Results for 'Master Amartya Sen'
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- The Quality of Life.Martha Nussbaum,Amartya Sen &MasterAmartya Sen (eds.) -1993 - Oxford University Press.
- Other People.SenAmartya -2001 - In Amartya Sen,Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 111: 2000 Lectures and Memoirs. pp. 319-335.
- Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 111: 2000 Lectures and Memoirs.Amartya Sen -2001No categoriesExport citation
Bookmark - On Sen on comparative justice.Chandran Kukathas -2013 -Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (2):196-204.Against scepticism from thinkers including John Rawls and Thomas Nagel about the appropriateness of justice as the concept through which global ethical concerns should be approached,Amartya Sen argues that the problem lies not with the idea of justice, but with a particular approach to thinking of justice, namely a transcendental approach. In its stead Sen is determined to offer an alternative systematic theory of justice, namely a comparative approach, as a more promising foundation for a theory of ?global (...) justice.? But in the end Sen offers no such thing. He does not develop a theory of justice and this is all to the good; for if values are plural in the way Sen suggests, then justice is not amaster idea but one value among many, and it should be neither the first virtue of social institutions, nor the notion that frames all our reflections on ethical and political life. (shrink)
- Viii the impossibility of a Paretian liberal*Amartya Sen.Amartya Sen -1979 - In Frank Hahn & Martin Hollis,Philosophy and economic theory. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 78--127.
- Human rights and capabilities.Amartya Sen -2009 - In Mark Goodale,Human rights: an anthropological reader. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
- The idea of justice.Amartya Sen -2009 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.And in this book the distinguished scholarAmartya Sen offers a powerful critique of the theory of social justice that, in its grip on social and political ...
- Objectivity and Position.Amartya Sen -unknownThis is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 1992, given byAmartya Sen, an Indian philosopher.
- Liberty as Control: An Appraisal.Amartya Sen -1982 -Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7 (1):207-221.
- Sur l'économie de marché. Entretien avecAmartya Sen.Amartya Sen,Arjo Klamer &Pierre Lurbe -2000 -Cités 1:179-201.No categories
- Rational fools: A critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory.Amartya Sen -1977 -Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (4):317-344.
- Hume's Law and Hare's rule.Amartya K. Sen -1966 -Philosophy 41 (155):75 - 79.
- Reason and Justice: The Optimal and the Maximal.Amartya Sen -2017 -Philosophy 92 (1):5-19.This paper is a revised version of the Royal Institute of Philosophy’s Annual Lecture, 2016. It discusses the demands of critical reasoning in ethical arguments, and focuses in particular on the assessment of justice. It disputes the belief that reasoning about choice remains unfinished until an optimal alternative has been identified. A successful closure of a reasoning may identify a maximal alternative, which is not judged to be worse than any other available option. A maximal alternative need not be optimal (...) in the sense of being ‘best’. Critically sound reasoning can lead us to a partial ordering yielding a maximal alternative that is not optimal. The compulsive search for an optimal alternative needlessly limits the reach of reasoning in ethics. (shrink)No categories
- Home in the World: A Memoir.Leela Gandhi -2024 -Common Knowledge 30 (1):143-144.Amartya Sen's teeming account of an ecumenical life lived across three continents and over nine decades, in the interstices of colonial encounter, takes the reader on an intimate journey through some of the most significant global, intellectual, and historical events of the second half of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. We learn of Sen's formative years at Rabindranath Tagore's Shantiniketan University (he was named by the sage himself), and of the lasting impact of the Bengal Famine of 1943 (...) on his oeuvre and outlook. At Cambridge (where Sen was a student and latermaster of Trinity College, becoming the first Asian head of an Oxbridge college), his interlocuters included Edward Morgan Forster and Piero Sraffa—the Italian economist who reputedly catalyzed Wittgenstein's later work by scratching his (own) chin with an upward sweep to communicate a non-verbal “form of life” expletive. Sraffa and the Marxian Maurice Dobb, among others, fueled Sen's interest in welfare economics at a time when the discipline was all about capital and growth. Several chapters also point to the little-known impact of the ancient Indic renunciatory tradition on Sen's dazzling, counterintuitive vision of economics as an ethical enterprise, more concerned with living well than with factors of capital growth or prosperity as such. “Even though economic growth is important,” Sen writes, “the single-minded pursuit of it... is terrible... for people's quality of life.” A good life gains more substantially from opportunities for the development of existential capabilities. This insight is at the heart of Sen's modified social choice theory. He tells us that it was fully anticipated and realized in ascetic outlooks that proliferated around the fifth century BCE across the Eastern Gangetic Plain, incorporating parts of modern Bihar, Nepal, and Bengal (proximate stomping grounds of Sen's childhood and early youth). It's worth lingering on this point.The German philosopher, Karl Jaspers—a winner of the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade, awarded to Sen as well in 2020—discerned early signs of non-Western modernity