Movatterモバイル変換

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 99, Issue 3, Page 714-719, November 2019.

No categories

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   44 citations  

Ceteris-paribus clauses are nothing to worry about; aceteris-paribus qualifier is not poisonously indeterminate in meaning. Ceteris-paribus laws teach us that a law need not be associated straightforwardly with a regularity in the manner demanded by regularity analyses of law and analyses of laws as relations among universals. This lesson enables us to understand the sense in which the laws of nature would have been no different under various counterfactual suppositions — a feature even of those laws that involve no ceteris-paribus (...) qualification and are actually associated with exceptionless regularities. Ceteris-paribus generalizations of an‘inexact science’ qualify as laws of that science in virtue of their distinctive relation to counterfactuals: they form a set that is stable for the purposes of that field. (Though an accident may possess tremendous resilience under counterfactual suppositions, the laws are sharply distinguished from the accidents in that the laws are collectively as resilient as they could logically possibly be.) The stability of an inexact science's laws may involve their remaining reliable even under certain counterfactual suppositions violating fundamental laws of physics. The ceteris-paribus laws of an inexact science may thus possess a kind of necessity lacking in the fundamental laws of physics. A nomological explanation supplied by an inexact science would then be irreducible to an explanation of the same phenomenon at the level of fundamental physics. Island biogeography is used to illustrate how a special science could be autonomous in this manner. (shrink)

Direct download(7 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   78 citations  

Hempel and Giere contend that the existence of provisos poses grave difficulties for any regularity account of physical law. However, Hempel and Giere rely upon a mistaken conception of the way in which statements acquire their content. By correcting this mistake, I remove the problem Hempel and Giere identify but reveal a different problem that provisos pose for a regularity account — indeed, for any account of physical law according to which the state of affairs described by a law-statement presupposes (...) a Humean regularity. These considerations suggest a normative analysis of law-statements. On this view, law-statements are not distinguished from accidental generalizations by the kind of Humean regularities they describe because a law-statement need not describe any Humean regularity. Rather, a law-statement says that in certain contexts, one ought to regard the assertion of a given type of claim, if made with justification, as a proper way to justify a claim of a certain other kind. (shrink)

Direct download(6 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   86 citations  

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   19 citations  

It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by science. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems not from an elusive feature of the mind, but from the special nature of the concepts used to describe conscious states.Marc Champagne draws on the neglected branch of philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop a new take on this strategy. The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period (...) – its etymology is ancient Greek, and its theoretical underpinnings are medieval. Charles Sanders Peirce made major advances in semiotics, so he can act as a pipeline for these forgotten ideas. Most philosophers know Peirce as the founder of American pragmatism, but few know that he also coined the term “qualia,” which is meant to capture the intrinsic feel of an experience. Since pragmatic verification and qualia are now seen as conflicting commitments, Champagne endeavors to understand how Peirce could (or thought he could) have it both ways. The key, he suggests, is to understand how humans can insert distinctions between features that are always bound. Recent attempts to take qualities seriously have resulted in versions of panpsychism, but Champagne outlines a more plausible way to achieve this. So, while semiotics has until now been the least known branch of philosophy ending in –ics, his book shows how a better understanding of that branch can move one of the liveliest debates in philosophy forward. (shrink)

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   12 citations  

Philosophers who regard some mathematical proofs as explaining why theorems hold, and others as merely proving that they do hold, disagree sharply about the explanatory value of proofs by mathematical induction. I offer an argument that aims to resolve this conflict of intuitions without making any controversial presuppositions about what mathematical explanations would be.

Direct download(8 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   33 citations  

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   28 citations  

Many philosophers have believed that the laws of nature differ from the accidental truths in their invariance under counterfactual perturbations. Roughly speaking, the laws would still have held had q been the case, for any q that is consistent with the laws. (Trivially, no accident would still have held under every such counterfactual supposition.) The main problem with this slogan (even if it is true) is that it uses the laws themselves to delimit qs range. I present a means of (...) distinguishing the laws (and their logical consequences) from the accidents, in terms of their range of invariance under counterfactual antecedents, that does not appeal to physical modalities (or any cognate notion) in delimiting the relevant range of counterfactual perturbations. I then argue that this approach explicates the sense in which the laws possess a kind of necessity. (shrink)

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   33 citations  

Scientific essentialism aims to account for the natural laws' special capacity to support counterfactuals. I argue that scientific essentialism can do so only by resorting to devices that are just as ad hoc as those that essentialists accuse Humean regularity theories of employing. I conclude by offering an account of the laws' distinctive relation to counterfactuals that portrays laws as contingent but nevertheless distinct from accidents by virtue of possessing a genuine variety of necessity.

