Narrative and evidence. How can case studies from the history of science support claims in the philosophy of science?Katherina Kinzel -2015 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49 (C):48-57.detailsA common method for warranting the historical adequacy of philosophical claims is that of relying on historical case studies. This paper addresses the question as to what evidential support historical case studies can provide to philosophical claims and doctrines. It argues that in order to assess the evidential functions of historical case studies, we first need to understand the methodology involved in producing them. To this end, an account of historical reconstruction that emphasizes the narrative character of historical accounts and (...) the theory-laden character of historical facts is introduced. The main conclusion of this paper is that historical case studies are able to provide philosophical claims with some evidential support, but that, due to theory-ladenness, their evidential import is restricted. (shrink)
De-idealizing Disagreement, Rethinking Relativism.Katherina Kinzel &Martin Kusch -2018 -Humana Mente 26 (1):40-71.detailsRelativism is often motivated in terms of certain types of disagreement. In this paper, we survey the philosophical debates over two such types: faultless disagreement in the case of gustatory conflict, and fundamental disagreement in the case of epistemic conflict. Each of the two discussions makes use of a implicit conception of judgement: brute judgement in the case of faultless disagreement, and rule-governed judgement in the case of fundamental disagreement. We show that the prevalent accounts work with unreasonably high levels (...) of idealization. We defend two claims. First, philosophical discussions of disagreement need to be de-idealized. Second, once a less idealized account of disagreement is available, both our conception of judgement and our understanding of relativism need to be revised. Our example is a case study in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s classic Leviathan and the Air-Pump. This case study gives a less idealized account of disagreement that conceptualizes judgements as situated. We argue that this conception can and should be applied to cases of gustatory and epistemic disagreement. The payoff will be a reformulation of relativism in terms of rationally resolvable yet contingent disagreements. (shrink)
No categories
State of the field: Are the results of science contingent or inevitable?Katherina Kinzel -2015 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 52:55-66.detailsThis paper presents a survey of the literature on the problem of contingency in science. The survey is structured around three challenges faced by current attempts at understanding the conflict between “contingentist” and “inevitabilist” interpretations of scientific knowledge and practice. First, the challenge of definition: it proves hard to define the positions that are at stake in a way that is both conceptually rigorous and does justice to the plethora of views on the issue. Second, the challenge of distinction: some (...) features of the debate suggest that the contingency issue may not be sufficiently distinct from other philosophical debates to constitute a genuine, independent philosophical problem. And third, the challenge of decidability: it remains unclear whether and how the conflict could be settled on the basis of empirical evidence from the actual history of science. The paper argues that in order to make progress in the present debate, we need to distinguish more systematically between different expressions that claims about contingency and inevitability in science can take. To this end, it introduces a taxonomy of different contingency and inevitability claims. The taxonomy has the structure of an ordered quadruple. Each contingency and each inevitability claim contains an answer to the following four questions: (how) are alternatives to current science possible, what types of alternatives are we talking about, how should the alternatives be assessed, and how different are they from actual science? (shrink)
Between Pluralism and Objectivism: Reconsidering Ernst Cassirer's Teleology of Culture.Katherina Kinzel -2024 -Journal of the History of Philosophy 62 (1):125-147.detailsAbstractabstract:This paper revisits debates on a tension in Cassirer's philosophy of culture. On the one hand, Cassirer describes a plurality of symbolic forms and claims that each needs to be assessed by its own internal standards of validity. On the other hand, he ranks the symbolic forms in terms of a developmental hierarchy and states that one form, mathematical natural science, constitutes the highest achievement of culture. In my paper, I do not seek to resolve this tension. Rather, I aim (...) to arrive at a better understanding of how it arises, and of the different options that it presents for understanding the development of culture. I discuss three recent attempts at resolving the tension, put forward by Sebastian Luft, Samatha Matherne, and Simon Truwant, respectively. Based on a reconstruction of Cassirer's system of symbolic forms that centralizes the concept of function, I show that the most promising of these attempts, formulated by Truwant, is not successful. I then turn to Cassirer's philosophy of the cultural sciences, the implications of which for the present problem have not yet been sufficiently explored. I argue that in this context, Cassirer develops the contours of an alternative to the function-based view of cultural development. I conclude that this alternative does not resolve the tension either, but that it allows for a reconceptualization of the teleology of culture as open. (shrink)
