Results for 'Kenneth R. Evans'
966 found
Order:
1 filter applied
- Ethics and the ivory tower: The case of academic departments of finance.Kenneth R.Evans,Stephen P. Ferris &G. Rodney Thompson -1998 -Teaching Business Ethics 2 (1):17-34.
- ‘Hegel’s Semantics of Singular Cognitive Reference, Newton’s Methodological Rule 4 and Scientific Realism Today’.Kenneth R. Westphal -2014 -Philosophical Inquiries 2 (1):9-67.Empirical investigations use empirical methods, data and evidence. This banal observation appears to favour empiricism, especially in philosophy of science, though no rationalist ever denied their importance. Natural sciences often provide what appear to be, and are taken by scientists as, realist, causal explanations of natural phenomena. Empiricism has never been congenial to scientific realism. Bas van Fraassen’s ‘Constructive Empiricism’ purports that realist interpretations of any scientific theory in principle always transcend whatever can be justified by that theory’s empirical adequacy, (...) and that ‘explanations’ are merely pragmatic, insofar as they are context-specific to the presuppositions of whomever poses the question an explanation is to answer. Here I argue that ‘Constructive Empiricism’ rests upon a series of flawed presumptions about natural science and about epistemology. To do so I draw upon two main resources. One resource is the constraints upon specifically cognitive reference to particulars, first identified by Kant (and later byEvans). The second is William Harper’s (2011) brilliant re-analysis and defence of Newton’s Principia, which shows that, and how, Newton justified his realism about gravitational force. One surprise is that Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference (examined in §3) directly and strongly supports Newton’s Rule 4 of scientific method (§4), which strongly supports his realism about gravitational force (summarised in §2). A further surprise is that Hegel first recognised that this semantics of singular cognitive reference directly and strongly supports Newton’s methodological Rule 4 of experimental philosophy in ways which support Newton’s realism about gravitational force, and about distance forces generally. The textual and exegetical issues these attributions require I examine elsewhere. Here I make these important findings available to philosophers and historians of science. (shrink)
- Hegel’s Internal Critique of Naïve Realism.Kenneth R. Westphal -2000 -Journal of Philosophical Research 25:173-229.This article reconstructs Hegel’s chapter “Sense Certainty” (Phenomenology of Spirit, chap. 1) in detail in its historical and philosophical context. Hegel’s chapter develops a sound internal critique of naive realism that shows that sensation is necessary but not sufficient for knowledge of sensed particulars. Cognitive reference to particulars also requires using a priori conceptions of space, spaces, time, times, self, and individuation. Several standard objections to and misinterpretations of Hegel’s chapter are rebutted. Hegel’s protosemantics is shown to accord in important (...) regards with GarethEvans’ view in “Identity and Predication.”. (shrink)
- (1 other version)Contemporary Epistemology: Kant, Hegel, McDowell.Kenneth R. Westphal -2006 -European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):274–301.Argues inter alia that Kant and Hegel identified necessary conditions for the possibility of singular cognitive reference that incorporate avant la lettreEvans’ (1975) analysis of identity and predication, that Kant’s and Hegel’s semantics of singular cognitive reference are crucial to McDowell’s account of singular thoughts, and that McDowell has neglected (to the detriment of his own view) these conditions and their central roles in Kant’s and in Hegel’s theories of knowledge. > Reprinted in: J. Lindgaard, ed., John McDowell: (...) Experience, Norm and Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008d), 124–151. (shrink)
- Some Replies to Remarks and Queries by Professor Parrini, Students and Members of the Audience.Kenneth R. Westphal -2015 -Esercizi Filosofici 10 (1).Concise replies to remarks and queries by Paolo Parrini, and by students andmembers of the audience regarding the topics indicated by the above mentioned keywords.No categories
- Brain MR spectroscopy in autism spectrum disorder—the GABA excitatory/inhibitory imbalance theory revisited.Maiken K. Brix,Lars Ersland,Kenneth Hugdahl,Renate Grüner,Maj-Britt Posserud,Åsa Hammar,Alexander R. Craven,Ralph Noeske,C. JohnEvans,Hanne B. Walker,Tore Midtvedt &Mona K. Beyer -2015 -Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
- Book Symposium onKenneth R. Westphal’s How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law.Kenneth R. Westphal -2019 -Filozofija I Društvo 30 (2):197-237.EDITED BY SLAVENKO ŠLJUKIĆBOOK SYMPOSIUM ONKENNETH R. WESTPHAL’S HOW HUME AND KANT RECONSTRUCT NATURAL LAW.
