Works by Michael A. Slote
29 found
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| Michael A. Slote [23] | Michael Anthony Slote [7] |
- Morals from motives.Michael A. Slote -2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.Morals from Motives develops a virtue ethics inspired more by Hume and Hutcheson's moral sentimentalism than by recently-influential Aristotelianism. It argues that a reconfigured and expanded "morality of caring" can offer a general account of right and wrong action as well as social justice. Expanding the frontiers of ethics, it goes on to show how a motive-based "pure" virtue theory can also help us to understand the nature of human well-being and practical reason.
- Time in counterfactuals.Michael A. Slote -1978 -Philosophical Review 87 (1):3-27.
- (1 other version)Common Sense Morality and Consequentialism.Michael A. Slote -1985 -Philosophy 61 (238):552-553.No categories
- Understanding free will.Michael A. Slote -1980 -Journal of Philosophy 77 (March):136-51.
- An empirical basis for psychological egoism.Michael Anthony Slote -1964 -Journal of Philosophy 61 (18):530-537.In the present paper I wish to argue that psychological egoism may well have a basis in the empirical facts of human psychology. Certain contemporary learning theorists, e.g., Hull and Skinner, have put forward behavioristic theories of the origin and functioning of human motives which posit a certain number of basically "selfish, " unlearned primary drives or motives (like hunger, thirst, sleep, elimination, and sex), explain all other, higher-order, drives or motives as derived genetically from the primary ones via certain (...) "laws of reinforcement," and, further, deny the "functional autonomy" of those higher-order drives or motive. Now it is a hotly debated issue in contemporary Learning Theory whether any theory such as we have described briefly above could adequately explain adult human behavior. I shall, however, argue only that a theory of the above kind may well be true, and that from such a theory, fortified only by one additional psychological premise, the truth of egoism (non-altruism) logically follows. I hope to show, thereby, that the question of psychological egoism is still an open empirical issue, however fallacious be the philosophical arguments for it. (shrink)
- Why We Need Empathy.Michael A. Slote -2021 -Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (4):366-373.Kwong-loi Shun argues that our reactions to situations of danger to others needn’t be understood in terms of empathy for those others, but can be fully anchored in what is bad about the situations themselves. My reply begins by pointing out cases where the desire to help and/or emotional reactions to what is bad for others don’t seem to involve empathy and then showing how empathy actually works in those cases. It goes on to argue that empathy allows a deeper (...) and more nuanced explanation of our responses and non-responses to dire situations than the appeal to the badness of those situations makes possible. Bringing in empathy forces one to go beyond Shun’s attempt to stay within Chinese tradition.However, the reply to Shun goes on to demonstrate how our understanding of empathy and of many other aspects of our moral psychology can be deepened and enhanced by bringing in the distinctive Chinese ideas of yin and yang—conceived as complementary rather than as opposites or contraries. Via a revived and fine-tuned notion of yin/yang Chinese thought has much to teach Western philosophers. (shrink)No categories
- Desert, consent, and justice.Michael A. Slote -1973 -Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (4):323-347.
- Reason and Scepticism.Michael A. Slote -1970 -Philosophy 46 (178):363-365.No categories
- Metaphysics and Essence.Michael A. Slote -1975 -Philosophy 51 (196):241-243.No categories
- The rationality of aesthetic value judgments.Michael A. Slote -1971 -Journal of Philosophy 68 (22):821-839.
- The theory of important criteria.Michael Anthony Slote -1966 -Journal of Philosophy 63 (8):211-224.No categories
- Causality and the Concept of a "Thing".Michael A. Slote -1979 -Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):387-400.
- Existentialism and the Fear of Dying.Michael A. Slote -1975 -American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1):17 - 28.
- Inapplicable concepts.Michael A. Slote -1975 -Philosophical Studies 28 (4):265 - 271.No categories
- Morality and ignorance.Michael A. Slote -1977 -Journal of Philosophy 74 (12):745-767.No categories
- Reply to Noddings, Cottingham, Driver and Baier.Michael A. Slote -2010 -Abstracta 5 (S5):42-61.
