Results for 'Leonard Levin'
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- The Classic Jewish Philosophers: From Saadia Through the Renaissance.LeonardLevin (ed.) -2007 - Boston: Brill.This book provides a standard reference of the major medieval Jewish philosophers, as well as an eminently readable narrative of the course of medieval Jewish philosophical thought, presented as a response to the spiritual-intellectual challenges facing Judaism in that period.
- Isaac israeli.LeonardLevin -2008 -Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.No categories
- Leonard’s System: Why Doesn’t It Work?Joseph Levine -2009 - In Andrew Kania,Memento. Routledge.No categories
- Hume,Leonard J., "Bentham and Bureaucracy". [REVIEW]Andrew Levine -1982 -Ethics 93:639.
- Moving Beyond Us and Them? Marginality, Rhizomes, and Immanent Forgiveness.Valentine Moulard-Leonard -2012 -Hypatia 27 (4):828-846.Here, I offer a candid response to bell hooks's call for a testimony to the “movement beyond a mere ‘us and them’ discussion” that purportedly informs contemporary radical and feminist thought on difference. In alignment with a tradition that includes bell hooks, Audre Lorde, Gloria Anzaldúa, and Aurora Levins Morales, I offer a personal testimony to the ways in which I—a middle-class, French, immigrant, continental-philosophy-bred incest survivor—envision both that movement and its limits. To establish these alliances means forming necessary communities. (...) I call on the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari to propose an account of the production of such communities that does not depend only on shared lived experience, but also on shared marginal spatiality, temporality, and “medicinal history”. I suggest that on the one hand, Deleuze's philosophy of immanence may indeed find apt expression in the politics of integrity that hooks, Lorde, and Morales call for. On the other hand, a genuine politics of integrity may benefit from drawing on the philosophy of immanence, which alone offers alternatives to the traditional, oppositional models of difference informed by transcendence. Finally, I propose the concept of “immanent forgiveness” to capture the movement at issue. (shrink)
- On personal and public concerns: essays in Jewish philosophy.Eliezer Schweid -2014 - Brighton, MA: Academic Studies Press. Edited by Leonard Levin.Editor's introduction byLeonardLevin -- A personal viewpoint: autobiographical essay -- My way in the research and teaching of Jewish thought -- Judaism and the lonely Jew -- Faith: its trusting and testing - the question of God's righteousness -- History in the postmodern age -- The idolatrous values and rituals of the global village.No categories
- What is a phenomenal concept?JanetLevin -2006 - In Torin Alter & Sven Walter,Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press.
- Functionalism.JanetLevin -2008 -Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part. This doctrine is rooted in Aristotle's conception of the soul, and has antecedents in Hobbes's conception of the mind as a “calculating machine”, but it has become fully articulated (and popularly endorsed) only (...) in the last third of the 20th century. Though the term ‘functionalism’ is used to designate a variety of positions in a variety of other disciplines, including psychology, sociology, economics, and architecture, this entry focuses exclusively on functionalism as a philosophical thesis about the nature of mental states. (shrink)
- Change blindness blindness: The metacognitive error of overestimating change-detection ability.Daniel T.Levin,Nausheen Momen,Sarah B. Drivdahl &Daniel J. Simons -2000 -Visual Cognition 7 (1):397-412.
- What kind of explanation is truth.MichaelLevin -1984 - In Jarrett Leplin,Scientific Realism. University of California Press. pp. 124--139.
- Collected Writings.Leonard Woodbury -1991No categories
- Dispositional theories of color and the claims of common sense.JanetLevin -2000 -Philosophical Studies 100 (2):151-174.
- Could love be like a heatwave?: Physicalism and the subjective character of experience.JanetLevin -1986 -Philosophical Studies 49 (March):245-61.