in these subcontinental ascetic philosophies, instigated by eccentric proponents, such as Kashyapa the elder, Makkali of the cowshed, Ajita of the hairshirt, and Vardhamana Mahavira and Siddhartha Gautama, the more reputable founders of Jainism and Buddhism, respectively. By modernity, Jaspers means individual self-sufficiency, in the Kantian sense: a dissociative freedom from the paraphernalia of law, custom, habitual observances, and the lives and examples of others. Sen agrees and disagrees. In his reading, the Indic enlightenment tradition pioneered by the Buddha and his contemporaries calls for critical yet compassionate coexistence, points of reentry into, rather than rupture from, the mainstay of human interaction. Buddhist asceticism (much like Sen's brand of economics) takes the suffering of the destitute as a conceptual springboard. Its proposal to end suffering—or capability-deprivation, in Sen's formulation—through the liberation of transformative resources for living well (agencies and choices) is revealed only in the company of others, on plural ground (to follow Sen's thinking about justice) and as a program of joint action. The program is thwarted by systemic inequality and interpersonal intolerance when, for example, interest groups (identified by gender, race, religion, caste, sexuality, and so on) insist on privileged distance or divergence from other groups.Sen's memoir tempts us to imagine the earliest Buddhist disciples in his own likeness: fearless, free, highly sociable, brimful of curiosity and clarity, a touch impatient, compassionate, tolerant, restless, immeasurably sane. (shrink)No categories
- The Tacit Dimension. --.Michael Polanyi &Amartya Sen -1966 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.Suitable for students and scholars, this title challenges the assumption that skepticism, rather than established belief, lies at the heart of scientific discovery.
- Well-being, agency and freedom: The Dewey lectures 1984.Amartya Sen -1985 -Journal of Philosophy 82 (4):169-221.
- Equality of what?Amartya Sen -1987 - In John Rawls & Sterling M. McMurrin,Liberty, equality, and law: selected Tanner lectures on moral philosophy. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
- Moral Information.Amartya Sen -1985 -Journal of Philosophy 82 (4):169-184.
- Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What's Wrong With Welfare Economics.Amartya K. Sen -1979 -Economic Journal 89 (355):537-558.
- Utilitarianism and welfarism.Amartya Sen -1979 -Journal of Philosophy 76 (9):463-489.
- The topics: Reason and religious identity.Amartya Sen -2009 -International Journal on Humanistic Ideology 2 (2).No categories
- Justice and identity.Amartya Sen -2014 -Economics and Philosophy 30 (1):1-10.This paper discusses the relationship between justice and identity. While it is widely agreed that justice requires us to go beyond loyalty to our simplest identity – being just oneself – there is less common ground on how far we must go beyond self-centredness. How relevant are group identities to the requirements of justice, or must we transcend those too? The author draws attention to the trap of confinement to nationality and citizenship in determining the requirements of justice, particularly under (...) the social-contract approach, and also to the danger of exclusive concentration on some other identity such as religion and race. He concludes that it is critically important to pay attention to every human being's multiple identities related to the different groups to which a person belongs; the priorities have to be chosen by reason, rather than any single identity being imposed on a person on grounds of some extrinsic precedence. Justice is closely linked with the pursuit of impartiality, but that pursuit has to be open rather than closed, resisting closure through nationality or ethnicity or any other allegedly all-conquering single identity. Christian List. (shrink)
- XII*—Plural Utility.Amartya Sen -1981 -Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1):193-216.Amartya Sen; XII*—Plural Utility, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 193–216, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/.
- Forum su Identità e violenza.Amartya Sen -2007 -la Società Degli Individui 29:11-32.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Inequality Reexamined.Amartya Sen -1927 - Oxford University Press UK.This book develops some of the most important themes of Sen's works over the last decade. He argues in a rich and subtle approach that we should be concerned with people's capabilities rather than their resources or welfare.
- Democracy as a universal value.Amartya Sen -unknownIn the summer of 1997, I was asked by a leading Japanese newspaper what I thought was the most important thing that had happened in the twentieth century. I found this to be an unusually thought-provoking question, since so many things of gravity have happened over the last hundred years. The European empires, especially the British and French ones that had so dominated the nineteenth century, came to an end. We witnessed two world wars. We saw the rise and fall (...) of fascism and Nazism. The century witnessed the rise of communism, and its fall (as in the former Soviet bloc) or radical transformation (as in China). We also saw a shift from the economic dominance of the West to a new economic balance much more dominated by Japan and East and Southeast Asia. Even though that region is going through some financial and economic problems right now, this is not going to nullify the shift in the balance of the world economy that has occurred over many decades (in the case of Japan, through nearly the entire century). The past hundred years are not lacking in important events. (shrink)
- Positional objectivity.Amartya Sen -1993 -Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (2):126-145.