- An activation–verification model for letter and word recognition: The word-superiority effect.Kenneth R. Paap,Sandra L. Newsome,James E. McDonald &Roger W. Schvaneveldt -1982 -Psychological Review 89 (5):573-594.
- Bilingual advantages in executive functioning: problems in convergent validity, discriminant validity, and the identification of the theoretical constructs.Kenneth R. Paap -2014 -Frontiers in Psychology 5.
- Probabilistic functioning and the clinical method.Kenneth R. Hammond -1955 -Psychological Review 62 (4):255-262.No categories
- Beyond Rationality: The Search for Wisdom in a Troubled Time.Kenneth R. Hammond -2007 - Oup Usa.Ken Hammond has been an influential figure in the study of decision making; with this book, he aims to show why mistaken judgments happen, how to make better decisions, and how to understand the thought modes operating in the political process.
- Consciousness and its Transcendental Conditions: Kant’s Anti-Cartesian Revolt.Kenneth R. Westphal -2007 - In Sara Heinämaa, Vili Lähteenmäki & Pauliina Remes,Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy. Springer.Kant was the first great anti-Cartesian in epistemology and philosophy of mind. He criticised five central tenets of Cartesianism and developed sophisticated alternatives to them. His transcendental analysis of the necessary a priori conditions for the very possibility of self-conscious human experience invokes externalism about justification and proves externalism about mental content. Semantic concern with the unity of the proposition—required for propositionally structured awareness and self-awareness—is central to Kant’s account of the unity of any cognitive judgment. The perceptual ‘binding problem’ (...) is central to Kant’s account of the unity of the object in perception. This paper outlines Kant’s development and justification of his a rationalist account of our active intellect and its roles in perceptual consciousness and in rational judgment, including our consciousness of our rational freedom, all through a radically innovative transcendental inquiry into the necessary a priori conditions for us to be conscious at all. Kant’s anti-Cartesianism is a major philosophical breakthrough far surpassing contemporary anti-Cartesian efforts. It behoves us to give Kant his due and avail ourselves of his profound insights into the nature of human mindedness. (shrink)
- ‘Hegel’ (Hegel's Moral Philosophy).Kenneth R. Westphal -2010 - In John Skorupski,The Routledge Companion to Ethics. New York: Routledge.A 5,000-word conspectus of Hegel’s moral philosophy which considers the theoretical context of his moral philosophy (§1), his accounts of legal, personal, moral and social freedom (§2), the structure of Hegel’s analysis in his Philosophy of Justice (or »Rechtsphilosophie«) (§3), his account of role obligations as a central component of social freedom (§4), and his integrated account of individual autonomy and social reconciliation (§5).
- Hegel’s Epistemology: A Philosophical Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit.Kenneth R. Westphal -2003 - Hackett.Though concise and introductory, this book argues inter alia that Dretske’s information-theoretic epistemology must take into account that many of our information channels are socially constructed, not least through learning concepts and information. These social aspects of human knowledge are consistent with realism about the objects of our empirical knowledge. It further argues that, though important, Margaret Gilbert’s social ontology in principle can neither accommodate nor account for the most fundamental social dimensions of human cognition.
- Back to the 3 R’s: Rights, Responsibilities and Reasoning.Kenneth R. Westphal -2016 -SATS 17 (1):21-60.
