Ways of Meaning: An Introduction to a Phiosophy of Language.Mark de Bretton Platts -1979 - Boston: MIT Press.detailsThis second edition of the book contains a new chapter on the notions of natural-kind words and natural kinds.
Reference, Truth and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language.Mark de Bretton Platts (ed.) -1980 - Boston: Routledge.detailsThe papers in this collection discuss the central questions about the connections between language, reality and human understanding. The complex relations between accounts of meaning and facts about ordinary speakers’ understanding of their language are examined so as to illuminate the philosophical character of the connections between language and reality. The collection as a whole is a thematically unified treatment of some of the most central questions within contemporary philosophy of language.
Moral Realities: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology.Mark de Bretton Platts -1991 - New York: Routledge.detailsFirst published in 1991. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
No categories
Detrás de la tolerancia.Mark Platts -2003 -Isonomía. Revista de Teoría y Filosofía Del Derecho 19:7-17.detailsLas historia de los distintos modos de concebir la tolerancia ha sido determinada en gran parte por la historia paralela de las intolerancias religiosas.
No categories
Mind, language and morality: essays in honor of Mark Platts.Mark de Bretton Platts,Gustavo Ortiz Millán,Cruz Parcero &Juan Antonio (eds.) -2018 - London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.detailsMark Platts is responsible for the first systematic presentation of truth-conditional semantics and for turning a generation of philosophers on to the Davidsonian program. He is also a pioneer in discussions of moral realism, and has made important contributions to bioethics, the philosophy of human rights and moral responsibility. This book is a tribute to Platts's pioneering work in these areas, featuring contributions from number of leading scholars of his work from the US, UK and Mexico. It features replies to (...) the individual essays from Platts, as well as a concluding chapter reflecting on his philosophical career from Oxford to Mexico City. Mind, Language and Morality will be of interest to philosophers across a wide range of areas, including ethics, moral psychology, philosophy of law, and philosophy of language. (shrink)
Export citation
Bookmark
Philosophical Scepticism about Moral Obligation.Mark Platts &Robert Black -1993 -Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 67 (1):175 - 212.detailsHow much of our ordinary moral thought can we make sense of using a model of practical reason in which value is seen as subjective? There are already problems with showing strength of will not to be irrational. If social obligations are conceived of instrumentally as in a tradition running from Hobbes through Hume to Mackie, and if we employ our strength of will to sacrifice our individual projects in favor of them, the problems become insuperable.
The languages of rights and of human rights.Mark Platts -2010 -Philosophy 85 (3):319-340.detailsIn an attempt to control the 'ballooning' of (discourse about) human rights James Griffin proposes a theory of them grounded in their presumed aim of protecting what he calls 'normative agency'. This paper criticizes the resulting theory's restriction of those thereby deemed to possess human rights only to functioning human agents, and does so in part through special attention to cases of human beings trapped in non-functioning bodies. The need for a less stringent account of the conditions necessary for possession (...) of human rights is suggested, and is defended against the claim that adoption of such an account would continue to favour debasement of the language of human rights. (shrink)
VIII*—Natural Kind Words and “Rigid Designators”.Mark Platts -1982 -Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 82 (1):103-114.detailsMark Platts; VIII*—Natural Kind Words and “Rigid Designators”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 82, Issue 1, 1 June 1982, Pages 103–114, https://.