- Rational choice: discipline, brand name, and substance.Amartya Sen -2007 - In Fabienne Peter,rationality and commitment. Oxford University Press USA. pp. 339--361.
- Well-being and Freedom.Amartya Sen -1985 -Journal of Philosophy 82 (4):185-203.
- Evaluator relativity and consequential evaluation.Amartya Sen -1983 -Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (2):113-132.
- Justice: Means versus freedoms.Amartya Sen -1990 -Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (2):111-121.
- La démocratie des autres. Pourquoi la liberté n'est pas une invention de l'Occident.Amartya Sen -2005 -Cités 24:177-180.No categories
- A Response.Amartya Sen -2014 -Jurisprudence 5 (2):385-400.
- La nonviolenza di Gandhi oggi [The Actuality of Mahatma Gandhi’s Teaching of Non-violence].Amartya Sen -2007 -la Società Degli Individui 29:133-140.L’articolo illustra le ragioni che rendono l’insegnamento di Gandhi ancora straordinariamente attuale. Particolare rilievo assume, innanzitutto, il riconoscimento all’essere umano del diritto a esplorare e coltivare tutte le sfaccettature della propria identità, senza doverla costringere nelle anguste gabbie dell’etnia religiosa, dunque l’esigenza di costruire società che siano realmente complesse e condivise, non solo composite e frammentate. In secondo luogo, emerge il valore essenziale della moralità, strumento base per l’affermazione della nonviolenza e della democrazia, la cui carenza mina molte delle odierne (...) lotte portate avanti proprio in nome della democrazia e della libertà. The enclosed article expounds the reasons why the teaching of Mahatma Gandhi is still extraordinarily actual. Particularly relevant is the right, inherent to human beings, to explore and develop each and every aspect of their identities, not having to restrict themselves to the ethnic and religious ones; thus the need to build truly complex and value-sharing societies and not just composite and fragmented ones. Secondly, the essential value of morality, a fundamental instrument in the accomplishment of democracy and nonviolence, stands out; its want is seen as undermining many current struggles, apparently conducted in the name of democracy and freedom. (shrink)No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Rights: Formulation and Consequences.Amartya Sen -1996 -Analyse & Kritik 18 (1):153-170.The symposium included in this issue of Analyse & Kritik has provided an excellent occasion to re-examine formal as well as motivational issues underlying the so-called liberal paradox. This rejoinder discusses the significance of the new results and analyses, their bearing on the formulation and implications of rights, and also corrects a misinterpretation. Reflections precipitated by the liberal paradox can influence the acceptability of different principles of social decisions, and also the interpretation of ‘preference’ and ‘unanimity’. They also point to (...) some concerns that are relevant in the formation of individual preferences in a society with interdependent lives. (shrink)
- Rationality, Joy and freedom.Amartya Sen -1996 -Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 10 (4):481-494.In The Joyless Economy, Tibor Scitovsky proposes a model of human behavior that differs substantially from that of standard economic theory. Scitovsky begins with a basic distinction between “comfort” and “stimulation.” While stimulation is ultimately more satisfying and creative, we frequently fall for the bewitching attractions of comfort, which leads to impoverished lives. Scitovsky's analysis has far‐reaching implications not only for the idea of rationality, but for the concept of utility (by making it plural in nature) and, perhaps most importantly, (...) for the importance of freedom (including the freedom to change our preferences). (shrink)
- Commodities and Capabilities.Amartya Sen -1985 - Oxford University Press India.Commodities and Capabilities presents a set of inter-related theses concerning the foundations of welfare economics, and in particular about the assessment of personal well-being and advantage. The argument presented focuses on the capability to function, i.e. what a person can do or can be, questioning in the process the more standard emphasis on opulence or on utility. In fact, a person's motivation behind choice is treated here as a parametric variable which may or may not coincide with the pursuit of (...) self-interest. Given the large number of practical problems arising from the roles and limitations of different concepts of interest and the judgement of advantage and well-being, this scholarly investigation is both of theoretical interest and practical import. (shrink)
- Liberty and social choice.Amartya Sen -1983 -Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):5-28.
- Economic methodology: heterogeneity and relevance.Amartya Sen -2004 -Social Research: An International Quarterly 71 (3):583-614.
