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    The Polish School of Argumentation: A Manifesto.Katarzyna Budzynska,Michal Araszkiewicz,Barbara Bogołȩbska,Piotr Cap,Tadeusz Ciecierski,Kamila Debowska-Kozlowska,Barbara Dunin-Kȩplicz,Marcin Dziubiński,Michał Federowicz,Anna Gomolińska,Andrzej Grabowski,Teresa Hołówka,Łukasz Jochemczyk,Magdalena Kacprzak,Paweł Kawalec,Maciej Kielar,Andrzej Kisielewicz,Marcin Koszowy,Robert Kublikowski,Piotr Kulicki,Anna Kuzio,Piotr Lewiński,Jakub Z. Lichański,Jacek Malinowski,Witold Marciszewski,Edward Nieznański,Janina Pietrzak,Jerzy Pogonowski,Tomasz A. Puczyłowski,Jolanta Rytel,Anna Sawicka,Marcin Selinger,Andrzej Skowron,Joanna Skulska,Marek Smolak,Małgorzata Sokół,Agnieszka Sowińska,Piotr Stalmaszczyk,Tomasz Stawecki,Jarosław Stepaniuk,Alina Strachocka,Wojciech Suchoń,Krzysztof Szymanek,Justyna Tomczyk,Robert Trypuz,Kazimierz Trzȩsicki,Mariusz Urbański,Ewa Wasilewska-Kamińska,Krzysztof A. Wieczorek,Maciej Witek,Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska,Olena Yaskorska,Maria Załȩska,Konrad Zdanowski & Żure -2014 -Argumentation 28 (3):267-282.
    Building on our diverse research traditions in the study of reasoning, language and communication, the Polish School of Argumentation integrates various disciplines and institutions across Poland in which scholars are dedicated to understanding the phenomenon of the force of argument. Our primary goal is to craft a methodological programme and establish organisational infrastructure: this is the first key step in facilitating and fostering our research movement, which joins people with a common research focus, complementary skills and an enthusiasm to work (...) together. This statement—the Manifesto—lays the foundations for the research programme of the Polish School of Argumentation. (shrink)
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  2. Dlaczego wnioskujemy niepoprawnie. Teoria modeli mentalnych P. N. Johnsona-Lairda.Krzysztof A. Wieczorek -2007 -Filozofia Nauki 4.
    In the article we are trying to answer the question why people make mistakes in their reasoning. According to the theory proposed by P. N. Johnson-Laird, reasoning is a semantic process based on mental models. Reasoners build models of the situations described in premises and then check which conclusion holds in all the models. Unfortunately, our working memory has a limited processing capacity, and so we often fail to represent all possibilities necessary to draw a valid conclusion. The more models (...) we have to build, the higher the chance of making a mistake. Due to limitations of our working memory, we tend to represent in the models only what is true, but not what is false. One of the consequences of this fact is the occurrence of certain illusions: inferences that are compelling but invalid. The existence of such illusionary inferences have been corroborated by numerous experiments. (shrink)
     
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  3. Mechanizmy „staczania się” po równi pochyłej.Krzysztof A. Wieczorek -2011 -Filozofia Nauki 19 (2).
    The empirical slippery slope arguments are arguments of the following form: if we take a first step A, as a result of a sequence of events, step N will necessarily or very likely follow; N is clearly not acceptable; therefore we must not take step A. Such arguments are often used in the discussions concerning abortion, assisted suicide, human gene therapy, free speech, decriminalizing marijuana, gun control and other ethical or social issues. In this article, I am trying to argue (...) that although slippery slope arguments are not deductive, they need not to be considered as fallacies. There are some mechanisms that make the realization of the scenarios sketched in the slippery slope arguments much more probable than one could think. I analyze three different examples of such mechanisms. The first one originates in the psychological phenomenon of cognitive dissonance. The second is connected with the use of precedents. The third mechanism depends on so-called multi-peaked preferences which some people might have when they make their decisions. (shrink)
     
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  4. The Mechanisms of Falling Down the Slippery Slope.Krzysztof A. Wieczorek -2011 -Filozofia Nauki 19 (2):63.
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