- Value judgments and the theory of important criteria.Michael Anthony Slote -1968 -Journal of Philosophy 65 (4):94-112.No categories
- Critical study.Richard J. Bernstein,E. M. Zemach &Michael Anthony Slote -forthcoming -Foundations of Language.No categoriesExport citation
Bookmark - A General Solution to Goodman's Riddle?Michael A. Slote -1968 -Analysis 29 (2):55 - 58.
- Confirmation and Conservatism.Michael A. Slote -1981 -American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1):79 - 84.No categories
- D. the role and significance of desert.Michael A. Slote -1999 - In Louis P. Pojman & Owen McLeod,What do we deserve?: a reader on justice and desert. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 210.Export citation Bookmark
- Entrenchment and Validity.Michael A. Slote -1974 -Analysis 34 (6):204 - 207.
- Empirical certainty and the theory of important criteria.Michael Anthony Slote -1967 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 10 (1-4):21 – 37.Philosophers frequently treat certainty as some sort of absolute, while ordinary men typically do not. According to the Theory of Important Criteria, on which the present paper is based, this difference is not to be explained in terms of ambiguity or vagueness in the word?certain?, but rather in terms of disagreement between ordinary men and philosophers as to the importance of one of the criteria of the ordinary sense of?certain?. I argue that there is reason to think that certainty is (...) some sort of absolute, and thus that no empirical statement is certain. And in any case, the problem of empirical certainty is not a pseudo?problem, as metaphilosophers like Wittgenstein and Wisdom have thought. (shrink)No categories
- Free will, determinism, and the theory of important criteria.Michael A. Slote -1969 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 12 (1-4):317-38.The Theory of Important Criteria is used to argue that the age?old problem of the compatibility of free will and determinism turns on the question of the importance of causal indeterminacy of choice as a criterion of being able to do otherwise. One's answer to this question depends in turn on one's evaluation of certain moral issues and of the force and significance of certain similes, analogies and diagrams in terms of which one can ?depict? a deterministic universe. It is (...) further argued that the problem of free will and determinism is not a pseudo?problem, but a genuine problem that is hard to solve because of the depth and complexity of the evaluative issues on which it hangs. (shrink)
- Induction and other minds.Michael Anthony Slote -1966 -Review of Metaphysics 20 (2):341-60.In "Induction and Other Minds," Plantinga casts the Argument from Analogy in the form of an inductive argument in the following way.
- Moral Psychology.Michael A. Slote -1998 -Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Moral psychology as a discipline is centrally concerned with psychological issues that arise in connection with the moral evaluation of actions. It deals with the psychological presuppositions of valid morality, that is, with assumptions it seems necessary for us to make in order for there to be such a thing as objective or binding moral requirements: for example, if we lack free will or are all incapable of unselfishness, then it is not clear how morality can really apply to human (...) beings. Moral psychology also deals with what one might call the psychological accompaniments of actual right, or wrong, action, for example, with questions about the nature and possibility of moral weakness or self-deception, and with questions about the kinds of motives that ought to motivate moral agents. Moreover, in the approach to ethics known as ‘virtue ethics’ questions about right and wrong action merge with questions about the motives, dispositions, and abilities of moral agents, and moral psychology plays a more central role than it does in other forms of ethical theory. (shrink)
- Some Thoughts on Goodman's Riddle.Michael Anthony Slote -1967 -Analysis 27 (4):128 - 132.
- God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God. [REVIEW]Michael A. Slote -1970 -Journal of Philosophy 67 (2):39-45.
- Philosophical Tasks: An Introduction to Some Aims and Methods in Recent Philosophy. [REVIEW]Michael A. Slote -1974 -Philosophical Review 83 (4):553-555.
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
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