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   26 citations  

A driving force behind the evolution of the stakeholder concept is the potential of negative outcomes for an organization as the result of conflict between that organization and its stakeholders. Where conflict does arise between an organization and stakeholder how might it be resolved in a manner compatible with stakeholder theory? Applying feminist ethical theory as a theoretical basis for stakeholder theory, mediation provides an appropriate process for resolving such disputes in comparison to traditional adversarial strategies. This paper discusses the (...) attributes of mediation, and its potential benefits as a method to resolve disputes between businesses and their stakeholders. (shrink)

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   24 citations  

Contemporary financial markets have recently witnessed a sea change with the ‘algorithmic revolution’, as trading automats are used to ease the execution sequences and reduce market impact. Being constantly monitored, they take an active part in the shaping of markets, and sometimes generate crises when ‘they mess up’ or when they entail situations where traders cannot go backwards. Algorithms are software codes coding practices in an IT significant ‘textual’ device, designed to replicate trading patterns. To be accepted, however, they need (...) to comply with regulatory texts, which are nothing else but codes of conduct coding accepted practices in the markets. In this article, I draw on ethnographic fieldwork in order to open these black boxes, while trying to describe their existence as devices encapsulating several points of views. I address the question of a possible misalignment between those visions, and more specifically try to draw the consequences raised by such discrepancies as regards the future of financial regulation. (shrink)

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   8 citations  

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   10 citations  

La 4e de couverture indique : "Quelle place accorder aujourd'hui aux religions dans les démocraties? Que peut-on espérer du dialogue entre croyants et non-croyants dans une société devenue plurielle et sécularisée? Quel rôle peut jouer la religion dans la modernité du XXIe siècle? Le philosophe français Jean-Marc Ferry prend à bras-le-corps ces questions difficiles, laissées en déshérence ou livrées aux excès de tous bords. Refusant les pièges d'un laïcisme souvent ignorant, tout comme les hégémonies religieuses, il reprend le fil (...) d'une longue tradition philosophique qui a toujours pris au sérieux la question religieuse, même quand elle s'y opposait. Dans ce livre qui fera date, le philosophe rassemble pour la première fois sous la forme d'une conversation l'ensemble de sa réflexion sur la religion dans la modernité. Au cours de sa réflexion, Jean-Marc Ferry invite à considérer les "Lumières de la religion", une expression malicieuse par laquelle il entend signifier que les religions ne sont pas en opposition avec la modernité. A la condition de devenir réflexives et critiques, et d'accepter les règles du jeu démocratique, elles peuvent apporter une précieuse participation à la vie commune, au bénéfice de tous.". (shrink)

No categories

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

English summary: Neoplatonism leads to the difficulty of explaining what is nature beyond being or essence. But what does being beyond the being mean? And if the One is above being, what can he be, if not nothing? The erudite discussions explored by Jean-Marc Narbonne lead readers along paths of ontology and henology, through our speculative tradition, from Aristotle, Plato, and Plotinus to Heidedegger. French description: Quiconque s'est expose a la pensee neoplatonicienne, ete confronte a la difficulte d'expliquer en (...) quoi consiste la nature au-dela de l'etre ou de l'essence - selon la formule platonicienne -, du Premier principe des Neoplatoniciens. Que peut bien signifier etre au-dela de l'etre? Est-ce que n'est pas dit etre tout ce qui existe, et si l'Un est au-dela de l'etre, que peut-il justement etre, si ce n'est le rien, le neant? Et s'il n'est pas pur neant, c'est donc que, d'une certaine maniere, il est. Des lors, pourquoi ne pas l'admettre plutot que d'emprunter ce curieux et apparemment inutile detour par l'Un, par l' henologie? Ces interrogations sont centrales, puisque d'elles depend l'intelligence de ce qui constitue l'essentiel de notre tradition speculative, les courants ontologique et henologique, respectivement rattaches aux noms d'Aristote et de Platon/Plotin, formant l'armature meme de notre heritage conceptuel. Et l'oubli meme de l'etre decrie par Heidegger, dans tout cela? Peut-il avoir le meme sens dans une philosophie de l'etre et dans une philosophie qui, expressement, methodiquement, choisit de se situer dans une perspective autre que celle de l'etre, etre que par la justement, elle n'oublie pas, mais qu'intentionnellement elle delaisse et maintient a distance? Jean-Marc Narbonne est professeur de Philosophie ancienne a l'Universite Laval (Quebec) et s'interesse a la tradition platonicienne et a son influence dans l'histoire occidentale et dans la pensee contemporaine. Il est l'auteur de Plotin. Les deux matieres (1993), La Metaphysique de Plotin (1994) et Plotin. Traite 25 (1998). (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

