Animal Consciousness.Daisie Radner &Michael Radner -1996 - Prometheus Books.detailsAny intelligent debate on the ethical treatment of animals hinges on understanding their mental processes. The idea that consciousness in animals is beyond comprehension is usually traced to the 17th-century philosopher Ren? Descartes whose concept of animals as beast machines lacking consciousness influenced arguments for more than 200 years. But in reviewing Descartes' theory of mind, Daisie and Michael Radner demonstrate in Animal Consciousness that he did not hold the view so frequently attributed to him. In fact, they contend that (...) Descartes distinguished two types of consciousness, which make it easier to discuss the conscious experiences of animals and to trace the debate into the post-Darwinian era. (shrink)
Analysis of Theories and Methods of Physics and Psychology: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science.Michael Radner &Stephen Winokur (eds.) -1956 - University of Minnesota Press.detailsAnalyses of Theories and Methods of Physics and Psychology was first published in 1970. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.This is Volume IV of the Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, a series published in cooperation with the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Minnesota and edited by Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell. Dr. Feigl was the (...) director of the Center.In a preface to the first volume in the series, Professors Feigl and Michael Scriven noted the extensive concern of the Center with "the meaning of theoretical concepts as defined by their locus in the 'nomological net' and the related rejection of the reductionist forms of operationism and positivism." In this volume, several contributors are again concerned with philosophical, logical, and methodological problems of psychology. As before, some papers deal with broad philosophical issues, others with more specific problems of method or interpretation. However, a deep concern for logical and methodological problems of special relevance to the physical sciences is reflected in a number of essays.The contents are arranged in two sections, the first part being based on the papers and discussion from a conference held at the Center on the problems of correspondence rules. Contributors are Herbert Feigl, Paul K. Feyerabend, N.R. Hanson, Carl G. Hempel, Mary Hesse, Grover Maxwell, and William Rozeboom. The second group of essays, by various members of the staff of the Center and some of its visitors, reflects current issues and controversies of great interest. The contributors are William Demopoulos, Keith Gunderson, Paul E. Meehl (three essays), and Michael Radner. (shrink)
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Unlocking the second antinomy: Kant and Wolff.Michael Radner -1998 -Journal of the History of Philosophy 36 (3):413-441.detailsUnlocking the Second Antinomy: Kant and Wolff MICHAEL RADNER But how in this business can metaphysics be reconciled with geometry, when it seems easier to mate griffins with horses than to unite transcendental philosophy with geometry?' Kant, x756 THE SECOND ANTINOMY, treating the proof and refutation of bodies as composed of simple substances, is one of the more puzzling sections of the Critique of Pure Reason. The thesis argument especially baffles commentators. Edward Caird in t 889 said: "Kant's statement of (...) this argument is very obscure."Among commen- tators of our era, T. E. Wilkerson complains: "This argument is very muddy." Jonathan Bennett remarks: "The text, however, is not clear enough for us to be sure exactly what Kant is relying on in his argument for the Thesis. "~ Nor have commentators spared the antithesis argument. No one, to my knowledge, has interpreted the text so that the thesis and antithesis arguments come out valid and constitute a genuine antinomy. Yet Kant stated on more than one occasion that all the antinomy arguments are valid. The proofs "are not deceptions, but are well-founded, under the supposition that appearances or a sensible world which comprehends them all are things in themselves" .3 In the Prolego- "Physical Monadology," in Kant's Latin Writings: Translations, Commentaries, and Notes, trans. and ed. Lewis White Beck, Mary J. Gregor, Roll Meerbote and John A. Reuscher , ll6; Ak.. (shrink)
Cognition, natural selection and the intentional stance.Daisie Radner &Michael Radner -1995 -International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (2):109-19.detailsAbstract Daniel Dennett advocates the use of the intentional stance in adaptationist biology and in cognitive ethology. He sees intentional system theory as closely related to decision theory and game theory. In biological decision and game theory models, nature ?chooses? the strategy by which the animal chooses a course of action. The design of the animal imposes constraints on the model. For Dennett, by contrast, the description of nature's rationale imposes constraints on the design of the animal. Dennett's oversimplified conception (...) of nature's rationale undermines the usefulness of the intentional stance as a tool in cognitive ethology. Intentional system theory can be made more useful in investigating animal cognition by modifying its application to questions of biological function. (shrink)
Optimality in Biology.Daisie Radner &Michael Radner -1998 -The Monist 81 (4):669-686.detailsIn 1979 Harvard biologists Stephen Jay Gould and Richard C. Lewontin published an essay entitled “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme.” The target of their critique is a style of thinking rooted in “the near omnipotence of natural selection in forging organic design and fashioning the best among possible worlds.” According to Gould and Lewontin, adaptationists assume that all traits of an organism are products of natural selection, and that the traits (...) were favored by natural selection because they were optimal solutions to problems posed by the environment. Gould and Lewontin called the adaptationist program the Panglossian paradigm because they saw strong parallels between the arguments of Dr. Pangloss in Voltaire’s Candide and the arguments of adaptationists and optimality theorists in biology. (shrink)
Heeding the CryAnimal ConsciousnessThe Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain and Science.Gordon M. Burghardt,Daisie Radner,Michael Radner &Bernard E. Rollin -1991 -Hastings Center Report 21 (2):48.detailsBook reviewed in this article: Animal Consciousness. By Daisie Radner and Michael Radner The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain and Science. By Bernard E. Rollin.