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The present study is couched within Rachman's three-pathway theory of fear acquisition. Besides the direct contact with the objects of fear, this model also includes two indirect pathways to fear acquisition: negative information transmission and modeling. The study aims to explore the contribution of these three factors to the level of children's fear of COVID-19. The sample consisted of 376 children, aged 7–19, and one of their parents. The survey was conducted online during the COVID-19 national state of emergency in (...) the Republic of Serbia. The children assessed their fear of COVID-19, general fearfulness, negative information transmission, and modeling by their parents, as well as the level of exposure to negative information outside their home. The parents assessed their own fear of COVID-19 and trait anxiety. Parents' anxiety, children's age, and children's general fearfulness were used as covariates. The results of our path analysis provide support for Rachman's notion of indirect pathways. The more the parents were afraid of COVID-19, the more they expressed this, which in turn led to an increase in the children's fear of COVID-19. Furthermore, children's exposure to negative information related to COVID-19, provided by their teachers and peers or stemming from the media, directly contributed to the level of children's fear. The results of the study emphasize the importance of caregivers' behavior during global health crises and provide some clues as to what caregivers may do to protect their children's mental health in such circumstances. (shrink)

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This article defends the view that liars need not intend to deceive. I present common objections to this view in detail and then propose a case of a liar who can lie but who cannot deceive in any relevant sense. I then modify this case to get a situation in which this person lies intending to tell his hearer the truth and he does this by way of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to tell the truth by lying. (...) This case, and further cases that I develop from it, demonstrate that lying without the intention to deceive is possible. (shrink)

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In their paper published in 2017 in Philosophical Psychology, Ronja Rutschmann and Alex Wiegmann introduce a novel kind of lies, the indifferent lies. According to them, these lies are not intended to deceive simply because the liars do not care whether their audience is going to believe them or not. It seems as if indifferent lies avoid the objections raised against other kinds of lies supposedly not intended to deceive. I argue that this is not correct. Indifferent lies, too, are (...) either intended to deceive or are not lies at all, since they do not involve genuine assertions. (shrink)

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In his 2018 AJP paper, Shlomo Cohen hints that deception could be a distinct subset of manipulation. We pursue this thought further, but by arguing that Cohen’s accounts of deception and manipulation are incorrect. Deception under uncertainty need not involve adding false premises to the victim’s reasoning but it must involve manipulating her response, and cases of manipulation that do not interfere with the victim’s reasoning, but rather utilize it, also exist. Therefore, deception under uncertainty must be constituted by covert (...) manipulation. (shrink)

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Sorensen says that my assertion that p is a knowledge-lie if it is meant to undermine your justification for believing truly that ∼p, not to make you believe that p and that, therefore, knowledge-lies are not intended to deceive. It has been objected that they are meant to deceive because they are intended to make you more confident in a falsehood. In this paper, I propose a novel account according to which an assertion that p is a knowledge-lie if it (...) is intended not to provide evidence that p but to make you stop trusting all testimonies concerning whether p, which is how they undermine your testimonial knowledge. Because they are not intended to provide evidence that bears on the truth of p, they are not intended to make you more confident in a falsehood; therefore, knowledge-lies are not intended to deceive. This makes them a problem for the traditional account, which takes the intention to deceive as necessary for lying, and an interesting example of Kant's idea that allowing lies whenever one feels like it would bring it about that statements in general are not believed. (shrink)

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We conducted two experiments to determine whether common folk think that so-called _tell-tale sign_ bald-faced lies are intended to deceive—since they have not been tested before. These lies involve tell-tale signs (e.g. blushing) that show that the speaker is lying. Our study was designed to avoid problems earlier studies raise (these studies focus on a kind of bald-faced lie in which supposedly everyone knows that what the speaker says is false). Our main hypothesis was that the participants will think that (...) the protagonists from our examples lied without intending to deceive, and the results of our surveys confirmed this hypothesis: most of our participants rated tell-tale sign lies as lies not intended to deceive. Therefore, our analysis suggests that common folk think that some lies are not intended to deceive. (shrink)

