Results for 'Maddi Barley'
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- Effectiveness of a cognitive behavioural workbook for changing beliefs about antipsychotic polypharmacy: analysis from a cluster randomized controlled trial.Andrew Thompson,Sarah Sullivan,MaddiBarley,Laurence Moore,Paul Rogers,Attila Sipos &Glynn Harrison -2010 -Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 16 (3):520-528.
- Utilitarianism and Cooperation.BlakeBarley -1984 -Noûs 18 (1):152-159.No categories
- Constraints on the Origin of Coherence in Far-from-Equilibrium Chemical Systems.Joseph E.Barley Sr -2003 - In Timothy E. Eastman & Henry Keeton,Physics and Whitehead: Quantum, Process, and Experience. Albany, USA: State University of New York Press.No categories
- Two Anglo-Saxon Sign Systems Compared.Nigel F.Barley -1974 -Semiotica 12 (3).
- The Schopenhauer Cure.AndrewBarley -2005 -Philosophy Now 52:42-43.
- Disabled people and ethics of nursing research.Maddie Blackburn -1994 - In Dr Geoffrey Hunt & Geoffrey Hunt,Ethical Issues in Nursing. New York: Routledge. pp. 39--54.Export citation
Bookmark - Romanell Lecture.Penelope Maddy -unknownThere’s a tendency to suppose that a naturalist is automatically, by virtue of her naturalism, committed to some particular view of logic. These days, for example, the classical Quinean picture is sometimes taken to be the naturalistic standard: logic lies at the center of the web of belief; remote from sense experience, but widely confirmed by its role in all our successful theorizing; a posteriori like the rest, but also the most resistant to change, given the principle of minimum mutilation; (...) and thus apparently, or even practically, a priori. 1 But others, at other times, have held that other views of logic followed directly from naturalism, say psychologism, or simple inductivism, or some form of linguistic conventionalism. The trouble is that ‘naturalism’ means something different in each case, or that it comes encumbered with various inessential add-ons (like holism). (shrink)No categories
- Realism in mathematics.Penelope Maddy -1990 - New York: Oxford University Prress.Mathematicians tend to think of themselves as scientists investigating the features of real mathematical things, and the wildly successful application of mathematics in the physical sciences reinforces this picture of mathematics as an objective study. For philosophers, however, this realism about mathematics raises serious questions: What are mathematical things? Where are they? How do we know about them? Offering a scrupulously fair treatment of both mathematical and philosophical concerns, Penelope Maddy here delineates and defends a novel version of mathematical realism. (...) She answers the traditional questions and poses a challenging new one, refocusing philosophical attention on the pressing foundational issues of contemporary mathematics. (shrink)
- Naturalism in mathematics.Penelope Maddy -1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.Naturalism in Mathematics investigates how the most fundamental assumptions of mathematics can be justified. One prevalent philosophical approach to the problem--realism--is examined and rejected in favor of another approach--naturalism. Penelope Maddy defines this naturalism, explains the motivation for it, and shows how it can be successfully applied in set theory. Her clear, original treatment of this fundamental issue is informed by current work in both philosophy and mathematics, and will be accessible and enlightening to readers from both disciplines.
- Perspectives on Anglo-Saxon Names.Nigel F.Barley -1974 -Semiotica 11 (1):1-32.
- Structural Aspects of the Anglo-Saxon Riddle.Nigel F.Barley -1974 -Semiotica 10 (2).
- Wissenschaft und Lebenswahrheit: zwei Bereiche der Wirklichkeitserfahrung.DelbertBarley -1980 - Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics.Penelope Maddy -1984 -PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:427 - 448.Mathematical axioms have traditionally been thought of as obvious or self-evident truths, but current set theoretic work in the search for new axioms belies this conception. This raises epistemological questions about what other forms of justification are possible, and how they should be judged.
- Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method.Penelope Maddy -2007 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.Many philosophers claim to be naturalists, but there is no common understanding of what naturalism is. Maddy proposes an austere form of naturalism called 'Second Philosophy', using the persona of an idealized inquirer, and she puts this method into practice in illuminating reflections on logical truth, philosophy of mathematics, and metaphysics.