Direct download(6 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   14 citations  

After reviewing several failed arguments that laws cannot change, I use the laws' special relation to counterfactuals to show how temporary laws would have to differ from eternal but time-dependent laws. Then I argue that temporary laws are impossible and that neither Lewis's nor Armstrong's analyses of law nicely accounts for the laws' immutability. *Received September 2006; revised September 2007. ‡Many thanks to John Roberts and John Carroll for valuable comments on earlier drafts, as well as to several anonymous referees (...) for their good suggestions. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, CB #3125, Caldwell Hall, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3125;. (shrink)

Direct download(7 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   15 citations  

In a notable article entitled “What is the Theory of Relativity?” written at the request of The Times and published in its November 28, 1919 edition, Albert Einstein famously distinguished “theories of principle” from “constructive theories.” Einstein placed relativity theory among the principle theories. His distinction has recently received increased attention, especially as it relates to scientific explanation. In particular, there has been considerable discussion of how to explain why there obtain the Lorentz transformations as well as of how to (...) account for the Lorentz covariance of the dynamical laws. Some .. (shrink)

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   10 citations  

Roche and Sober have offered a new argument for the view that a hypothesis H is not confirmed by its capacity to explain some observation O. Their argument purports to work by showing that O screens H off from the fact that H would explain O. This paper offers several objections to this argument. Firstly, the screening-off test cannot identify whatever evidential contribution Hs explanatoriness may make. Secondly, that H would explain O may be logically necessary, eluding the screening-off test. (...) Thirdly, the test cannot detect an important difference that Hs explanatoriness often makes to Hs confirmation. (shrink)

No categories

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   7 citations  

. A typical textbook explanation of a rocket’s motion when its engine is fired appeals to momentum conservation: the rocket accelerates forward because its exhaust accelerates rearward and the system’s momentum must be conserved. This paper examines how this explanation works, considering three challenges it faces. First, the explanation does not proceed by describing the forces causing the rocket’s motion. Second, the rocket’s motion has a causal-mechanical explanation involving those forces. Third, if momentum conservation and the rearward motion of the (...) rocket’s exhaust explain why the rocket accelerates forward, then presumably momentum conservation and the rocket’s forward motion likewise explain why the rocket emits exhaust rearward. Explanatory circularity threatens to follow from this pair of explanations. This paper examines how the conservation-law explanation works and how it is compatible with the causal-mechanical explanation. The paper argues that these two explanations do not explain precisely the same fact relative to the same contrast class. The paper interprets the two conservation-law explanations as non-causal and argues that they yield no explanatory circularity. (shrink)

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   5 citations  

In recent years, a number of cultural theorists have made important contributions to the study of the body’s surface. Despite their importance, however, none of these contributions provides us with a systematic framework for understanding why the body’s surface — its skin — matters to the extent that it does. In this article, I seek to provide such a framework and, in doing so, to shed light on why the skin and the self seem to share a special and sometimes (...) strained relationship. To this end, I will present a critical introduction to the work of two contemporary Anglo-American psychoanalysts: Esther Bick and Thomas Ogden. Throughout this introduction, I will show how both Bick and Ogden — despite the fact that they are almost completely unknown outside clinical circles — offer up a host of conceptual tools that could prove useful to cultural theorists interested in making sense of the relationship between the skin and the self. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   13 citations  

No categories

Export citation   Bookmark  

Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

Export citation   Bookmark   4 citations  

Myrvold (2003) has proposed an attractive Bayesian account of why theories that unify phenomena tend to derive greater epistemic support from those phenomena than do theories that fail to unify them. It is argued, however, that "unification" in Myrvold's sense is both too easy and too difficult for theories to achieve. Myrvold's account fails to capture what it is that makes unification sometimes count in a theory's favor.