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In this paper, I examine a kind of delusion in which the patients judge that their occurrent thoughts are false and try to abandon them precisely because they are false, but fail to do so. I call this delusion transparent, since it is transparent to the sufferer that their thought is false. In explaining this phenomenon, I defend a particular two-factor theory of delusion that takes the proper integration of relevant reasoning processes as vital for thought-evaluation. On this proposal, which (...) is a refinement of Gerrans’s account of delusion as unsupervised by decontextualized processing, I can have all my reasoning processes working reliably and thus judge that my delusion is false but, if I cannot use their outputs when revising the thought itself, the delusion will persist. I also sketch how this framework explains some interesting cases of failed belief-revision in the general population in which people judge that ~p but nonetheless continue to believe that p. (shrink)

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Arguably, the existence of bald-faced (i.e. knowingly undisguised) lies entails that not all lies are intended to deceive. Two kinds of bald-faced lies exist in the literature: those based on some common knowledge that implies that you are lying and those that involve tell-tale signs (e.g. blushing) that show that you are lying. I designed the tell-tale sign bald-faced lies to avoid objections raised against the common knowledge bald-faced lies but I now see that they are more problematic than what (...) I initially thought. Therefore, I will discuss these lies in more detail, refine the existing cases, and resolve some anticipated objections. I conclude that tell-tale sign bald-faced lies are genuine lies not intended to deceive. (shrink)

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This paper argues that extant signalling-based analyses cannot explain a range of cases of biological (and psychological) deception, such as those in which the deceiver does not send a signal at all, but that Artiga and Paternotte’s (Philos Stud 175:579–600, 2018) functional and my (Krstić in The analysis of self-deception: rehabilitating the traditionalist account. PhD Dissertation, University of Auckland, 2018: §3;Krstić and Saville in Australas J Philos 97:830–835, 2019) manipulativist analyses can. Therefore, the latter views should be (...) given preference. And because we still do not have a satisfactory definition of manipulation, the functional analysis, according to which a state is deceptive iff its function is to mislead and it misleads, is currently our best theory of deception. This is not to argue that the signalling-based analyses have no value but only that they should not be used in general analyses of biological deception. We need to move on to some other interesting issues. (shrink)

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A satisfactory analysis of human deception must rule out cases where it is a mistake or an accident that person B was misled by person A's behavior. Therefore, most scholars think that deceivers must intend to deceive. This article argues that there is a better solution: rather than appealing to the deceiver's intentions, we should appeal to the function of their behavior. After all, animals and plants engage in deception, and most of them are not capable of forming intentions. Accordingly, (...) certain human behavior is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead. This solves our problem because if the function of A's behavior was to mislead, B's ending up misled was not an accident or a mere mistake even if A did not intend to deceive B. (shrink)

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According to one influential argument put forward by, e.g. Chisholm and Feehan, Pfister, Meibauer, Dynel, Keiser, and Harris, asserting requires intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say (first premise) and, because liars must assert what they believe is false (second premise), liars necessarily intend to cause their hearer to believe as true what the liars believe is false (conclusion). According to this argument, that is, all genuine lies are intended to deceive. ‘Lies’ not intended to (...) deceive are not genuine lies because they do not involve assertions and you need to assert in order to lie. In this paper, I reject this argument by arguing that the first premise is false: intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say is not necessary for asserting. (shrink)

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The use of war metaphors in COVID–19 crisis communication has prompted great metalinguistic attention and highlighted the role of conflict memory in crisis discourse. Still, discourses of collective memory are to date rarely integrated with the study of metaphor and crisis communication, though frequently observed in crisis metaphor analyses in post–conflict contexts. This study focuses on the relations between the war metaphor and war memory as seen specifically in post–conflict settings. Set across three post–Yugoslav states, it starts from an examination (...) of WAR metaphor use and its relations to war memory discourses in early pandemic political leaders' announcements, and citizen responses to these. Second, it zooms in on the patterns of metaphor negotiation and contestation in citizen discourses in particular. The findings show how the early pandemic discourse drew on heavily militarized metaphoricity, which revived nationalist images of the country's violent breakup in the 1990s but also gave rise to ample contestation in public space, revealing differing positionings in politicians' and citizens' discourses. The analysis allows a discussion of some implications pertaining to the relations of metaphor, collective memory and crisis communication, as well as the increasingly laden affective potentials of war and history in times when ‘war is never far away’. (shrink)

