate a perspective that has so far been neglected: that personal identities are in large part social constructs. Consequently, to enable a particular identity to survive the transference process, it is not sufficient to settle age-old philosophical questions about the nature of identity. It is also necessary to maintain certain networks of interaction between the synthetic person and its social environment, and sustain a collective belief in the persistence of identity. We defend this position by using the example of the Dalai Lama in Tibetan Buddhist tradition and identify technological procedures that could increase the credibility of personal continuity between biological and artificial substrates. (shrink)

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The progressing cyborgization of the human body reaches its completion point when the entire body can be replaced by uploading individual minds to a less vulnerable and limited substrate, thus achieving \digital immortality" for the uploaded self. The paper questions the philosophical assumptions that are being made whenmind-uploading is thought a realistic possibility. I will argue that we have little reason to suppose that an exact functional copy of the brain will actually produce similar phenomenological e®ects (if any (...) at all), and even less reason to believe that the uploadedmind, even if similar, will be the same self as the one on whose brain it was modeled. (shrink)

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In a paper in this journal, Neil Levy challenges Nicholas Agar’s argument for the irrationality ofmind-uploading.Mind-uploading is a futuristic process that involves scanning brains and recording relevant information which is then transferred into a computer. Its advocates suppose thatmind-uploading transfers both human minds and identities from biological brains into computers. According to Agar’s original argument,mind-uploading is prudentially irrational. Success relies on the soundness of the program of Strong AI—the view that it may (...) someday be possible to build a computer that is capable of thought. Strong AI may in fact be false, an eventuality with dire consequences formind-uploading. Levy argues that Agar’s argument relies on mistakes about the probability of failedmind-uploading and underestimates what is to be gained from successfullymind-uploading. This paper clarifies Agar’s original claims about the likelihood ofmind-uploading failure and offers further defense of a pessimistic evaluation of success. (shrink)

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In recent years, the idea ofmind uploading has left the genre of science fiction. Uploading our minds as a form of immortality, or so it has been argued, is now within our reach. Of course, this depends on the assumption that ourmind is nothing more than some sort of computer software running on the brain as hardware paving the way for a standard procedure ofmind uploading, namely instantaneous destructive uploading – where the brain is (...) simulated on a computer - or gradual destructive uploading – where brain regions are gradually replaced by micro-chips. Lately, however, there has been sustained doubts that things are so simple. In this volume alone Susan Schneider & Joe Corabi and Gualtiero Piccinini argue that a person cannot survive standard procedures ofmind uploading. The main reasons are that the uploading process violates identity criteria for the person and that it is unclear that conscious mental states can be uploaded. In this article, we argue that while the sceptics about the standard methods of uploading are probably right, there are more options to be evaluated. We introduce what we call slow continuousmind uploading as an alternative procedure. Slow continuous uploading is based on the extendedmind thesis which claims that artefacts can under specific circumstances come to count as part of the realization basis for an individual’smind. In this context, we explore a form ofmind uploading which may already be being innovated today through our deep reliance upon cognitive incorporation of “smart” internet technologies. We will argue that this process may give us the right kind of tools to survivemind uploading, or more minimally, to create an agent that can be considered a psychological continuity of an individual. We think that, at least, the objections so far developed in the literature do not rule this out. (shrink)

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For Ray Kurzweil, artificial intelligence (AI) is not just about making artificial things intelligent; it's also about making humans artificially superintelligent. The author challenges Kurzweil's predictions about the destiny of the humanmind. He argues that it is unlikely ever to be rational for human beings toupload their minds completely onto computers. The author uses the term “mind uploading” to describe two processes. Most straightforwardly, it describes the one‐off event when a fully biological being presses a (...) button and instantaneously and completely copies her entire psychology into a computer. It also describes the decisive event in a series of replacements of neurons by electronic chips. Searle's Wager treats the exchanges over the possibility of successfulmind uploading in much the same way that Pascal's Wager treats the debate over God's existence. Finally the author explains why nondestructive uploading is prudentially irrational. (shrink)

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Mind uploading speculation and debate often concludes that a procedure described as gradual in-place replacement preserves personal identity while a procedure described as destructive scan-and-copy produces some other identity in the target substrate such that personal identity is lost along with the biological brain. This paper demonstrates a chain of reasoning that establishes metaphysical equivalence between these two methods in terms of preserving personal identity.

