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This article examines strands of an intellectual history in Media and Cultural Studies and Science and Technology Studies in both of which researchers were prompted to take up ethnography. Three historical phases of this process are identified. The move between phases was the result of particular displacements and contestations of perspective in the research procedures within each discipline. Thus concerns about appropriate contextualization led to the eventual embrace of anthropological ethnographic methods. The article traces the subsequent emergence of a ‘crisis (...) of context’ in the deployment of ethnography within these disciplines. The analysis of these historical changes is informed by a particular depiction of Euro-American knowledge conventions. The article suggests that the limits currently perceived for ethnography are a specific instance of the more general limits now recognized for these knowledge conventions. (shrink)

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Culture and Enlightenment are the two words that best characterise the essence of GyörgyMarkus's career, in whose honour this book is published.Markus devoted the last twenty years of research towards a theory of cultural objectivations and their pragmatics, and the great depth of his knowledge of the history of culture and philosophy informs all his teaching and writing. The pursuit of Enlightenment ideals attains reflective self-consciousness inMarkus' works; forged in the knowledge of its own (...) historicity, of the embeddedness of rationalities in culture and in an awareness of the paradoxes that cling to the conscious affirmation of ideals which are no longer self evident or beyond questioning. In taking up the challenge of these paradoxes,Markus spans the whole history of modern philosophy and culture with a matchless authority.This book draws together contributions from leading figures in contemporary philosophy, who are also friends, colleagues and former students of GyörgyMarkus. The book is divided into two sections: the first presents critical assessments of various aspects ofMarkus' wide-ranging works; the second presents contributions in celebration of his influence and his wide interests. In their critical assessment ofMarkus' work and in the demonstration of his influence, the contributors hope to convey something of the breadth and something of the excitement of doing philosophy in the company of GyörgyMarkus. (shrink)

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In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and 'agency' denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. The philosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and a standard theory of action. The former construes action in terms of intentionality, the latter explains the intentionality of action in terms of causation by the agent’s mental states and events. From this, we obtain a standard conception and a standard theory of agency. There are (...) alternative conceptions of agency, and it has been argued that the standard theory fails to capture agency. Further, it seems that genuine agency can be exhibited by beings that are not capable of intentional action, and it has been argued that agency can and should be explained without reference to causally efficacious mental states and events. Debates about the nature of agency have flourished over the past few decades in philosophy and in other areas of research. In philosophy, the nature of agency is an important issue in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychology, the debates on free will and moral responsibility, in ethics, meta-ethics, and in the debates on the nature of reasons and practical rationality. For the most part, this entry focuses on conceptual and metaphysical questions concerning the nature of agency. In the final sections, it provides an overview of empirically informed accounts of the sense of agency and of various empirical challenges to the commonsense assumption that our reasons and our conscious intentions make a real difference to how we act. (shrink)

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Robustness is often presented as a guideline for distinguishing the true or real from mere appearances or artifacts. Most of recent discussions of robustness have focused on the kind of derivational robustness analysis introduced by Levins, while the related but distinct idea of robustness as multiple accessibility, defended by Wimsatt, has received less attention. In this paper, I argue that the latter kind of robustness, when properly understood, can provide justification for ontological commitments. The idea is that we are justified (...) in believing that things studied by science are real insofar as we have robust evidence for them. I develop and analyze this idea in detail, and based on concrete examples show that it plays an important role in science. Finally, I demonstrate how robustness can be used to clarify the debate on scientific realism and to formulate new arguments. (shrink)

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Computer assisted theorem proving is an increasingly important part of mathematical methodology, as well as a long-standing topic in artificial intelligence (AI) research. However, the current generation of theorem proving software have limited functioning in terms of providing new proofs. Importantly, they are not able to discriminate interesting theorems and proofs from trivial ones. In order for computers to develop further in theorem proving, there would need to be a radical change in how the software functions. Recently, machine learning results (...) in solving mathematical tasks have shown early promise that deep artificial neural networks could learn symbolic mathematical processing. In this paper, I analyze the theoretical prospects of such neural networks in proving mathematical theorems. In particular, I focus on the question how such AI systems could be incorporated in practice to theorem proving and what consequences that could have. In the most optimistic scenario, this includes the possibility of autonomous automated theorem provers (AATP). Here I discuss whether such AI systems could, or should, become accepted as active agents in mathematical communities. (shrink)