- Legal Rights and Moral Rights: Old Questions and New Problems.Amartya Sen -1996 -Ratio Juris 9 (2):153-167.The author examines the discipline of moral rights and in particular the need to embed them in a consequential system. He argues that the widely held opinion that independence from consequential evaluation is the right way of guaranteeing individual freedom is based on an inadequate appraisal of the role of moral rights in the social context. In this perspective he examines two specific cases: (1) elementary political and civil rights, and (2) the reproductive rights of women in the context of (...) poor countries with the problem of fast population growth. He argues that a coherent goal-rights system which accommodates rights among others goals, can overcome the non-consequential arguments and justify the force of moral rights fully within a consequentiality perspective. (shrink)
- A reply to Robeyns, Peter and Davis.Amartya Sen -2012 -Journal of Economic Methodology 19 (2):173 - 176.Journal of Economic Methodology, Volume 19, Issue 2, Page 173-176, June 2012.
- Measures of Inequality.Amartya Sen -1997 - InOn Economic Inequality. Clarendon Press.Various measures of inequality that have been proposed in the literature are discussed. These fall into two categories: those that measure in some objective sense—positive measures that make no explicit use of any concept of social welfare and those that measure in terms of a normative notion of social welfare and the loss incurred from unequal distribution. The characteristics of positive measures are described in respect of range, relative mean deviation, variance and the coefficient of variation, the standard deviation of (...) logarithms, the Gini coefficient, and Theil's entropy measure. Normative measures are described in terms of Dalton's measure, Atkinson's measure, axioms for additive separability, and a more general measure. (shrink)No categories
- The Contemporary Relevance of Adam Smith.Amartya Sen -2013 - In Christopher J. Berry, Maria Pia Paganelli & Craig Smith,The Oxford Handbook of Adam Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press.The primary concern of this chapter is the contemporary relevance of Smith’s thoughts and analyses. It begins by considering some contemporary uses and abuses of Smith that have coloured his historical reputation and discusses how some contemporary economists have failed to appreciate the richness of his discussion of morality and human behaviour. It seeks to dispel these abuses by focusing on his balanced argument for supporting a society with multiple institutions in which the market would do its important job, without (...) eliminating the role of other institutions, including the state, which can play their part in providing public goods like basic education and offering economic support for the poor, in addition to its limited—but important—function in regulating the market. The chapter ends by considering Smith’s thought in the light of the work of John Rawls and the contemporary discussion of justice applied in an increasingly globalized and cosmopolitan world. (shrink)No categories
- Work, Needs, and Inequality.Amartya Sen -1997 - InOn Economic Inequality. Clarendon Press.Some of the broader issues concerning economic inequality are addressed. Inequality is sometimes viewed in relative terms, viz., as a departure from some notion of appropriate distribution, based on needs and desert Inequality can, therefore, be viewed not merely as a measure of dispersion, but also as a measure of the difference between the actual distribution of income, and the distribution according to needs or according to some concept of desert. These two approaches are discussed.No categories
- On the Status of Equality.Amartya Sen -1996 -Political Theory 24 (3):394-400.
- Collective Choice and Social Welfare: An Expanded Edition.Amartya Sen -2017 - Harvard University Press.No categories
- Symposium onAmartya Sen's philosophy: 4 reply.Amaryta Sen -2001 -Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):51-66.I am most grateful to Elizabeth Anderson (2000), Philip Pettit (2000) and Thomas Scanlon (2000) for making such insightful and penetrating comments on my work and the related literature. I have reason enough to be happy, having been powerfully defended in some respects and engagingly challenged in others. I must also take this opportunity of thanking Martha Nussbaum, for not only chairing the session in which these papers were presented followed by a splendid discussion (which she led), but also for (...) taking the initiative, in the first place, to arrange the session. (shrink)
- Incompleteness and reasoned choice.Amartya Sen -2004 -Synthese 140 (1-2):43 - 59.No categories
- Why exactly is commitment important for rationality?Amartya Sen -2005 -Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):5-14.Gary Becker and others have done important work to broaden the content of self interest, but have not departed from seeing rationality in terms of the exclusive pursuit of self-interest. One reason why committed behavior is important is that a person can have good reason to pursue objectives other than self interest maximization (no matter how broadly it is construed). Indeed, one can also follow rules of behavior that go beyond the pursuit of one's own goals, even if the goals (...) include non-self-interested concerns. By living in a society, one develops possible reasons for considering other people's goals as well, which takes one beyond an exclusive concentration on one's own goals, not to mention the single-minded pursuit of one's own self interest. The recognition of other people's goals may be a part of rational thought. If rational behavior may depart from the relentless pursuit of one's own goals, commitment has to be important in a theory of rationality. Furthermore, seeing the role of commitment in human behavior can have explanatory importance in allowing us to understand behavior patterns that are hard to fit into the narrow format of contemporary rational choice theory. Commitment is, thus, important both for practical reason and for causal explanation. (shrink)
- On Ethics and Economics.Amartya Sen -1989 -Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 51 (4):722-723.No categories
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
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