Results for 'Leonard-G. Miller'
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- The Logic of Moral Discourse.Leonard G.Miller -1956 -Philosophical Review 65 (4):560.
- Rules and exceptions.Leonard G.Miller -1955 -Ethics 66 (4):262-270.
- Descartes's Rules for the Direction of the Mind.Leonard G.Miller -1958 -Philosophical Review 67 (3):426.
- The Metaphysics of Descartes: A Study of the Meditations.Leonard G.Miller -1968 -Philosophical Review 77 (3):366.
- Descartes, mathematics, and God.Leonard G.Miller -1957 -Philosophical Review 66 (4):451-465.
- Moral scepticism.Leonard G.Miller -1961 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (2):239-245.
- Critical notice.Leonard G.Miller -1973 -Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):391-402.No categories
- Moral scepticism.Leonard-G.Miller -1961 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22:239-245.THE MORAL SCEPTIC IS ONE WHO BELIEVES MORALITY CANNOT BE\nJUSTIFIED AND THEREFORE THERE ARE GOOD REASONS FOR BEING\nSUSPICIOUS OF IT, AND FURTHER, THAT ONE WHO CONTINUES TO\nMAINTAIN A MORAL POSITION IS BEING UNREASONABLE. THE AUTHOR\nMAINTAINS THAT EVEN THOUGH THE CONCEPT OF JUSTIFICATION\nDOES NOT APPLY, THE SCEPTIC IS MISTAKEN IN DRAWING THE\nCONCLUSIONS HE DOES. THE SCEPTIC CONTENDS THAT IN THE\nABSENCE OF REASONS, IT IS UNREASONABLE TO BELIEVE. IT IS\nCONCLUDED THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO REASON US FROM MORALITY\nINTO SCEPTICISM. (STAFF).
- Roger Scruton, From Descartes to Wittgenstein: A Short History of Modern Philosophy Reviewed by.Leonard G.Miller -1983 -Philosophy in Review 3 (6):304-306.Export citation
Bookmark - Science and the Structure of Ethics.Leonard G.Miller -1962 -Philosophical Review 71 (4):528.No categories
- The Patient's Work.Leonard C. Groopman,Franklin G.Miller &Joseph J. Fins -2007 -Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 16 (1):44-52.In The Healer's Power, Howard Brody placed the concept of power at the heart of medicine's moral discourse. Struck by the absence of “power” in the prevailing vocabulary of medical ethics, yet aware of peripheral allusions to power in the writings of some medical ethicists, he intuited the importance of power from the silence surrounding it. He formulated the problem of the healer's power and its responsible use as “the central ethical problem in medicine.” Through the prism of power he (...) refracted a wide range of ethical problems, from informed consent to truth-telling, from confidentiality to futility, from the physician's fantasies to the physician's virtues. At times this prism shed new light on old problems, enabling us to see from an unexpected angle the elements of which the problem was composed. At other times it exposed issues of ethical significance that had been neglected in the bioethics literature. (shrink)
- Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The Defense of Reason in Descartes' Meditations. By Harry G. Frankfurt. Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1970. pp. ix, 193. $7.95. [REVIEW]Leonard G.Miller -1971 -Dialogue 10 (4):839-843.
- Split decisions.G. Wolford,M. B.Miller &M. S. Gazzaniga -2004 - In Michael S. Gazzaniga,The Cognitive Neurosciences III. MIT Press. pp. 1189--1199.
- Moral fictions and medical ethics.Robert D. Truog Franklin G.Miller -2010 -Bioethics 24 (9):453-460.ABSTRACTConventional medical ethics and the law draw a bright line distinguishing the permitted practice of withdrawing life‐sustaining treatment from the forbidden practice of active euthanasia by means of a lethal injection. When clinicians justifiably withdraw life‐sustaining treatment, they allow patients to die but do not cause, intend, or have moral responsibility for, the patient's death. In contrast, physicians unjustifiably kill patients whenever they intentionally administer a lethal dose of medication. We argue that the differential moral assessment of these two practices (...) is based on a series of moral fictions – motivated false beliefs that erroneously characterize withdrawing life‐sustaining treatment in order to bring accepted end‐of‐life practices in line with the prevailing moral norm that doctors must never kill patients. When these moral fictions are exposed, it becomes apparent that conventional medical ethics relating to end‐of‐life decisions is radically mistaken. (shrink)
- The meaning and existence of rules.Leonard G. Boonin -1966 -Ethics 76 (3):212-214.