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Although Kant is often considered the founding father of the controversial principle ‘Ought Implies Can’ (OIC), it is not at all clear how Kant himself understands and defends this principle. This essay provides a substained interpretation of Kant's views on OIC. I argue that Kant endorses two versions of OIC: a version that is concerned with our physical capacities, and a version that posits a link between moral obligation and a volitional power of choice. I show that although there are (...) important senses in which Kant's conception of OIC differs from the way in which OIC is discussed in recent philosophy, his account raises important issues for contemporary theory: for instance, it highlights the extent to which acceptance or rejection of OIC reflects convictions about the sources of normativity. (shrink)

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In this paper I develop a philosophical account of actual mathematical infinity that does not demand ontologically or epistemologically problematic assumptions. The account is based on a simple metaphor in which we think of indefinitely continuing processes as defining objects. It is shown that such a metaphor is valid in terms of mathematical practice, as well as in line with empirical data on arithmetical cognition.

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The polar orientation of cells within a tissue is an intensively studied research area in animal cells. The term planar polarity refers to the common polar arrangement of cells within the plane of an epithelium. In plants, the subcellular analysis of tissue polarity has been limited by the lack of appropriate markers. Recently, research on plant tissue polarity has come of age. Advances are based on studies of Arabidopsis patterning, cell polarity and auxin transport mutants employing the coordinated, polar localization (...) of auxin transporters and the planar polarity of root epidermal hairs as markers. These approaches have revealed auxin transport and response, vesicular trafficking, membrane sterol and cytoskeletal requirements of tissue polarity. This review summarizes recent progress in research on vascular tissue and planar epidermal polarity in the Arabidopsis root and compares it to findings on planar polarity in animals and cell polarity in yeast. BioEssays 26:719–729, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

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Despite a voluminous literature on happiness and well‐being, debates have been stunted by persistent dissensus on what exactly the subject matter is. Commentators frequently appeal to intuitions about the nature of happiness or well‐being, raising the question of how representative those intuitions are. In a series of studies, we examined lay intuitions involving happiness‐ and well‐being‐related terms to assess their sensitivity to internal (psychological) versus external conditions. We found that all terms, including ‘happy’, ‘doing well’ and ‘good life’, were far (...) more sensitive to internal than external conditions, suggesting that for laypersons, mental states are the most important part of happiness and well‐being. But several terms, including ‘doing well’, ‘good life’ and ‘enviable life’ were substantially more sensitive to external conditions than others, such as ‘happy’, consistent with dominant philosophical views of well‐being. Interestingly, the expression ‘happy’ was completely insensitive to external conditions for about two thirds of our participants, suggesting a purely psychological concept among most individuals. Overall, our findings suggest that lay thinking in this domain divides between two concepts, or families thereof: a purely psychological notion of being happy, and one or more concepts equivalent to, or encompassing, the philosophical concept of well‐being. In addition, being happy is dominantly regarded as just one element of well‐being. These findings have considerable import for philosophical debates, empirical research and public policy. (shrink)

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The concept of a good life is usually assumed by philosophers to be equivalent to that of well-being, or perhaps of a morally good life, and hence has received little attention as a potentially distinct subject matter. In a series of experiments participants were presented with vignettes involving socially sanctioned wrongdoing toward outgroup members. Findings indicated that, for a large majority, judgments of bad character strongly reduce ascriptions of the good life, while having no impact at all on ascriptions of (...) happiness or well-being. Taken together with earlier findings these results suggest that the lay concept of a good life is clearly distinct from those of happiness, well-being, or morality, likely encompassing both morality and well-being, and perhaps other values as well: whatever matters in a person’s life. Importantly, morality appears not to play a fundamental role in either happiness or well-being among the folk. (shrink)

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The focus of AI ethics has recently shifted towards the question of whether and how the use of AI technologies can promote sustainability. This new research question involves discerning the sustainability of AI itself and evaluating AI as a tool to achieve sustainable objectives. This article aims to examine the justifications that one might employ to advocate for promoting sustainable AI. Specifically, it concentrates on a dimension of often disregarded reasons — reasons of “meaning” or “meaningfulness” — as discussed more (...) recently in the “meaning in life” literature of analytic ethics. To proceed, the article first elucidates the working definitions of “sustainable AI” and “meaning in life”, while also setting the criteria for evaluating the plausibility of these reasons. Subsequently, it presents and scrutinises three arguments for the claim that one has reasons to care about sustainable AI from a perspective of meaning: the Meaning-conferring-action Argument, the Afterlife Argument, and the Harm Argument. In conclusion, this article asserts that only the Harm Argument presents a viable line of reasoning. However, it also outlines the presuppositions of this argument and the additional steps necessary to make it compelling. (shrink)