- The evidential status of philosophical intuition.JanetLevin -2004 -Philosophical Studies 121 (3):193-224.Philosophers have traditionally held that claims about necessities and possibilities are to be evaluated by consulting our philosophical intuitions; that is, those peculiarly compelling deliverances about possibilities that arise from a serious and reflective attempt to conceive of counterexamples to these claims. But many contemporary philosophers, particularly naturalists, argue that intuitions of this sort are unreliable, citing examples of once-intuitive, but now abandoned, philosophical theses, as well as recent psychological studies that seem to establish the general fallibility of intuition.In the (...) first two sections of this paper, I evaluate these arguments, and also the counter-arguments of contemporary defenders of tradition. In the next two sections, I sketch an alternative account of the role of philosophical intuitions that incorporates elements of traditionalism and naturalism - and defend it against other such views. In the final section, however, I discuss intuitions about conscious experience, and acknowledge that my view may not extend comfortably to this case. This may seem unfortunate, since so much contemporary discussion of the epistemology of modality seems motivated by worries about the mind-body problem, and informed by the position one wishes to endorse. But, as I argue, if conscious experience is indeed an exception to the view I suggest in this paper, it is an exception that proves - and can illuminate - the rule. (shrink)
- Assertion, practical reason, and pragmatic theories of knowledge.JanetLevin -2008 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):359–384.Defenders of pragmatic theories of knowledge (such as contextualism and sensitive invariantism) argue that these theories, unlike those that invoke a single standard for knowledge, comport with the intuitively compelling thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion and practical reason. In this paper, I dispute this thesis, and argue that, therefore, the prospects for both “high standard” approach, and contend that if one abandons the thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion and practical reason, the most serious arguments (...) against it lose force. (shrink)
- The Cost of Free Speech: Pornography, Hate Speech, and Their Challenge to Liberalism.AbigailLevin -2010 - Palgrave-Macmillan.The distinctly contemporary proliferation of pornography and hate speech poses a challenge to liberalism's traditional ideal of a 'marketplace of ideas' facilitated by state neutrality about the content of speech. This new study argues that the liberal state ought to depart from neutrality to meet this challenge.
- Is the Generality Problem too General?MichaelLevin -2002 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):87-97.Reliabilism holds that knowledge is true belief reliably caused. Reliabilists should say something about individuating processes; critics deny that the right degree of generality can be specified without arbitrariness. It is argued that this criticism applies as well to processes mentioned in scientific explanations. The gratuitous puzzles created thereby show that the “generality problem” is illusory.
- Memory for centrally attended changing objects in an incidental real-world change detection paradigm.Daniel T.Levin,Daniel J. Simons,Bonnie L. Angelone &Christopher Chabris -2002 -British Journal of Psychology 93:289-302.
- Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem.Michael E.Levin -1979 - New York: Oxford University Press.Defends the ancient thesis that man is a piece of matter, that all his states are physical states, and all his properties physical properties. This is done in a metaphysical framework which accommodates talk of the identity and diversity of such 'virtual entites' as states and properties without being committed to their actual existence.
- Kripke's argument against the identity thesis.Michael E.Levin -1975 -Journal of Philosophy 72 (March):149-67.
- Justice in the Flesh.David MichaelLevin -1990 - In Galen A. Johnson & Michael Bradley Smith,Ontology and alterity in Merleau-Ponty. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
- Molyneux’s question and the individuation of perceptual concepts.JanetLevin -2008 -Philosophical Studies 139 (1):1 - 28.Molyneux's Question, that is, “Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere... and the blind man made to see: Quaere, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the globe, which the cube”, was discussed by many theorists in the 17th and 18th centuries, and has recently been addressed by contemporary philosophers interested in the nature, and identity conditions, of (...) perceptual concepts. My main concern in this paper is to argue – against Evans, Campbell, and a number of other contemporary philosophers – that a test of the sort Molyneux envisioned, at least if carefully designed and administered, can indeed be a crucial experiment for the claim that we deploy the same perceptual concepts when identifying shapes by sight and by touch. I will explore some implications of this argument for a theory of recognitional concepts. And I’ll try to trace out some unhappy consequences of various alternative views. (shrink)
- Bultmann—Barth and Catholic Theology.Heinrich Fries &Leonard Swidler -1967No categoriesExport citation
Bookmark - Change blindness blindness as visual metacognition.Daniel T.Levin -2002 -Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):111-30.Many experiments have demonstrated that people fail to detect seemingly large visual changes in their environment. Despite these failures, most people confidently predict that they would see changes that are actually almost impossible to see. Therefore, in at least some situations visual experience is demonstrably not what people think it is. This paper describes a line of research suggesting that overconfidence about change detection reflects a deeper metacognitive error founded on beliefs about attention and the role of meaning as a (...) support for a coherent perceptual experience. Accordingly, CBB does not occur in all situations , while the scope of the phenomenon remains broad enough to suggest more than a misunderstanding of a small niche of visual experience. I finish by arguing that despite the very small amount of research on visual metacognition, these beliefs are critical to understand. (shrink)
- Analytic functionalism and the reduction of phenomenal states.JanetLevin -1991 -Philosophical Studies 61 (March):211-38.