- Kant and the Capacity to Judge.Kenneth R. Westphal &Beatrice Longuenesse -2000 -Philosophical Review 109 (4):645.Kant famously declares that “although all our cognition commences with experience, … it does not on that account all arise from experience”. This marks Kant’s disagreement with empiricism, and his contention that human knowledge and experience require both sensation and the use of certain a priori concepts, the Categories. However, this is only the surface of Kant’s much deeper, though neglected view about the nature of reason and judgment. Kant holds that even our a priori concepts are acquired, not from (...) sensation, but “originally,” because our mind has a fundamental capacity to judge that, upon sensory stimulation, generates the Categories through its basic logical functions of judgment. This “epigenesis” of reason and our fundamental capacity to judge that drives it is the topic of Longuenesse’s fascinating book, and the source of her title. (shrink)
- Hegel’s Epistemological Realism: A Study of the Aim and Method of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.Kenneth R. Westphal -2012 - Springer Verlag.The scope of this study is both ambitious and modest. One of its ambitions is to reintegrate Hegel's theory of knowledge into main stream epist~ology. Hegel's views were formed in consideration of Classical Skepticism and Modern epistemology, and he frequently presupposes great familiarity with other views and the difficulties they face. Setting Hegel's discussion in the context of both traditional and contemporary epistemology is therefore necessary for correctly interpreting his issues, arguments, and views. Accordingly, this is an issues-oriented study. I (...) analyze Hegel's problematic and method by placing them in the context of Sextus Empiricus, Descartes, Kant, Carnap, and William Alston. I discuss Carnap, rather than a Modern empiricist such as Locke or Hume, for several reasons. One is that Hegel himself refutes a fundamental presupposition of Modern empiricism, the doctrine of "knowledge by acquaintance," in the first chapter of the Phenomenology, a chapter that cannot be reconstructed within the bounds of this study. (shrink)
- Cow Care in Hindu Animal Ethics.Kenneth R. Valpey -2019 - Springer Verlag.This Open Access book provides both a broad perspective and a focused examination of cow care as a subject of widespread ethical concern in India, and increasingly in other parts of the world. In the face of what has persisted as a highly charged political issue over cow protection in India, intellectual space must be made to bring the wealth of Indian traditional ethical discourse to bear on the realities of current human-animal relationships, particularly those of humans with cows. Dharma, (...) yoga, and bhakti paradigms serve as starting points for bringing Hindu--particularly Vaishnava Hindu--animal ethics into conversation with contemporary Western animal ethics. The author argues that a culture of bhakti--the inclusive, empathetic practice of spirituality centered in Krishna as the beloved cowherd of Vraja--can complement recently developed ethics-of-care thinking to create a solid basis for sustaining all kinds of cow care communities. (shrink)
- Pragmatism, Reason, and Norms: A Realistic Assessment.Kenneth R. Westphal (ed.) -1998 - New York: Fordham University Press.This collection of essays examines the issue of norms and social practices both in epistemology and in moral and social philosophy. The contributors examine the issue across an unprecedented range of issues, including epistemology (realism, perception, testimony), logic, education, foundations of morality, philosophy of law, the pragmatic account of norms and their justification, and the pragmatic character of reason itself.
- How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law: Justifying Strict Objectivity Without Debating Moral Realism.Kenneth R. Westphal -2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.Kenneth R. Westphal presents an original interpretation of Hume's and Kant's moral philosophies, the differences between which are prominent in current philosophical accounts. Westphal argues that focussing on these differences, however, occludes a decisive, shared achievement: a distinctive constructivist account of the basic principles of justice which justifies their strict objectivity without invoking moral realism nor moral anti- or irrealism. Westphal explores how Hume developed a kind of constructivism for basic property rights and for government, and how Kant greatly (...) refined Hume's construction of justice within his 'metaphysical principles of justice', whilst preserving the core model of Hume's innovative account. Westphal contends that Hume's and Kant's constructivism avoids the conventionalist and relativist tendencies latent if not explicit in contemporary forms of moral constructivism. (shrink)
- Alien Powers: The Pure Theory of Ideology.Kenneth R. Minogue -2008 - Intercollegiate Studies Institute.The term “ideology” can cover almost any set of ideas, but its power to bewitch political activists results from its strange logic. It is part philosophy, part science, and part spiritual revelation, all tied together in leading to a remarkable paradox—that the modern Western world, beneath its liberal appearance, is actually the most systematically oppressive system of despotism the world has ever seen. In Alien Powers,Kenneth Minogue takes this complex intellectual construction apart, analyzing its logical, rhetorical, and psychological (...) devices, and thus opening it up to critical analysis. This new, ISI Books’ Background edition of Alien Powers includes a new introduction to the text by Martyn P. Thompson and critical essays on the text by political theorist Paul Gottfried and philosopher Stephen A. Erickson. (shrink)
- The emergence of the Weierstrassian approach to complex analysis.Kenneth R. Manning -1975 -Archive for History of Exact Sciences 14 (4):297-383.No categories
- ‘Consciousness, Scepticism and the Critique of Categorial Concepts in Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit’.Kenneth R. Westphal -2009 - In M. Bykova & M. Solopova,Сущность и Слово. Сборник научных статей к юбилею профессора Н.В.Мотрошиловой. Phenomenology & Hermeneutics Press.This paper (in English) highlights a hitherto neglected feature of Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit: its critique of the content of our basic categorial concepts. It focusses on Hegel’s semantics of cognitive reference in ‘Sense Certainty’ and his use of this semantics also in ‘Perception’ and ‘Force and Understanding’. Explicating these points enables us to understand how Hegel criticizes Pyrrhonian Scepticism on internal grounds.