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As forms of private self-regulation, multi-stakeholder initiatives have emerged as an important empirical phenomenon in global governance processes. At the same time, MSIs are also theoretically intriguing because of their inherent double nature. On the one hand, MSIs spell out CSR standards that define norms for corporate behavior. On the other hand, MSIs are also the result of corporate and stakeholder behavior. We combine the perspectives of institutional theory and club theory to conceptualize this double nature of MSIs. Based on (...) a stage model that looks at the interplay of actor and institutional dynamics, we generate insights into why actors join a voluntary MSI, how the various motivations and intentions of the actors influence the standard development, and how these as well as the MSI design are subsequently influenced by both external and internal dynamics. (shrink)

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I propose a new way of understanding Kant’s doctrine of freedom. My reading seeks to combine features of two popular opposed lines of interpretation, namely, of metaphysical and anti-metaphysical readings. I defend the view that Kant’s idealist attempt to ‘save’ human freedom involves substantive metaphysical commitments. However, I show that this interpretation can fruitfully integrate important insights that are standardly associated with deflationary readings: first, the idea that for Kant freedom and natural necessity can be ascribed to one and the (...) same human being; and second, the idea that for Kant the belief in freedom and the belief in natural necessity belong to two different standpoints. (shrink)

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One key question in the philosophy of artificial intelligence (AI) concerns how we can recognize artificial systems as intelligent. To make the general question more manageable, I focus on a particular type of AI, namely one that can prove mathematical theorems. The current generation of automated theorem provers are not understood to possess intelligence, but in my thought experiment an AI provides humanly interesting proofs of theorems and communicates them in human-like manner as scientific papers. I then ask what the (...) criteria could be for recognizing such an AI as intelligent. I propose an approach in which the relevant criteria are based on the AI’s interaction within the mathematical community. Finally, I ask whether we can deny the intelligence of the AI in such a scenario based on reasons other than its (non-biological) material construction. (shrink)

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How do we acquire the notions of cardinality and cardinal number? In the (neo-)Fregean approach, they are derived from the notion of equinumerosity. According to some alternative approaches, defended and developed by Husserl and Parsons among others, the order of explanation is reversed: equinumerosity is explained in terms of cardinality, which, in turn, is explained in terms of our ordinary practices of counting. In their paper, ‘Cardinality, Counting, and Equinumerosity’, Richard Kimberly Heck proposes that instead of equinumerosity or counting, cardinality (...) is derived from a cognitively earlier notion of _just as many_. In this paper, we assess Heck’s proposal in terms of contemporary theories of number concept acquisition. Focusing on bootstrapping theories, we argue that there is no evidence that the notion of _just as many_ is cognitively primary. Furthermore, since the acquisition of cardinality is an enculturated process, the cognitive primariness of these notions, possibly including _just as many_, depends on various external cultural factors. Therefore, being possibly a cultural construction, _just as many_ could be one among several notions used in the acquisition of cardinality and cardinal number concepts. This paper thus challenges those accounts which seek for a fundamental concept underlying all aspects of numerical cognition. (shrink)

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Mental state reasoning or theory-of-mind has been the subject of a rich body of imaging research. Although such investigations routinely tap a common set of regions, the precise function of each area remains a contentious matter. With the help of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we sought to determine which areas are involved when processing mental state or intentional metarepresentations by focusing on the relational aspect of such representations. Using non-intentional relational representations such as spatial relations between persons and between (...) objects as a contrast, the results ascertained the involvement of the precuneus, the temporal poles, and the medial prefrontal cortex in the processing of intentional representations. In contrast, the anterior superior temporal sulcus and the left temporo-parietal junction were implicated when processing representations that refer to the presence of persons in relational contexts in general. The right temporo-parietal junction, however, was specifically activated for persons entering spatial relations. The level of representational complexity, a previously unexplored factor, was also found to modulate the neural response in some brain regions, such as the medial prefrontal cortex and the right temporo-parietal junction. These findings highlight the need to take into account the critical roles played by an extensive network of neural regions during mental state reasoning. (shrink)

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In this highly original book,Markus Gabriel presents 'Neo-Existentialism', an anti-naturalist view that holds that human mindedness consists in an open-ended proliferation of mentalistic vocabularies. Challenged by Charles Taylor, Andrea Kern and Jocelyn Benoist, Gabriel deftly refutes naturalism's metaphysical claim to epistemic exclusiveness.

