Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrongdoing.Margaret Urban Walker -2006 - Cambridge University Press.detailsMoral Repair examines the ethics and moral psychology of responses to wrongdoing. Explaining the emotional bonds and normative expectations that keep human beings responsive to moral standards and responsible to each other, Margaret Urban Walker uses realistic examples of both personal betrayal and political violence to analyze how moral bonds are damaged by serious wrongs and what must be done to repair the damage. Focusing on victims of wrong, their right to validation, and their sense of justice, Walker presents a (...) unified and detailed philosophical account of hope, trust, resentment, forgiveness, and making amends - the emotions and practices that sustain moral relations. Moral Repair joins a multidisciplinary literature concerned with transitional and restorative justice, reparations, and restoring individual dignity and mutual trust in the wake of serious wrongs. (shrink)
Moral Contexts.Margaret Urban Walker -2002 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.detailsTo be truly reflective, moral thinking and moral philosophy must become aware of the contexts that bind our thinking about how to live. These essays show how to do this, and why it makes a difference.
Keeping Moral Space Open New Images of Ethics Consulting.Margaret Urban Walker -1993 -Hastings Center Report 23 (2):33-40.detailsThe moral expertise of clinical ethicists is not a question of mastering codelike theories and lawlike principles. Rather, ethicists are architects of moral space within the health care setting, as well as mediators in the conversations taking place within that space.
Chapter 5 Skeptical-Dogmatism and the Self-Undermining Objection.Mark Walker -2024 - InOutlines of skeptical-dogmatism: on disbelieving our philosophical views. Lanham: Lexington Books.detailsThis chapter puts to rest for all of eternity the self-undermining charge against conciliationism.
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The Line-drawing Problem in Disease Definition.Wendy A. Rogers &Mary Jean Walker -2017 -Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 42 (4):405-423.detailsBiological dysfunction is regarded, in many accounts, as necessary and perhaps sufficient for disease. But although disease is conceptualized as all-or-nothing, biological functions often differ by degree. A tension is created by attempting to use a continuous variable as the basis for a categorical definition, raising questions about how we are to pinpoint the boundary between health and disease. This is the line-drawing problem. In this paper, we show how the line-drawing problem arises within “dysfunction-requiring” accounts of disease, such as (...) those of Christopher Boorse and Jerome Wakefield. We then provide several detailed examples to establish that biological dysfunction cannot provide a boundary. We examine potential ways of resolving the line-drawing problem, either by dropping one of the claims that generates it, or by appealing to additional criteria. We argue that two of these options are plausible, and that each of these can be applied with regard to different diseases. (shrink)
Moral Psychology: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory.Sandra Lee Bartky,Paul Benson,Sue Campbell,Claudia Card,Robin S. Dillon,Jean Harvey,Karen Jones,Charles W. Mills,James Lindemann Nelson,Margaret Urban Walker,Rebecca Whisnant &Catherine Wilson (eds.) -2004 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.detailsMoral psychology studies the features of cognition, judgement, perception and emotion that make human beings capable of moral action. Perspectives from feminist and race theory immensely enrich moral psychology. Writers who take these perspectives ask questions about mind, feeling, and action in contexts of social difference and unequal power and opportunity. These essays by a distinguished international cast of philosophers explore moral psychology as it connects to social life, scientific studies, and literature.