- A Modern Introduction to Logic.John W. Blyth &Henry S.Leonard -1959 -Philosophy of Science 26 (2):149-150.
- (1 other version)Responses to race differences in crime.MichaelLevin -1992 -Journal of Social Philosophy 23 (1):5-29.
- On theory-change and meaning-change.Michael E.Levin -1979 -Philosophy of Science 46 (3):407-424.I argue against the currently popular view that a radical change in theory affects the meaning of theoretical terms, and hence render pre- and post-shift theories incomparable. I first show how to pose the meaning-change issue without appeal to meanings reified. I contend that arguments against theory-neutral observation languages are faulty, but that even if they were sound, there are semantic devices that allow a theory to refer to the factual basis of a competitor. This suggests a picture of science (...) as the accumulation of truths, with each successive stage being more stable. (shrink)
- Functionalism and the argument from conceivability.JanetLevin -1985 -Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 11:85-104.In recent years, functionalism has emerged as the most appealing candidate for a materialistic theory of mind. Its central thesis - that types of mental states can be defined in terms of their causal and counterfactual relations to the sensory stimulations, other internal states, and behavior of the entities that have them - offers hope for a reasonable materialism: it promises type-identity conditions for beliefs, sensations, and emotions that are not irreducibly mental, yet would permit entities that are physically quite (...) different to be in mental states of the same type. (shrink)
- Taking type-b materialism seriously.JanetLevin -2008 -Mind and Language 23 (4):402-425.Abstract: Type-B materialism is the thesis that though phenomenal states are necessarily identical with physical states, phenomenal concepts have no a priori connections to physical or functional concepts. Though type-B materialists have invoked this conceptual independence to counter a number of well-known arguments against physicalism (e.g. the conceivability of zombies, the ignorance of Mary, the existence of an 'explanatory gap'), anti-physicalists have raised objections to this strategy. My aim here is to defend type-B materialism against these objections, by arguing that (...) they share the common problem of not taking the central features of the view sufficiently seriously. However, I will end by noting that type-B materialism raises other questions, and suggesting that what stands in the way of an adequate naturalistic account of phenomenal states may be the propensity to take type-B materialism more seriously than it deserves. (shrink)
- The extensionality of causation and causal-explanatory contexts.Michael E.Levin -1976 -Philosophy of Science 43 (2):266-277.I argue that 'c' occurs extensionally in 'c caused e' and 'D' occurs extensionally in 'c caused e because c is D'. I claim that this has been insufficiently appreciated because the two contexts are often run together and because it has not been clear that the description D of c is among the referents of an explanatory argument. I argue as well that Hume's analysis of causation is consistent with taking causation to be a relation between single events, and (...) that even if events are eliminated as virtual entities, extensionality holds for all terms in the resulting context. (shrink)
- Why we believe in other minds.MichaelLevin -1984 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (March):343-59.