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Many consider the nature of human consciousness to be one of the last great unsolved mysteries. Why should the light turn on, so to speak, in human beings at all? And how is the electrical storm of neurons under our skull connected with our consciousness? Is the self only our brain's user interface, a kind of stage on which a show is performed that we cannot freely direct? In this book, philosopherMarkus Gabriel challenges an increasing trend in the (...) sciences towards neurocentrism, a notion which rests on the assumption that the self is identical to the brain. Gabriel raises serious doubts as to whether we can know ourselves in this way. In a sharp critique of this approach, he presents a new defense of the free will and provides a timely introduction to philosophical thought about the self – all with verve, humor, and surprising insights. Gabriel criticizes the scientific image of the world and takes us on an eclectic journey of self-reflection by way of such concepts as self, consciousness, and freedom, with the aid of Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nagel but also Dr. Who, The Walking Dead, and Fargo. (shrink)

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Journal Name: SATS Issue: Ahead of print.

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If we think of recognition as the practical relation consciously enacted by concerned individual subjects as social actors, which allows them to fulfil their intersubjectively valid social roles, this by no means exhausts the significance that recognition is accorded by Hegel. In fact the problem of recognition is central to the understanding and evaluation of Hegel’s metaphysical system. Thus a close scrutiny of the presentation of self-consciousness in Phenomenology of Spirit and the interpretative difficulties it poses leads on to the (...) question of the subject and Hegel’s distinction between finite, accidental individuals and the true subject in his system: the concept of Spirit, understood not as a separate entity but as a system of relations, objectified in the historical forms of the Absolute Spirit. But what is the price of Hegel’s metaphysics of subjectivity? Hegelian recognition signifies the recognition by individuals of recognition in its truth, that is, the self-recognition by finite individuals that they participate in Spirit as the true universal subject to the degree that they recognize their shared world of actions as the world of their own making. Modernity is therefore defined for Hegel as the recognition and realization of ‘conscious freedom’, whose telos lies in the actualization of universal reciprocal recognition that brings the unfreedom of history to an end. The idea of freedom and the thesis of the ‘end of history’ remain, however, the preserve of the thinking few. Hegelian recognition and with it Hegel’s whole metaphysical system founders on the rock of finitude, on the unfreedom of finite human beings. (shrink)

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Bertolt Brecht is internationally known as one of the most influential dramatists, directors, and theater theorists of the twentieth century and also, within German culture, as one of its most innovative modern poets and prose stylists. Whereas Brecht’s contributions to a Marxist aesthetics of drama, theater, poetry, and prose are widely acknowledged, he is less well known as a major thinker on ethical issues, mostly because of his materialist orientation, which conflicts with ethical traditions rooted in metaphysics. Against these traditions, (...) Brecht envisioned an “ethics for the satisfaction of needs”1 and claimed that “material needs as ethical, ethical ones as material, this is not grasped.”2 This.. (shrink)

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This chapter discusses whether the appropriation of Kuhnian thoughts by the so-called Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge is appropriate. In order to answer the question of appropriate appropriation, Kuhn’s and the Strong Programme’s stances on two “isms” are compared: relativism and naturalism. It is shown that the Strong Programme clearly goes beyond Kuhn and breaks more radically with philosophical tradition. Nevertheless, there are also philosophical continuities and similarities.

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The Cognitive Foundations and Epistemology of Arithmetic and Geometry How is knowledge of arithmetic and geometry developed and acquired? In the tradition established by Plato and often associated with Kant, the epistemology of mathematics has been focused on a priori approaches, which take mathematical knowledge and its study to be essentially independent of sensory experience. … Continue reading The Cognitive Foundations and Epistemology of Arithmetic and Geometry →.