Perceived Organizational Motives and Consumer Responses to Proactive and Reactive CSR.Mark D. Groza,Mya R. Pronschinske &Matthew Walker -2011 -Journal of Business Ethics 102 (4):639-652.detailsCorporate social responsibility (CSR) has emerged as an effective way for firms to create favorable attitudes among consumers. Although prior research has addressed the direct influence of proactive and reactive CSR on consumer responses, this research hypothesized that consumers’ perceived organizational motives (i.e., attributions) will mediate this relationship. It was also hypothesized that the source of information and location of CSR initiative will affect the motives consumers assign to a firms’ engagement in the initiative. Two experiments were conducted to test (...) these hypotheses. The results of Study 1 indicate that the nature of a CSR initiative influences consumer attribution effects and that these attributions act as mediators in helping to explain consumers’ responses to CSR. Study 2 suggests that the source of the CSR message moderates the effect of CSR on consumer attributions. The mediating influence of the attributions as well as the importance of information source suggests that proper communication of CSR can be a viable way to inculcate positive corporate associations and purchase intentions. (shrink)
Neurotechnologies, Relational Autonomy, and Authenticity.Mary Jean Walker &Catriona Mackenzie -2020 -International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 13 (1):98-119.detailsThe ethical debate about neurotechnologies—including both drugs and implanted devices—has been largely framed around the questions of whether and when these technologies could damage or promote authenticity. Patients can experience changes in mood, behavior, emotion, or preferences—seemingly, changes in character or personality. Some describe such changes by saying they feel like different people; that they have become either more or less themselves; or that they feel as though some of their moods, behaviors, emotions or preferences are not their own. These (...) kinds of statements are used to describe both changes that a drug or device is... (shrink)
Neurotechnologies, personal identity and the ethics of authenticity.Catriona Mackenzie &Mary Walker -2015 - In Mackenzie Catriona & Walker Mary,Springer Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer. pp. 373-92.detailsIn the recent neuroethics literature, there has been vigorous debate concerning the ethical implications of the use of neurotechnologies that may alter a person’s identity. Much of this debate has been framed around the concept of authenticity. The argument of this chapter is that the ethics of authenticity, as applied to neurotechnological treatment or enhancement, is conceptually misleading. The notion of authenticity is ambiguous between two distinct and conflicting conceptions: self-discovery and self-creation. The self-discovery conception of authenticity is based on (...) a problematic conception of a static, real inner self. The notion of self-creation, although more plausible, blurs the distinction between identity and autonomy. Moreover, both conceptions are overly individualistic and fail sufficiently to account for the relational constitution of personal identity. The authors propose that a relational, narrative understanding of identity and autonomy can incorporate the more plausible aspects of both interpretations of authenticity, while providing a normatively more illuminating theoretical framework for approaching the question of whether and how neurotechnologies threaten identity. (shrink)
Moral Understandings: Alternative “Epistemology” for a Feminist Ethics.Margaret Urban Walker -1989 -Hypatia 4 (2):15-28.detailsWork on representing women's voices in ethics has produced a vision of moral understanding profoundly subversive of the traditional philosophical conception of moral knowledge. 1 explicate this alternative moral “epistemology,” identify how it challenges the prevailing view, and indicate some of its resources for a liberatory feminist critique of philosophical ethics.
Aristotelian Naturalism, Zhu Xi, and the Goodness of Human Nature.Matthew D. Walker -2023 -Australasian Philosophical Review 7 (2):164-174.detailsYong Huang defends a meta-ethical moral realism (as opposed to anti-realism) that is naturalistic (as opposed to non-naturalistic) and focused on agents (as opposed to actions). In my response, I focus on two questions that Huang’s paper raises: (1) Do we have good reason to reject Aristotelian naturalism? (2) Do we have good reason to hold that the virtues are objective in the way that Zhu Xi suggests, viz., as strongly constitutive of human nature? In response to (1), I argue (...) that Aristotelian naturalism has resources for addressing Huang’s worries. In response to (2), I argue that alternative Mencian and Aristotelian views can account for the phenomena to which Zhu Xi appeals, yet without insisting that the virtues are strongly constitutive of human nature. (shrink)