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Zu den weiterreichenden transhumanistischen Zukunftsvisionen gehörtMind-Uploading: Wir werden dank wissenschaftlicher und technologischer Fortschritte in der Lage sein, Bewusstsein auf künstliche Körper oder digitale Strukturen zu transferieren, um sehr viel länger oder gar unendlich lange leben zu können. Im Kern handelt es sich also um die Vision, durch Technik den Tod zu überwinden. In diesem Beitrag gehe ich im Wesentlichen der Frage nach, welche Theorie des Bewusstseins bzw. welches Geist-Körper-Verhältnis imMind-Uploading vorausgesetzt werden. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass (...) das zugrunde gelegte Verständnis des menschlichen Geistes problematisch ist, weil die Rolle des Eingebettet-Seins in einen lebendigen Körper unterschätzt wird.Mind-Uploading arbeitet mit einem stark verkürzten Begriff des Geistes, der den komplexen Bezügen zu den biologischen, psychischen und sozialen Dimensionen unserer Existenz nicht gerecht wird. (shrink)

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We present a hypothetical process ofmind coalescence, where arti cial connections are created between two or more brains. This might simply allow for an improved form of communication. At the other extreme, it might merge the minds into one in a process that can be thought of as a reverse split-brain operation. We propose that one waymind coalescence might happen is via an exocortex, a prosthetic extension of the biological brain which integrates with the brain as (...) seamlessly as parts of the biological brain integrate with each other. An exocortex may also prove to be the easiest route formind uploading, as a person's personality gradually moves away from the aging biological brain and onto the exocortex. Memories might also be copied and shared even without minds being permanently merged. Over time, the borders of personal identity may become loose or even unnecessary. (shrink)

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This chapter discusses the question of whether we will ever have an Artificial General Superintelligence (AGSI) and how it will affect our species if it does so. First, it explores various proposed definitions of AGSI and the potential implications of its emergence, including the possibility of collaboration or conflict with humans, its impact on our daily lives, and its potential for increased creativity and wisdom. The concept of the Singularity, which refers to the hypothetical future emergence of superintelligent machines that (...) will take control of the world, is also introduced and discussed, along with criticisms of this concept. Second, it is considered the possibility ofmind uploading (MU) and whether such MU would be a suitable means to achieve (true) immortality in this world—the ultimate goal of the proponents of this approach. It is argued that the technological possibility of achieving something like this is very remote, and that, even if it were ever achieved, serious problems would remain, such as the preservation of personal identity. Third, the chapter concludes arguing that the future we create will depend largely on how well we manage the development of AI. It is essential to develop governance of AI to ensure that critical decisions are not left in the hands of automated decision systems or those who create them. The importance of such governance lies not only in avoiding the dystopian scenarios of a future AGSI but also in ensuring that AI is developed in a way that benefits humanity. (shrink)

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ZusammenfassungIch möchte in diesem Artikel aufzeigen, dass ein Leben oder zumindest eine Fortexistenz des Subjekts nach dem physischen Tod aus anthropologischer Sicht durchaus nicht ausgeschlossen, die Fortexistenz einer Person durch die Übertragung ihres Geistes auf eine Festplatte dagegen aus prinzipiellen Gründen unmöglich ist. Beide Thesen lassen sich durch eine Reflexion auf die humane Verfassung begründen.

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Immer mehr sehen wir uns in die Lage versetzt, aktiv Einfluss nicht nur auf unsere Existenz und unser Leben, sondern auch auf die Bedingungen unseres Sterbens zu nehmen. Alterungsprozesse aber auch unser Tod gelangen zunehmend in den Verfügungsbereich unserer Selbstbestimmung und sind zu einem gewissen Grade gestaltbar geworden. Offen ist, wohin dieser Trend vor dem Hintergrund aktueller technologischer Fortschritte noch führen mag. Gegenwärtig sind wir mit den Problemen einer alternden Bevölkerung, einer unzureichenden Altenpflege und einer mangelhaften Alterskultur konfrontiert, die nach (...) gesellschaftspolitischen und medizinethischen Handlungsoptionen verlangen. Zugleich kursieren Zukunftsvisionen, in denen der physiologische Verfall im Zuge des Alterns und damit auch die Leiblichkeit des Menschen insgesamt als defizitär betrachtet wird. Alternative Lebensentwürfe in post- oder transhumanistischen Kreisen betrachten den Tod als extreme Grenzerfahrung, die es zu verhüten gilt. Eine selbstbestimmte Existenz wird mit Selbstoptimierung gleichgesetzt – und sei es auch um den Preis des eigenen Leibes. Werden hier die Grenzen des Menschseins erweitert oder verengt? (shrink)