- An Ethics of Significance.Leonard G. Schulze -1985 -Substance 14 (2):87.
- Education and Ecstasy.G. B.LEONARD -1968No categories
- Morality and the Law.Leonard G. Boonin -1967 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (2):289-290.
- Transcendent love: Dostoevsky and the search for a global ethic.Leonard G. Friesen -2016 - Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.In Transcendent Love: Dostoevsky and the Search for a Global Ethic,Leonard G. Friesen ranges widely across Dostoevsky's stories, novels, journalism, notebooks, and correspondence to demonstrate how Dostoevsky engaged with ethical issues in his times and how those same issues continue to be relevant to today's ethical debates. Friesen contends that the Russian ethical voice, in particular Dostoevsky's voice, deserves careful consideration in an increasingly global discussion of moral philosophy and the ethical life. Friesen challenges the view that contemporary (...) liberalism provides a religiously neutral foundation for a global ethic. He argues instead that Dostoevsky has much to offer when it comes to the search for a global ethic, an ethic that for Dostoevsky was necessarily grounded in a Christian concept of an active, extravagant, and transcendent love. Friesen also investigates Dostoevsky's response to those who claimed that contemporary European trends, most evident in the rising secularization of nineteenth-century society, provided a more viable foundation for a global ethic than one grounded in the One, whom Doestoevsky called simply "the Russian Christ." Throughout, Friesen captures a sense of the depth and sheer loveliness of Dostoevsky's canon. Dostoevsky was, after all, someone who believed that the ethical life was sublimely beautiful, even as it recklessly embraced suffering and unreasonably forgave others. The book will appeal to both students and scholars of Russian literature and history, comparative ethics, global ethics, and cultural studies, and togeneral readers with an interest in Dostoevsky. "Others have written about Dostoevsky's ethics, but I am not aware of any single-authored, sustained attempt to make the case for Dostoevsky's 'transcendent love' as part of a larger discussion of a global ethic. Moreover,Leonard Friesen presents his case in an engaging and highly accessible form. He believes passionately that Dostoevsky is deeply relevant to the discussion; his commitment rings through the pages and draws the reader in. In this way, his essay makes an original contribution to Dostoevsky studies that will appeal to scholars in a variety of disciplines and to educated lay readers with ethical concerns about the path of modernity, as well as to the many fans of Dostoevsky's work." --Russell Hillier, Providence College. (shrink)No categories
- Concerning the authoritative status of legal rules.Leonard G. Boonin -1964 -Ethics 74 (3):219-221.
- Concerning the defeasibility of legal rules.Leonard G. Boonin -1966 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (3):371-378.
- The logic of legal decisions.Leonard G. Boonin -1965 -Ethics 75 (3):179-194.
- A rating scale for psychotic symptoms (RSPS): part II: subscale 2: distraction symptoms (catatonia and passivity experiences subscale 3: delusions and semi-structured interview (SSCI-RSPS). [REVIEW]G. Chouinard &R.Miller -1999 -Schizophrenia Research 38 (2-3):123-50.