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This paper examines the connection between lies, deception, and self-deception. Understanding this connection is important because the consensus is that you cannot deceive yourself by lying since you cannot make yourself believe as true a proposition you already believe is false – and, as a liar, you must assert a proposition you believe is false. My solution involves refining our analysis of lying: people can lie by asserting what they confidently believe is true. Thus, self-deceivers need not replace one belief (...) with another; rather, they may just increase existing credence in a proposition they already believe is true. (shrink)

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Ovaj rad želi u dilemama s kojima se suočavaju suvremene društvene znanosti pri nastojanju artikuliranja koncepcije kolektivnog identiteta prepoznati motive mišljenja identiteta koje je već iskušavala spekulativna filozofska tradicija. Čini se da jednim zaobilaznim i tako reći »empirijskim« putem prve ponavljaju paradokse potonje: udarajući na samu granicu diskurzivnog poimanja identiteta, svjedoče o unutrašnjoj proturječnosti i, istovremeno, neophodnosti njegovog instaliranja. Oba pristupa ustanovljuju neizbježnu »dijalektičku« suigru identiteta i razlike, koji se, čak i u svojim radikalnim samoafirmacijama, međusobno podrazumijevaju, konstituiraju i podržavaju. (...) Upitno, međutim, ostaje koliko je takva njihova »apstraktna« strukturalna su-upućenost operativna, kao i je li moguće misliti mimo ili preko nje.In confronting dilemmas of contemporary social science when attempting to articulate the concept of collective identity, this paper would try to recognize the motives of thinking the identity that has already been tried by the speculative philosophical tradition. It appears that in roundabout, so called “empirical” way the former are repeating the paradox of the latter: aiming at the boundary of the discursive understanding of the identity, they testify inner contradictions, and at the same time, necessity of establishing it. Both approaches ascertain unavoidable “dialectical” inter-play of the identity and the difference, that even in their radical self affirmation, imply, constitute, and endorse one another. However, there is still the question of how much is this “abstract” structural co-dependency operative, and also, is it possible to think past it or over it. (shrink)

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For J. Brown the essential feature of thought experiments is that they mobilize our intuition; the way they teach positive lessons to cognizers is by means of the intuition mobilized. The paper presents a problem for Brown with the help of a famous TE as counterexample. It argues that Berkeley’s master argument is a philosophical thought experiment that lacks a feature typical of platonic thought experiments -- intuitive grasp. If Berkeley’s argument is a thought experiment,as I’ve attempted to show, then (...) we have a counterexample to Brown’s view that thought experiments are not arguments. (shrink)

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The paper concentrates on issues of intentionality subdivided into four particular sub-issues. First, is there an intentional object of depression and of states like depression? Second, according to the strong intentionalist view defended by T. Crane, what it is like to be in a mental state is fixed by the mental state’s mode and its content; but mode is not sufficiently well-defined in his analysis. Third, how can the intentionalist explain phenomenological richness of conscious mental states? Crane appeals to non-conceptual (...) content. But in order to have such and such a content, e.g. such and such a pain, one has to recognize it on some later occasion, i.e. to be able to discriminate pains. But, discrimination brings us to concepts. It turns out that non-conceptual content is in fact just a non-linguistic or not yet lexicalized concept. Namely, in order to be re-identifiable, a pain must have a determinate and recognizable sharpness, continuity, and intensity. These are traditionally properties of a pain quale. A quale is also recognizable, it explains richness of experience, and it does not require language capability. The question is what is it that quale and non-conceptual content do not share? What sets one apart from the other? Fourth, what is the relation between the intentional object and content? (shrink)

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The first excursion to Greece for classicists after World War II – and likely the first one since the university was established in 1919 – was devised by Professor Milan Grošelj for his classical seminar in 1958. Those were the years when every effort was made to eliminate classical gymnasia in Slovenia, and they were eventually abolished in 1958. However, we, the students of those days, still considered ourselves fortunate. Our professors were professionally sound; they took their calling seriously and (...) were aware that they were not merely experts but also teachers and educators. Therefore, the excursions were a serious matter, far from merely fun and charming trips. (shrink)