- Reflection of risk preferences and scale of magnitude.K. Kuhn,Ll Lopes &IpLevin -1991 -Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 29 (6):513-513.Export citation Bookmark
- Nagel vs. Nagel on the nature of phenomenal concepts.JanetLevin -2007 -Ratio 20 (3):293–307.In a footnote to his ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’, Thomas Nagel sketches a promising account of phenomenal concepts that purports to explain why mind-body identity statements, even if necessary, will always seem contingent. Christopher Hill and Brian McLaughlin have recently developed this sketch into a more robust theory. In Nagel's more recent work, however, he suggests that the only adequate theory of phenomenal concepts is one that makes the relation between phenomenal and physical states intelligible, or (...) ‘transparent’. Developing such a theory, however, appears to be no easy task. In this paper I argue that the Nagel-Hill-McLaughlin proposal is preferable – and that a serious problem with it, noticed by Stephen Yablo, can be avoided by revising the proposal according to some further suggestions made by Nagel himself. (shrink)
- Lying to ourselves: dishonesty in the Army profession.Leonard Wong -2015 - Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press. Edited by Stephen J. Gerras.Untruthfulness is surprisingly common in the U.S. military even though members of the profession are loath to admit it. Further, much of the deception and dishonesty that occurs in the profession of arms is actually encouraged and sanctioned by the military institution. The end result is a profession whose members often hold and propagate a false sense of integrity that prevents the profession from addressing -- or even acknowledging -- the duplicity and deceit throughout the formation. It takes remarkable courage (...) and candor for leaders to admit the gritty shortcomings and embarrassing frailties of the military as an organization in order to better the military as a profession. Such a discussion, however, is both essential and necessary for the health of the military profession"--Publisher's web site. (shrink)
- Introduction to Ethics: An Open Educational Resource, collected and edited by NoahLevin.NoahLevin,Nathan Nobis,David Svolba,Brandon Wooldridge,Kristina Grob,Eduardo Salazar,Benjamin Davies,Jonathan Spelman,Elizabeth Cady Stanton,Kristin Seemuth Whaley,Jan F. Jacko &Prabhpal Singh (eds.) -2019 - Huntington Beach, California: N.G.E Far Press.Collected and edited by NoahLevin -/- Table of Contents: -/- UNIT ONE: INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY ETHICS: TECHNOLOGY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND IMMIGRATION 1 The “Trolley Problem” and Self-Driving Cars: Your Car’s Moral Settings (NoahLevin) 2 What is Ethics and What Makes Something a Problem for Morality? (David Svolba) 3 Letter from the Birmingham City Jail (Martin Luther King, Jr) 4 A Defense of Affirmative Action (NoahLevin) 5 The Moral Issues of Immigration (B.M. Wooldridge) 6 The (...) Ethics of our Digital Selves (NoahLevin) -/- UNIT TWO: TORTURE, DEATH, AND THE “GREATER GOOD” 7 The Ethics of Torture (Martine Berenpas) 8 What Moral Obligations do we have (or not have) to Impoverished Peoples? (B.M. Wooldridge) 9 Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing (Nathan Nobis) 10 An Argument Against Capital Punishment (NoahLevin) 11 Common Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis & Kristina Grob) 12 Better (Philosophical) Arguments about Abortion (Nathan Nobis & Kristina Grob) -/- UNIT THREE: PERSONS, AUTONOMY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND RIGHTS 13 Animal Rights (Eduardo Salazar) 14 John Rawls and the “Veil of Ignorance” (Ben Davies) 15 Environmental Ethics: Climate Change (Jonathan Spelman) 16 Rape, Date Rape, and the “Affirmative Consent” Law in California (NoahLevin) 17 The Ethics of Pornography: Deliberating on a Modern Harm (Eduardo Salazar) 18 The Social Contract (Thomas Hobbes) -/- UNIT FOUR: HAPPINESS 19 Is Pleasure all that Matters? Thoughts on the “Experience Machine” (Prabhpal Singh) 20 Utilitarianism (J.S. Mill) 21 Utilitarianism: Pros and Cons (B.M. Wooldridge) 22 Existentialism, Genetic Engineering, and the Meaning of Life: The Fifths (NoahLevin) 23 The Solitude of the Self (Elizabeth Cady Stanton) 24 Game Theory, the Nash Equilibrium, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Douglas E. Hill) -/- UNIT FIVE: RELIGION, LAW, AND ABSOLUTE MORALITY 25 The Myth of Gyges and The Crito (Plato) 26 God, Morality, and Religion (Kristin Seemuth Whaley) 27 The Categorical Imperative (Immanuel Kant) 28 The Virtues (Aristotle) 29 Beyond Good and Evil (Friedrich Nietzsche) 30 Other Moral Theories: Subjectivism, Relativism, Emotivism, Intuitionism, etc. (Jan F. Jacko). (shrink)
- Demons, possibility and evidence.MichaelLevin -2000 -Noûs 34 (3):422–440.No categories
- Virtue epistemology: No new cures.MichaelLevin -2004 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):397–410.One version of virtue epistemology defines knowledge as belief whose truth arises from, or is explained by, the motives that produced it. This version is also intended to solve the Gettier problem, by shielding properly caused beliefs from double accidents. Unfortunately, there is no notion of "explains" or "arises from" which explains in the intended sense the truth of true beliefs.