- A rating scale for psychotic symptoms (RSPS) part I: theoretical principles and subscale 1: perception symptoms (illusions and hallucinations).G. Chouinard &R.Miller -1999 -Schizophrenia Research 38 (2-3):101-22.No categories
- A Standing Asymmetry between Blame and Forgiveness.Kyle G. Fritz &Daniel J.Miller -2022 -Ethics 132 (4):759-786.Sometimes it is not one’s place to blame or forgive. This phenomenon is captured under the philosophical notion of standing. However, there is an asymmetry to be explained here. One can successfully blame, even if one lacks the standing to do so. Yet, one cannot successfully forgive if one lacks the standing to do so. In this article we explain this asymmetry. We argue that a complete explanation depends on not only a difference in the natures of the standing to (...) blame and forgive but also a difference in the natures of blame and forgiveness themselves. (shrink)
- Women’s fertility across the cycle increases the short-term attractiveness of creative intelligence.Martie G. Haselton &Geoffrey F.Miller -2006 -Human Nature 17 (1):50-73.Male provisioning ability may have evolved as a “good dad” indicator through sexual selection, whereas male creativity may have evolved partly as a “good genes” indicator. If so, women near peak fertility (midcycle) should prefer creativity over wealth, especially in short-term mating. Forty-one normally cycling women read vignettes describing creative but poor men vs. uncreative but rich men. Women’s estimated fertility predicted their short-term (but not long-term) preference for creativity over wealth, in both their desirability ratings of individual men (r=.40, (...) p<.01) and their forced-choice decisions between men (r=.46, p<.01). These preliminary results are consistent with the view that creativity evolved at least partly as a good genes indicator through mate choice. (shrink)
- Inferring from language.Leonard G. M. Noordman -1979 - New York: Springer Verlag.In the study of human thought there could hardly be a more fundamental con cern than language and reasoning. In the tradition of Western philosophy, humans are distinguished by their ability to speak and to think rationally. And language is often considered a prerequisite for rational thought. If psycholoQists, then, are ever to discover what is truly human about their species, they will have to discover how language is produced and understood, and how it plays a role in reasoning and (...) other forms of rational thought. Within psychology there has been an imperative to study language and rea soning together. Since Wundt, psychologists have succeeded in building a the oretical foundation for both language and reasoning. What has become clear from these beginnings is that the two are inextricably bound to each other. Like the two players ina chess game, take away one of them and the game no longer exists. On the one hand, producing and understanding speech re quires an intricate process of reasoning. Speakers must rationally choose sentences that will affect their listeners in ways they intend, and listen ers must infer what speakers could conceivably have meant in selecting the sentences they did. Reasoning, inference, and rational thought lie at the very center of speaking and listening. On the other hand, logical reasoning begins with, and is influenced by, the language in which a problem is stated. (shrink)
- The Unique Badness of Hypocritical Blame.Kyle G. Fritz &DanielMiller -2019 -Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.It is widely agreed that hypocrisy can undermine one’s moral standing to blame. According to the Nonhypocrisy Condition on standing, R has the standing to blame some other agent S for a violation of some norm N only if R is not hypocritical with respect to blame for violations of N. Yet this condition is seldom argued for. Macalester Bell points out that the fact that hypocrisy is a moral fault does not yet explain why hypocritical blame is standingless blame. (...) She raises a challenge: one must explain what is distinct about hypocritical blame such that the hypocritical blamer lacks the standing to blame, even if the arrogant or petty blamer does not. Of those writing on hypocrisy, only we offer a direct response to Bell’s challenge. Recently, however, our account has come under criticism. We argue here that (1) our account can handle these criticisms and that (2) no other rival account adequately addresses Bell’s challenge of explaining what is uniquely objectionable about hypocritical blame. Because answering Bell’s challenge is a necessary component of any plausible account of the relationship between hypocrisy and standing, our account remains the best on offer. (shrink)
- Book review: Fly Pushing: The Theory and Practice of Drosophila Genetics. [REVIEW]Leonard G. Robbins -2005 -Bioessays 27 (5):579-579.