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We present an argument against physicalism in two steps: 1) Physics reduces the world to a mathematical structure; 2) The notion of 'structure' only makes sense when carried by something and interpreted by something else. Physicalism does not allow such a carrier and interpreter at a fundamental level, hence it must be wrong. An extended notion of Mind is presented as the fundamental 'hardware' which is necessary by the argument. In particular, qualia correspond to the 'monitor component' of mind. Some (...) ideas are presented on how to extend this mind-matter relation to a more elaborate picture: (1) A system of two complementary reductionisms (one physical, the other mental) may hint toward a deeper reality in which mind and the physical world are closely entangled. (2) A division of mind into a conscious 'monitor' and an unconscious 'processor' is suggested using the analogy of dreams. Finally, the problem of Solipsism and the existence of 'minds other than my own' is discussed. (shrink)

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In _Expressive Arts Education and Therapy_ we see how the creative process in a dance theatre lab evolved into a Creative Process-based Research project that included the director/choreographer and participants in a collaborative sense-making project.

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In early analytic philosophy, one of the most central questions concerned the status of arithmetical objects. Frege argued against the popular conception that we arrive at natural numbers with a psychological process of abstraction. Instead, he wanted to show that arithmetical truths can be derived from the truths of logic, thus eliminating all psychological components. Meanwhile, Dedekind and Peano developed axiomatic systems of arithmetic. The differences between the logicist and axiomatic approaches turned out to be philosophical as well as mathematical. (...) In this paper, I will argue that Dedekind’s approach can be seen as a precursor to modern structuralism and as such, it enjoys many advantages over Frege’s logicism. I also show that from a modern perspective, Frege’s criticism of abstraction and psychologism is one-sided and fails against the psychological processes that modern research suggests to be at the heart of numerical cognition. The approach here is twofold. First, through historical analysis, I will try to build a clear image of what Frege’s and Dedekind’s views on arithmetic were. Then, I will consider those views from the perspective of modern philosophy of mathematics, and in particular, the empirical study of arithmetical cognition. I aim to show that there is nothing to suggest that the axiomatic Dedekind approach could not provide a perfectly adequate basis for philosophy of arithmetic. (shrink)

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Neuroenhancement concerns the improvement of a person’s mental properties, abilities, and performance. The various techniques of neuroenhancement offer new opportunities of such improvement, but also come with substantive perils. Neuroenhancement thus involves significant normative challenges for individual persons as well as for society as a whole. This expert report provides a concise overview of the contemporary debate on neuroenhancement. It discusses the definition, techniques and targets of neuroenhancement and examines arguments for and against it at the level of individual persons, (...) social interaction, and social policy. (shrink)

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In his Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations (Mach 1885) the phenomenalist philosopher Ernst Mach confronts us with a difficulty: “If we regard the Ego as a real unity, we become involved in the following dilemma: either we must set over against the Ego a world of unknowable entities […] or we must regard the whole world, the Egos of other people included, as comprised in our own Ego.” (Mach 1885: 21) In other words, if we start from a (...) phenomenalist viewpoint, i.e., if we believe that the manifold of sensations we are confronted with is ontologically fundamental —as Mach clearly does: “For us, colors, sounds, spaces, times,… are the ultimate ele-ments” (Mach 1885: 23)—then we are in danger to end up in solipsism. Unless, that is, we assume that some underlying thing-in-itself substratum from which matter, we ourselves, and all the others emanate. The only other alter-native seems to be—and Mach advertises it vehemently for he denies any “mons-trous notion of a thing-in-itself” (Mach 1885: 6)1—that we get rid of the Ego. For, if there is no Self in the first place, then the question whether there are others dissolves. To put it the other way round, it is ok that the others do not exist because, really, I do not exist either. If the Ego is a Myth solipsism is not just wrong but nonsense. There are two questions this paper wishes to address: first, do we need independent additional support for the denial of the Self or is the avoidance of solipsism reason enough to assume the Ego’s non-existence? I will argue that we do need additional reasons and I will evaluate those that Mach indeed gives to prove that “the primary fact is not the I, the Ego, but the elements (sensations)” (Mach 1885: 19). Second, is the deconstruction of the I, even if further sufficient support can be found, really adequate to stop us from worrying about solipsism? The doubt I will put forward is that the illusion of a Self might conjure up enough of an Ego—just like feeling a pain is having a pain, even if it is located in a phantom limb—to start us wondering whether it also occurs elsewhere. (shrink)