Current Dilemmas in Defining the Boundaries of Disease.Jenny Doust,Mary Jean Walker &Wendy A. Rogers -2017 -Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 42 (4):350-366.detailsBoorse’s biostatistical theory states that diseases should be defined in ways that reflect disturbances of biological function and that are objective and value free. We use three examples from contemporary medicine that demonstrate the complex issues that arise when defining the boundaries of disease: polycystic ovary syndrome, chronic kidney disease, and myocardial infarction. We argue that the biostatistical theory fails to provide sufficient guidance on where the boundaries of disease should be drawn, contains ambiguities relating to choice of reference class, (...) and is out of step with medical processes for identifying disease boundaries. Although proponents of the biostatistical theory might regard these practical issues as irrelevant to the aim of providing a theoretical account of disease, we take them to indicate the need for a theoretical account that is adequate for current needs—including limiting new forms of medicalization that are driven by the identification of disease based on dysfunction. Our processes for determining the boundaries for disease need to recognize that there is no value-free method for making these decisions. (shrink)
Ethical Justifications for Access to Unapproved Medical Interventions: An Argument for (Limited) Patient Obligations.Mary Jean Walker,Wendy A. Rogers &Vikki Entwistle -2014 -American Journal of Bioethics 14 (11):3-15.detailsMany health care systems include programs that allow patients in exceptional circumstances to access medical interventions of as yet unproven benefit. In this article we consider the ethical justifications for—and demands on—these special access programs (SAPs). SAPs have a compassionate basis: They give patients with limited options the opportunity to try interventions that are not yet approved by standard regulatory processes. But while they signal that health care systems can and will respond to individual suffering, SAPs have several disadvantages, including (...) the potential to undermine regulatory and knowledge-generation structures that constitute significant public goods. The “balance” between these considerations depends in part on how broadly SAPs are used, but also on whether SAPs can be made to contribute to the generation of knowledge about the effects of health interventions. We argue that patients should usually be required to contribute outcome data while using SAPs. (shrink)
Contract cheating: a new challenge for academic honesty?Mary Walker &Cynthia Townley -2012 -Journal of Academic Ethics 10 (1):27-44.details‘Contract cheating’ has recently emerged as a form of academic dishonesty. It involves students contracting out their coursework to writers in order to submit the purchased assignments as their own work, usually via the internet. This form of cheating involves epistemic and ethical problems that are continuous with older forms of cheating, but which it also casts in a new form. It is a concern to educators because it is very difficult to detect, because it is arguably more fraudulent than (...) some other forms of plagiarism, and because it appears to be connected to a range of systemic problems within modern higher education. This paper provides an overview of the information and literature thus far available on the topic, including its definition, the problems it involves, its causal factors, and the ways in which educators might respond. We argue that while contract cheating is a concern, some of the suggested responses are themselves problematic, and that best practice responses to the issue should avoid moral panic and remain focussed on supporting honest students and good academic practice. (shrink)
Moral Contexts. Collected Essays.Margaret Urban Walker -unknowndetailsMany contexts shape and limit moral thinking in philosophy and life. Human conditions of vulnerability and interdependency, of limited awareness and control, of imperfect insight into ourselves and others are inevitable contexts that neither moral thought nor theory should forget. To be truly reflective, moral thinking and moral philosophy must become aware of the contexts that bind our thinking about how to live. This collection of essays by Margaret Urban Walker seek to show how to do this, and why it (...) makes a difference. Contingent and changeable contexts that shape moral thinking include our individual histories, our social positions, and institutional roles, relationships, cultural settings, and social arrangements, and the specific moral idioms we pick up along the way. The paradigms and specialized language of ethical theory are contexts, too; they shape how moral theory looks and what or whom it looks at. Ethical theory and practice are meaningless without these Moral Contexts. (shrink)
Outlines of skeptical-dogmatism: on disbelieving our philosophical views.Mark Walker -2024 - Lanham: Lexington Books.detailsMark Walker argues for Skeptical-Dogmatism-the view that we should disbelieve our cherished philosophical views, such as beliefs about what makes for a good life, religious beliefs, and political beliefs. To not disbelieve one's preferred views in these contested matters is hubristic.