- Evidence for ovulatory shifts in attraction to artistic and entrepreneurial excellence.M. G. Haselton &G. F.Miller -forthcoming -Human Nature.Export citation Bookmark
- Anonymity, pseudonymity, or inescapable identity on the net (abstract).Deborah G. Johnson &KeithMiller -1998 -Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 28 (2):37-38.The first topic of concern is anonymity, specifically the anonymity that is available in communications on the Internet. An earlier paper argues that anonymity in electronic communication is problematic because: it makes law enforcement difficult ; it frees individuals to behave in socially undesirable and harmful ways ; it diminishes the integrity of information since one can't be sure who information is coming from, whether it has been altered on the way, etc.; and all three of the above contribute to (...) an environment of diminished trust which is not conducive to certain uses of computer communication. Counterbalancing these problems are some important benefits. Anonymity can facilitate some socially desirable and beneficial behavior. For example, it can eliminate the fear of repercussions for behavior in contexts in which repercussions would diminish the availability or reliability of information, e.g., voting, personal relationships between consenting adults, and the like. Furthermore, anonymity can be used constructively to reduce the effect of prejudices on communications. Negative aspects of anonymity all seem to point to a tension between accountability and anonymity. They suggest that accountability and anonymity are not compatible, and they even seem to suggest that since accountability is a good thing, it would be good to eliminate anonymity. In other words, the problems with anonymity suggest that individuals are more likely to behave in socially desirable ways when they are held accountable for their behavior, and they are more likely to engage in socially undesirable behavior when they are not held accountable. I am not going to take issue with the correlation between accountability and anonymity, but rather with the claim that accountability is good. To examine this problem, let's look at a continuum that stretches from total anonymity at one end, and no anonymity at all at the other end. At the opposite extreme of anonymity is a panopticon society. The panopticon is the prison environment described by Foucault in which prison cells are arranged in a large circle with the side facing the inside of the circle open to view. The guard tower is placed in the middle of the circle so that guards can see everything that goes on in every cell. In a recent article on privacy, Jeffrey Reiman, reflecting on the new intelligent highway systems, suggests that we are moving closer and closer to a panopticon society. When we contemplate all the electronic data that is now gathered about each one of us as we move through our everyday lives- intelligent highway systems, consumer transactions, traffic patterns on the internet, medical records, financial records, and so on- we see the trend that Reiman identifies. Electronic behavior is recorded and the information is retained. While actions/transactions in separate domains are not necessarily combined, it seems obvious that the potential exists for combining data into a complete portfolio of an individual's day to day life. So it would seem that as more and more activities and domains are moved into a IT-based medium, the closer we will come to a panopticon society. A panopticon society gives us the ultimate in accountability. Everything an individual does is observable and therefore available to those to whom we are accountable. Of course, in doing this, it puts us, in effect, in prison. The prison parallel is appropriate here because what anonymity allows us is freedom; prison is the ultimate in lack of freedom. In this way the arguments for a free society become arguments for anonymity. Only when individuals are free will they experiment, try new ideas, take risks, and learn by doing so. Only in an environment that tolerates making mistakes will individuals develop the active habits that are so essential for democracy. In a world without information technology, individuals have levels or degrees and various kinds of anonymity and consequently different levels and kinds of freedom. Degrees and kinds of anonymity vary with the domain: small town social life versus urban social life, voting, commercial exchanges, banking, automobile travel, airplane travel, telephone communication, education, and so on. Drawing from our experience before IT-based institutions, we might believe that what we need is varying levels or degrees and kinds of anonymity. This seems a good starting place because it suggests an attempt to re-create the mixture that we have in the physical, non-IT-based world. Nevertheless, there is a danger. If we think in terms of levels and degrees of anonymity, we may not see the forest from the trees. We may not acknowledge that in an electronic medium, levels and kinds of anonymity mean, in an important sense, no anonymity. If there are domains in which we can be anonymous but those domains are part of a global communication infrastructure in which there is no anonymity at the entry point, then it will always be possible to trace someone's identity. We delude ourselves when we think we have anonymity on-line or off-line. Rather, what we have both places is situations in which it is more and less difficult to identify individuals. We have a continuum of situations in which it is easy and difficult to link behavior to other behavior and histories of behaviors. In the physical world, we can go places and do things where others don't know us by name and have no history with us, though they see our bodies, clothes, and behavior. If we do nothing unusual, we may be forgotten. On the other hand, if we do something illegal, authorities may attempt to track us down and figure out who we are. For example, law enforcement officials, collection agencies, those who want to sue us may take an active interest in removing our anonymity, ex post facto. Think of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols-the men who apparently bombed the federal building in Oklahoma City. Much of what they did, they did anonymously, but then law enforcement officials set out to find out who had done various things, e.g., rented a car, bought explosives, etc. The shrouds of anonymity under which McVeigh and Nichols had acted were slowly removed. Is this any different than behavior on the internet? Is there a significant difference in the kind or degree of anonymity we have in the physical world versus what we have in an IT-based world? The character of the trail we leave is different; in the one case, its an electronic trail; while in the other it involves human memories, photographs, and paper and ink. What law enforcement officials had to do to track down McVeigh is quite different from tracking down an electronic law breaker. Also, the cost of electronic information gathering, both in time and money, can be dramatically lower than the cost of talking to people, gathering physical evidence, and the other minutia required by traditional detective work. We should acknowledge that we do not and are never likely to have anonymity on the Internet. We would do better to think of different levels or kinds of identity. There are important moral and social issues arising as a result of these varying degrees and kinds of identity. Perhaps the most important matter is assuring that individuals are informed about the conditions in which they are interacting. Perhaps, even more important is that individuals have a choice about the conditions under which they are communicating. In the rest of this paper we explore a few examples of levels and kinds of identity that are practical on the Internet. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages that we see for these "styles" of identity for individuals, and we examine the costs and benefits of these styles for society as a whole. (shrink)No categories
- The University and the Colleges of Education in Wales 1925-1978.Leonard G. Bewsher &D. Gerwyn Lewis -1982 -British Journal of Educational Studies 30 (2):242.
