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Thinking of problems of aesthetics has a long and strong tradition in Austrian Philosophy. It starts with Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848); it is famously represented by the critic and musicologist Eduard Hanslick (1825-1904); and it is continued within the school of Alexius Meinong (1853-1920), in particular by Christian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932) and Stephan Witasek (1870-1915). Nowadays the aesthetic writings of Bolzano, Ehrenfels, and Witasek are hardly known, particularly not in the Anglo-Saxon world. Austrian aesthetics is surely less known than Austrian contributions (...) to other philosophical disciplines, like ontology, epistemology or philosophy of science. One of the aims of this paper is to show that this is both regrettable and unjustified for the following reasons: Austrian aestheticians have dealt with a number of problems (mainly concerning the foundations of aesthetics) that are salient until today; in terms of subtlety and depth as well as exactness and originality, in general, they easily stand comparison with today's analytic aesthetics; and many of there views and arguments are still worthy of consideration. In this paper, the focus is on a number of hardly known Austrian contributions to aesthetics. These contributions concern the following, partly interrelated, central problems of philosophical aesthetics: i. The problem of the definition of beauty (What is beauty? What does it mean to say of an object that it is beautiful?) ii. The problem of the ontological status of works of art (What kinds of objects are works of art?) iii. The problem of the objectivity of aesthetic values (Do we claim objective validity for aesthetic value judgements, and if so, is this claim justified?) The answers of Bolzano, Meinong, Witasek and Ehrenfels to these questions will be considered. (shrink)

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In diesem Beitrag werden drei Thesen verteidigt: 1. Interpretationen literarischer Werke (im Sinne von Aussagen über die Bedeutung literarischer Werke) können richtig oder falsch sein. 2. Werke haben eine objektive Bedeutung, unabhängig von Interpretationen. 3. Die Bedeutung eines Werks wird wesentlich durch die kommunikativen Absichten der Autorin determiniert. Die Position, dass Werk- und Textbedeutungen durch tatsächliche Autorabsichten des echten Autors konstituiert werden – die Position des aktualen Intentionalismus – wird gegen eine Reihe von Einwänden und konkurrierenden Theorien verteidigt, nämlich gegen (...) den Konstruktivismus (»Werke und Texte haben keinerlei Bedeutung unabhängig von einer Interpretation«), den Konventionalismus (»Die Werk- und Textbedeutung ist ausschließlich durch linguistische Konventionen determiniert«), den Kontextualismus (»Die Werk- und Textbedeutung ist ausschließlich durch den Äußerungskontext determiniert«) und den hypothetischen Intentionalismus (»Die Bedeutung eines Werks bzw. Textes ist identisch mit dem, was ein intendiertes bzw. ideales Publikum für die Bedeutung des Werks bzw. Textes halten würde«). (shrink)

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In Francesco Berto’s words, the term “Serious Actualism” is used for the position “that any object must exist in every circumstance in which it has any property – the thesis that predication, or the having of properties as such, entails existence.” (“Modal Meinongianism and Fiction: The Best of Three Worlds”, Philosophical Studies 152, 2011, 324f.) Berto agrees with Nathan Salmon that Serious Actualism is “a confused and misguided prejudice” (Salmon, “Nonexistence”, Noûs 32, 1998, 290). The aim of this article is (...) to defend the doctrine of Serious Actualism against this verdict. (shrink)

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The topic of this paper is the relationship between value facts (e.g., that this is good) and value experiences (e.g., appreciation). Its aim is, first, to give a concise account of the value theories of some important early phenomenologists (Franz Brentano, Christian von Ehrenfels, Alexius Meinong), second, to show that they raise questions and put forward arguments that are still worthy of note, and, third, to critically assess these arguments. Among others, the following questions are discussed: Can past and other (...) nonexistent objects have value? Are value experiences feelings or rather desires? Are value properties exemplified by “immanent objects” only? (shrink)

