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METAPHYSICS, NATURE OF (Addendum) What ismetaphysics? An answer to this question requires a specification both of the scope ofmetaphysics – that is, of the nature of the questions that metaphysicians raise and attempt to answer – and of the methods that they employ in this enterprise. The discussion falls into the following two parts: 1. The Scope ofMetaphysics 2. The Methods ofMetaphysics 1. The Scope ofMetaphysics As regards the scope, (...) a natural answer is thatmetaphysics is concerned with the investigation of the ultimate nature of reality, where this involves the attempt, first, to arrive at the most fundamental truths about what exists, and second, to provide an account of the concepts that are involved in such fundamental truths. This leads immediately to the question of howmetaphysics is related to science. For does not science also aim at discovering fundamental truths about reality? In response, it is suggested, first, that a central part ofmetaphysics involves offering accounts of concepts that are essential to scientific theories in general, but of which no account is offered within any of the sciences themselves. Then, secondly, philosophers attempt to establish necessary truths involving some of those concepts, at least some of which have no relevance to scientific theories, whereas science is typically silent on questions that have no bearing on the experimental content and predictions of scientific theories. Thirdly, physics and the other sciences involve presuppositions for which they offer no justification, such as that there is an external, physical world, whereas philosophers attempt to answer such questions. Fourthly, the sciences rely upon induction, in the form of the method of hypothesis, or inference to the best explanation, but, in contrast to philosophers do attempt to show that induction is justified – a question whose answer may very well turn upon metaphysical questions, such as that of the nature of laws of nature. 2. The Methods ofMetaphysics In this second section, a number of methods that philosophers employ inmetaphysics are described and discussed, including. The following: (1) The idea of direct acquaintance with mental entities. (2) The idea of direct perception of non-mental entities. (3) Various proposed inductive methods. (4) The derivation of analytical truths (5) The search for truthmakers. (6) The appeal to intuitions -/- . (shrink)

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In this paper, I aim to discuss E. J. Lowe's view of the synergy betweenmetaphysics and natural science. In doing so, I will extend Lowe’s synergistic model to develop a realist account of theological claims thereby responding to Byrne’s strong form of eliminativism and agnosticism about theological claims. The paper is divided up as follows. In section 1, I will discuss Lowe’s view ofmetaphysics. In section 2, I will explain how Lowe thinksmetaphysics and natural (...) science are related. In section 3, I will respond to objections against Lowe’s conception ofmetaphysics. In section 4, I will discuss the implications of Lowe’s conception ofmetaphysics for a realist account of theological claims. In section 5, I will conclude this paper by claiming that there are excellent reasons to extend the synergy betweenmetaphysics and natural science to that of theology as well. (shrink)

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Victorino Tejera combines an American naturalist approach to Aristotle's modes of knowing with new applications of Justus Buchler's systematicmetaphysics. Bridging the gap between classical and modern, Tejera reveals a cohesive revitalization of metaphysical naturalism for contemporary scholars.

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Victorino Tejera combines an American naturalist approach to Aristotle's modes of knowing with new applications of Justus Buchler's systematicmetaphysics. Bridging the gap between classical and modern, Tejera reveals a cohesive revitalization of metaphysical naturalism for contemporary scholars.

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The American philosophical school called “Columbia Naturalism” began with Aristotle. That is, the naturalist thinkers at Columbia University over the first half of the 20th century, including John Dewey and Ernest Nagel, began with F.J.E. Woodbridge, Columbia’s famed Aristotelian from 1902 to 1937 and founder of The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods. Dewey arrived in 1904, retired in 1930. Later John Herman Randall took up the cause of interpreting Aristotle so as to be consistent with the “functionalist” naturalism (...) of Dewey, presented in his 1960 Aristotle. A third generation philosopher... (shrink)

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Strawson described ‘descriptivemetaphysics’, Bach described ‘natural languagemetaphysics’, Sapir and Whorf describe, well, Sapir-Whorfianism. And there are other views concerning the relation between correct semantic analysis of linguistic phenomena and the “reality” that is supposed to be thereby described. I think some considerations from the analyses of the mass-count distinction can shed some light on that very dark topic.

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Every Thing Must Go aruges that the only kind ofmetaphysics that can contribute to objective knowledge is one based specifically on contemporary science as it ...