Conscientious Objection to Vaccination.Steve Clarke,Alberto Giubilini &Mary Jean Walker -2016 -Bioethics 31 (3):155-161.detailsVaccine refusal occurs for a variety of reasons. In this article we examine vaccine refusals that are made on conscientious grounds; that is, for religious, moral, or philosophical reasons. We focus on two questions: first, whether people should be entitled to conscientiously object to vaccination against contagious diseases ; second, if so, to what constraints or requirements should conscientious objection to vaccination be subject. To address these questions, we consider an analogy between CO to vaccination and CO to military service. (...) We argue that conscientious objectors to vaccination should make an appropriate contribution to society in lieu of being vaccinated. The contribution to be made will depend on the severity of the relevant disease, its morbidity, and also the likelihood that vaccine refusal will lead to harm. In particular, the contribution required will depend on whether the rate of CO in a given population threatens herd immunity to the disease in question: for severe or highly contagious diseases, if the population rate of CO becomes high enough to threaten herd immunity, the requirements for CO could become so onerous that CO, though in principle permissible, would be de facto impermissible. (shrink)
Aristotle on the Uses of Contemplation.Matthew D. Walker -2018 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.detailsTraditionally, Aristotle is held to believe that philosophical contemplation is valuable for its own sake, but ultimately useless. In this volume, Matthew D. Walker offers a fresh, systematic account of Aristotle's views on contemplation's place in the human good. The book situates Aristotle's views against the background of his wider philosophy, and examines the complete range of available textual evidence. On this basis, Walker argues that contemplation also benefits humans as perishable living organisms by actively guiding human life activity, including (...) human self-maintenance. Aristotle's views on contemplation's place in the human good thus cohere with his broader thinking about how living organisms live well. A novel exploration of Aristotle's views on theory and practice, this volume will interest scholars and students of both ancient Greek ethics and natural philosophy. It will also appeal to those working in other disciplines including classics, ethics, and political theory. (shrink)
Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism.Mark Walker -2023 - Lexington.detailsThe ancient Pyrrhonians skeptics suspended judgment about all philosophical views. Their main opponents were the Dogmatists—those who believed their preferred philosophical views. In Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism: On Disbelieving Our Philosophical Views, Mark Walker argues, contra Pyrrhonians and Dogmatists, for a "darker" skepticism: we should disbelieve our philosophical views. On the question of political morality, for example, we should disbelieve libertarianism, conservativism, socialism, liberalism, and any alternative ideologies. Since most humans have beliefs about philosophical subject matter, such as beliefs about religious (...) and political matters, humanity writ large should disbelieve their preferred philosophical views. Walker argues that Skeptical-Dogmatism permits a more realistic estimation of our epistemic powers. Dogmatists who believe their view is correct, while believing that two or more competitor views of their opponents are false, must—at least implicitly—take themselves to be “über epistemic superiors” to their disagreeing colleagues. Such a self-assessment is as implausible as it is hubristic. Skeptical-Dogmatism, in contrast, permits a more realistic and humbler epistemic self-conception. The author also shows that there are no insuperable practical difficulties in living as a Skeptical-Dogmatist. (shrink)
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Neuroscience, self-understanding, and narrative truth.Mary Jean Walker -2012 -American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 3 (4):63-74.detailsRecent evidence from the neurosciences and cognitive sciences provides some support for a narrative theory of self-understanding. However, it also suggests that narrative self-understanding is unlikely to be accurate, and challenges its claims to truth. This article examines a range of this empirical evidence, explaining how it supports a narrative theory of self-understanding while raising questions of these narrative's accuracy and veridicality. I argue that this evidence does not provide sufficient reason to dismiss the possibility of truth in narrative self-understanding. (...) Challenges to the possibility of attaining true, accurate self-knowledge through a self-narrative have previously been made on the basis of the epistemological features of narrative. I show how the empirical evidence is consistent with the epistemological concerns, and provide three ways to defend the notion of narrative truth. I also aim to show that neuroethical discussions of self-understanding would benefit from further engagement with the philosophical literature on narrative truth. (shrink)