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Abstract. Could a person ormind be uploaded—transmitted to a computer or network—and thereby survive bodily death? I argue ‘mind uploading’ is possible only if amind is an abstract object rather than a concrete particular. Two implications are notable. One, if someone can be uploaded someone can be multiply-instantiated, such that there could be as many instances of a person as copies of a book. Second,mind uploading’s possibility is incompatible with the leading theories of (...) personal identity, insofar as these assume themind is a concrete particular. Moreover, because David Chalmers (2010; 2012; 2014) defendsmind uploading without construing minds as abstract, I show Chalmers’ argument to be unsound. (shrink)

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I survey four categories of factors that might give a digitalmind, such as anupload or an artificial general intelligence, an advantage over humans. Hardware advantages include greater serial speeds and greater parallel speeds. Self-improvement advantages include improvement of algorithms, design of new mental modules, and modification of motivational system. Co-operative advantages include copyability, perfect co-operation, improved communication, and transfer of skills. Human handicaps include computational limitations and faulty heuristics, human-centric biases, and socially motivated cognition. The shape (...) of hardware growth curves, as well as the ease of modifying minds, are found to have a major impact on how quickly a digitalmind may take advantage of these factors. (shrink)

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Could you survive your bodily death by uploading yourmind?

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In this essay we will usemind as the term to designate the totality and manner in which our thoughts take place. We use the term brain to refer to the underlying mechanics, the substrate and the manner in which it supports the operations needed to carry out thoughts.

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Could we transfer you from your biological substrate to an electronic hardware by simulating your brain on a computer? The answer to this question divides optimists and pessimists aboutmind uploading. Optimists believe that you can genuinely survive the transition; pessimists think that survivingmind uploading is impossible. An influential argument against uploading optimism is the multiplicity objection. In a nutshell, the objection is as follows: If uploading optimism were true, it should be possible to create not only (...) one, but multiple digital versions of you. However, you cannot literally become many. Hence, you cannot survive even a single instance of uploading, and optimism about uploading is misguided. In this paper, I will first spell out the multiplicity objection in detail and then provide a two-pronged defence against the objection. First, uploading pessimists cannot establish that uploading optimism has the contentious implication. Second, it is in fact plausible to think that we could become multiple distinct persons. Optimists’ hope for a digital afterlife is therefore not thwarted by the prospect of multiplicity. (shrink)

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If a brain is uploaded into a computer, will consciousness continue in digital form or will it end forever when the brain is destroyed? Philosophers have long debated such dilemmas and classify them as questions about personal identity. There are currently three main theories of personal identity: biological, psychological, and closest continuer theories. None of these theories can successfully address the questions posed by the possibility of uploading. I will argue that uploading requires us to adopt a new theory of (...) identity, psychological branching identity. Psychological branching identity states that consciousness will continue as long as there is continuity in psychological structure. What differentiates this from psychological identity is that it allows identity to continue in multiple selves. According to branching identity, continuity of consciousness will continue in both the original brain and theupload after nondestructive uploading. Branching identity can also resolve long standing questions about split-brain syndrome and can provide clear predictions about identity in even the most difficult cases imagined by philosophers. (shrink)

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There is a debate about the possibility ofmind-uploading – a process that purportedly transfers human minds and therefore human identities into computers. This paper bypasses the debate about the metaphysics ofmind-uploading to address the rationality of submitting yourself to it. I argue that an ineliminable risk thatmind-uploading will fail makes it prudentially irrational for humans to undergo it.

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This chapter identifies some of the unique ways in which uploading relates to transformations in values, as well as to collect, and to some extent integrate, diverse yet overlapping ideas and research relevant to the question of teleology in a transhumanist/posthuman context. The transition to a non‐biological substrate represents a nonpareil transformation of values. Given an unprecedented influx of novelty, it is difficult to anticipate new values and directions; however, the underlying patterns of human teleology, coupled with the fundamental values (...) carried forward to the transition, can suggest invariants in values and which directions might be pursued. Would uploaded persons spend most of their time inside or outside virtual reality? Would there be radical diversity in body shape and form, or a concentration of similar morphologies? While many provocative questions remain regarding a post‐biological future, some answers seem strongly supported. (shrink)

