Quality of Will Accounts and Non-Culpably Developed Mental Disorders.Matthew Lamb -2022 -Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 22 (3).detailsIn their article, Dylon McChesney & Mathieu Doucet argue that any viable account of the epistemic condition needs to account for the right scope of cases where an agent’s mental disorder results in exculpating ignorance. The authors then argue that this constraint on viability poses a serious problem for George Sher’s account of the epistemic condition, but not for quality of will views. In this discussion note, I do not challenge the viability constraint about mental disorder-based ignorance nor do I (...) challenge McChesney & Doucet’s argument that Sher’s account unjustly blames many cases of disorder-based ignorance. Instead, I argue against their position that quality of will views have the resources to accurately capture the scope of cases where mental disorders lead to exculpating ignorance. I argue that quality of will views fall short because they do not take into consideration the way that a non-culpably acquired difficulty, such as developing a mental disorder in childhood, can make an expectation that the agent avoid the disorder-based ignorance an unreasonably demanding expectation. This shortcoming results in quality of will views unjustly blaming agents for their disorder-based ignorance in some cases where the ignorance i) reflects a poor quality of will, but ii) it would be unreasonable to expect the agent to have avoided the ignorance. (shrink)
Philosophy as a Way of Life: Albert Camus and Pierre Hadot.Matthew Lamb -2011 -Sophia 50 (4):561-576.detailsThis paper compares Pierre Hadot’s work on the history of philosophy as a way of life to the work of Albert Camus. I will argue that in the early work of Camus, up to and including the publication of The Myth of Sisyphus, there is evidence to support the notions that, firstly, Camus also identified these historical moments as obstacles to the practice of ascesis, and secondly, that he proceeded by orienting his own work toward overcoming these obstacles, and thus (...) toward a modern rehabilitation of ascesis. Moreover, in contrast to Hadot’s Platonism, Camus located the source of this practice in the pre-philosophical stage of Athenian tragedy. This points to a further contrast between these two figures, which has historical and cultural precedents, in the distinction between this pre-Platonic form of ascesis - favoured by Camus - and the latter Christian form of asceticism - favoured by Hadot, with the status of Platonic ascesis rendered in terms of prefiguring this Christian form of asceticism. (shrink)
A Reasonable Expectation Account of The Epistemic Condition of Blameworthiness and Ignorance Rooted in Myside Bias.Matthew Lamb -2024 -Journal of Value Inquiry:1-24.detailsA plausible view in the literature on the epistemic condition of blameworthiness is the Reasonable Expectation View (RE). According to RE, whether ignorance excuses an agent from deserving blame is a matter of whether the agent could have reasonably been expected to have avoided or corrected the ignorance. This paper does not take up the task of defending this view, but instead examines what it implies for an interesting type of ignorance: moral or political ignorance rooted in myside bias. With (...) the prevalence of increasing political polarization, it is worth examining what a plausible view like RE implies about when, if ever, myside bias-based ignorance excuses the agent from blame—from deserving resentment or indignation. To assess this issue, the paper examines the empirical literature on what it takes to mitigate myside bias and then takes the United States as a case study to examine what RE implies for the actual non-ideal circumstances many agents are in. The paper argues that RE has two revisionary implications for our practice of blame. First, the paper argues that RE implies that political or moral ignorance rooted in myside bias is currently an excuse in a surprising number of cases. Second, our epistemic position to know whether a given instance of political or moral ignorance is excusing is often inadequate. (shrink)
Difficulty and the Reasonable Expectation Account of Exculpating Ignorance.Matthew Lamb -2023 -The Journal of Ethics 27 (3):233-243.detailsA plausible view about the epistemic condition of blameworthiness holds the following. Reasonable Expectation (RE): S's state of ignorance excuses iff S could not have been reasonably expected to have corrected or avoided the ignorance. An important, yet underexplored issue for RE concerns cases where an agent had the capacities and opportunities to have corrected or avoided the state of ignorance yet failed to do because of the difficulty involved. When does the fact that it was difficult for the agent (...) to have corrected or avoided the ignorance make an expectation to have done so an unreasonable expectation? Addressing this question is important for understanding what RE implies for a broad range of interesting cases where non-ideal agents out in the real world are ignorant because of commonplace difficulties (e.g., cognitive biases, complexity of large bodies of evidence, and misinformation). Whether commonplace difficulties excuse is an interesting and important topic that a satisfactory account of the epistemic condition needs to address. This paper proposes and defends an irreducibly normative account of when difficulty precludes a reasonable expectation to know better. The paper then shows how this account can be used alongside empirical research to reveal what RE implies for important cases of ignorance had by real non-ideal agents. (shrink)
Towards a synthetization of the sciences.Matthew L. Lamb -1965 -Philosophy of Science 32 (2):182-191.detailsThe rapidity with which new sciences are being formed and the older ones are becoming further specialized calls for a complementary effort to interrelate the sciences. A genuine synthetization must be completely open to all future discoveries and developments within science. Such an openness would be possible only if scientific understanding possesses certain invariable patterns according to which the synthetization could be constructed. Lonergan's Insight (New York, 1958) seems to have uncovered these basic and irrevisable patterns. Not only do they (...) demonstrate the complementarity of classical and statistical methods but the isomorphic Emergent Probability operative in world-process may well provide the framework for an open synthetization. In the present essay this possibility is demonstrated by interrelating, according to it, certain generic fields of the scientific endeavor, from physics to cultural anthropology. (shrink)
The doors of psychoanalysis.Matthew Lamb -2007 -.detailsThe challenge nowadays is how to critically evaluate psychoanalysis without assuming one’s position within the usual debates regarding its truth or falsity. Through an examination of Freud’s Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis, and associated works, this paper calls for an analysis of space deployed at three distinct levels. First, there is the physical reality of the lecture theatre, in which Freud stood before a live audience of the Vienna Psychiatric Clinic. Second, there is the imaginary space created by Freud’s discourse, produced (...) through the rhetorical imagery he deploys in order to create the effect of the possibility of psychoanalysis. Finally, there is a third space, a psychoanalytic space, in which Freud attempts to shift his discourse away from being imaginary toward achieving a certain degree of ‘reality-congruency’. This paper argues that Freud’s inability to establish this psychoanalytic space opens the way for a fresh examination of how the physical and the imaginary interact. (shrink)
No categories
The Pessimism of Luiz Costa Lima.Matthew Lamb -2012 -The European Legacy 17 (6):791-802.detailsThis article examines the relationship between the philosophical marginalisation of pessimism in Joshua Foa Dienstag's Pessimism: Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit (2006) and the concept of mimesis in the work of Luiz Costa Lima, particularly in his Control of the Imaginary (1988). My aim is threefold: (1) to compare the shared background and peripheral contexts of Dienstag's and Costa Lima's work; (2) to discuss the significance of Cervantes's Don Quixote in this comparative analysis; and (3) to characterise Costa Lima's thinking vis-à-vis conventional (...) institutional thinking. The nature of my subject requires a narrative approach in which the writer remains on the margin of the material, bringing the reader into the same position; to proceed otherwise, as articles conventionally do, would be to adopt a position of authority, institutionality, and hierarchy that is at odds with the material. It is a position that avers conclusions and prefers ongoing questioning. (shrink)