- When Hypocrisy Undermines the Standing to Blame: a Response to Rossi.Kyle G. Fritz &Daniel J.Miller -2019 -Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (2):379-384.In our 2018 paper, “Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame,” we offer an argument justifying the Nonhypocrisy Condition on the standing to blame. Benjamin Rossi (2018) has recently offered several criticisms of this view. We defend our account from Rossi’s criticisms and emphasize our account’s unique advantage: explaining why hypocritical blamers lack the standing to blame.
- British society.Leonard G. Hulls -1951 -History of Science 1 (5).No categories
- Semiotics 2008 (Proceedings of the 33rd annual meeting of the Semiotic Society of America.John N. Deely &Leonard G. Sbrocchi (eds.) -2009 - Legas Press.Export citation Bookmark
- Protecting human subjects in brain research: a pragmatic perspective.Franklin G.Miller & Fins & Joseph -2005 - In Judy Illes,Neuroethics: Defining the Issues in Theory, Practice, and Policy. Oxford University Press.Export citation Bookmark
- Ancient Japanese Nobility: The Kabane Ranking System.Felicia G. Bock &Richard J.Miller -1977 -Journal of the American Oriental Society 97 (4):579.No categories
- Ethik: philos.-eth. Forschungen in d. Sowjetunion.A. G. Kharchev &ReinholdMiller (eds.) -1976 - Berlin: Deutscher Verlag d. Wiss., VEB.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- (2 other versions)Two Problems of Self-Blame for Accounts of Moral Standing.Kyle G. Fritz &Daniel J.Miller -forthcoming -Ergo.Traditionally, those writing on blame have been concerned with blaming others, including when one has the standing to blame others. Yet some alleged problems for such accounts of standing arise when we focus on self-blame. First, if hypocrites lack the standing to blame others, it might seem that they also lack the standing to blame themselves. But this would lead to a bootstrapping problem, wherein hypocrites can only regain standing by doing that which they lack the standing to do. Second, (...) in addition to hypocrites, there may be hypercrites, who blame themselves more severely than others. Leading accounts for why hypocrites lack standing to blame others would also seem to imply that hypercrites lack the standing to blame others, but some may find this counterintuitive. We argue that neither of these problems from self-blame poses a unique threat to leading accounts of standing. (shrink)
- Un-making artificial moral agents.Deborah G. Johnson &Keith W.Miller -2008 -Ethics and Information Technology 10 (2-3):123-133.Floridi and Sanders, seminal work, “On the morality of artificial agents” has catalyzed attention around the moral status of computer systems that perform tasks for humans, effectively acting as “artificial agents.” Floridi and Sanders argue that the class of entities considered moral agents can be expanded to include computers if we adopt the appropriate level of abstraction. In this paper we argue that the move to distinguish levels of abstraction is far from decisive on this issue. We also argue that (...) adopting certain levels of abstraction out of context can be dangerous when the level of abstraction obscures the humans who constitute computer systems. We arrive at this critique of Floridi and Sanders by examining the debate over the moral status of computer systems using the notion of interpretive flexibility. We frame the debate as a struggle over the meaning and significance of computer systems that behave independently, and not as a debate about the ‘true’ status of autonomous systems. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that while levels of abstraction are useful for particular purposes, when it comes to agency and responsibility, computer systems should be conceptualized and identified in ways that keep them tethered to the humans who create and deploy them. (shrink)
- The ties that bind: connections, comet cursors, and consent.D. G. Johnson &K. W.Miller -2001 -Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 31 (1):12-16.Electronic communication and commerce facilitate the collection of information about individual use of the Internet. Focusing on the case of Comet Systems Inc. and its data gathering practices, this paper explores the technical details of gathering personal information in databases in general and the special character of the privacy issue raised by 'anonymous' information about individual behavior on the Internet. The case analysis suggests new insights for our understanding of privacy and frames a discussion of policy alternatives with respect to (...) the privacy of Internet communication. (shrink)
- Paul Litton and Franklin G.Miller Reply to Madeline M. Motta.Paul Litton &Franklin G.Miller -2005 -Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 33 (4):635-635.