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Eine ausgearbeitete Kunstontologie findet sich bei Ehrenfels nicht, wohl aber Bausteine zu einer solchen. Diese herauszuarbeiten ist das Anliegen des vorliegenden Beitrags. Dabei geht es um die Frage nach dem ontologischen Status von Kunstwerken, um mögliche kategoriale Einteilungen derselben, um Bestandteile und Identitätsbedingungen. Ehrenfels vertritt die Auffassung, dass nicht materielle Entitäten, sondern „Vorstellungskomplexe“ Träger ästhetischer Eigenschaften sind. Ich argumentiere, dass Ehrenfels die Auffassung zugeschrieben werden kann, dass Kunstwerke nicht mit materiellen Gegenständen, sondern mit Vorstellungskomplexen zu identifizieren sind. Im Weiteren wird (...) die Frage diskutiert, ob die Vorstellungskomplexe als mentale Entitäten im engeren Sinn aufzufassen sind (d. h. als Entitäten, die in jedem Moment ihrer Existenz von Bewusstseinsvorgängen ontologisch abhängig sind) oder ob sie von Bewusstseinsvorgängen unabhängige Existenz haben können. Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage wird ein wenig beachteter Text zur Gestalttheorie herangezogen, der eine überraschende Antwort nahe legt. Was die Frage nach den Bestandteilen betrifft, lässt sich aus Ehrenfels’ Schriften die Auffassung extrahieren, dass Kunstwerke aus Gestalten bestehen, die entweder durch sinnliche Qualitäten oder durch Psychisches fundiert sein können. Ich zeige zudem, dass Ehrenfels eine differenzierte Auffassung bezüglich der Identitätsbedingungen von Kunstwerken vertritt: In erster Linie sind die konstituierenden Gestalten identitätsrelevant, doch es können auch Kontexte und Funktionen eine Rolle spielen. (shrink)

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The aim of this paper is an ontological clarification of the concept of artefact. The following questions are addressed: 1. Do artefacts constitute an ontological category of objects in its own right, and if so, how could this category be characterized? 2. How do artefacts come into existence? 3. What kind of artefacts are there, and in which relations do they stand to each other? It is argued that artefacts are characterized essentially through their genesis and that they owe their (...) existence to mental acts of a particular kind, which I call “acts of creation”. It is maintained that there are not only concrete, material artefacts, but also abstract artefacts, that is, artefacts that cannot be perceived through the senses and are not located in space. Furthermore, it shall be claimed that in a sense those abstract artefacts are even primary to the concrete, material artefacts. (shrink)

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In "Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit" entwickelt Meinong seine Theorie der unvollständigen Gegenstände. Der Begriff der Unvollständigkeit wird eingeführt mittels expliziter Bezugnahme auf den Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten: Ein Gegenstand ist unvollständig genau dann, wenn für ihn der Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten nicht gilt. M. a. W.: x ist unvollständig, wenn nicht für jede Eigenschaft P gilt, daß x P hat oder daß x P nicht hat. Alle existierenden und bestehenden Gegenstände sind vollständig; Gegenstände wie das Dreieck in abstracto oder der (...) Gegenstand etwas Blaues sollen dagegen unvollständig sein. Meinong unterscheidet zwei Arten der Negation: Es ist nicht der Fall, daß x p hat. X hat nicht-P Meinong selbst stellt fest, daß in bezug auf die externe Negation der Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten uneingeschränkt gültig ist. Um zu verstehen, was es heißt, daß ein Gegenstand unvollständig ist, erscheint es daher unumgänglich, Klarheit darüber zu gewinnen, was eigentlich mit der internen Negation zum Ausdruck gebracht wird. Es wird eine Interpretation der internen Negation vorgeschlagen, und es soll gezeigt werden, daß es gemäß dieser Interpretation überhaupt keine Gegenstände gibt, die unvollständig im Sinne Meinongs sind. (shrink)

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In diesem Beitrag geht es um die Frage, ob wir aus fiktionalen literarischen Werken etwas lernen können. Können fiktionale literarische Werke uns Wissen vermitteln? Wenn ja, wie ist das möglich, und welche Art von Wissen vermitteln uns fiktionale Werke? Es wird argumentiert, dass fiktionale literarische Werke in der Tat Wissen vermitteln können, und zwar, unter anderem, propositionales Wissen über die “wirkliche Welt”.