- Finding Darwin's God: A Scientist's Search for Common Ground between God and Evolution.Kenneth R. Miller -1999 - New York: Cliff Street Books.Focusing on the ground-breaking and often controversial science of Charles Darwin, the author seeks to bridge the gulf between science and religion on the subject of human evolution.
- Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism.Kenneth R. Westphal -2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.This book is the first detailed study of Kant's method of 'transcendental reflection' and its use in the Critique of Pure Reason to identify our basic human cognitive capacities, and to justify Kant's transcendental proofs of the necessary a priori conditions for the possibility of self-conscious human experience.Kenneth Westphal, in a closely argued internal critique of Kant's analysis, shows that if we take Kant's project seriously in its own terms, the result is not transcendental idealism but realism regarding (...) physical objects. Westphal attends to neglected topics - Kant's analyses of the transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold, the 'lifelessness of matter', fallibilism, the semantics of cognitive reference, four externalist aspects of Kant's views, and the importance of Kant's Metaphysical Foundations for the Critique of Pure Reason - that illuminate Kant's enterprise in new and valuable ways. His book will appeal to all who are interested in Kant's theoretical philosophy. (shrink)
- Hegel, Russell, and the foundations of philosophy.Kenneth R. Westphal -2009 - In Angelica Nuzzo,Hegel and the Analytic Tradition. Continuum.Though philosophical antipodes, Hegel and Russell were profound philosophical revolutionaries. They both subjected contemporaneous philosophy to searching critique, and they addressed many important issues about the character of philosophy itself. Examining their disagreements is enormously fruitful. Here I focus on one central issue raised in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: the tenability of the foundationalist model of rational justification. I consider both the general question of the tenability of the foundationalist model itself, and the specific question of the tenability of Russell’s (...) preferred foundations of empirical knowledge, namely sense data. The stage is set by briefly considering Russell’s philosophical revolt (§2). I examine Russell’s neglect of the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion (§3), and then consider Russell’s appeal to “knowledge by acquaintance”—the very view Hegel criticized under the banner of “Sense Certainty” (§4). I argue that Hegel’s internal critique of “Sense Certainty” refutes Russell’s “knowledge by acquaintance” and undermines Russell’s ahistorical approach to philosophy. (This article supercedes ‘“Sense Certainty”, or Why Russell had no “Knowledge by Acquaintance”’. The Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 45/46 (2002):110–23.). (shrink)
- Trade‐Offs Between Grounded and Abstract Representations: Evidence From Algebra Problem Solving.Kenneth R. Koedinger,Martha W. Alibali &Mitchell J. Nathan -2008 -Cognitive Science 32 (2):366-397.This article explores the complementary strengths and weaknesses of grounded and abstract representations in the domain of early algebra. Abstract representations, such as algebraic symbols, are concise and easy to manipulate but are distanced from any physical referents. Grounded representations, such as verbal descriptions of situations, are more concrete and familiar, and they are more similar to physical objects and everyday experience. The complementary computational characteristics of grounded and abstract representations lead to trade‐offs in problem‐solving performance. In prior research with (...) high school students solving relatively simple problems, Koedinger and Nathan (2004) demonstrated performance benefits of grounded representations over abstract representations—students were better at solving simple story problems than the analogous equations. This article extends this prior work to examine both simple and more complex problems in two samples of college students. On complex problems with two references to the unknown, a “symbolic advantage” emerged, such that students were better at solving equations than analogous story problems. Furthermore, the previously observed “verbal advantage” on simple problems was replicated. We thus provide empirical support for a trade‐off between grounded, verbal representations, which show advantages on simpler problems, and abstract, symbolic representations, which show advantages on more complex problems. (shrink)No categories
- Engineering the brain.Kenneth R. Foster -2005 - In Judy Illes,Neuroethics: Defining the Issues in Theory, Practice, and Policy. Oxford University Press.