Wilhelm Windelband and the problem of relativism.Katherina Kinzel -2017 -British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (1):84-107.detailsThis paper analyzes the shifts in Wilhelm Windelband’s ‘critical philosophy of values’ as it developed hand in hand with his understanding of relativism. The paper has two goals. On the one hand, by analyzing the role that relativism played in his philosophical project, it seeks to contribute to a better understanding of Windelband's intellectual development in the context of historicism and Neo-Kantianism. On the other hand, by highlighting Windelband’s contribution to the understanding of relativism, it sheds light on an important (...) episode in the history of that problem. The paper distinguishes between three phases in Windelband’s thinking and shows that his views about relativism changed in close connection with his conception of history. The early Windelband thought that historicism was compatible with absolute validity because he was firmly convinced of historical progress. The mature Windelband rejected progress as a means for justifying validity and put the problem of relativism into sharp relief. In response to the failure of his mature philosophy to fend off relativism, the later Windelband strengthened the role of history again. The paper concludes that Windelband’s significance lies not in his arguments against relativism, but rather in having furthered philosophical understanding of the problems at stake. (shrink)
Method and meaning: Ranke and droysen on the historian's disciplinary ethos.Katherina Kinzel -2020 -History and Theory 59 (1):22-41.detailsIn this paper I revisit nineteenth-century debates over historical objectivity and the political functions of historiography. I focus on two central contributors to these debates: Leopold von Ranke and Johann Gustav Droysen. In their takes on objectivity and subjectivity, impartiality and political engagement I reveal diametrically opposed solutions to shared concerns: how can historians reveal history to be meaningful without taking recourse to speculative philosophy? And how can they produce a knowledge that is relevant to the present when the project (...) of “exemplary” history has been abandoned? I put a special focus on the relativist themes in Ranke’s and Droysen’s answers to these questions. Ranke’s demand for impartiality leads him to think of all historical epochs as equally valid, while Droysen’s emphasis on the historian’s subjectivity relativizes historical truth. In order to explain why Ranke and Droysen nevertheless remained unfazed by the problem of historical relativism, I analyze their normative conceptions of the historian’s disciplinary ethos. I show that Ranke and Droysen think of objective impartiality and subjective partiality not only in methodological terms, but also in terms of justice and ethic duty. This normative element secures the professional study of history an ethical-political relevance for the present. (shrink)
The Emergence of Relativism: German Thought from the Enlightenment to National Socialism.Martin Kusch,Johannes Steizinger,Katherina Kinzel &Niels Jacob Wildschut (eds.) -2019 - London, New York: Routledge.detailsDebates over relativism are as old as philosophy itself. Since the late nineteenth century, relativism has also been a controversial topic in many of the social and cultural sciences. And yet, relativism has not been a central topic of research in the history of philosophy or the history of the social sciences. This collection seeks to remedy this situation by studying the emergence of modern forms of relativism as they unfolded in the German lands during the "long nineteenth century"—from the (...) Enlightenment to National Socialism. It focuses on relativist and anti-relativist ideas and arguments in four contexts: history, science, epistemology, and politics. -/- The Emergence of Relativism will be of interest to those studying nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy, German idealism, and history and philosophy of science, as well as those in related disciplines such as sociology and anthropology. (shrink)
Inner Experience and Articulation: Wilhelm Dilthey’s Foundational Project and the Charge of Psychologism.Katherina Kinzel -2018 -Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 8 (2):347-375.detailsThis paper seeks to re-assess Dilthey’s descriptive psychology in light of the charge of “psychologism”. The paper has two goals. First, I seek to give a fine-grained reconstruction of Dilthey’s foundational project. I provide a systematic account of how Dilthey sought to ground the knowledge claims of the human sciences in inner experience. I place special emphasis on Dilthey’s concept of “articulation” which mediates between inner experience and psychological knowledge, as well as between individual psychology and knowledge about the socio-historical (...) world. Second, I re-assess the allegedly “psychologistic” aspects of Dilthey’s philosophy. I reconstruct how Dilthey’s critics Husserl, Windelband and Rickert understood psychologism, highlight commonalities between them and explain why Dilthey’s approach seemed “psychologistic” from their perspective. At the same time, I show that Dilthey’s philosophical thinking goes against the very presuppositions that the “psychologism”-charges are usually based upon. The paper concludes with some reflections on the transition from Dilthey's descriptive psychology to his mature hermeneutics. (shrink)