Mother Time: Women, Aging, and Ethics.Margaret Urban Walker (ed.) -1999 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.detailsFifteen original essays open up a novel area of inquiry: the distinctively ethical dimensions of women's experiences of and in aging. Contributors distinguished in the fields of feminist ethics and the ethics of aging explore assumptions, experiences, practices, and public policies that affect women's well-being and dignity in later life. The book brings to the study of women's aging a reflective dimension missing from the empirical work that has predominated to date. Ethical studies of aging have so far failed to (...) emphasize gender. And feminist ethics has neglected older women, even when emphasizing other dimensions of 'difference.' Finally work on aging in all fields has focused on the elderly, while this volume sees aging as an extended process of negotiating personal and social change. (shrink)
A New Approach to Defining Disease.Mary Jean Walker &Wendy A. Rogers -2018 -Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (4):402-420.detailsIn this paper, we examine recent critiques of the debate about defining disease, which claim that its use of conceptual analysis embeds the problematic assumption that the concept is classically structured. These critiques suggest, instead, developing plural stipulative definitions. Although we substantially agree with these critiques, we resist their implication that no general definition of “disease” is possible. We offer an alternative, inductive argument that disease cannot be classically defined and that the best explanation for this is that the concept (...) is structured as a cluster. We further argue that we do not need to reject the possibility of defining the general concept “disease” to legitimate developing stipulative definitions of disease that are relative to particular purposes. A cluster definition of disease is compatible with contextually motivated definitions, which may be considered précisifications of the more general cluster concept. (shrink)
Third Parties and the Social Scaffolding of Forgiveness.Margaret Urban Walker -2013 -Journal of Religious Ethics 41 (3):495-512.detailsIt is widely accepted that only the victim of a wrong can forgive that wrong. Several philosophers have recently defended “third-party forgiveness,” the scenario in which A, who is not the victim of a wrong in any sense, forgives B for a wrong B did to C. Focusing on Glen Pettigrove's argument for third-party forgiveness, I will defend the victim's unique standing to forgive, by appealing to the fact that in forgiving, victims must absorb severe and inescapable costs of distinctive (...) kinds, a plight that third parties do not share. There are, nonetheless, significant, even essential, roles played by third parties in making forgiveness possible, reasonable, or valuable for victims of serious wrongs. I take a closer look at the links between victims, wrongdoers, resentment, and forgiveness in showing why the victim alone can forgive. (shrink)
The Roles of Credibility and Social Consciousness in the Corporate Philanthropy-Consumer Behavior Relationship.Matthew Walker &Aubrey Kent -2013 -Journal of Business Ethics 116 (2):341-353.detailsThe attention paid to the influence of organizational philanthropy on consumer responses has precipitated a shift in the role this practice plays in organizational dynamics—with philanthropy becoming an increasingly strategic marketing tool. The authors develop and test a model predicting that: (1) perceived organizational credibility will mediate the relationship between awareness of philanthropy and the outcomes of advocacy and financial sacrifice; (2) consumer social consciousness will moderate the relationship between awareness of philanthropy and firm credibility, and between credibility and the (...) outcome variables; and (3) these moderated relationships will be mediated by perceived credibility. Data obtained from a sample of professional golf patrons support our assertions. Notably, the findings implicate perceived credibility as a key intervening variable in the hypothesized relationships for the PGA Tour. (shrink)
Truth telling as reparations.Margaret Walker -2010 -Metaphilosophy 41 (4):525-545.details: International instruments now defend a "right to the truth " for victims of political repression and violence and include truth telling about human rights violations as a kind of reparation as well as a form of redress. While truth telling about violations is obviously a condition of redress or repair for violations, it may not be clear how truth telling itself is a kind of reparations. By showing that concerted truth telling can satisfy four features of suitable reparations vehicles, (...) I defend the idea that politically implemented modes of truth telling to, for, and by those who are victims of gross violation and injustice may with good reason be counted as a kind of reparations. Understanding the doubly symbolic character of reparations, however, makes clearer why truth telling is unlikely to be sufficient reparation for serious wrongs and is likely to be sensitive to the larger context of reparative activity and its social, political, and historical background. (shrink)
Higher education pedagogies: a capabilities approach.Melanie Walker -2006 - New York: Open University Press.detailsThis book sets out to generate new ways of reflecting ethically about the purposes and values of contemporary higher education in relation to agency, learning, public values and democratic life, and the pedagogies which support these.