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Self-deception makes best sense as a self-defensive mechanism by which the self protects itself from painful reality. Hence, we typically imagine self-deceivers as people who cause themselves to believe as true what they want to be true. Some self-deceivers, however, end up believing what they do not want to be true. Their behaviour can be explained on the hypothesis that the function of this behaviour is protecting the agent's perceived focal benefit at the cost of inflicting short-term harm, which is (...) a basis for a unified account of the phenomenon. In this paper, I argue that this view is narrow. Cases of altruistic, benevolent, and even self-punishing self-deception also exist. There, the function is not the self-deceiver's benefit. In fact, self-deception may have no function at all. Therefore, I put forward a novel account that analyses the function of self-deception on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)

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To assess the prevalence of plagiarism in manuscripts submitted for publication in the Croatian Medical Journal (CMJ). All manuscripts submitted in 2009–2010 were analyzed using plagiarism detection software: eTBLAST , CrossCheck, and WCopyfind . Plagiarism was suspected in manuscripts with more than 10% of the text derived from other sources. These manuscripts were checked against the Déjà vu database and manually verified by investigators. Of 754 submitted manuscripts, 105 (14%) were identified by the software as suspicious of plagiarism. Manual verification (...) confirmed that 85 (11%) manuscripts were plagiarized: 63 (8%) were true plagiarism and 22 (3%) were self-plagiarism. Plagiarized manuscripts were mostly submitted from China (21%), Croatia (14%), and Turkey (19%). There was no significant difference in the text similarity rate between plagiarized and self-plagiarized manuscripts (25% [95% CI 22–27%] vs. 28% [95% CI 20–33%]; U = 645.50; P = 0.634). Differences in text similarity rate were found between various sections of self-plagiarized manuscripts (H = 12.65, P = 0.013). The plagiarism rate in the Materials and Methods (61% (95% CI 41–68%) was higher than in the Results (23% [95% CI 17–36%], U = 33.50; P = 0.009) or Discussion (25.5 [95% CI 15–35%]; U = 57.50; P< 0.001) sections. Three authors were identified in the Déjà vu database. Plagiarism detection software combined with manual verification may be used to detect plagiarized manuscripts and prevent their publication. The prevalence of plagiarized manuscripts submitted to the CMJ , a journal dedicated to promoting research integrity, was 11% in the 2-year period 2009–2010. (shrink)

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Unavailability of published data and studies focused on young researchers in Europe and research integrity issues reveals that clear understanding and stance on this subject within European area is lacking. Our study provides information on attitudes and experiences of European researchers at early career stages, based on a limited sample of respondents. The study provides both quantitative and qualitative results for the examined issues. The data suggest that awareness and interest of the younger researchers surveyed in research integrity issues is (...) high, however, it is often based on self-initiatives, with many of the respondents not having adequate training or any possibility to obtain it. Our attitude survey conducted within the European Council of Doctoral Candidates and Junior Researchers indicates that only 22 % of respondents had an opportunity to obtain relevant training, and that only one third believed that institutions and supervisors regularly paid attention to it. Further, we noted certain differences between disciplines. The study also reveals that many younger researchers felt they faced problems due to the misconduct of their senior colleagues and the existing institutional culture. The results of the study indicate a need for better prevention mechanisms, training and raising awareness activities. Preferably, junior researchers should be given an active role in shaping the integrity culture. It should be noted that the presented results should be considered in the context of the limitations stemming from the small-scale survey. This paper encourages further research activities on research integrity practices to provide stronger evidence on the attitudes and experiences of young researchers in Europe and other parts of the world. (shrink)

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In his article, Grossmann argues that, in the context of human cooperative caregiving, heightened fearfulness in children and human sensitivity to fear in others are adaptive traits. I offer and briefly defend a rival hypothesis: Heightened fearfulness among infants and young children is a maladaptive trait that did not get deselected in the process of evolution because human sensitivity to fear in others mitigates its disadvantageous effects to a sufficient extent.