- Listening with generative models.Maddie Cusimano,Luke B. Hewitt &Josh H. McDermott -2024 -Cognition 253 (C):105874.
- Permaculture: Tools for Making Women’s Lives More Abundant.Maddy Harland -2017 -Feminist Theology 25 (3):240-247.Permaculture is primarily a thinking tool for designing low carbon, highly productive systems. It originated in Australia in the 1970s and was conceived by Bill Mollison and David Holmgren as a response to the devastating effects of a temperate European agriculture on the fragile soils of an ancient antipodean landscape. Like the dust bowls of the Great Plains in the USA in the 1930s, an alien agriculture has the capacity to turn a delicately balanced ecology into desert. Their initial response (...) was to design a permanent agriculture with tree crops and other perennials inhabiting all the niches from the canopy to the ground cover and below. The soil is left untilled to establish its own robust micro-ecology. Key to this is that the land must be biodiverse and stable for future generations. From perennial tree crops, permaculture has developed into an integrated system of design that encompasses everything from agriculture, horticulture, architecture, and ecology, as well as economy and legal systems for businesses and communities. (shrink)No categories
- Guy Sircello 1992.Penelope Maddy -1993 -Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (5):89 - 90.No categories
- Introductory Overview.Penelope Maddy -2018 -International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):193-197._ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 193 - 197 This piece gives an overview of my book, _What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy_.
- Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge Approaches from Philosophy, Psychology and Cognitive Science.Penelope Maddy (ed.) -2018 - London: Routldge.Export citation Bookmark
- Skepticism, Naturalism, and Therapy.Penelope Maddy -unknownOur goal in this course is to investigate radical skepticism about the external world, primarily to compare and contrast various naturalist and therapeutic reactions to it. We’ll largely side-step attempts to refute the skeptic and focus instead on naturalistic and therapeutic ways of reacting without refuting (though the boundary between these isn’t always sharp). The hope is that this exercise will help differentiate various strains of naturalism and clarify their interrelations with a range of therapeutic approaches.
- The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda.Bruce Maddy-Weitzman -2015 -The European Legacy 20 (4):418-419.No categories
- Student and faculty perceptions of, and experiences with, academic dishonesty at a medium-sized Canadian university.Jeff Meadows,RandallBarley,Stephanie Varsanyi,Christina M. Nord &Oluwagbohunmi Awosoga -2021 -International Journal for Educational Integrity 17 (1).There is a paucity of research into the prevalence of academic dishonesty within Canada compared to other countries. Recently, there has been a call for a better understanding of the particular characteristics of educational integrity in Canada so that Canada can more meaningfully contribute to current discussions surrounding academic integrity. Here, we present findings from student and faculty surveys conducted within a medium-sized Canadian university. These surveys probed perceptions towards, and experiences with, academic dishonesty, in which we aimed to understand (...) how students and faculty regarded academically dishonest practices during their postsecondary careers. We also aimed to understand how often students engaged in, and faculty had witnessed, academic dishonesty, whether or not witnessing incidents of academic dishonesty corresponded with gender, year of experience, highest level of educational attainment, discipline, or their personal perceptions towards the importance of academic honesty, and whether students had been adequately taught what constitutes academic dishonesty. We found that an overwhelming majority of students viewed academic honesty as important, and that most students reported not engaging in academic dishonesty themselves despite 45.8% reporting that they had witnessed others engage in academic dishonesty. We also found that students were more likely to witness cheating as their postsecondary experience increased, that witnessing varied across disciplines and educational attainment, and that witnessing varied with student perceptions. However, we found no such patterns in faculty responses, but found that faculty are split on whether or not they believe incidents of academic honesty are increasing. (shrink)No categories
- Recent Work in Philosophy of Mathematics: Review of P. Maddy, Naturalism in Mathematics; S. Shapiro, Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology; M. Resnik, Mathematics as a Science of Patterns.Jamie Tappenden,Penelope Maddy,Stewart Shapiro &Michael Resnik -2001 -Journal of Philosophy 98 (9):488.