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In this paper, I answer a fundamental question facing any view according to which natural selection is a population‐level causal process—namely, how is the causal process of natural selection related to, yet not preempted by, causal processes that occur at the level of individual organisms? Without an answer to this grounding question, the population‐level causal view appears unstable—collapsing into either an individual‐level causal interpretation or the claim that selection is a purely formal, statistical phenomenon. I argue that a causal account (...) of realization provides an answer to the grounding question. By applying this account of realization to the natural selection of melanism in rock pocket mice, I show how an alternative, formal account of realization, favored by proponents of the statistical interpretation, misses biologically important features. More generally, this paper shows how metaphysical issues about realization normally discussed in the philosophy of mind apply to debates in philosophy of biology. Thus, it is a first step toward fleshing out the oft‐noted similarities between debates in these areas. (shrink)

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This book argues that the only kind ofmetaphysics that can contribute to objective knowledge is one based specifically on contemporary science as it really is, and not on philosophers' a priori intuitions, common sense, or simplifications of science. In addition to showing how recentmetaphysics has drifted away from connection with all other serious scholarly inquiry as a result of not heeding this restriction, this book demonstrates how to build ametaphysics compatible with current fundamental physics, (...) which, when combined withmetaphysics of the special sciences, can be used to unify physics with the other sciences without reducing these sciences to physics itself. Taking science metaphysically seriously, this book argues, means that metaphysicians must abandon the picture of the world as composed of self-subsistent individual objects, and the paradigm of causation as the collision of such objects. The text assesses the role of information theory and complex systems theory in attempts to explain the relationship between the special sciences and physics, treading a middle road between the grand synthesis of thermodynamics and information, and eliminativism about information. The consequences of the books' metaphysical theory for central issues in the philosophy of science are explored, including the implications for the realism versus empiricism debate, the role of causation in scientific explanations, the nature of causation and laws, the status of abstract and virtual objects, and the objective reality of natural kinds. (shrink)

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In this paper, we consider the relative significance of concrete and abstract features for the identity and persistence of a group. The theoretical background for our analysis is the position according to which groups are realizations of structures. Our main argument is that the relative significance of the abstract features with respect to the significance of concrete features can vary across different types of groups. The argumentation will be backed by introducing the examples in which we show that this difference (...) in significance can affect the identity and persistence of the group. (shrink)

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In this paper, I defend a pluralistic view of phenomenological method which will provide evidence for particular accounts of experience without relying exclusively on the reflective method or on intuition as a criterion for truth. To this end, I discuss the prospects for indirect phenomenology. I argue that phenomenology ought to be defined by its object of investigation, first-person experience, and not by any particular method of gaining access to this object of investigation. On this view, an integration of (...) class='Hi'>naturalized phenomenology into the cognitive sciences is far more feasible than we might have expected. (shrink)