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This paper rejects an argument defending the view that the boundary between deception and manipulation is such that some manipulations intended to cause false beliefs count as non-deceptive. On the strongest version of this argument, if a specific behaviour involves compromising the victim’s reasoning, then the behaviour is manipulative but not deceptive, and if it involves exposing the victim to misleading evidence that justifies her false belief, then it is deceptive but not manipulative. This argument has been consistently used as (...) a reason to reject the traditional analysis of human deception, according to which intentionally causing someone to acquire a false belief is sufficient for deception. And because the traditional analysis is also consistent with our most basic intuitions about deception, it does matter whether this argument succeeds. (shrink)

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The pointwise ergodic theorem is nonconstructive. In this paper, we examine origins of this non-constructivity, and determine the logical strength of the theorem and of the auxiliary statements used to prove it. We discuss properties of integrable functions and of measure preserving transformations and give three proofs of the theorem, though mostly focusing on the one derived from the mean ergodic theorem. All the proofs can be carried out in ACA₀; moreover, the pointwise ergodic theorem is equivalent to (ACA) over (...) the base theory RCA₀. (shrink)

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Deceptionism about lying is the view that all lies are intended to deceive. This view sits uneasily with some cases that seem to involve lies not intended to deceive. We call these lies bald-faced because the liar lies while believing that the hearer knows that they are lying. The most recent deceptionist argument put forward by Rudnicki and Odrowąż-Sypniewska (this journal) defends the view that all genuine bald-faced lies are intended to deceive some of their hearers. I argue that this (...) argument is interesting but problematic: its premises do not support the view that all bald-faced lies are intended to deceive but rather only that some people who bald-faced lie to institutions or large audiences intend to deceive someone. Also, genuine bald-faced lies addressed at institutions are intended to (non-deceptively) manipulate institutions rather than deceive anyone. (shrink)

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The paper discusses Rey’s projectivism. It offers an argument against it and in favor of the reliability of introspection. In short, if it is fallible, then at least sometimes it has to be veridical. Therefore, introspection can’t be systematically deceptive. But then, some introspective beliefs are true and at least some phenomenal conscious states exist.

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Traditionalists affirm that in self-deception I intend to deceive myself; but, on the standard account of interpersonal deception, according to which deceiver intend to make their target believe a falsehood, traditionalism generates paradoxes, arising from the fact that I will surely know that I want to make myself believe a falsehood. In this thesis, I argue that these well-known paradoxes need not arise under my manipulativist account of deception. In particular, I defend traditionalism about self-deception by showing that what causes (...) paradoxes is not the idea that self-deception is an intrapersonal analogue of interpersonal deception but rather our incorrect conceptions of deception, interpersonal deception, and lying. I show, by way of counterexamples, that the essence of deception is not ending up epistemically worse off but rather being intentionally manipulated into forming or retaining a certain truth-evaluable mental state. Vitally, contra the standard view, the deceiver need not hold that the mental state he intends to produce in the deceived involves a falsehood; in fact, the targeted effect may involve a proposition believed by the deceiver to be true or about whose truth the deceiver suspends belief. Any phenomenon rightly called self-deception, I argue, involves an action in which the person intentionally manipulates (by way of a trick) her own way of forming or retaining some truth-evaluable mental state of her own (belief or a belief-like thought). Thus, on the manipulativist view, a self-deceiver may non-paradoxically intend to deceive himself: the relevant intention is to affect a particular truth-evaluable thought by way of non-deviantly manipulating his agential use of his own cognitive capacities. While all cases of self-deception involve intentional manipulation of the self by the self, how this manipulative trick works out varies in different kinds of cases. In some cases, the self-deceptive manipulative trick is not intentional under that description, a description that captures the so-called deflationary view. Although the manipulativist account allows for numerous different strategies of self-deception, and is consistent with both traditionalism and deflationism, it cannot, by itself, vindicate the idea of lying to oneself. On the standard conception, lying to myself is practically impossible (if the mind is not partitioned) and this is because the very forming the intention to lie to myself – as including the intention to make myself believe my own lie – seems very unlikely. Arguably, people will not φ if they think that φ-ing is impossible. I argue that some kinds of behaviour typically understood as self-deception are actually cases in which the person is lying to herself without the intention to deceive herself; rather, she avoids legitimising an unfavourable state of affairs by openly affirming its contrary. It may also be the case, however, that some lies to oneself are aimed at deceiving – this is because, as I argue, liars need not assert what they believe is false; hence, by lying to myself, I may intend to increase my confidence in the belief I already hold. Finally, the motive for self-deception is always a matter of preserving the person’s endorsed idealised picture of reality. This account allows me to explain all possible cases of self-deception. In the last chapter, I apply my theory to some paradigmatic cases first outlined in my introduction. (shrink)

