Works by Michael P. Lynch
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| Michael P. Lynch [67] | Michael Patrick Lynch [13] |
- True to Life: Why Truth Matters.Michael P. Lynch -2004 - Cambridge: MIT Press.In this engaging and spirited text, Michael Lynch argues that truth does matter, in both our personal and political lives. He explains that the growing cynicism over truth stems in large part from our confusion over what truth is.
- Internet of Us: Knowing More and Understanding Less in the Age of Big Data.Michael P. Lynch -2016 - New York, NY, USA: WW Norton.An investigation into the way in which information technology has shaped how and what we know, from "Google-knowing" to privacy and social media.
- Know-it-All Society: Truth and Arrogance in Political Culture.Michael P. Lynch -2020 - New York, NY, USA: WW Norton.Know-it-All Society is about how we form and maintain our political convictions, and the ways in which political ideologies, human psychology and technology conspire to make our society more dogmatic, less intellectually humble and ultimately less democratic.
- (1 other version)True to Life: Why Truth Matters.Michael P. Lynch -2004 -Philosophy 80 (314):601-604.No categories
- Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity.Michael Patrick Lynch -1998 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.A Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 1999 Academic debates about pluralism and truth have become increasingly polarized in recent years. One side embraces extreme relativism, deeming any talk of objective truth as philosophically naïve. The opposition, frequently arguing that any sort of relativism leads to nihilism, insists on an objective notion of truth according to which there is only one true story of the world. Both sides agree that there is no middle path. In Truth in Context, Michael Lynch argues (...) that there is a middle path, one where metaphysical pluralism is consistent with a robust realism about truth. Drawing on the work of Hilary Putnam, W.V.O. Quine, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, among others, Lynch develops an original version of metaphysical pluralism, which he calls relativistic Kantianism. He argues that one can take facts and propositions as relative without implying that our ordinary concept of truth is a relative, epistemic, or "soft" concept. The truths may be relative, but our concept of truth need not be. (shrink)
- Epistemic circularity and epistemic incommensurability.Michael P. Lynch -forthcoming -Social Epistemology:262--77.
- Truth as One and Many.Michael Patrick Lynch -2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.What is truth? Michael Lynch defends a bold new answer to this question. Traditional theories hold that all truths are true in the same way. More recent theories claim that the concept of truth is of no real importance. Lynch argues against both these extremes: truth is a functional property whose function can be performed in more than one way.
- After the Spade Turns: Disagreement, First Principles and Epistemic Contractarianism.Michael P. Lynch -2016 -International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):248-259.
- (1 other version)The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives.Michael P. Lynch (ed.) -2001 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.These essays center around two questions: Does truth have an underlying nature? And if so, what sort of nature does it have?
- ReWrighting Pluralism.Michael P. Lynch -2006 -The Monist 89 (1):63–84.
- A Functionalist Theory of Truth.Michael P. Lynch -2001 - InThe Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. pp. 723--750.
- Truth and multiple realizability.Michael P. Lynch -2004 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.Pluralism about truth is the view that there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. When taken to imply that there is more than one concept and property of truth, this position faces a number of troubling objections. I argue that we can overcome these objections, and yet retain pluralism's key insight, by taking truth to be a multiply realizable property of propositions.
- Varieties of Deep Epistemic Disagreement.Paul Simard Smith &Michael Patrick Lynch -2020 -Topoi 40 (5):971-982.In this paper we discuss three different kinds of disagreement that have been, or could reasonably be, characterized as deep disagreements. Principle level disagreements are disagreements over the truth of epistemic principles. Sub-principle level deep disagreements are disagreements over how to assign content to schematic norms. Finally, framework-level disagreements are holistic disagreements over meaning not truth, that is over how to understand networks of epistemic concepts and the beliefs those concepts compose. Within the context of each of these kinds of (...) disagreement it is not possible for the parties to the dispute to rationally persuade one another through only offering epistemic reasons for their conflicting points of view. However, in spite of the inability to rationally persuade, we explore how it may nevertheless be possible to rationally navigate each of these varieties of deep disagreement. (shrink)
- Arrogance, Truth and Public Discourse.Michael Patrick Lynch -2018 -Episteme 15 (3):283-296.Democracies, Dewey and others have argued, are ideally spaces of reasons – they allow for an exchange of reasons both practical and epistemic by those willing to engage in that discourse. That requires that citizens have convictions they believe in, but it also requires that they be willing to listen to each other. This paper examines how a particular psychological attitude, “epistemic arrogance,” can undermine the achievement of these goals. The paper presents an analysis of this attitude and then examines (...) four arguments for how its adoption – especially by the powerful – undermines the ideal of democracy as a space of reasons. (shrink)
- The values of truth and the truth of values.Michael P. Lynch -2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard,Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 225--42.