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Meinongianism (named after Alexius Meinong) is, roughly, the view that there are not only existent but also nonexistent objects. In this Element, Meinong's so-called object theory as well as "neo-Meinongian" reconstructions are presented and discussed, especially with respect to logical issues, both from a historical and a systematic perspective.

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This paper is a commentary on David Woodruff Smith's "Intentionality and Picturing: Early Husserl vis-à-vis Early Wittgenstein" (S J Phil 40 (Supp), 2002). I address three questions: 1. What is a fact according to Wittgenstein? What is the relation between states of affairs on the one hand and facts on the other? Is a fact an existing state of affairs (as Smith suggests), or is it the existence of a state of affairs, as most of Wittgenstein's remarks on this matter (...) in the _Tractatus suggest? The difference becomes especially important when negative facts are under consideration. 2. How far goes the parallelism between Husserl's and Wittgenstein's models of the thought-language-world relation really? In particular: Is there anything in Wittgenstein that corresponds to Husserl's ideal senses? Do Wittgenstein's thoughts play that role? 3. Do ideal senses have an explanatory function? (shrink)

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Terence Horgan's "contextual semantics" is supposed to be a means to avoid unwanted ontological commitments, in particular commitments to non-physical objects, such as institutions, theories and symphonies. The core of contextual semantics is the claim that truth is correct assertibility, and that there are various standards of correct assertibility, the standards of "referential semantics" being only one among others. I am investigating the notions of correct assertibility,assertibility norms and indirect reference. I argue that closer inspection reveals that contextual semantics ultimately (...) amounts – contra Horgan's intentions – to a paraphrase strategy. I defend an ontological commitment to theories and symphonies. (shrink)

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Thema der Arbeit ist der ontologische Status von Werken sowie die Beziehung zwischen Werken einerseits und Aufführungen, Manuskripten, Partituren, Schallplatten, Gemälden, Gebäuden, Drucken etc. andererseits. Es wird angeknüpft an den phänomenologischen Ansatz von Roman Ingarden (aber auch an den von Alexius Meinung). Diese Ansätze werden unter Verwendung moderner logischer Hilfsmittel weiterentwickelt und, wo notwendig, revidiert. Im ersten Kapitel wird ausführlich begründet, warum Werke (und zwar Werke aller Gattungen) abstrakte, typenartige Gegenstände sein müssen, die in konkreten Einzeldingen (z. B. Aufführungen) realisiert (...) sein können, jedoch von diesen Realisierungen in ihrer Existenz nicht abhängig sind. Diese These ist im weiteren Verlauf der Arbeit eine nicht mehr hinterfragte Grundvoraussetzung. Im zweiten Kapitel werden die formalen Grundlagen einer Typenontologie des Werks entwickelt. Zwei Hauptfragen stehen dabei im Vordergrund: (a) Wie kann ein Werk (also ein abstrakter Gegenstand) sinnliche Eigenschaften (z. B. Klangeigenschaften, Farbeigenschaften) haben? (b) Was macht einen Gegenstand zu einer Realisierung eines Werks? Welche Bedingungen müssen erfüllt sein, damit etwas eine Realisierung eines gegebenen Werks ist? Neben dem Begriff des Werks beruht die in dieser Arbeit entwickelte Theorie auf drei weiteren Grundbegriffen: Realisierungen, Konkretisierungen und Aktualisierungen. Realisierungen sind jene Gegenstände, in denen Werke realisiert sind. Konkretisierungen sind abstrakte Gegenstände, die durch "Vervollständigung" aus Werken hervorgehen. Sie sind immer noch unvollständig bestimmt, aber vollständiger bestimmt als die Werke, deren Konkretisierungen sie sind. Beispiele für Konkretisierungen sind Inszenierungen im Theater oder musikalische Interpretationen. Aktualisierungen sind die intentionalen Korrelate von Rezeptionsvorgängen. Sie entstehen im Verlauf der Rezeption eines Werks und werden von den Rezipienten erzeugt. Ein und dasselbe Werk kann auf verschiedene Weisen aktualisiert werden (z. B.: ein Musikstück kann auf verschiedene Weisen "gehört" werden). In eigenen Kapiteln werden Probleme der Mereologie, der Identität, des Darstellens und der Beziehung zwischen dem darstellenden Werk und dem Dargestellten erörtert. (shrink)