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In this paper, I argue (1) that the contents of some delusions are believed with sufficient confidence; (2) that a delusional subject could have a conscious belief in the content of his delusion (p), and concurrently judge a contradictory content (not-p) – his delusion could be transparent, and (3) that the existence of even one such case reveals a problem with pretty much all existing accounts of lying, since it suggests that one can lie by asserting what one consciously and (...) confidently believes is true, and (4) sincerity, since it suggests that asserting a proposition you believe is true is neither sufficient nor necessary for sincerity. If I am right about (1) and (2), then (3) and (4) follow easily. Therefore, the paper is mainly devoted to an analysis of transparent delusion and defending (1) and (2). (shrink)

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It is estimated that in Croatia around 12 000 children have one or both parents in prison, while the number of children of ex-prisoners is even higher. Children of prisoners are stigmatized on daily basis, due to parental incarceration. Regarding the fact that educational institutions can be a safe-places with strong protective role, the survey among pedagogical professionals towards children of prisoners was conducted. Results showed that pedagogical professionals nurture biological determinism, with inconsistency in structural aspects of affects, behavior, and (...) cognition. The structure of the attitudes is not connected with professionals’ working experience, and their formal level of education. However, in the cognition subscale, more positive attitudes have pedagogical professionals with previous experiences with children of prisoners. Obtained results reveal the need for further education about children of prisoners, as well as the need for strengthening the social support for children and families, including peer support, advocacy aimed at broader society, intersectoral cooperation, and participative research engaging the children, families and prisoners. (shrink)

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This paper argues that extant signalling-based analyses cannot explain a range of cases of biological (and psychological) deception, such as those in which the deceiver does not send a signal at all, but that Artiga and Paternotte’s (Philos Stud 175:579–600, 2018) functional and my (Krstić in The analysis of self-deception: rehabilitating the traditionalist account. PhD Dissertation, University of Auckland, 2018: §3;Krstić and Saville in Australas J Philos 97:830–835, 2019) manipulativist analyses can. Therefore, the latter views should be (...) given preference. And because we still do not have a satisfactory definition of manipulation, the functional analysis, according to which a state is deceptive iff its function is to mislead and it misleads, is currently our best theory of deception. This is not to argue that the signalling-based analyses have no value but only that they should not be used in general analyses of biological deception. We need to move on to some other interesting issues. (shrink)

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This chapter provides a brief history of the concept of emancipation and its applications in and relationship with education, starting with the Enlightenment and considering both the continuation and the critique of this tradition that has further shaped the relationship between education and emancipation. The tension between two meanings of emancipation—personal, intellectual emancipation on the one hand, and political emancipation of the oppressed and the entire society on the other—comes into view in the divergence between Kantian and Marxists paths to (...) emancipation. The chapter goes on to consider the ideas by notable classic thinkers who further developed the Enlightenment ideal of emancipatory education by democratizing it (Freire, Habermas, Dewey, Popper), but also outright questioned some of its main aspects (Peirce, Berlin, Rancière). Nevertheless, even the critics of the Enlightenment mentioned here stay faithful to the ideals of equality and freedom that were formulated in the Age of Reason. And here we are, facing “new” and “old” challenges and media. The chapter then presents the content of this volume, commenting on each chapter and reflecting on how the book Rethinking Education and Emancipation tackles the relationship between emancipation and education by considering contemporary struggles and crises, as well as rethinking and recontextualizing the classic ideas (authors), and building on more recent work. (shrink)

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