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I develop an argument that believing in the survivability of amind uploading procedure conveys value to its believers that is assessable independently of assessing the truth of the belief. Regardless of whether the first-order metaphysical belief is true, believing it conveys a kind of Darwinian fitness to the believer. Of course, a further question remains of whether having that Darwinian property can be a basis—in a rational sense of being a basis—for one’s holding the belief. I’ll also make (...) some remarks in the present article toward answering that latter question. (shrink)

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This edited book deepens the engagement between 21st century philosophy ofmind and the emerging technologies which are transforming our environment. Many new technologies appear to have important implications for the humanmind, the nature of our cognition, our sense of identity and even perhaps what we think human beings are. They prompt questions such as: Would an uploadedmind be 'me'? Does our reliance on smart phones, or wearable gadgets enhance or diminish the humanmind? (...) and: How does our deep reliance upon ambient artificial intelligence change the shape of the humanmind? Readers will discover the best philosophical analysis of what current and near future 21st technology means for the metaphysics ofmind. Important questions are addressed on matters relating to the extendedmind and the distributed self. Expert authors explore the role that the ubiquitous smart phone might have in creating new forms of self-knowledge. They consider machine consciousness, brain enhancement and smart ambient technology, and what they can tell us about phenomenal consciousness. While ideas of artificial general intelligence, cognitive enhancements and the smart environment are widely commented on, serious analysis of their philosophical implications is only getting started. These contributions from top scholars are therefore very timely, and are of particular relevance to students and scholars of the philosophy ofmind, philosophy of technology, computer science and psychology. (shrink)

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We present the consequences of the assumption of the classical and quantum nature of information storing and processing in the brain. These assumptions result in different behaviours of consciousness under a hypothetical brain copy experiment. The subject is important in the context of ‘mind uploading’ considerations.

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An ontology of information belies our common intuitions about reality today and animates and governs both explicit scholarly study in philosophy and the sciences as well as the ideologies that are growing out of them. Transhumanism is one such technoscientific ideology that holds to a very specific ontology of information which need not be the only one on offer. This article argues that the transhumanist ontology of information exhibits gnostic and docetic religious overtones in it and that it devalues physical (...) existence. At the same time, despite claiming a rejection of supernature, hypothetical transhumanist practices (such asmind‐uploading) posit the infosphere as a kind of supernatural realm that is often set in opposition to the natural world. This article presents a critique of transhumanist conceptions of information and offers an alternative ontology of information that more adequately accounts for the distinction between the natural and supernatural as well as the integrity of the physical world. (shrink)

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This special issue of JET deals with questions relating to our radically enhanced future selves or our possible “mind children” – conscious beings that we might bring about through the development of advanced computers and robots. Ourmind children might exceed human levels of cognition, and avoid many human limitations and vulnerabilities. In a call for papers earlier this year, the editors asked how far we ought to go with processes that might ultimately convert humans to some sort (...) of post-biological form or replace us with post-biological beings. Are these coherent ideas at all? If so, is it likely, or plausible, that we’ll one day be able to do such things? Even if we can, is that desirable? More generally, how far can all these processes go, and how far should we pursue them? To offer a more personal and pointed question, would you “upload” your personality into some kind of advanced computer or robot if the technology became available? Would you do so even if the process required the destruction of your original organic brain? We are not the first to ask such questions. A large body of relevant literature has built up in recent decades, some of it discussing these and similar questions purely as philosophical thought experiments , but some of it at the level of practical recommendations for a posthuman future. Despite the intensity and quality of the ongoing debate and the eminence of many of the contributors, much work remains to be done to sort it all out and advance the discussion. We have gathered a range of viewpoints, and I predict that some of these pieces will soon be regarded as classics. They may not be the last word – how could they be when they do not all agree with each other? – but they advance our understanding of what is at stake. (shrink)

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Transhumanism has enormous effect on temporary philosophical thought by forcing philosophers to take on many intellectual challenges. Not only philosophers deal with transhumanism but also scientists who try to create technological solutions that enable implementation of transhumanistic ideas. The question is whether all these ideas will be realized. The purpose of the article is to show that not all transhumanist aspirations can be put into practice. The first reason is that transhumanism limits human’s understanding to the material dimension. While this (...) is understandable in the naturalistic paradigm, this approach is insufficient when it comes to all complexity of human being and for this reason tanshumanism represents too narrow a human’s understanding to be able to implement its all assumptions. The second reason is that to enable people to become posthumans the latest technologies would have to be available to everyone and this seems impossible. If so, such a situation will divide people into ordinary people and posthumans and this could lead to conflicts that transhumanists want to avoid after all. Finally, the body-mind problem is essentially limited to emergentism, which corresponds to the naturalistic paradigm. It seems, however, that without the concept of the soul it is impossible to understand who a man is, his/her identity and consciousness and this is crucial formind uploading. (shrink)