- Truth, value and epistemic expressivism.Michael P. Lynch -2009 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.
- Memes, Misinformation, and Political Meaning.Michael P. Lynch -2022 -Southern Journal of Philosophy 60 (1):38-56.Are most people sincere when they share misinformation and conspiracies online? This question, while natural and important, is difficult to answer for obvious reasons. But it also applies poorly to one of the main vehicles for misinformation—memes. And it can be ambiguous; as a result, we should be mindful of two distinctions. First, a distinction between belief and a related propositional attitude, commitment. And second, the distinction between the propositional content of an attitude and what I will call its political (...) meaning. I will suggest that these distinctions not only can help us understand how we communicate online, but they also suggest a lesson about what we should be focusing on when fighting misinformation. (shrink)
- Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Disagreement.Michael P. Lynch -2008 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock,Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
- In Praise of Reason: Why Rationality Matters for Democracy.Michael Patrick Lynch -2012 - MIT Press.Why does reason matter, if in the end everything comes down to blind faith or gut instinct? Why not just go with what you believe even if it contradicts the evidence? Why bother with rational explanation when name-calling, manipulation, and force are so much more effective in our current cultural and political landscape? Michael Lynch's In Praise of Reason offers a spirited defense of reason and rationality in an era of widespread skepticism--when, for example, people reject scientific evidence about such (...) matters as evolution, climate change, and vaccines when it doesn't jibe with their beliefs and opinions. In recent years, skepticism about the practical value of reason has emerged even within the scientific academy. Many philosophers and psychologists claim that the reasons we give for our most deeply held views are often little more than rationalizations of our prior convictions. _In_ _Praise of Reason_ gives us a counterargument. Although skeptical questions about reason have a deep and interesting history, they can be answered. In particular, appeals to scientific principles of rationality are part of the essential common currency of any civil democratic society. The idea that everything is arbitrary--that reason has no more weight than blind faith--undermines a key principle of a civil society: that we owe our fellow citizens explanations for what we do. Reason matters--not just for the noble ideal of truth, but for the everyday world in which we live. (shrink)
- Neuromedia, extended knowledge and understanding.Michael Patrick Lynch -2014 -Philosophical Issues 24 (1):299-313.Imagine you had the functions of your smartphone miniaturized to a cellular level and accessible by your neural network. Reflection on this possibility suggests that we should not just concern ourselves with whether our knowledge is extending “out” to our devices; our devices are extending in, and with them, possibly the information that they bring. If so, then the question of whether knowledge is “extended” becomes wrapped up with the question of whether knowing is something we do, or something we (...) can share with, or outsource to, instruments. And that in turn raises the two questions of this paper: First, to what extent does such technology put pressure on the idea that we might have more than one conception of knowledge? And second, what is the value of states that fit these conceptions of knowledge? (shrink)
- Minimalism and the Value of Truth.Michael P. Lynch -2004 -Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):497 - 517.Minimalists generally see themselves as engaged in a descriptive project. They maintain that they can explain everything we want to say about truth without appealing to anything other than the T-schema, i.e., the idea that the proposition that p is true iff p. I argue that despite recent claims to the contrary, minimalists cannot explain one important belief many people have about truth, namely, that truth is good. If that is so, then minimalism, and possibly deflationism as a whole, must (...) be rejected or recast as a profoundly revisionary project. (shrink)
- Epistemic commitments, epistemic agency and practical reasons.Michael P. Lynch -2013 -Philosophical Issues 23 (1):343-362.In this paper, I raise two questions about epistemic commitments, and thus, indirectly, about our epistemic agency. Can we rationally defend such commitments when challenged to do so? And if so, how?