- Abstract of Comments: Mathematical Epistemology: What is the Question?Penelope Maddy -1982 -Noûs 16 (1):106 - 107.
- Transcendentalism, and Therapy.Penelope Maddy -2011 - In Joel Smith & Peter Sullivan,Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 120.
- Physicalistic Platonism.Penelope Maddy -1990 - In A. D. Irvine,Physicalism in Mathematics. Dordrecht: Kluwer. pp. 259-290.
- Logic and the Discursive Intellect.Penelope Maddy -1999 -Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (1):94-115.The effort to fit simple logical truths–like `if it's either red or green and it's not red, then it must be green'–into Kant's account of knowledge turns up a position more subtle and intriguing than might be expected at first glance.
- How the Causal Theorist Follows a Rule.Penelope Maddy -1984 -Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):457-477.
- Monism and Beyond.Penelope Maddy -1990 - InRealism in mathematics. New York: Oxford University Prress.Outlines a physicalistic version of set theoretic realism, and compares and contrasts it with Field's nominalism, with structuralism, and with modalism. I conclude that, despite metaphysical differences, versions of all these views share the new challenge raised in Ch. 4: how are new axiom candidates to be rationally evaluated?No categories
- Picturing Algeria.Bruce Maddy-Weitzman -2015 -The European Legacy 20 (2):194-195.No categories
- Perception and Intuition.Penelope Maddy -1990 - InRealism in mathematics. New York: Oxford University Prress.Begins with a presentation and elaboration of Benacerraf's epistemic challenge to realism: how can we gain knowledge of an acausal world of non‐spatio‐temporal abstracts? I then outline a theory of perception based in part on neurological theories of Hebb and developmental evidence from Piaget, and I argue in these terms that we can, in fact, perceive sets of medium‐sized physical objects. This account of perception is elaborated into an account of physical and mathematical intuition, faculties that produce various rudimentary beliefs (...) that underlie the simplest physical and set theoretic assumptions. I conclude by comparing and contrasting this epistemology with some controversial passages from Gödel's writings. (shrink)No categories
- This body which is not mine: The notion of the habit body, prostitution and (dis)embodiment.Maddy Coy -2009 -Feminist Theory 10 (1):61-75.This paper explores women's accounts of prostitution in terms of the lived experience of the body, drawing on life story narratives and arts images created by women in the sex industry. These narratives show that women's experiences of prostitution constitute a spectrum of (dis)embodiment that is inflected, not determined, by settings and contexts. Theoretical approaches to embodiment were sought that acknowledged tensions between violation and a sense of empowerment. Therefore, the ontology of selling sex, and associated experiences such as violence, (...) drug use and self-harm are explored using feminist applications of Merleau-Ponty's notion of the `habit body'. A key focus is how the body is constituted by embodied experiences of abuse (e.g. the work of Parkins and of Weiss), and how women negotiate ownership of the body within commercial sex transactions. This highlights the process of repositioning the body by selling sex, in accordance with the accumulated experiences of the habit body. Thus, to borrow from Wendy Parkins, women perceive that they are acting meaningfully through the body, even when reproducing dynamics of objectification and dissociation. (shrink)No categories
- Defending the Axioms: On the Philosophical Foundations of Set Theory.Penelope Maddy -2011 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.Mathematics depends on proofs, and proofs must begin somewhere, from some fundamental assumptions. For nearly a century, the axioms of set theory have played this role, so the question of how these axioms are properly judged takes on a central importance. Approaching the question from a broadly naturalistic or second-philosophical point of view, Defending the Axioms isolates the appropriate methods for such evaluations and investigates the ontological and epistemological backdrop that makes them appropriate. In the end, a new account of (...) the objectivity of mathematics emerges, one refreshingly free of metaphysical commitments. (shrink)
- Indispensability and Practice.Penelope Maddy -1992 -Journal of Philosophy 89 (6):275.