- History, ethics, and emergent probability: ethics, society, and history in the work of Bernard Lonergan.Kenneth R. Melchin -1987 - Ottawa: Lonergan Web Site.
- ‘The Basic Context and Structure of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’.Kenneth R. Westphal -1993 - In Frederick C. Beiser,The Cambridge Companion to Hegel. New York: Cambridge University Press.Hegel’s Philosophy of Right responds to two dichotomies. One is between the freedom of rational thought in its practical application and the givenness of natural impulses and desires. Against Kant Hegel argues that pure reason alone cannot determine the content of any maxim or principle of action. Thus Hegel must find a way in which the content of natural needs and impulses – the only source of content for maxims of action – can be transfigured into contents of rationally self-given (...) principles and maxims. Hegel also responds to the dichotomy between the individual agent and the social whole within which agents act. Hegel argues that this dichotomy is specious because human beings are fundamentally social practitioners and because neither social practices nor individual agents have priority over the other. There are no social practices without social practitioners and there are no social practitioners without social practices. Hegel’s response to this second dichotomy allows him to respond to the first one as well. The elaboration and specialization of natural needs and desires through exchange relations and the social division of labor transfigures the contents of those needs and desires into collectively self-given ends. The social practices producing this transfiguration and meeting these ends form the contents of implicit principles of right. These implicit principles are collectively self-given because they result from the social practices collectively developed to meet these needs. Only acts that are executed and accepted by an agent are free acts. This strong condition requires that an agent’s intentions correspond to the actual nature and consequences of his or her act. Since the aims, the principles, and the means of action are fundamentally social, these strong constraints entail that free action is possible only within a community which makes known its structure and the role of its members within it and their contribution to it, so that its members can act on the basis of that knowledge. Hegel’s theory of the state is a theory of a communal structure that makes such explicit, free action possible. In briefest compass, Hegel holds that laws are legitimate only insofar as they codify those practices that have been developed in order to achieve human freedom, and laws are obligatory only insofar as they are necessary for achieving human freedom. Hegel’s government is designed to codify and promulgate such laws. Hegel’s legislature is designed to make known to the citizens at large, through their corporate representatives, that laws have such a basis and how individual roles and actions fit within the community as a whole. (shrink)
- Roots & branches: grounding religion in human experience.Kenneth R. Overberg -1991 - Kansas City, MO: Sheed & Ward.
- Grounds of Pragmatic Realism: Hegel's Internal Critique and Reconstruction of Kant's Critical Philosophy.Kenneth R. Westphal -2017 - Brill._Grounds of Pragmatic Realism_ shows Hegel is a major epistemologist, who disentangled Kant’s critique of judgment, across the Critical corpus, from transcendental idealism, and augmented its enormous evaluative and justificatory significance for commonsense knowledge, the natural sciences and freedom of action.No categories
- The Blackwell Guide to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.Kenneth R. Westphal (ed.) -2009 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.Providing a groundbreaking collective commentary, by an international group of leading philosophical scholars, _Blackwell’s Guide to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit_ transforms and expands our understanding and appreciation of one of the most challenging works in Western philosophy. Collective philosophical commentary on the whole of Hegel’s _Phenomenology_ in sequence with the original text. Original essays by leading international philosophers and Hegel experts. Provides a comprehensive Bibliography of further sources.