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Would you survive if your consciousness branched into two or more streams? Commonly discussed within the context of split-brain scenarios, this possibility might soon become commonplace withmind uploading technology. Cerullo suggests that after nondestructivemind uploading and other branching scenarios, personal identity would continue in two streams of consciousness. Thus he argues for what he calls branching identity. In this discussion, I evaluate the theory of branching identity and Cerullo’s arguments for it, concluding that branching identity is (...) insufficiently justified and does not yield a better interpretation of branching cases than provided by Parfit. (shrink)

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Machines will attain human levels of intelligence by the year 2040, predicts robotics expert Hans Moravec. And by 2050, they will have far surpassed us. In thismind-bending new book, Hans Moravec takes the reader on a roller coaster ride packed with such startling predictions. He tells us, for instance, that in the not-too-distant future, an army of robots will displace workers, causing massive, unprecedented unemployment. But then, says Moravec, a period of very comfortable existence will follow, as humans (...) benefit from a fully automated economy. And eventually, as machines evolve far beyond humanity, robots will supplant us. But if Moravec predicts the end of the domination by human beings, his is not a bleak vision. Far from railing against a future in which machines rule the world, Moravec embraces it, taking the startling view that intelligent robots will actually be our evolutionary heirs. "Intelligent machines, which will grow from us, learn our skills, and share our goals and values, can be viewed as children of our minds." And since they are our children, we will want them to outdistance us. In fact, in a bid for immortality, many of our descendants will choose to transform into "ex humans," as theyupload themselves into advanced computers. We will become our children and live forever. In his provocative new book, the highly anticipated follow-up to his bestselling volumeMind Children, Moravec charts the trajectory of robotics in breathtaking detail. A must read for artificial intelligence, technology, and computer enthusiasts, Moravec's freewheeling but informed speculations present a future far different than we ever dared imagine. (shrink)

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As persons, we are importantly different from all other creatures in the universe. But in what, exactly, does this difference consist? What kinds of entities are we, and what makes each of us the same person today that we were yesterday? Could we survive having all of our memories erased and replaced with false ones? What about if our bodies were destroyed and our brains were transplanted into android bodies, or if instead our minds were simply uploaded to computers? -/- (...) In this engaging and accessible introduction to these important philosophical questions, Amy Kind brings together three different areas of research: the nature of personhood, theories of personal identity over time, and the constitution of self-identity. Surveying the key contemporary theories in the philosophical literature, Kind analyzes and assesses their strengths and weaknesses. As she shows, our intuitions on these issues often pull us in different directions, making it difficult to develop an adequate general theory. Throughout her discussion, Kind seamlessly interweaves a vast array of up-to-date examples drawn from both real life and popular fiction, all of which greatly help to elucidate this central topic in metaphysics. -/- A perfect text for readers coming to these issues for the first time, Persons and Personal Identity engages with some of the deepest and most important questions about human nature and our place in the world, making it a vital resource for students and researchers alike. (shrink)

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This paper examines the relationship between neural enhancement, uploading, and personal identity. Building on our earlier work, it argues that the aspects of cognitive functioning that are central to the preservation of personal identity are those surrounding consciousness. Neural enhancements that do not preserve consciousness do not preserve personal identity. Examining in particular the influential arguments of Clark, Clowes, Gärtner, and others regarding the extendedmind, we argue for a pessimistic view of the ability formind extension technologies (...) that are currently available to provide a feasible path to transcend human biology while still preserving our personal identity. (shrink)

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Our digital technologies have inspired new ways of thinking about old religious topics. Digitalists include computer scientists, transhumanists, singularitarians, and futurists. Digitalists have worked out novel and entirely naturalistic ways of thinking about bodies, minds, souls, universes, gods, and life after death. Your Digital Afterlives starts with three digitalist theories of life after death. It examines personality capture, body uploading, and promotion to higher levels of simulation. It then examines the idea that reality itself is ultimately a system of self-surpassing (...) computations. On that view, you will have infinitely many digital lives across infinitely many digital worlds. Your Digital Afterlives looks at superhuman bodies and infinite bodies. Thinking of nature in purely computational terms has the potential to radically and positively change our understanding of life after death. (shrink)

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