Direct download(8 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   13 citations  

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   12 citations  

I offer an argument regarding chances that appears to yield a dilemma: either the chances at time t must be determined by the natural laws and the history through t of instantiations of categorical properties, or the function ch(•) assigning chances need not satisfy the axioms of probability. The dilemma's first horn might seem like a remnant of determinism. On the other hand, this horn might be inspired by our best scientific theories. In addition, it is entailed by the familiar (...) view that facts about chances at t are ontologically reducible to facts about the laws and the categorical history through t. However, that laws are ontologically prior to chances stands in some tension with the view that chances are governed by laws just as categorical-property instantiations are. The dilemma's second horn entails that if chances are in fact probabilities, then this is a matter of natural law rather than logical or conceptual necessity. I conclude with a suggestion for going between the horns of the dilemma. This suggestion involves a generalization of the notion that chances evolve by conditionalization. Introduction "Chances evolve by conditionalization" How might the lawful magnitude principle be defended? A historical interlude What if chances failed to be determined by the laws and categorical facts? (shrink)

Direct download(10 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   8 citations  

Direct download(5 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   9 citations  

Scientific realism is the view that one can be justified in believing, of some theory about unobservable entities, that the entities it posits are real and accurately described by the theory, in the same sense as one can be justified in believing that the theory’s empirical predictions are accurate, and that so to believe is what it means for a scientist to “accept” that theory, because the goal of science is to describe reality, even its unobservable features. The first part (...) is an epistemic claim, whereas the second concerns the rational reconstruction of scientific practice. Together they suggest that evidence justifying scientific acceptance of a theory justifies belief that the unobservable entities it posits are real and as the theory purports them to be. Anti-realism denies ; it holds that claims about unobservables are either unjustified or justified in a different sense from predictions of observations. It also denies ; it maintains that in her scientific work, as rationally reconstructed, a scientist who accepts a claim about unobservables believes that it yields accurate predictions of observables, not that it describes unobservables. (shrink)

Direct download(6 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   7 citations  

Introduction L’analyse des temporalités de l’action constitue une entrée pertinente pour aborder les rapports sociaux de domination. À sa manière, la revue Temporalités a perpétué cette tradition des sciences sociales qui observent les inégalités et les différenciations sociales, analysent leurs logiques, en insistant sur les relations étroites entre temporalités et pouvoir. Mais les articles de Temporalités, à l’exception d’un dossier sur les temps sexués de l’activité (Bess..

No categories

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   5 citations  

Suppose that unobtanium-346 is a rare radioactive isotope. Consider: (1) Every Un346 atom, at its creation, decays within 7 microseconds (µs). (50%) Every Un346 atom, at its creation, has a 50% chance of decaying within 7µs. (1) and (50%) can be true together, but (1) and (50%) cannot together be laws of nature. Indeed, (50%)'s mere (non-vacuous) truth logically precludes (1)'s lawhood. A satisfactory analysis of chance and lawhood should nicely account for this relation. I shall argue first that David (...) Lewis's Humean picture accounts for this relation only by inserting this relation ‘by hand’. Next, I shall argue that this relation between law and chance also threatens a radically non-Humean picture of laws and chances. Finally, I shall offer an account of natural law that nicely explains the relation between chancy facts and deterministic laws. This explanation is not ad hoc because it derives the relation from the very same features of lawhood that account for the laws' special relation to counterfactuals and explain how the laws (unlike the accidents) possess a variety of necessity. The reason that a chancy fact such as (50%) keeps (1) from being a law, without keeping (1) from being true, is ultimately that a chancy fact constrains the subjunctive facts and (1)'s lawhood, unlike (1)'s truth, depends upon the subjunctive facts. (shrink)

Direct download(8 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   7 citations  

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   7 citations  

Export citation   Bookmark  

Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   4 citations  

Glymour, Scheines, Spirtes, and Kelly argue for ‘Spearman's Principle’: one should (ceteris paribus) favour the theory whose ‘free parameters’ need assume no particular values for the theory to save the ‘constraints’ holding of the phenomena. I argue that the rationale they give for Spearman's Principle fails, but that (contra Cartwright) Spearman's Principle cannot be made to favour either of two theories depending on how they are expressed. I examine how one must motivate the demand for a scientific explanation of a (...) parameter's value and how one justifies believing that a constraint should be explained independent of any parameter's particular value. (shrink)