Epistemic Permissiveness and the Problem of Philosophical Disagreement.Mark Walker -2022 -Dialogue 61 (2):285-309.detailsRésuméÉtant donné un ensemble de données D, les tenants de l'unicité épistémique soutiennent qu'une seule réponse doxastique est rationnelle, tandis que les tenants du permissivisme épistémique soutiennent que plusieurs réponses doxastiques peuvent être rationnelles. Comme certains auteurs l'ont signalé, l'un des attraits de la position permissiviste est qu'elle nous permet de comprendre le désaccord philosophique comme un désaccord dans lequel aucune des parties ne commet de faute rationnelle, et donc de respecter le statut épistémique de chacune d'elles. Je soutiens au (...) contraire que la position permissiviste ne parvient pas à offrir un tel avantage dans de nombreux désaccords philosophiques. (shrink)
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(1 other version)Defining disease in the context of overdiagnosis.Mary Jean Walker &Wendy Rogers -2017 -Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 20 (2):269-280.detailsRecently, concerns have been raised about the phenomenon of ‘overdiagnosis’, the diagnosis of a condition that is not causing harm, and will not come to cause harm. Along with practical, ethical, and scientific questions, overdiagnosis raises questions about our concept of disease. In this paper, we analyse overdiagnosis as an epistemic problem and show how it challenges many existing accounts of disease. In particular, it raises ques- tions about conceptual links drawn between disease and dysfunction, harm, and risk. We argue (...) that ‘disease’ should be considered a vague concept with a non-classical structure. On this view, overdiagnosed cases are ‘borderline’ cases of disease, falling in the zone between cases that are clearly disease, and cases that are clearly not disease. We then develop a pre ́cising definition of disease designed to provide practical help in preventing and limiting overdiagnosis. We argue that for this purpose, we can define disease as dysfunction that has a significant risk of causing severe harm to the patient. (shrink)
Aristotle on Wittiness.Matthew D. Walker -2019 - In Pierre Destrée & Franco V. Trivigno,Laughter, Humor, and Comedy in Ancient Philosophy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 103-121.detailsThis chapter offers a complete account of Aristotle’s underexplored treatment of the virtue of wittiness (eutrapelia) in Nicomachean Ethics IV.8. It addresses the following questions: (1) What, according to Aristotle, is this virtue and what is its structure? (2) How do Aristotle’s moral psychological views inform Aristotle’s account, and how might Aristotle’s discussions of other, more familiar virtues, enable us to understand wittiness better? In particular, what passions does the virtue of wittiness concern, and how might the virtue (and its (...) attendant vices) be related to the virtue of temperance (and its attendant vices)? (3) How does wittiness, as an ethical virtue, benefit its possessor? (4) How can Aristotle resolve some key tensions that his introducing a virtue of wittiness apparently generates for his ethics? In addition to exploring these questions, this chapter challenges some commonly accepted accounts of Aristotle’s views on the nature of the laughable. (shrink)