- Affinity, Idealism and Naturalism: The Stability of Cinnabar and the Possibility of Experience.Kenneth R. Westphal -1997 -Kant Studien 88 (2):139-189.In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant introduced both transcendental idealism and transcendental arguments into philosophy. Transcendental arguments in general aim to establish conditions necessary for our having self-conscious experience at all. Transcendental idealism holds that such conditions do not hold independently of human subjects; those conditions obtain or are satisfied because they are generated or fulfilled by the structure or functioning of the subject’s cognitive capacities. Is transcendental idealism the only possible explanation of such conditions? I pursue this question (...) by exploring a widely neglected issue, the transcendental affinity of the manifold of intuition. I argue the following: (1) This issue remains vital to the second edition of the Critique, even though many passages on the topic were omitted from that edition. (2) Kant’s link between transcendental idealism and transcendental arguments is substantive, not methodological. (3) Kant’s views on transcendental affinity show that there are non-subjective, transcendental material conditions for the possibility of unified self-conscious experience. (4) These conditions and Kant’s arguments for them directly undermine Kant’s own arguments for transcendental idealism. This criticism of Kant’s arguments for transcendental idealism is entirely internal to the first Critique. (5) These points reveal some serious flaws in Henry Allison’s defense of Kant’s idealism. (6) Realists, naturalists, and pragmatists have much to learn and to borrow from Kant’s transcendental analysis of the conditions of unified self-conscious experience. (shrink)
- Hume, Empiricism and the Generality of Thought.Kenneth R. Westphal -2013 -Dialogue 52 (2):233-270.Hume sought to analyse our propositionally-structured thought in terms of our ultimate awareness of nothing but objects, sensory impressions or their imagistic copies, The ideas of space and time are often regarded as exceptions to his Copy Theory of impressions and ideas. On grounds strictly internal to Humes account of the generality of thought. This ultimately reveals the limits of the Copy Theory and of Concept Empiricism. The key is to recognise how very capacious is our (Humean) imaginative capacity to (...) associate particular perceptions by various fine-grained determinable resemblances. (shrink)
- Effects of script similarity on bilingual advantages in executive control are likely to be negligible or null.Kenneth R. Paap,Jack Darrow,Chirag Dalibar &Hunter A. Johnson -2014 -Frontiers in Psychology 5.
- The question of education science: Experimentism versus experimentalism.Kenneth R. Howe -2005 -Educational Theory 55 (3):307-321.The ascendant view in the current debate about education science —experimentism— is a reassertion of the randomized experiment as the methodological gold standard. Advocates of this view have ignored, not answered, long‐standing criticisms of the randomized experiment: its frequent impracticality, its lack of external validity, its confinement to a regularity conception of causality, and its externalization of politics. This article rehearses these criticisms and then adumbrates the alternative of experimentalism. In contrast to experimentism, experimentalism is expansive and variegated in its (...) conception of scientific method, seeing methodology as itself an object of experimentation. Experimentalism also includes a central role for intentional causation and self‐consciously incorporates progressive political values. (shrink)
- [no title].Kenneth R. Westphal -unknownNo categories
- Subject preferences and the nature of information stored in short-term memory.Kenneth R. Laughery &James C. Fell -1969 -Journal of Experimental Psychology 82 (2):193.
- Is Sartorius getting away with doing the moral thing?Kenneth R. Pahel -1978 -Southern Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):95-103.
- Michael Tooley on abortion and potentiality.Kenneth R. Pahel -1987 -Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):89-107.
- Hegel’s Civic Republicanism: Integrating Natural Law with Kant’s Moral Constructivism.Kenneth R. Westphal -2019 - New York, NY: Routledge.In this book, Westphal offers an original interpretation of Hegel's moral philosophy. Building on his previous study of the role of natural law in Hume's and Kant's accounts of justice, Westphal argues that Hegel developed and justified a robust form of civic republicanism. Westphal identifies, for the first time, the proper genre to which Hegel's Philosophical Outlines of Justice belongs and to which it so prodigiously contributes, which he calls Natural Law Constructivism, an approach developed by Hume, Rousseau, Kant, and (...) Hegel. He brings to bear Hegel's adoption and augmentation of Kant's Critique of rational judgment and justification in all non-formal domains to his moral philosophy in his Outlines. Westphal argues that Hegel's justification for the standards of political legitimacy successfully integrates Rousseau's Independence Requirement into the role of public reason within a constitutional republic. In these regards, Hegel's moral and political principles are progressive not only in principle, but also in practice. Hegel's Civic Republicanism will be of interest to scholars of moral philosophy, social and political philosophy, philosophy of law, Hegel, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophy. (shrink)
- The education science question: A symposium.Kenneth R. Howe -2005 -Educational Theory 55 (3):235-243.