- CORCORAN'S 27 ENTRIES IN THE 1999 SECOND EDITION.John Corcoran -1995 - In Robert Audi,The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. New York City: Cambridge University Press. pp. 65-941.Corcoran’s 27 entries in the 1999 second edition of Robert Audi’s Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge UP]. -/- ancestral, axiomatic method, borderline case, categoricity, Church (Alonzo), conditional, convention T, converse (outer and inner), corresponding conditional, degenerate case, domain, De Morgan, ellipsis, laws of thought, limiting case, logical form, logical subject, material adequacy, mathematical analysis, omega, proof by recursion, recursive function theory, scheme, scope, Tarski (Alfred), tautology, universe of discourse. -/- The entire work is available online free at more than (...) one website. Paste the whole URL. http://archive.org/stream/RobertiAudi_The.Cambridge.Dictionary.of.Philosophy/Robert.Audi_The.Cambrid ge.Dictionary.of.Philosophy -/- The 2015 third edition will be available soon. Before you think of buying it read some reviews on Amazon and read reviews of its competition: For example, my review of the 2008 Oxford Companion to Philosophy, History and Philosophy of Logic,29:3,291-292. URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340701300429 -/- Some of the entries have already been found to be flawed. For example, Tarski’s expression ‘materially adequate’ was misinterpreted in at least one article and it was misused in another where ‘materially correct’ should have been used. The discussion provides an opportunity to bring more flaws to light. -/- Acknowledgements: Each of these entries was presented at meetings of The Buffalo Logic Dictionary Project sponsored by The Buffalo Logic Colloquium. The members of the colloquium read drafts before the meetings and were generous with corrections, objections, and suggestions. Usually one 90-minute meeting was devoted to one entry although in some cases, for example, “axiomatic method”, took more than one meeting. Moreover, about half of the entries are rewrites of similarly named entries in the 1995 first edition. Besides the help received from people in Buffalo, help from elsewhere was received by email. We gratefully acknowledge the following: José Miguel Sagüillo, John Zeis, Stewart Shapiro, Davis Plache, Joseph Ernst, Richard Hull, Concha Martinez, Laura Arcila, James Gasser, Barry Smith, Randall Dipert, Stanley Ziewacz, Gerald Rising,Leonard Jacuzzo, George Boger, William Demopolous, David Hitchcock, John Dawson, Daniel Halpern, William Lawvere, John Kearns, Ky Herreid, Nicolas Goodman, William Parry, Charles Lambros, Harvey Friedman, George Weaver, Hughes Leblanc, James Munz, Herbert Bohnert, Robert Tragesser, DavidLevin, Sriram Nambiar, and others. -/- . (shrink)
- Induction and Husserl's theory of eidetic variation.David MichaelLevin -1968 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (1):1-15.
- The Socratic Method.Leonard Nelson -1980 -Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children 2 (2):34-38.No categories
- A Formal Treatment of Gene Identity, Genetic Causation, and Related Notions.MichaelLevin -1994 -Behavior and Philosophy 22 (2):49 - 58.
- A remark on field S account of meaning.MichaelLevin -1983 - In Alex Orenstein & Rafael Stern,Developments in Semantics. Haven. pp. 2--259.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Critical and intensive care ethics.Phillip D.Levin &Charles L. Sprung -2008 - In Peter A. Singer & A. M. Viens,The Cambridge textbook of bioethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 462.Export citation Bookmark
- (1 other version)Concentration = growth = ? : A view of the American publishing landscape.MartinLevin -2004 -Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 15 (2):95-97.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Confidence in judgments based on incomplete information.IpLevin &Rd Johnson -1986 -Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 24 (5):351-351.Export citation Bookmark
- Can Locke's Theory of Property Inform the Court on Fifth Amendment" Takings" Law?Oren M.Levin-Waldman -1996 -Public Affairs Quarterly 10 (4):355-377.
- Liberals' Opposition to Workfare a Misunderstanding of Their Philosophic Tradition.Oren M.Levin-Waldman -1994 -Public Affairs Quarterly 8 (4):341-357.
- Marx, Engels and Liberal Democracy.MichaelLevin -1991 -Studies in Soviet Thought 41 (2):145-146.No categories
- Non-Paradigmatic Forms: Suppletion or Preemption?SaulLevin -1972 -Foundations of Language 8 (3):346-359.
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