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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Introduction: Emancipation fromMetaphysics? Natural History, Natural Philosophy and the Study of Nature from the Late Renaissance to the EnlightenmentTinca Prunea-Bretonnet and Oana MateiThis special issue is devoted to the analysis of the relationship between natural history, natural philosophy, and themetaphysics of nature in the early modern period up to the mid-eighteenth century. It considers the evolving dynamics among these disciplines as well as the role (...) played by natural history in modern hermeneutics and aesthetics. The collected papers examine how early modern natural history acquires a growing importance in the study of nature, while observation and experiment gain epistemic priority among experimental philosophers. In the early modern and modern periods the critique of systems of natural philosophy and of Cartesianmetaphysics goes hand-in-hand with the prioritization of experimental facts and collected data. The latter become the first, indispensable step in the process of knowledge acquisition. This is the case for Francis Bacon and his followers, who establish natural and experimental history as [End Page 549] the preliminary step and the foundation for natural philosophy. Baconian natural history consists of a vast collection of observations and experiments from which, by induction, the experimenter is able to provide axioms and general rules of nature. These axioms and general rules constitute the foundation on which natural philosophy would be built. According to this approach, theoretical claims must be supported by experimental evidence, while natural philosophical theories, alert to the dangers of speculation, are inferred, by induction, from natural and experimental history (Anstey 2005, pp. 215–42; Anstey 2020; Anstey and Jalobeanu 2022, pp. 222–37; Anstey and Vanzo 2012, pp. 499–518; Corneanu et al. 2012; Jalobeanu 2015; Serjeantson 2014, pp. 681–705). Laws and principles are thus to be admitted in the study of nature, but only if founded on experimentally verified facts. This perspective seems to reject speculation and abstract systems and to contest their role in natural philosophy altogether. However, in spite of its influence on eighteenth-century thinkers, this approach to natural history would not go uncontested.In the eighteenth century these transformations were accompanied by a new emphasis onmetaphysics in the study of nature. While natural history was still largely regarded as preliminary to natural philosophy and continued to play a significant role in knowledge acquisition, Enlightenment philosophers elaborated new methods which rehabilitated metaphysical principles in the study of nature and promoted competing perspectives reassessing their pre-eminence (Anstey 2020). Two rival perspectives seem to compete on the philosophical scene: on the one hand, experimental thinkers justifying the theoretical autonomy of natural philosophy and emphasizing the prevalence of mathematical and empirically-oriented methodologies; on the other hand, novel approaches to the theory of principles arguing for the foundational role of metaphysical (a priori) principles and of speculative disciplines, such as metaphysical cosmology. This special issue explores the tension between the new role conferred to metaphysical disciplines and the study of nature, including a particular focus on the writings of Maupertuis, d’Alembert, and Kant. Our aim is to nuance the familiar narrative that inscribes Kant in the metaphysical tradition of Descartes and Wolff and opposes the latter to an experimental lineage comprising post-Newtonian thinkers such as Condillac, d’Alembert, and Maupertuis (Leduc 2015, pp. 11–30; contrast with Anstey 2018, pp. 131–50).In order to shed new light on these transformations and tensions, the collected papers address the complex interplay between natural history, natural philosophy, and themetaphysics of nature. Particular attention is devoted to the different methodologies in use starting with the late Renaissance and leading up to the mid-eighteenth century. We examine not only conceptions arguing for a decisive role played by observation [End Page 550] and experiment, but also more speculative treatments of the study of nature, where principles and metaphysical standpoints reclaim a foundational function, albeit through a revised definition ofmetaphysics and a novel understanding of the role of speculative disciplines, such as cosmology.Andreas Blank’s paper, “Protestant Hermeneutics and the Persistence of Moral Meanings in Early Modern Natural Histories,” examines the divergences in the symbolic interpretations of animals proposed in hermeneutics and in natural histories of the sixteenth and seventeenth... (shrink)

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This book advances a reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus that moves beyond the main interpretative options of the New Wittgenstein debate. It covers Wittgenstein’s approach to language and logic, as well as other areas unduly neglected in the literature, such as his treatment ofmetaphysics, the natural sciences and value. Tejedor re-contextualises Wittgenstein’s thinking in these areas, plotting its evolution in his diaries, correspondence and pre- Tractatus texts, and developing a fuller picture of its intellectual background. This broadening of the (...) angle of view is central to the interpretative strategy of her book: only by looking at the Tractatus in this richer light can we address the fundamental questions posed by the New Wittgenstein debate – questions concerning the method of the Tractatus , its approach to nonsense and the continuity in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Wittgenstein’s early work remains insightful, thought-inspiring and relevant to contemporary philosophy of language and science,metaphysics and ethics. Tejedor’s ground-breaking work ultimately conveys a surprisingly positive message concerning the power for ethical transformation that philosophy can have, when it is understood as an activity aimed at increasing conceptual clarification and awareness. (shrink)

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This paper considers whether there can be any such thing as anaturalizedmetaphysics of color—any distillation of the commitments of perceptual science with regard to color ontology. I first make some observations about the kinds of philosophical commitments that sometimes bubble to the surface in the psychology and neuroscience of color. Unsurprisingly, because of the range of opinions expressed, an ontology of color cannot simply be read off from scientists’ definitions and theoretical statements. I next consider two (...) alternative routes. First, conceptual pluralism inspired by Mark Wilson's analysis of scientific representation. I argue that these findings leave the prospects for anaturalized color ontology rather dim. Second, I outline anaturalized epistemology of perception. I ask how the correctness and informativeness of perceptual states is understood by contemporary perceptual science. I argue that the detectionist ideal of correspondence should be replaced by the pragmatic ideal of usefulness. I argue that this result has significant implications for themetaphysics of color. (shrink)