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The general topic of this paper is the ontological commitment to so-called "fictitious objects", that is, things and characters of fictional stories, like Sherlock Holmes and Pegasus. Discourse about fiction seems to entail an ontological commitment to fictitious entities, a commitment that is often deemed inconsistent with empirical facts. For instance, "Pegasus is a flying horse" seems to entail "There are flying horses" as well as "Pegasus exists" (according to some widely accepted logical principles). I discuss two solutions that have (...) been proposed in the literature. The first one amounts to rejecting sentences like "Pegasus is a flying horse" as false, at least if they are taken at face value. This solution is called the "story operator strategy". It consists in paraphrasing sentences like "Pegasus is a flying horse" by means of the expression "according to a story" such that they are interpreted as an elliptic formulation of, e.g., "According to a story, Pegasus is a flying horse". I spell out the difficulties of the story operator strategy and opt for a realist ontology of fiction. A novel interpretation of the story operator "according to a story" is given, which is not only consistent with but even sheds new light on such a realist ontology. In particular, it is shown how the story operator can be used as a tool to introduce the so-called "modes of predication distinction" (which is an essential ingredient of many realist ontologies of fiction) in a commonsensical way. (shrink)

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States of affairs raise, among others, the following questions: What kind of entity are they (if there are any)? Are they contingent, causally efficacious, spatio-temporal and perceivable entities, or are they abstract objects? What are their constituents and their identity conditions? What are the functions that states of affairs are able to fulfil in a viable theory, and which problems and prima facie counterintuitive consequences arise out of an ontological commitment to them? Are there merely possible (non-actual, non-obtaining) states of (...) affairs? Are there molecular (i.e., negative, conjunctive, disjunctive etc.) states of affairs? Are there modal and tensed states of affairs? (shrink)

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Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents Themenschwerpunkt/Special Topic: Bolzano & Kant Gastherausgeber/Guest Editor: Sandra Lapointe Sandra Lapointe: Introduction Sandra Lapointe: Is Logic Formal? Bolzano, Kant and the Kantian Logicians Nicholas F. Stang: A Kantian Reply to Bolzano¿s Critique of Kant¿s Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Clinton Tolley: Bolzano and Kant on the Place of Subjectivity in a Wissenschaftslehre Timothy Rosenkoetter: Kant and Bolzano on the Singularity of Intuitions Waldemar Rohloff: From Ordinary Language to Definition in Kant and Bolzano Weitere Artikel/Further Articles Christian Damböck: Wilhelm Diltheys empirische (...) Philosophie und der rezente Methodenstreit in der analytischen Philosophie Bernd Prien: Socially Constituted Actions and Objects Daniel Enrique Kalpokas: Two Dogmas of Coherentism Jon Cogburn & Jeff W. Roland: Strong, therefore Sensitive. Misgivings about DeRose¿s Contextualism Andre Abath: Brewer¿s Switching Argument Essay-Wettbewerb/Essay Competition Amadeus Magrabi: The Value of Feelings for Decision-Making Stefan Reining: Do Pain-Accompanying Emotions Mislead Us?¿Considerations in the Light of Reactive Dissociation Phenomena Peter Königs: Patriotism. A Case Study in the Philosophy of Emotions Besprechungsaufsatz/Review Essay Christopher Gauker: What Do Your Senses Say? On Burge¿s Theory of Perception Diskussion/Discussion Georg Brun: Adequate Formalization and De Morgan¿s Argument Buchnotizen/Critical Notes. (shrink)

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Are there nonexistent objects, i.e., objects that do not exist? Some examples often cited are: Zeus, Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes, Vulcan (the hypothetical planet postulated by the 19th century astronomer Le Verrier), the perpetual motion machine, the golden mountain, the fountain of youth, the round square, etc. Some important philosophers have thought that the very concept of a nonexistent object is contradictory (Hume) or logically ill-formed (Kant, Frege), while others (Leibniz, Meinong, the Russell of Principles of Mathematics) have embraced it wholeheartedly. (...) This entry is an examination of the many questions which arise in connection with the view that there are nonexistent objects. The following are particularly salient: What reasons are there (if any) for thinking that there are nonexistent objects? If there are nonexistent objects, then what kind of objects are they? How can they be characterized? Is it possible to provide a consistent theory of nonexistent objects? What is the explanatory force of a consistent theory of nonexistent objects (if such a thing is possible)? (shrink)