- The Growth of Scientific Physiology.June Goodfield &Leonard G. Wilson -1964 -Isis 55 (3):349-351.
- Review Essay: A Deeper Understanding of Moral Standing. [REVIEW]Kyle G. Fritz &Daniel J.Miller -forthcoming -Journal of Moral Philosophy.Hypocrites, we are told, lack the moral standing to blame. But what is this standing to blame? Why would hypocrisy undermine it? Do any other conditions compromise standing to blame? Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s The Beam and the Mote offers the first book-length treatment on such complex questions. Yet the book admirably pushes even further, extending the scope of standing into other normative domains, such as praise, forgiveness, and encouragement. In our review, we critically engage with four of the book’s central topics: (...) (1) the nature and scope of the moral standing to blame, (2) why hypocrisy undermines standing to blame, (3) what other conditions undermine standing to blame, and (4) standing in other normative domains. Although we argue that Lippert-Rasmussen’s views on (2) and (4) require further development, his expansion of standing into underexplored domains is praiseworthy. (shrink)
- Actes du IXe Congrès international de Philosophie Médiévale, Ottawa, 17-22 août.Francis Cheneval,B. Carlos Bazan,Eduardo Andujar &Leonard G. Sbrocchi (eds.) -1995Export citation Bookmark
- The Doctor's Changing Role in Allocating U.S. and British Medical Services.Robert G. Lee &Frances H.Miller -1990 -Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 18 (1-2):69-76.
- Implementing Change in Nursing.Ingeborg G. Mauksch &Michael H.Miller -1981 - Mosby.
- Morals and money.Alvin G. Burstein,William A.Miller &Ralph Warren -1984 -Journal of Medical Humanities 5 (1):41-53.The authors review the implication of the term “professional,” especially those dealing with the need for an ethic of trustworthiness and those dealing with the expectation of being paid for services. The erosive potential generated by these foci is explored, and circumstances which magnify or might ameliorate the potential described. The article concludes with a consideration of the relationship between professional ethics and world-view.
- Essays in Memory of Richard Helgerson: Laureations.Leonard Barkan,Frances Dolan,Heather Dubrow,Edwin M. Duval,Margaret Ferguson,Barbara Fuchs,Patricia Fumerton,Andrew Hadfield,Patricia Clare Ingham,Andrew McRae,ShannonMiller,James Nohrnberg &Michael O'Connell (eds.) -2011 - University of Delaware Press.Essays in Memory of Richard Helgerson: Laureations brings together new essays by leading literary scholars of the British and European middle ages and early modern period who have been influenced by the groundbreaking scholarship of Richard Helgerson. The contributors evince the ongoing impact of Helgerson's work in critical debates including those of nationalism, formal analysis, and literary careerism.No categories
- On the Dignity of Man, On Being and the One, Heptaplus.Pico Della Mirandola,C. G. Wallis,P. J. W.Miller &D. Carmichael -1972 -Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 162:173-174.Export citation Bookmark
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
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Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
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James Chase
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Ezio Di Nucci
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Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
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Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
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