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Philosophers of science commonly connect ontology and science, stating that these disciplines maintain a two-way relationship: on the one hand, we can extract ontology from scientific theories; on the other hand, ontology provides the realistic content of our scientific theories. In this article, we will critically examine the process of naturalizing ontology, i.e., confining the work of ontologists merely to the task of pointing out which entities certain theories commit themselves to. We will use non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case (...) study. We begin by distinguishing two roles for ontology: the first would be characterized by cataloging existing entities according to quantum mechanics; the second would be characterized by establishing more general ontological categories in which existing entities must be classified. We argue that only the first step is available for a naturalistic approach; the second step not being open for determination or anchoring in science. Finally, we also argue thatmetaphysics is still a step beyond ontology, not contained in either of the two tasks of ontology, being thus even farther from science. (shrink)

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The central thesis of this book is that the argument that probability is insufficient to handle uncertainty in artificial intelligence (AI) is metaphysical in nature. Piscopo calls this argument against probability the non-adequacy claim and provides this summary of it [which first appeared in (Piscopo and Birattari 2008)]:Probability theory is not suitable to handle uncertainty in AI because it has been developed to deal with intrinsically stochastic phenomena, while in AI, uncertainty has an epistemic nature. (Piscopo (3))Piscopo uses the term (...) “metaphysical” in the Popperian sense: the non-adequacy claim is metaphysical (rather than scientific) since it cannot be disproved (much less established) by observation or experiment.In Chapter 2, Piscopo recounts some of the relevant history and issues in philosophy of science. There is little that is controversial here. One problem is that when addressing the question of how a particular probabilistic model is tested, Piscopo limits herself .. (shrink)

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This book examines the metaphysical issues regarding the powerful qualities view in all its various forms. The author also develops and defends his own version of the powerful qualities view, which he calls powerful categoricalism. In recent years, the powerful qualities view about the nature of properties has received considerable attention in the philosophical literature. The core tenet of the powerful qualities view is that properties are both dispositional and categorical/qualitative. Despite the increased popularity of the powerful qualities view, there (...) is no book-length presentation of the view in its distinct versions. The first part of this book analyzes the advantages and drawbacks of each version of the theory paying special attention to those difficulties that make it unstable and perhaps incomprehensible. In the second part, the author shows how a developed version of a dualist model for the origin of natural modality-according to which the specific behaviour of things in the world is the outcome of both the thin power properties have to be nomically relatable and certain nomic relations that determine properties' nomological role-can support an alternative understanding of the main tenet of the powerful qualities view. This part, in combination with the discussion of the difficulties of the other versions, not only defends the tenability of powerful categoricalism but also its superiority over the other extant versions. TheMetaphysics of Powerful Qualities makes an original contribution to an ongoing debate in contemporarymetaphysics. (shrink)

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Reply in Book Symposium on James Ladyman, Don Ross: 'Everything must go:metaphysicsnaturalized', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

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In a number of important works, Jerry Fodor has wrestled with the problem of how mental representation can be accounted for within a physicalist framework. His favored response has attempted to identify nonintentional conditions for intentionality, relying on a nexus of casual relations between symbols and what they represent. I examine Fodor's theory and argue that it fails to meet its own conditions for adequacy insofar as it presupposes the very phenomenon that it purports to account for. I conclude, however, (...) that the ontological commitments of intentional psychology survive within a broader conception of naturalism than the one adopted by Fodor. (shrink)

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A naturalistic impulse has taken speculative analyticmetaphysics in its critical sights. Importantly, the claim that it is desirable or requisite to givemetaphysics scientific moorings rests on underlying epistemological assumptions or principles. If the naturalistic impulse towardmetaphysics is to be well-founded and its prescriptions to have normative force, those assumptions or principles should be spelled out and justified. In short, advocates ofnaturalized or scientificmetaphysics require epistemic infrastructure. This paper begins to supply (...) it. The author first sketches her conception of suitablynaturalized or scientificmetaphysics. She then lays out a number of candidate epistemic principles centring around the notion of theoretical constraint. The author offers several arguments for the principles, based on statistical likeliness, agreement, falsity avoidance, and methodological efficiency and inefficiency. Finally, she shows how scientificmetaphysics satisfies the epistemic principles and is therefore preferable to its traditional rivals. (shrink)

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The present paper discusses different approaches tometaphysics and defends a specific, non-deflationary approach that nevertheless qualifies as scientifically-grounded and, consequently, as acceptable from the naturalistic viewpoint. By critically assessing some recent work on science andmetaphysics, we argue that such a sophisticated form of naturalism, which preserves the autonomy ofmetaphysics as an a priori enterprise yet pays due attention to the indications coming from our best science, is not only workable but recommended.