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In this book, a general type ontology of works is defended and developed in detail. A wide concept of “work” is used here, such that “work” roughly corresponds to “artefact”. Though the focus is on works of art, the theory is meant to be applicable, in principle, to works of science and technology and to everyday items of all sorts as well. Among others, the following questions are discussed: To what ontological category or categories do works belong? Is there a (...) principled ontological divide between linguistic and musical works, on the one hand, and works of the visual arts on the other? What is the relationship between works and such diverse things as performances, manuscripts, scores, blueprints, stagings, film screenings, printing plates, data carriers, and others? What is the relationship between works and interpretations? In what way do works come into existence? Can works, once they are finished, be changed and/or cease to exist, and if so, under what conditions? Which sorts of parts can be distinguished within a work? Is the context of origin constitutive of a work’s identity? Can a translation be identical with the original linguistic work? Who is the author of a computer-generated work? The central thesis is that works of all kinds are abstract artefacts, i. e., types that are instantiated in concrete particulars, that is, in material or mental objects and events. The relationship between works and their “realizations” is defined by means of a modes of predication distinction, as it is used in a variety of Meinongian logics. An extensive chapter is dedicated to the relation between “representing works” and their represented worlds, with a focus on fictitious worlds and their objects. The latter are modeled as parts of fictional works. (shrink)

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Those who are – in the tradition of Meinong – willing to accept the claim that there are objects that do not exist usually argue that the ontological commitment to nonexistent objects allows to resolve a variety of problems of reference and intentionality, such as: the problem of singular negative existential statements, the problem of discourse on past and future objects, the problem of discourse on fictitious objects, the problem of counterfactual existentials, the problem of allegedly necessary truths on nonexistent (...) objects (e. g., "The round square is round".) It seems that the ontological commitment to nonexistent objects enables us to explain both the obvious truth of many predicative sentences whose subject terms do not denote anything existent and the possibility of intentional acts whose objects do not exist. The aim of this paper is to show that the commitment to nonexistents does not resolve any of these problems. Furthermore, some alternative solutions are delineated. (shrink)

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States of affairs raise, among others, the following questions: What kind of entity are they (if there are any)? Are they contingent, causally efficacious, spatio-temporal and perceivable entities, or are they abstract objects? What are their constituents and their identity conditions? What are the functions that states of affairs are able to fulfil in a viable theory, and which problems and prima facie counterintuitive consequences arise out of an ontological commitment to them? Are there merely possible (non-actual, non-obtaining) states of (...) affairs? Are there molecular (i.e., negative, conjunctive, disjunctive etc.) states of affairs? Are there modal and tensed states of affairs? In this volume, these and other questions are addressed by David M. Armstrong, Marian David, Herbert Hochberg, Uwe Meixner, L. Nathan Oaklander, Peter Simons, Erwin Tegtmeier and Mark Textor. (shrink)

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Meinongianism (named after Alexius Meinong) is, roughly, the view that there are not only existent but also nonexistent objects. In this book, Meinong’s so-called object theory as well as “neo-Meinongian” reconstructions are presented and discussed, especially with respect to logical issues, both from a historical and a systematic perspective. Among others, the following topics are addressed: basic principles and motivations for Meinongianism; the distinction between “there is” (usually expressed by the existential quantifier) and “exists” (usually expressed by an existence predicate (...) “E!”); interpretations and kinds of quantification; Meinongianism, the principle of excluded middle and the principle of non-contradiction; the nuclear-extranuclear distinction and modes of predication; varieties of neo-Meinongianism and Meinongian logics. (shrink)