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Danaher (2016) has argued that increasing robotization can lead to retribution gaps: Situations in which the normative fact that nobody can be justly held responsible for a harmful outcome stands in conflict with our retributivist moral dispositions. In this paper, we report a cross-cultural empirical study based on Sparrow’s (2007) famous example of an autonomous weapon system committing a war crime, which was conducted with participants from the US, Japan and Germany. We find that (1) people manifest a considerable willingness (...) to hold autonomous systems morally responsible, (2) partially exculpate human agents when interacting with such systems, and that more generally (3) the possibility of normative responsibility gaps is indeed at odds with people’s pronounced retributivist inclinations. We discuss what these results mean for potential implications of the retribution gap and other positions in the responsibility gap literature. (shrink)

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Existential crises, referred to as inner conflicts, are characterized by identity confusion and meaninglessness. Tension and anxiety accompany them, often to the point where they produce melancholy and make it difficult to go about everyday tasks. Their negative outlook on meaning is reminiscent of some elements of the existentialist intellectual movement. It is possible to categories existential crises' emotional, cognitive, and behavioral aspects. Emotional components include emotions like emotional discomfort, helplessness, despair, guilt, concern, or loneliness. The issue of insignificance, the (...) erosion of one's spiritual beliefs or personal values, and death anxiety are examples of cognitive components. Among the behavioral components are addictions, which encompass antisocial and obsessive behavior. A person may have existential crises during any time, including adolescence, midlife, older life, and quarter-life. Early crises are typically forward-looking, with the person feeling uncertain and scared about their future course in terms of education, work, identity, and social connections. Subsequent crises are typically retroactive. They are typically accompanied by feelings of regret, humiliation, and fear of dying and are frequently sparked by the idea that one is past one's prime. It is easier for a person to resolve or avoid further existential crises if a previous crisis was well resolved. Existential crises do not occur to everyone. (shrink)

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We propose that the fundamental mechanism underlying resilience is the integration of novel or negative experiences into internal schemata. This process requires a switch from reactive to predictive control modes, from the brain's salience network to the default mode network. Reappraisal, among other mechanisms, is suggested to facilitate this process.

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Die These dieses Aufsatzes besteht darin, dass menschliches Leben als genuin politisch begriffen werden sollte. Dieser Gedanke wird in Form einer aristotelischen Kritik am ethischen Naturalismus entwickelt. (1) Zunächst rekonstruiere ich den ethischen Naturalismus vor der Frage, was genau naturalistisch an dieser Position ist. Es wird gezeigt, dass es sich nicht um ein naturalistisches Begründungsprogramm von Normativität handelt, das Normativität in einem außerethischen Bereich begründen will. Naturalistisch ist der ethische Naturalismus, insofern die Position vertreten wird, der natürliche Vollzug menschlichen Lebens (...) impliziere praktische Rationalität und Tugenden. (2) In einem zweiten Schritt wird mit Aristoteles argumentiert, dass die besonderen Realisierungsformen dieser praktischen Rationalität in Genese und Geltung stark lokale Aspekte aufweisen und von Aristoteles zirkulär bestimmt werden. Ich rekonstruiere dies als polis- statt lebensformrelative Normativität. (3) Der dritte Abschnitt diskutiert Implikationen dieser Umstellung vor dem Hintergrund älterer Fassungen des Neoaristotelismus, die durch die Leitbegriffe von Brauchtum und Tradition die Lokalität von Normativität explizit herausstellen. Gegen diese Theorien versuche ich abschließend vorzuschlagen, die aristotelische Zirkularität des menschlich Guten als Offenheit der menschlichen Lebensform zu begreifen, die nicht zwingenderweise durch Rekurs auf Natur oder Tradition geschlossen werden muss. (shrink)

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The nineteenth century saw the invention of the national hero. His main function was to serve as an ideal for the nation. Latvia, however, is an exception to this general rule: after it regained independence in 1990, the national hero simply disappeared and no heroic image emerged. On the contrary, it was now the victim that became the emblem of Latvia’s regained independence. The country, of course, did not lack “heroes,” for there were in fact many candidates for the creation (...) of a national hero, yet the hero as such no longer seemed to fit the new state. While the path Latvia had chosen of rejecting or refusing national heroes had an impact on its integration into Europe, it also contributed to ongoing frictions among its own ethnic communities. (shrink)

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