Direct download(10 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   6 citations  

Export citation   Bookmark  

Cette parole d'Emmanuel Levinas touche le coeur d'une actualité, celle de notre rapport occidental à la mort, qui résume le contexte dans lequel la mort nous fait problème, C'est ce contexte qui permet aussi d'éclairer la difficile question des "fins de vie" sous nos latitudes. S'engage la bataille idéologique : puis-je ou non disposer de mon existence? Des deux côtés, on invoque la dignité humaine, que ce soit pour réclamer le droit de "mourir dans la dignité" ou pour justifier l'interdiction (...) de toute forme d'euthanasie au nom du "caractère sacré" de la vie humaine. La "dignité humaine" devrait-elle justifier tout et son contraire? Il importe plutôt d'en élucider la notion et le fondement, en commençant par faire le clair sur les interprétations concurrentes et leurs implications pratiques. L'approche pluridisciplinaire de l'ouvrage favorisera une lecture critique au sein de laquelle différents points de vue s'inscrivent dans des moments distincts : Moment d'attestation, celui des praticiens aux prises avec la réalité des hôpitaux et des unités de soins palliatifs. Ils expérimentent au jour le jour le drame et la tragédie des passages de la phase curative à la phase palliative puis à la phase terminale ; Moment d'information, d'analyse exégétique et critique, touchant notamment à l'état du droit ; Moment de problématisation. De quoi et vers quoi? Tout logiquement, en direction des fondements philosophiques, c'est-à-dire de ce qui justifie que l'on prenne telle ou telle décision importante concernant les soins, l'arrêt des soins, la fin de vie, voire l'arrêt de la vie. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

No categories

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

No categories

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

Human vision raises a number of puzzles. Among them are the puzzles of visual experience: how to provide a scientific understanding of the phenomenal character of the visual experiences of the shapes, textures, colors, orientations and motion of perceived objects? How can a purely subjective visual experience be the basis of so much objective knowledge of the world? Visually guided actions raise a different puzzle: how can actions directed towards a target be so accurate in the absence of the agent’s (...) awareness of many of the target’s visual attributes? Ways of Seeing has three related goals, the first of which is to make the case for a broadly representational approach to the above set of puzzles. The second goal of WoS is to argue that the version of the ‘two-visual systems’ model of human vision best supported by the current empirical evidence has the resources to solve the puzzle of visually guided actions, which has been at the center of much recent work in the cognitive neuroscience of vision and action. The third goal of WoS is to draw attention to some of the tensions between acceptance of the two-visual systems model of human vision and some influential views about the nature and function of the content of visual experience espoused by philosophers in response to the puzzles raised by visual experience. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

Aucun des termes tels que sophia ou sagesse, gnose, ontologie, henologie, theologie, philosophie transcendantale, dialectique, deconstruction, qui tous ont un rapport certain avec la metaphysique, n'egale son prestige et son pouvoir d'evocation. Dans le sens large entrevu ici, est metaphysique toute enquete argumentee, demarche ou approche dont la destination expresse est l'etablissement ou la decouverte des premiers principes ou des premieres causes de l'etre, du connaitre ou de l'agir Le questionnement metaphysique presente donc une figure hautement typique de notre tradition, (...) moins assuree que la theologie dont elle dispute pourtant l'ampleur de vue, plus indeterminee que la science dont elle veut neanmoins partager l'ideal de rigueur et d'intelligibilite. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

In Bayes or Bust?, John Earman attempts to express in Bayesian terms a sense of "projectibility" in which it is logically impossible for "All emeralds are green" and "All emeralds are grue" simultaneously to be projectible. I argue that Earman overlooks an important sense in which these two hypotheses cannot both be projectible. This sense is important because it allows projectibility to be connected to lawlikeness, as Goodman intended. Whether this connection suggests a way to resolve Goodman's famous riddle remains (...) unsettled, awaiting an account of lawlikeness. I explore one line of thought that might prove illuminating. (shrink)

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   5 citations  

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   2 citations  

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   4 citations  

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark   2 citations  

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark