Movatterモバイル変換

This essay argues against the standard reading of Mencius that the emotions are perfectible or that they require perfecting in order to render a person virtuous. Rejecting this perfectibility reading allows us to explore two interesting philosophical points: (1) we can give an account of moral virtue and moral development that is significantly different from broadly Aristotelian accounts and that provides a psychologically realistic model of the Mencian sage; and (2) this account introduces a conception of emotional engagement as active (...) and under a person's control. (shrink)

Direct download(5 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   19 citations  

In an award-winning essay, Shu-Shan L ee discusses scholarly commentary about obedience to the emperor, focusing on public and hidden records of protest. The thesis of Lee’s essay is that the relationship between authority and subject in imperial Confucianism was built on a conditional obligation of obedience, despite traditional accounts of it as absolute. On his account, the obligation of obedience should be conceived through the rubric of imperial Confucianism as being conditional on fulfillment of reciprocal obligations. As part of (...) my response, I suggest that there is a third way to understand the obligation of obedience through the Confucian lens, which is less transactional than reciprocal obligation, while also providing a plausible alternative to absolute obligation as the correct understanding of imperial Confucian thinking about obedience to the emperor. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   5 citations  

Direct download(2 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   2 citations  

In this paper, I reveal systematic aspects of the moral epistemology of the Warring States Confucian, Mengzi. Mengzi thinks moral knowledge is 'internally' available to humans because it is acquired through normative dictates built into the human heart-mind. Those dictates are capable of motivating and justifying an agent's normative categorizations. Such dictates are linked to Mengzi's conception of human nature as good. I then interpret Mengzi's difficult discussion of courage and qi in Mengzi 2A: 2 as illuminating the idea of (...) 'internal' justification. The epistemology of courage is intimately related in 2A: 2 to its practice. Finally, I indicate at the end in outline the ways in which Mengzi and Gaozi are engaged in a dispute about moral epistemology that pits each of them against Xunzi and also against Zhuangzi. (shrink)

Direct download(3 more)   Export citation   Bookmark   2 citations  

Early Confucian thought is still not completely understood. This is particularly so, I argue, in the case of Mencius , who was the first prominent follower of Confucius. I present a new reading of this early figure. ;The key problem in traditional analyses is in attributing to Mencius the view that a person's motivational capacities, especially her emotions, require cultivation in order for her to act and feel correctly. That reading, combined with certain important passages of the text, make it (...) seem that Mencius is quite simply confused. For he seems in those passages to exhort people to do and feel what is right even though it is clear that they lack the kind of cultivation Mencius's view supposedly requires. What is more, he quite obviously expects such people to be able immediately to do and feel what is right. ;Once we leave the cultivation reading behind, I argue, pieces of Mencius's fall into place and a more or less systematic ethical theory begins to form. Far from being confused, I argue, Mencius combines a psychologically realistic account of the morally virtuous person, i.e. one which recognizes human limitations with respect to our emotional lives, with a plausible account of the control that we have and the responsibility that we bear for how we feel or don't feel toward one another. (shrink)

Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

No categories

Export citation   Bookmark   1 citation  

Direct download(4 more)   Export citation   Bookmark  

Export citation   Bookmark  

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark  

Direct download   Export citation   Bookmark