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Kant was centrally concerned with issues in the philosophy of natural science throughout his career. The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science presents his most mature reflections on these themes in the context of both his 'critical' philosophy, presented in the Critique of Pure Reason, and the natural science of his time. This volume presents a new translation, by Michael Friedman, which is especially clear and accurate. There are explanatory notes indicating some of the main connections between the argument of the (...) Metaphysical Foundations and the first Critique - as well as parallel connections to Newton's Principia. The volume is completed by an historical and philosophical introduction and a guide to further reading. (shrink)

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In this paper it is highlighted and argued that Boscovich’s natural sciences theory is so deeply rooted inmetaphysics and pervaded by it, we can maintain that it is a distinctive example of sharp-­witted, clever and far­-reaching metaphysical natural philosophy. Critically engaging with the unsubstantiated denial ofmetaphysics and several centuries long attempts to overcome it, I demonstrate that by metaphysical thinking Boscovich arrived at his unique notion of attractive­repulsive force and gained insight into the structure of things, (...) by which he anticipated, among other things, the theory of relativity and quantum physics. Although Boscovich greatly and successfully used quantitative methods while solving problems from geodesy, astronomy, optics, civil engineering statistics, hydraulic engineering and other fields – the most important parts of his natural sciences legacy, which made him transpose several centuries, are supported by geometric intuition and carried out mainly by qualitative methods, that is, metaphysical speculation. Also, I explain how for the creation and development of electromagnetism it was crucial to describe electromagnetic phenomena using Boscovich’s unique law of force and his theory of the structure of matter, what was explicitly stated by the ‘father of electromagnetism’ James Clerk Maxwell. Boscovich would have never reached these ideas by the exact scientific method, only by metaphysically founded and guided ‘proper thinking’. (shrink)

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Current analyticmetaphysics has been claimed to be, at best, out of touch with modern physics, at worst, actually in conflict with the latter The continuum companion to the philosophy of science, Continuum, London, 2011; Ladyman and Ross Every thing must go:metaphysicsnaturalized, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). While agreeing with some of these claims, it has been suggested thatmetaphysics may still be of service by providing a kind of ‘toolbox’ of devices that philosophers (...) of science can access in order to help provide an interpretation of theories in fundamental physicsMetaphysics in contemporary physics, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 2015). In this context it has been argued that ‘standard’ forms of dispositionalism simply cannot be sustained in the context of modern physics but that certain ‘non-standard’ views may provide the resources to help explicate the sense in which physics may be regarded as ‘modally informed’. Here that suggestion will be further extended in order to consider the implications both with regard to the overall relevance ofmetaphysics given advances in science and for the prospects of a naturalisedmetaphysics more generally. In particular, this paper will focus on three concerns: that the particular tools identified are not, in fact, ‘scientifically disinterested’ and thus that the distinction between ‘naturalised’ and ‘non-naturalised’metaphysics is at best vague or poorly drawn; that the usefulness of such tools depends on their being shaped to fit the relevant physics and thus the latter ‘guts’metaphysics; that ifmetaphysics does prove to be useful in this sense then we have no reason to scorn non-naturalisedmetaphysics to begin with. (shrink)

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Thenaturalized epistemologist's appeals to classical pragmatist epistemology are often used to justify (1) the rejection of idealized accounts of truth and (2) the acceptance what Putnam (2002) refers to as the “collapse of the fact/value dichotomy.” This paper takes a closer look at both of these appeals to pragmatism with the aim of showing that neither relies on a correct reading of the literature. The hope here is that some clarification of the classical pragmatist literature will alleviate concerns (...) contemporary epistemologists have about adopting a more robust pragmatist epistemology, and, specifically, a more robust pragmatist “truth-talk.” This paper ends with a discussion of Philip Kitcher's attempts to shed light on the pragmatist theory of truth in his 2012 book, Preludes to Pragmatism: Toward a Reconstruction of Philosophy. However, I leave it as an open question whether Kitcher successfully captures the role ofmetaphysics in classical pragmatist “truth-making.”. (shrink)

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FROM ITS INCEPTION PRAGMATISM HAS DISPLAYED an ambivalent relation to Hegelianism. John Dewey conceived his experimentalism as a more modest alternative to Hegel's system of absolute idealism, which he deemed "too grand for present tastes." At the same time, pragmatists from James and Dewey to Quine and Rorty have all assimilated important Hegelian motifs. These include most importantly a deep suspicion of modern representationalist epistemology, in both its rationalist and empiricist versions; a conception of intelligence as a form of practice, (...) best conceived in terms of making, doing, and acting; and a commitment to a nonreductionist, holistic appreciation of our beliefs about the world. To this list Rorty adds an appreciation of Hegel's conception of the philosophical enterprise as Nachdenken, as a kind of edifying recollective summary. (shrink)