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The aim of this book is to investigate the nature and ontological status of fictional characters on the one hand (i. e., entities like Sherlock Holmes, Hamlet, or Anna Karenina) and literary works on the other. The overall question is: What kinds of objects are fictional characters and literary works, and how are they related to our everyday world? Thomasson advocates a realist, non-reductionist theory of fictitious objects whose main principles are: Fictional characters exist – just as literary works exist. (...) Fictional characters as well as literary works are abstract objects (i. e., lack spatiotemporal location), are created (and thus contingent), are brought into existence through the intentional acts of an author, can go on existing without intentional acts of an author, and are existentially dependent objects in a variety of ways. Thomasson develops a subtle theory of ontological dependence. The review contains a detailed account of Thomasson's "artifactual theory" as well as detailed criticism of some pivotal points. While I am, in principle, sympathetic to the non-reductionist approach, I object against some of Thomasson's specific dependency claims. Furthermore, I defend so-called "Meinongian" theories of fiction against Thomasson's objections. Finally, I raise questions concerning, among other things, the relation between a literary work and its "text", the proposed identity conditions for literary works, the relation between a literary work and its (fictitious) objects. (shrink)

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The aim of this book is to investigate the nature and ontological status of fictional characters on the one hand (i. e., entities like Sherlock Holmes, Hamlet, or Anna Karenina) and literary works on the other. The overall question is: What kinds of objects are fictional characters and literary works, and how are they related to our everyday world? Thomasson advocates a realist, non-reductionist theory of fictitious objects whose main principles are: Fictional characters exist – just as literary works exist. (...) Fictional characters as well as literary works are abstract objects (i. e., lack spatiotemporal location), are created (and thus contingent), are brought into existence through the intentional acts of an author, can go on existing without intentional acts of an author, and are existentially dependent objects in a variety of ways. Thomasson develops a subtle theory of ontological dependence. The review contains a detailed account of Thomasson's "artifactual theory" as well as detailed criticism of some pivotal points. While I am, in principle, sympathetic to the non-reductionist approach, I object against some of Thomasson's specific dependency claims. Furthermore, I defend so-called "Meinongian" theories of fiction against Thomasson's objections. Finally, I raise questions concerning, among other things, the relation between a literary work and its "text", the proposed identity conditions for literary works, the relation between a literary work and its (fictitious) objects. (shrink)

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Human nature has always been a foundational issue for philosophy. What does it mean to have a human nature? Is the concept the relic of a bygone age? What is the use of such a concept? What are the epistemic and ontological commitments people make when they use the concept? In What’s Left of Human Nature?Maria Kronfeldner offers a philosophical account of human nature that defends the concept against contemporary criticism. In particular, she takes on challenges related to (...) social misuse of the concept that dehumanizes those regarded as lacking human nature (the dehumanization challenge); the conflict between Darwinian thinking and essentialist concepts of human nature (the Darwinian challenge); and the consensus that evolution, heredity, and ontogenetic development results from nurture and nature. After answering each of these challenges, Kronfeldner presents a revisionist account of human nature that minimizes dehumanization and does not fall back on outdated biological ideas. Her account is post-essentialist because it eliminates the concept of an essence of being human; pluralist in that it argues that there are different things in the world that correspond to three different post-essentialist concepts of human nature; and interactive because it understands nature and nurture as interacting at the developmental, epigenetic, and evolutionary levels. On the basis of this, she introduces a dialectical concept of an ever-changing and “looping” human nature. Finally, noting the essentially contested character of the concept and the ambiguity and redundancy of the terminology, she wonders if we should simply eliminate the term “human nature” altogether. (shrink)

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Les études sur l’Obéissance à l’Autorité (OtA) de Milgram ont depuis longtemps été comprises comme démontrant que les gens ont une tendance à suivre aveuglément les ordres de l’autorité. Plus récemment, nous avons proposé un modèle d’obéissance basé sur le suivisme engagé (engaged followership), qui suggère que la décision d’une personne d’accepter les requêtes d’une figure d’autorité est basée sur son identification avec cette personne et/ou la cause qu’elle représente. Dans cet article, nous présentons nos raisons de soutenir cette perspective (...) et faisons le point sur les éléments empiriques dont nous disposons actuellement pour la soutenir. Nous indiquons également quelles questions restent posées, et posons ainsi les bases d’un programme pour des recherches futures. (shrink)