- The Internet and Epistemic Agency.Hanna Gunn &Michael P. Lynch -2021 - In Jennifer Lackey,Applied Epistemology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 389-409.For most people, the internet is now the most dominant source of socially useful knowledge. Its widespread use has made knowledge more accessible, more widely distributed, and more commonly produced. -/- But the internet is also widely seen—and not just by philosophers—as raising a number of distinct epistemological problems. Some of those problems concern the metaphysics of knowledge—the extent to which knowledge via the internet is understood as outsourced, or even extended, knowledge. Others concern the type of knowledge the internet (...) can give us—whether, for example, the knowledge we gain by using our digital devices is a kind of testimonial knowledge. -/- In this chapter, we will focus on a third issue: how our uses of the internet to gain information affect our epistemic agency—or our capacity to take responsibility for our own epistemically relevant mental states and our wider contributions to our epistemic environment. In the early days of digital technology, the internet was generally seen as increasing our epistemic agency for the simple reason that it made information (and presumably knowledge) more accessible and widespread. But in recent years, such optimism has been tempered due to the rise of fake news, massive amounts of misinformation online, and the average consumer’s seeming credulity with regard to what they read on social media. The chapter will outline these objections and critically examine them, arguing that both our epistemic agency and our ability to responsibly exercise such agency can be undermined by some uses of the internet, even as those same uses increase agency in other ways. (shrink)
- Three questions for truth pluralism.Michael P. Lynch -2012 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright,Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 21.
- Truth and realism.Patrick Greenough &Michael Patrick Lynch (eds.) -2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? The essays in this book debate these two questions, which are among the oldest of philosophical issues and have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant, to Wittgenstein. Fifteen eminent contributors bring fresh perspectives, renewed energy, and original answers to debates of great interest both within philosophy and in the culture at large.
- Googling.Hanna Gunn &Michael P. Lynch -2018 - In David Coady & James Chase,Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. pp. 41-53.In a recent New Yorker cartoon, a man is fixing a sink. His partner, standing nearby skeptically asks, “Do you really know what you are doing, or do you only google-know?” This cartoon perfectly captures the mixed relationship we have with googling, or knowing via digital interface, particularly via search engines. On the one hand, googling is now the dominant source of socially useful knowledge. The use of search engines for this purpose is almost completely integrated into many of our (...) lives. On the other, the point the cartoon is making resonates with nearly all of us: users often recognize that there are risks and trade-offs associated with gaining certain kinds of information via online search. These facts about googling make it particularly interesting to the applied epistemologist. Our practices involving search engines not only have a distinctive character, that character puts some traditional epistemic questions in a new light. This chapter will examine two of those questions. The first concerns the extent to which googling raises problems similar to familiar quandaries surrounding testimonial knowledge. The second –and more radical –concerns whether googling is a type of distributed or extended knowledge. (shrink)
- Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth: A Reply to Cory Wright.Michael P. Lynch -2005 -Synthese 145 (1):29-43.According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the views main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes true as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims.
- Pragmatism and the Price of Truth.Michael P. Lynch -2015 - In Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben & Michael Williams,Meaning Without Representation: Expression, Truth, Normativity, and Naturalism. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 245-261.Like William James before him, Huw Price has influentially argued that truth has a normative role to play in our thought and talk. I agree. But Price also thinks that we should regard truth-conceived of as property of our beliefs-as something like a metaphysical myth. Here I disagree. In this paper, I argue that reflection on truth's values pushes us in a slightly different direction, one that opens the door to certain metaphysical possibilities that even a Pricean pragmatist can love.
- The Nature of Truth.Michael P. Lynch -2005 -Human Studies 28 (1):95-100.
- Polarization and the problem of spreading arrogance.Michael P. Lynch -2020 - In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch,Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. London, UK: Routledge.
- The impossibility of superdupervenience.Michael P. Lynch &Joshua Glasgow -2003 -Philosophical Studies 113 (3):201-221.Supervenience has provided a way for nonreductive materialists to explain how the mental can be physically irreducible but still physically respectable. In recent years, doubts about this research program have emerged from a number of quarters. Consequently, Terence Horgan has argued that nonreductive materialists must appeal to an upgraded "superdupervenience," if supervenience is to do any materialist work. We argue that nonreductive materialism cannot meet this challenge. Superdupervenience is impossible.
- Trusting intuitions.Michael P. Lynch -2006 - In Patrick Greenough & Michael Patrick Lynch,Truth and realism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 227--238.No categories
- A coherent moral relativism.David Capps,Michael P. Lynch &Daniel Massey -2009 -Synthese 166 (2):413 - 430.Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face.
- Introduction.Alessandra Tanesini &Michael P. Lynch -2020 - In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch,Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. London, UK: Routledge.
- Why Worry about Epistemic Circularity?Michael P. Lynch &Paul Silva -2016 -Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999):33-52.Although Alston believed epistemically circular arguments were able to justify their conclusions, he was also disquieted by them. We will argue that Alston was right to be disquieted. We explain Alston’s view of epistemic circularity, the considerations that led him to accept it, and the purposes he thought epistemically circular arguments could serve. We then build on some of Alston’s remarks and introduce further limits to the usefulness of such arguments and introduce a new problem that stems from those limits. (...) The upshot is that adopting Alston’s view that epistemically circular arguments can be used to justify their conclusions is more costly than even he thought. (shrink)
- Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives.Alessandra Tanesini &Michael P. Lynch (eds.) -2020 - London, UK: Routledge.Introduction / Alessandra Tanesini and Michael P. Lynch -- Reassessing different conceptions of argumentation / Catarina Dutilh Novaes -- Martial metaphors and argumentative virtues and vices / Ian James Kidd -- Arrogance and deep disagreement / Andrew Aberdein -- Closed-mindedness and arrogance / Heather Battaly -- Intellectual trust and the marketplace of ideas / Allan Hazlett -- Is searching the Internet making us intellectually arrogant? / J. Adam Carter and Emma C. Gordon -- Intellectual humility and the curse of knowledge (...) / Michael Hannon -- Bullshit and dogmatism : a discourse analytical perspective / Chris Heffer -- Polarization and the problem of spreading arrogance / Michael P. Lynch -- Arrogance, polarization and arguing to win / Alessandra Tanesini -- Partisanship, humility, and epistemic polarization / Thomas Nadelhoffer, Rose Graves, Gus Skorburg, Mark Leary, and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong -- Science denial, polarization, and arrogance / Lee McIntyre -- The polarization toolkit / Quassim Cassam -- Epistemic rights in a polarized world : the right to know and the abortion / Debate Lani Watson. (shrink)
- Three models of conceptual schemes.Michael P. Lynch -1997 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):407 – 426.Despite widespread confusion over its meaning, the notion of a conceptual scheme is pervasive in Anglo-American philosophy, particularly amongst those who call themselves ' conceptual relativists'. In this paper, I identify three different ways to understand conceptual schemes. I argue that the two most common models, deriving from Kant and Quine, are flawed, and, in addition, useless for the relativist. Instead, I urge adoption of a 'neo-Kantian', broadly Wittgensteinian model, which, it is ' argued, is immune from Davidsonian objections to (...) the very idea of a scheme. (shrink)
- Truth as the Good in the Way of Belief.Michael P. Lynch -2020 -American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):377-388.William James once said that truth is “the good in the way of belief.” This has the ring of, well, truth. While it may appear as if James’ claim is straightforwardly true, I think that there are at least three different dimensions along which truth can be normatively related to belief. In this paper, I explore these different dimensions of truth’s value, considering both how they differ and how they relate. As we will see, our understanding of these different dimensions (...) of truth’s value can impact our understanding of its nature. I argue that a fuller understanding of the connections between truth’s normative dimensions pushes us in a decidedly pragmatist and pluralist direction—something of which I believe James would approve. (shrink)No categories
- Expressivism and plural truth.Michael P. Lynch -2013 -Philosophical Studies 163 (2):385-401.Contemporary expressivists typically deny that all true judgments must represent reality. Many instead adopt truth minimalism, according to which there is no substantive property of judgments in virtue of which they are true. In this article, I suggest that expressivists would be better suited to adopt truth pluralism, or the view that there is more than one substantive property of judgments in virtue of which judgments are true. My point is not that an expressivism that takes this form is true, (...) but that it more readily accommodates the motivations that typically lead expressivists to their view in the first place. (shrink)
- The Many Faces of Truth: A Response to Some Critics.Michael Patrick Lynch -2012 -International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):255-269.International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 2, Page 255-269, May 2012.