A refined model of sleep and the time course of memory formation.Matthew P. Walker -2005 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1):51-64.detailsResearch in the neurosciences continues to provide evidence that sleep plays a role in the processes of learning and memory. There is less of a consensus, however, regarding the precise stages of memory development during which sleep is considered a requirement, simply favorable, or not important. This article begins with an overview of recent studies regarding sleep and learning, predominantly in the procedural memory domain, and is measured against our current understanding of the mechanisms that govern memory formation. Based on (...) these considerations, I offer a new neurocognitive framework of procedural learning, consisting first of acquisition, followed by two specific stages of consolidation, one involving a process of stabilization, the other involving enhancement, whereby delayed learning occurs. Psychophysiological evidence indicates that initial acquisition does not rely fundamentally on sleep. This also appears to be true for the stabilization phase of consolidation, with durable representations, resistant to interference, clearly developing in a successful manner during time awake (or just time, per se). In contrast, the consolidation stage, resulting in additional/enhanced learning in the absence of further rehearsal, does appear to rely on the process of sleep, with evidence for specific sleep-stage dependencies across the procedural domain. Evaluations at a molecular, cellular, and systems level currently offer several sleep specific candidates that could play a role in sleep-dependent learning. These include the upregulation of select plasticity-associated genes, increased protein synthesis, changes in neurotransmitter concentration, and specific electrical events in neuronal networks that modulate synaptic potentiation. Key Words: consolidation; enhancement; learning; memory; plasticity; sleep; stabilization. (shrink)
The voluntariness of judgment.Mark Thomas Walker -1996 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):97 – 119.detailsWhile various items closely associated with belief, such as speech?acts of assertion, or what have recently been termed acts of ?acceptance?, can clearly be voluntary, it is commonly supposed that belief itself, being intrinsically truth?directed, is essentially passive. I argue that while this may be true of belief proper, understood as a kind of disposition, it is not true of acts of assent or ?judgment?. Judgments, I contend, must be deemed voluntary precisely because of their truth?aimedness, for in their case (...) this feature entails that they can always be regarded as the subjects of a kind of implicit practical reasoning. By emphasizing the familiar point that voluntariness need not involve anything more than this, and by invoking the soft determinist option of holding causation to be compatible with choice, I seek to deflect some anticipated objections to this argument. (shrink)
Feminism, Ethics, and the Question of Theory.Margaret Urban Walker -1992 -Hypatia 7 (3):23 - 38.detailsFeminist discussions of ethics in the Western philosophical tradition range from critiques of the substance of dominant moral theories to critiques of the very practice of "doing ethics" itself. I argue that these critiques really target a certain historically specific model of ethics and moral theory-a "theoretical-juridical" one. I outline an "expressive-collaborative" conception of morality and ethics that could be a politically self-conscious and reflexively critical alternative.
Na-na, na-na, Boo-Boo, the accuracy of your philosophical beliefs is doo-doo.Mark Walker -2022 -Manuscrito 45 (2):1-49.detailsThe paper argues that adopting a form of skepticism, Skeptical-Dogmatism, that recommends disbelieving each philosophical position in many multi-proposition disputes- disputes where there are three or more contrary philosophical views-leads to a higher ratio of true to false beliefs than the ratio of the “average philosopher”. Hence, Skeptical-Dogmatists have more accurate beliefs than the average philosopher. As a corollary, most philosophers would improve the accuracy of their beliefs if they adopted Skeptical-Dogmatism.