- Identifying and justifying moral norms : necessary basics.Kenneth R. Westphal -2017 - In Patrick Capps & Shaun D. Pattinson,Ethical rationalism and the law. Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing.Export citation
Bookmark - Kant, Hegel and our fate as zoôn politikon.Kenneth R. Westphal -2020 - In James Gledhill & Sebastian Stein,Hegel and Contemporary Practical Philosophy: Beyond Kantian Constructivism. New York: Routledge.Export citation Bookmark
- Kant on the State, Law, and Obedience to Authority in the Alleged ‘Anti-Revolutionary’ Writings.Kenneth R. Westphal -1992 -Journal of Philosophical Research 17:383-426.The tension between Kant’s egalitarian conception of persons as ends in themselves and his rejection of the right of revolution has been widely discussed. The crucial issue is more fundamental: Is Kant’s defense of absolute obedience consistent with his own principle of legitimate law, that legitimate law is compatible with the Categorical Imperative? Resolving this apparent inconsistency resolves the subsidiary inconsistencies that have been debated in the literature. I argue that Kant’s legal principles contain two distinct grounds of obligation to (...) obey political authority. One lies in his metaphysical principles of law, according to which there is only a duty to obey legitimate law or fully legitimate authorities. Another lies in his moral-pragmatic principles. He believes that membership in the state helps improve one’s character by counter-balancing one’s immoral inclinations. This is his ultimate ground for obedience to de facto, imperfectly legitimate states. On this ground, the duty to obey an actual state is conditional. Kant’s strong statements about the duty to obey actual states is explained by the ease with which he thinks the relevant condition is met by extant states. The apparent ambiguities in his discussion of obedience point to some important philosophical and historical shortcomings of his analysis of the division of govemmental powers and of judicial competence which hamper his analysis of the duty to obey the state. (shrink)
- Engineering the brain.Kenneth R. Foster -2005 - In Judy Illes,Neuroethics: Defining the Issues in Theory, Practice, and Policy. Oxford University Press.
- Finding Darwin's God: A Scientist's Search for Common Ground between God and Evolution.Kenneth R. Miller -2002 -Journal of the History of Biology 35 (1):181-183.
- Epistemic reflection and cognitive reference in Kant's transcendental response to skepticism.Kenneth R. Westphal -2003 -Kant Studien 94 (2):135-171.Kant’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’ plainly has an anti-Cartesian conclusion: ‘inner experience in general is only possible through outer experience in general’ (B278). Due to wide-spread preoccupation with Cartesian skepticism, and to the anti-naturalism of early analytic philosophy, most of Kant’s recent commentators have sought to find a purely conceptual, ‘analytic’ argument in Kant’s Refutation of Idealism – and then have dismissed Kant when no such plausible argument can be reconstructed from his text. Kant’s argument supposedly cannot eliminate all relevant alternatives, (...) and so cannot justify its strong modal claims. Kant based his arguments on an inventory of our basic cognitive capacities to employ our forms of intuition and our forms of judgment. Kant provides a variety of considerations and arguments to determine what our cognitive capacities are. This involves ‘transcendental reflection’, which Kant held is absolutely crucial for judging matters a priori (A263/B319). I argue that there is a level of philosophical reflection on our own cognitive capabilities and their preconditions that is significantly richer than has been noticed by recent commentators, and that is a precondition of Kant’s transcendental reflection proper. I explicate certain thought experiments Kant proposes in order for us to recognize some our basic, characteristic cognitive capabilities, and the limits and requirements they entail for the nature and objects of human knowledge. These thought experiments involve a kind of reflection on who we as cognizant subjects are, on what our basic cognitive capabilities are. Engaging in this kind of reflection reveals that Kant’s transcendental arguments are significantly stronger and more persuasive than has been recognized in recent commentary. (shrink)
- Engineering the mind.Kenneth R. Foster -2005 - In Judy Illes,Neuroethics: Defining the Issues in Theory, Practice, and Policy. Oxford University Press.Export citation Bookmark
| 1 — 50 / 966 |
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution's proxy server or OpenAthens.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
 Email |  RSS feed |
Editorial team
General Editors:
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
Home |New books and articles |Bibliographies |Philosophy journals |About PhilPapers |API |Contact us |Code of conduct
PhilPapers logo byAndrea Andrews andMeghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see ourterms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications).Use of this site is subject toterms & conditions.
All rights reserved byThe PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-5b9ff6f457-7w7lb uwo