- Power, Bald-Faced Lies and Contempt for Truth.Michael Patrick Lynch -2021 -Revue Internationale de Philosophie 297 (3):11-26.Bald-faced lies are on the uptick by political leaders in democracies worldwide. In the United States, for example, we are becoming numb not only to outrageous falsehoods, but to the bizarre self-assurance with which they are pronounced. We were told crowds were bigger than they were, that the sun shined when it didn’t, that Trump won in a landslide—and that was just in the first few days after his election. What has shocked so many is the fearlessness in the face (...) of the facts, the willingness to simply deny reality outright, and the apparent toleration—even joy—with which Trump’s followers greet the practice. Bald-faced lying by political leaders is an important phenomenon, but it is easy to misunderstand in ways that undermine our ability to combat its strange effectiveness. In this paper, I aim to first analyze political bald-faced lies and then examine the threat they pose to the norms of democratic discourse. My goal is not to answer the empirical question of how frequently denials of obvious facts occur in politics; it is the normative question of understanding what harms they cause — particularly when they are made by those — in political power. Nonetheless, I think it is important to resist the temptation to think that what we are talking about here are a few isolated and extreme examples. As Hannah Arendt noted, there are times in political life when truth, “if it happens to oppose a given group’s profit or pleasure, is greeted with greater hostility.” Arguably we are living in one of those times. (shrink)No categories
- Zombies and the case of the phenomenal pickpocket.Michael P. Lynch -2006 -Synthese 149 (1):37-58.A prevailing view in contemporary philosophy of mind is that zombies are logically possible. I argue, via a thought experiment, that if this prevailing view is correct, then I could be transformed into a zombie. If I could be transformed into a zombie, then surprisingly, I am not certain that I am conscious. Regrettably, this is not just an idiosyncratic fact about my psychology; I think you are in the same position. This means that we must revise or replace some (...) important positions in the philosophy of mind. We could embrace radical skepticism about our own consciousness, or maintain the complete and total infallibility of our beliefs about our own phenomenal experiences. I argue that we should actually reject the logical possibility of zombies. (shrink)
- Intellectual Humility.Hanna Gunn,Nathan Sheff,Casey Rebecca Johnson &Michael P. Lynch -2017 -Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy.Intellectual humility is a concept in progress—philosophers and psychologists are in the process of defining and coming to understand what intellectual humility is and what place it has in our theories. Most accounts of intellectual humility build from work in virtue epistemology, the study of knowledge as the state that results when agents are epistemically virtuous (or, perhaps, the view that the proper object of study for epistemology is the intellectually virtuous agent). [...].
- Hume and the Limits of Reason.Michael P. Lynch -1996 -Hume Studies 22 (1):89-104.The purpose of this paper is to explain Hume's account of the way both the scope and the degree of benevolent motivation is limited. I argue that Hume consistently affirms, both in the _Treatise<D> and in the second _Enquiry<D>, (i) that the scope of benevolent motivation is very broad, such that it includes any creature that is conscious and capable of thought, and (ii) that the degree of benevolent motivation is limited, such that a person is naturally inclined to feel (...) benevolence more strongly for one with whom he or she has a 'connexion', e.g., a family member or friend. (shrink)
- Sensations and pain processes.Kenneth J. Sufka &Michael P. Lynch -2000 -Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):299-311.This paper discusses recent neuroscientific research that indicates a solution for what we label the ''causal problem'' of pain qualia, the problem of how the brain generates pain qualia. In particular, the data suggest that pain qualia naturally supervene on activity in a specific brain region: the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The first section of this paper discusses several philosophical concerns regarding the nature of pain qualia. The second section overviews the current state of knowledge regarding the neuroanatomy and physiology (...) of pain processing. The third section highlights the recent research by Rainville et al. [(1997) Pain affect encoded in human anterior cingulate but not somatosensory cortex, Science, 277, 968-971], which suggests that pain affect is encoded in the ACC. The final section of the paper spells out exactly how these data affect the causal problem of pain qualia. (shrink)
- Deception and the Nature of Truth.Michael P. Lynch -2009 - In Clancy W. Martin,The philosophy of deception. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 188.
- Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston.Heather D. Battaly &Michael Patrick Lynch (eds.) -2005 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.One of the most influential analytic philosophers of the late twentieth century, William P. Alston is a leading light in epistemology, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of language. In this volume, twelve leading philosophers critically discuss the central topics of his work in these areas, including perception, epistemic circularity, justification, the problem of religious diversity, and truth.
- Truth in Ethics.Michael P. Lynch -2013 - In Hugh LaFollette,The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.
- Relativity of Fact and Content.Michael P. Lynch -1999 -Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):579-595.A common strategy amongst realists grants relativism at the level of language or thought but denies it at the level of fact. Their point is that even if our concept of an object is relative to a conceptual scheme, it doesn't follow that objects themselves are relative to conceptual schemes. This is a sensible point. But in this paper I present a simple argument for the conclusion that it is false. According to what I call the T-argument, relativism about content (...) entails a relativism about fact. (shrink)
- Truth Pluralism, Truth Relativism and Truth-aptness.Michael P. Lynch -2011 -Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):149-158.In this paper, I make two points about Richard’s truth relativism. First, I argue his truth relativism is at odds with his account of truth-aptness. Second, I argue that his truth relativism commits him to a form of pluralism about truth.
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
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Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
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Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
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Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
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Øystein Linnebo
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Susana Nuccetelli
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