- Mathematical Realism.Penelope Maddy -1988 -Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):275-285.
- Wittgenstein on mathematics.Penelope Maddy -2024 -Philosophical Investigations 47 (4):461-483.The mature Wittgenstein's groundbreaking analyses of sense and the logical must—and the powerful new method that made them possible—were the result of a multi‐year process of writing, re‐arranging, re‐writing and one large‐scale revision that eventually produced the Philosophical Investigations and RFM I. In contrast, his struggles during the same period with questions of arithmetic and higher mathematics remained largely in first‐draft form, and he drops the topic entirely after 1945. In this paper, I argue that Wittgenstein's new method can be (...) applied to the cases of arithmetic and set theory and that the result is innovative, recognizably Wittgensteinian, and independently appealing. I conclude by acknowledging the reasons Wittgenstein himself might have had to resist applying his own proven method to the case of mathematics—particularly to set theory—and by indicating why I think those reasons are ultimately unsound. (shrink)No categories
- Replies to Coliva, Leite, and Stroud.Penelope Maddy -2018 -International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):231-244._ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 231 - 244 Here I cast some doubt on Professor Coliva’s interpretive claim that Moore’s “Proof of an external world” is addressed to idealism, not skepticism, and explore the consequences for our understanding of the final paragraphs of the paper. In response to Professor Leite, I examine the disagreement between us on whether the global skeptical hypotheses can be refuted by ordinary evidence. Finally, after analyzing the logic of the skeptical argumentation, I attempt (...) an answer to Professor Stroud’s question about the staying power of the representative theory of perception. (shrink)
- Psychology and the A Priori Sciences.Penelope Maddy -2018 - InNaturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge Approaches from Philosophy, Psychology and Cognitive Science. London: Routldge. pp. 15-29.
- Juliette Kennedy.* Gödel, Tarski and the Lure of Natural Language: Logical Entanglement, Formalism Freeness.Penelope J. Maddy -2021 -Philosophia Mathematica 29 (3):428-438.Juliette Kennedy’s new book brims with intriguing ideas. I don’t understand all of them, and I’m not convinced that the ones I do understand all fit together, b.
- The Logical Must: Wittgenstein on Logic.Penelope Maddy -2014 - Oxford, England: Oup Usa.The Logical Must is an examination of Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic, early and late, from an austere naturalistic perspective called "Second Philosophy.".
- A Plea for Natural Philosophy: And Other Essays.Penelope Maddy -2022 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.A plea for natural philosophy --On the question of realism --Hume and Reid --Moore's hands --Wittgenstein on hinges --A note on truth and reference --The philosophy of logic --A Second Philosophy of logic --Psychology and the a priori sciences --Do numbers exist? --Enhanced if-thenism.
- Believing the axioms. I.Penelope Maddy -1988 -Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2):481-511.
- Axioms.Penelope Maddy -1990 - InRealism in mathematics. New York: Oxford University Prress.Pursues the theoretical level of the two‐tiered epistemology of set theoretic realism, the level at which more abstract axioms can be justified by their consequences at more intuitive levels. I outline the pre‐axiomatic development of set theory out of Cantor's researches, describe how axiomatization arose in the course of Zermelo's efforts to prove Cantor's Well‐ordering Theorem, and review the controversy over the Axiom of Choice. Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis and various questions of descriptive set theory were eventually shown to be independent (...) of the standard axioms, and new axiom candidates—Gödel's Axiom of Constructibility, on the one hand, determinacy and large cardinal axioms, on the other—offer dramatically different solutions. This situation presents a new epistemic challenge to the set theoretic realist: on what grounds can we adjudicate between new axiom candidates? (shrink)No categories
- Numbers.Penelope Maddy -1990 - InRealism in mathematics. New York: Oxford University Prress.Begins with a review of Benacerraf's metaphysical challenge to mathematical realism based on sets: how, for example, can number theory be the study of particular sets when other sets with the same structural relations would seem to do just as well? The set theoretic realist gives the straightforward response that numbers are not particular sets, but properties of sets. I close with a digression on the prospects for ‘Frege numbers’—i.e. numbers construed as proper classes.No categories
- Perception and mathematical intuition.Penelope Maddy -1980 -Philosophical Review 89 (2):163-196.