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A Paradox About Our Epistemic Self-Conception: Are You an Über Epistemic Superior?Mark Walker -2022 -International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 12 (4):285-316.detailsI hope to show that each of 1, 2, and 3 are plausible, yet we can derive 4: 1. It is epistemically permissible to believe that our preferred views in multi-proposition disputes are true, or at least more likely true than not. 2. If it is epistemically permissible to believe that our preferred views in multi-proposition disputes are true, or at least more likely true than not, then it is epistemically permissible for us to believe that we are über epistemic (...) superiors to our disagreeing colleagues in multi-proposition disputes. 3. It is not epistemically permissible to believe that we are über epistemic superiors to our disagreeing colleagues in multi-proposition disputes. 4. At least one of 1, 2, or 3, is false. (shrink)
Hinge Propositions, Skeptical Dogmatism, and External World Disjunctivism.Mark Walker -2019 -International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (2):134-167.detailsFollowing Wittgenstein’s lead, Crispin Wright and others have argued that hinge propositions are immune from skeptical doubt. In particular, the entitlement strategy, as we shall refer to it, says that hinge propositions have a special type of justification because of their role in our cognitive lives. Two major criticisms are raised here against the entitlement strategy when used in attempts to justify belief in the external world. First, the hinge strategy is not sufficient to thwart underdetermination skepticism, since underdetermination considerations (...) lead to a much stronger form of skepticism than is commonly realized. Second, the claim that hinge propositions are necessary to trust perception is false. There is an alternative to endorsing a particular hinge proposition about the external world, external world disjunctivism, which permits us to trust perception, while skirting the difficulties raised by skepticism. (shrink)
Evidence for personalised medicine: mechanisms, correlation, and new kinds of black box.Mary Jean Walker,Justin Bourke &Katrina Hutchison -2019 -Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 40 (2):103-121.detailsPersonalised medicine has been discussed as a medical paradigm shift that will improve health while reducing inefficiency and waste. At the same time, it raises new practical, regulatory, and ethical challenges. In this paper, we examine PM strategies epistemologically in order to develop capacities to address these challenges, focusing on a recently proposed strategy for developing patient-specific models from induced pluripotent stem cells so as to make individualised treatment predictions. We compare this strategy to two main PM strategies—stratified medicine and (...) computational models. Drawing on epistemological work in the philosophy of medicine, we explain why these two methods, while powerful, are neither truly personalised nor, epistemologically speaking, novel strategies. Both are forms of correlational black box. We then argue that the iPSC models would count as a new kind of black box. They would not rely entirely on mechanistic knowledge, and they would utilise correlational evidence in a different way from other strategies—a way that would enable personalised predictions. In arguing that the iPSC models would present a novel method of gaining evidence for clinical practice, we provide an epistemic analysis that can help to inform the practical, regulatory, and ethical challenges of developing an iPSC system. (shrink)
Induced Pluripotent Stem Cell-Based Systems for Personalising Epilepsy Treatment: Research Ethics Challenges and New Insights for the Ethics of Personalised Medicine.Mary Jean Walker,Jane Nielsen,Eliza Goddard,Alex Harris &Katrina Hutchison -2022 -American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 13 (2):120-131.detailsThis paper examines potential ethical and legal issues arising during the research, develop- ment and clinical use of a proposed strategy in personalized medicine (PM): using human induced pluripotent stem cell (iPSC)-derived tissue cultures as predictive models of individ- ual patients to inform treatment decisions. We focus on epilepsy treatment as a likely early application of this strategy, for which early-stage stage research is underway. In relation to the research process, we examine issues associated with biological samples; data; health; vulnerable (...) populations; neural organoids; and what level of accuracy justifies using the iPSC-derived neural tissue system. In relation to clinical use, we examine potential uses in pre-natal screening, and effects on clinical decision-making. Although our focus is providing recommendations for researchers developing work in this area, we identify the novel issue of deciding on an acceptable accuracy level for the system. We also emphasize an issue thus far neglected in the ethics of PM: PM tends to represent treatment decisions as though they should be directed solely by biomedical information, but this in itself could be detri- mental to best personalizing treatment decisions in the clinic. (shrink)
Aristotle on Activity “According to the Best and Most Final” Virtue.Matthew Walker -2011 -Apeiron 44 (1):91-109.detailsAccording to Nicomachean Ethics I.7 1098a16–18, eudaimonia consists in activity of soul “according to the best and most final” virtue. Ongoing debate between inclusivist and exclusivist readers of this passage has focused on the referent of “the best and most final” virtue. I argue that even if one accepts the exclusivist's answer to this reference question, one still needs an account of what it means for activity of soul to accord with the best and most final virtue. I examine the (...) nature of this accordance relation and defend a novel inclusivist reading of the whole passage. (shrink)