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Over the last four decades arguments for and against the claim that creative hypothesis formation is based on Darwinian ‘blind’ variation have been put forward. This paper offers a new and systematic route through this long-lasting debate. It distinguishes between undirected, random, and unjustified variation, to prevent widespread confusions regarding the meaning of undirected variation. These misunderstandings concern Lamarckism, equiprobability, developmental constraints, and creative hypothesis formation. The paper then introduces and develops the standard critique that creative hypothesis formation is guided (...) rather than blind, integrating developments from contemporary research on creativity. On that basis, I discuss three compatibility arguments that have been used to answer the critique. These arguments do not deny guided variation but insist that an important analogy exists nonetheless. These compatibility arguments all fail, even though they do so for different reasons: trivialisation, conceptual confusion, and lack of evidence respectively. Revisiting the debate in this manner not only allows us to see where exactly a ‘Darwinian’ account of creative hypothesis formation goes wrong, but also to see that the debate is not about factual issues, but about the interpretation of these factual issues in Darwinian terms. (shrink)

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The article addresses the question whether culture evolves in a Lamarckian manner. I highlight three central aspects of a Lamarckian concept of evolution: the inheritance of acquired characteristics, the transformational pattern of evolution, and the concept of directed changes. A clear exposition of these aspects shows that a system can be a Darwinian variational system instead of a Lamarckian transformational one, even if it is based on inheritance of acquired characteristics and/or on Lamarckian directed changes. On this basis, I apply (...) the three aspects to culture. Taking for granted that culture is a variational system, based on selection processes, I discuss in detail the senses in which cultural inheritance can be said to be Lamarckian and in which sense problem solving, a major factor in cultural change, leads to directed variation. (shrink)

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We give an elementary theory of Henselian local rings and construct the Henselisation of a local ring. All our theorems have an algorithmic content.

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The concept of “critical science literacy” advanced by Susanna Priest is significant to how citizens approach scientific knowledge, but the concept is also relevant to undergraduate students majoring in the sciences, who are not necessarily becoming “critically literate” in their own disciplines. That is, future scientists are not learning how arguments are structured, meaning is made, and facts are agreed upon—specifically through communicative practices—both within and outside of the scientific community. This gap in the curriculum can be addressed through collaborative (...) efforts between rhetoricians and sociologists of science. Drawing from three major disciplinary traditions—writing studies, the rhetoric of science, and science communication—this article posits that a pedagogical intervention is necessary to improve science communication with nonexpert publics. A science writing and communication course that is grounded in the rhetoric of science and that also has sociological, philosophical, and historical components can provide science students with a critical awareness of how their discipline operates in society and teach them how to become more responsible and effective communicators. (shrink)

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Charles Darwin und seine Erben wendeten die Theorie der Evolution biologischer Arten auch auf Kultur an. Kultur evolviere wie die Natur auf Darwinistische Weise. Die sog. Memtheorie, vertreten von verschiedenen Autoren auf der Basis des Darwinistischen Genselektionismus, ist eine Spielart einer solchen analogen Anwendung. Dieser Artikel kritisiert drei zentrale Aussagen der Memtheorie: (i) dass es Einheiten der Kultur – Meme – gibt, die analog zu Genen zu verstehen sind, (ii) dass Meme, in Analogie zu Genen, Replikatoren sind, und (iii) dass (...) Meme als Einheiten der kulturellen Selektion auf die gleiche Art wie Gene 'egoistisch' sein können. Nach einer Einführung in die Memtheorie in Teil 1, werden diese drei Thesen in Teil 2 als entweder falsch oder trivial entlarvt. Dieser kritische Teil soll vor allem zeigen, dass die Memtheorie keine 'gefährliche Idee' ist, die das bisher in den Geistes- Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaften tradierte Verständnis von Geist und Kultur herausfordern kann. Im Gegenteil, im besten Fall re-formuliert die Memtheorie lediglich Bekanntes in evolutionärer Sprache und ist in diesem Sinne trivial. In Teil 3 wird die Perspektive gewechselt: Nicht mehr der Gehalt, sondern die Funktion der Memtheorie, v.a. im Kontext interdisziplinärer Verständigung, soll betrachtet werden. Denn trotz der Kritik der drei Kernthesen kann die Memtheorie eine kommunikative und somit produktive Rolle zwischen den 'zwei Kulturen' der Wissenschaften spielen. (shrink)

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