Social Selection, Agents' Intentions, and Functional Explanation.K. Brad Wray -2002 -Analyse & Kritik 24 (1):72-86.detailsJon Elster and Daniel Little have criticized social scientists for appealing to a mechanism of social selection in functional explanations of social practices. Both believe that there is no such mechanism operative in the social world. I develop and defend an account of functional explanation in which a mechanism of social selection figures centrally. In addition to developing an account of social selection, I clarify what functional hypotheses purport to claim, and re-examine the role of agents’ intentions in functional explanations (...) in an effort to show why a mechanism of social selection is indispensable to adequate functional explanations. (shrink)
Psychology and Politics: Lies, Damned Lies and Self-Deception.K. V. Wilkes -1994 -Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 37:115-.detailsCan deception be a model for self-deception? There are familiar problems with saying that it can be. At the heart of all these problems, in the long run and despite the complexities and sophistications of the various theories, is this one evident point: all deception of another requires at least two choosing and believing agents, and such a duality is not—is it?—a model which we can tolerate for understanding a single person. Yet on the other hand we seem to have (...) no other way of describing self-deception; most attempts to do so, even if they begin by criticising the ‘deception’ model, prove, in the long run, to come down to it. (shrink)