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This paper maps the landscape for a range of views concerning themetaphysics of natural kinds. I consider a range of increasingly ontologically committed views concerning natural kinds and the possible arguments for them. I then ask how these relate to natural kind essentialism, arguing that essentialism requires commitment to kinds as entities. I conclude by examining the homeostatic property cluster view of kinds in the light of the general understanding of kinds developed.

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This book is a collection of papers on themetaphysics and natural philosophy of John Buridan (ca. 1295-1361), one of the most innovative and influential ...

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Radicalnaturalizedmetaphysics wants to argue (1) thatmetaphysics without sufficient epistemic warrant should not be pursued, (2) that the traditional methods ofmetaphysics cannot provide epistemic warrant, (3) thatmetaphysics using these methods must therefore be discontinued, and (4) thatnaturalizedmetaphysics should be pursued instead since (5) such science‐basedmetaphysics succeeds in establishing justified conclusions about ultimate reality. This paper argues that to defend (5),naturalizedmetaphysics must rely (...) on methods similar to those criticized in (2). Ifnaturalizedmetaphysics instead opts for the weaker claim that science‐basedmetaphysics is only superior to othermetaphysics, then this is insufficient to establish (4). In this case, (4) might therefore be defeated by (1). An alternative is to replace (1) with the view that we should just approach metaphysical questions with the best means available. While this would recommend a science‐based approach whenever possible, it would also allow for the continuation of science‐independentmetaphysics in domains that science has no bearing on and thus reject (3). The paper concludes that none of these alternatives is entirely satisfactory fornaturalizedmetaphysics. (shrink)

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Professional philosophers and advanced students working inmetaphysics and the philosophy of science will find this book both provocative and stimulating.

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"This book is an important study in the philosophy of the mind; drawing on the work of philosopher Wilfrid Sellars and the theory of critical realism to develop a novel argument for understanding perception andmetaphysics."--Publisher's website.

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Metaphilosophy, Volume 53, Issue 2-3, Page 202-220, April 2022.

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There is now a considerable body of published work on the epistemology of modern chemistry, especially with regard to the nature of quantum chemistry. In addition, the question of the metaphysical underpinnings of chemistry has received a good deal of attention. The present article concentrates on metaphysical considerations including the question of whether elements and groups of elements are natural kinds. It is also argued that an appeal to the metaphysical nature of elements can help clarify the re-emerging controversies among (...) chemists regarding the placement of the elements hydrogen and helium in the periodic system and the question of whether there exists a best form of the periodic table. (shrink)

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Cognitive developmental evidence is sometimes conscripted to support ''naturalized epistemology'' arguments to the effect that a general epistemic stance leads children to build theory-like accounts of underlying properties of kinds. A review of the evidence suggests that what prompts conceptual acquisition is not a general epistemic stance but a series of category-specific intuitive principles that constitute an evolved ''naturalmetaphysics''. This consists in a system of categories and category-specific inferential processes founded on definite biases in prototype formation. Evidence (...) for this system provides a better understanding of the limited ''plasticity'' of ontological commitments as well as a computationally plausible account of their initial state, avoiding ambiguities about innateness. This may provide a starting point for a ''naturalized epistemology'' that takes into account evolved properties of human conceptual structures. (shrink)

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The idea of naturalizingmetaphysics stretches back to Locke and Newton. Recently it has been revived by Ross and Ladyman et al (2007) in ‘Every Thing Must Go’. At the heart of the doctrine is the idea thatmetaphysics should be constrained by actual science (science which is current and institutionally valid). It is my attempt in this paper to naturalize themetaphysics of the species problem by proposing a species concept which conforms to the principles set (...) out in Ross and Ladyman et al's book. This is a concept which conforms strictly with current work in the field of evolutionary theory, with specific reference to theories in Information theory and Thermodynamics. In the end I use as an example of non-naturalizedmetaphysics Matthew Slater's paper ‘The Indeterminacy Problem for Species as Individuals’. (shrink)

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New York and London: Routledge, 2015. 208 pages. Hardcover. ISBN 978-0-41-573039-6. Reviewed by Peter Hanks.

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