- What Do We Want a Foundation to Do?Penelope Maddy -2019 - In Stefania Centrone, Deborah Kant & Deniz Sarikaya,Reflections on the Foundations of Mathematics: Univalent Foundations, Set Theory and General Thoughts. Springer Verlag. pp. 293-311.It’s often said that set theory provides a foundation for classical mathematics because every classical mathematical object can be modeled as a set and every classical mathematical theorem can be proved from the axioms of set theory. This is obviously a remarkable mathematical fact, but it isn’t obvious what makes it ‘foundational’. This paper begins with a taxonomy of the jobs set theory does that might reasonably be regarded as foundational. It then moves on to category-theoretic and univalent foundations, exploring (...) to what extent they do these same jobs, and to what extent they might do other jobs also reasonably regarded as foundational. (shrink)
- Believing the axioms. II.Penelope Maddy -1988 -Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (3):736-764.
- Sized Out: Women, Clothing Size, and Inequality.Maddie Evans,Kjerstin Gruys &Katelynn Bishop -2018 -Gender and Society 32 (2):180-203.Feminist scholars have long critiqued the fashion industry’s ultra-thin beauty standards as harmful to women. Combining data from three qualitative studies of women’s clothing retailers—of bras, plus-size clothing, and bridal wear—we shift the analytical focus away from glamorized media images toward the seemingly mundane realm of clothing size standards, examining how women encounter, understand, and navigate these standards in their daily lives. We conceptualize clothing size standards as “floating signifiers,” given their lack of consistency within and across brands and the (...) extent to which women engage in identity work and body work in relation to them. Our findings indicate that the instability of these unregulated standards allows some women—particularly those with bodies located closest to the boundaries between size categories—to claim conformity to body ideals and to access some of the associated psychological, social, and material privileges. However, even as individual women may benefit by distancing themselves from stigmatized size categories, this pattern renders women’s body acceptance tenuous while simultaneously reinforcing hierarchies among women based on body size and shape. (shrink)No categories
- What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy.Penelope Maddy -2017 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.What Do Philosophers Do? takes up the leading arguments for radical skepticism from an everyday point of view. A range of philosophical methods are examined and employed, for a revealing portrait of what philosophers do, and perhaps a quiet suggestion for what they should do, for what they do best.
- What trial participants need to be told about placebo effects to give informed consent: a survey to establish existing knowledge among patients with back pain.John Hughes,Maddy Greville-Harris,Cynthia A. Graham,George Lewith,Peter White &Felicity L. Bishop -2017 -Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (12):867-870.Introduction Patients require an accurate knowledge about placebos and their possible effects to ensure consent for placebo-controlled clinical trials is adequately informed. However, few previous studies have explored patients’ baseline levels of understanding and knowledge about placebos. The present online survey aimed to assess knowledge about placebos among patients with a history of back pain. Design A 15-item questionnaire was constructed to measure knowledge about placebos. Additional questions assessed sociodemographic characteristics, duration and severity of back pain, and previous experience of (...) receiving placebos. Setting Participants recruited from community settings completed the study online. Results 210 participants completed the questionnaire. 86.7% had back pain in the past 6 months, 44.3% currently had back pain. 4.3% had received a placebo intervention as part of a clinical trial and 68.1% had previously read or heard information about placebos. Overall knowledge of placebos was high, with participants on average answering 12.07 of 15 questions about placebos correctly. However, few participants correctly answered questions about the nocebo effect and the impact of the colour of a placebo pill. Conclusions The findings identified key gaps in knowledge about placebos. The lack of understanding of the nocebo effect in particular has implications for the informed consent of trial participants. Research ethics committees and investigators should prioritise amending informed consent procedures to incorporate the fact that participants in the placebo arm might experience adverse side effects. (shrink)
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
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