Relativism in German Idealism, Historicism and Neo-Kantianism.Katherina Kinzel -2019 - In Martin Kusch,The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge.detailsThis chapter traces the development of relativist ideas in nineteenth-century debates about history and historical knowledge. It distinguishes between two contexts in which these ideas first emerged. First, the early-to-mid nineteenth-century encounter between speculative German idealism and professional historiography. Second, the late nineteenth-century debate between hermeneutic philosophy and orthodox Neo-Kantianism. The paper summarizes key differences between these two contexts: in the former, historical ontology and historical methodology formed a unity, in the latter, they came apart. As a result, the idea (...) of universal history became increasingly problematic. In light of these differences, the paper seeks to (partially) explain why it was only towards the late-nineteenth century that historical relativism became an explicit concern. (shrink)
Historical thought in German neo-Kantianism.Katherina Kinzel -2021 -British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (4):579-589.detailsTwo books inaugurated the revival of Kantianism in German universities in the second half of the nineteenth century. Both works were exercises in the history of philosophy. And both took to the his...
Geschichte ohne Kausalität. Abgrenzungsstrategien gegen die Wissenschaftssoziologie in zeitgenössischen Ansätzen historischer Epistemologie.Katherina Kinzel -2012 -Berichte Zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte 35 (2):147-162.detailsHistory Without Causality. How Contemporary Historical Epistemology Demarcates Itself From the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. Contemporary proponents of historical epistemology often try to delimit their enterprise by demarcating it from the sociology of scientific knowledge and other sociologically oriented approaches in the history of science. Their criticism is directed against the use of causal explanations which are deemed to invite reductionism and lead to a totalizing perspective on science. In the present article I want to analyse this line of criticism (...) in what I consider are two paradigmatic works of contemporary historical epistemology: Lorraine Daston's und Peter Galison's Objectivity and Hans‐Jörg Rheinberger's Toward a History of Epistemic Things. I first present their arguments against the sociological and causal analysis of scientific knowledge and practice and then try to defend sociological work in the history of science against their charges. I will, however, not do so by defending causal explanations directly. Rather, I will show that the arguments against sociological analysis put forward in contemporary historical epistemology, as well as historical epistemology's own models of historical explanation and narration, bear problematic consequences. I argue that Daston, Galison and Rheinberger fail to create productive resonances between macro‐ and microhistorical perspectives, that they reproduce an internalist picture of scientific knowledge, and finally that Rheinberger's attempt to deconstruct the dichotomy between subject and object leads him to neglect questions about the political dimension of scientific research. (shrink)
No categories
The history of philosophy and the puzzles of life. Windelband and Dilthey on the ahistorical core of philosophical thinking.Katherina Kinzel -2019 - In Martin Kusch, Johannes Steizinger, Katherina Kinzel & Niels Jacob Wildschut,The Emergence of Relativism: German Thought from the Enlightenment to National Socialism. London, New York: Routledge. pp. 26-42.detailsThe professionalization of the study of history in the Nineteenth Century made possible a new way of thinking about the history of philosophy: the thought emerged that philosophy itself might be relative to time, historical culture, and nationality. The simultaneous demise of speculative metaphysics scattered philosophers’ confidence that the historical variance of philosophical systems could be viewed in terms of the teleological self-realization of reason. Towards the late Nineteenth Century, philosophers began to explicitly address the worry that all philosophical systems (...) might have only relative validity. This paper compares two key figures in late-nineteenth-century debates concerning historical relativism: Wilhelm Windelband and Wilhelm Dilthey. Beneath the deep disagreements between these two authors, it reveals their common concern to immunize philosophy from the threat of historical relativism. The paper traces how both philosophers sought to fend off relativism by defending the idea of an ahistorical and permanent stratum of philosophical thinking. And it argues that although they succeeded in blocking historical versions of relativism, they did so at the cost of incurring a relativism vis-à-vis philosophical systems. This relativism turned out to be rooted not in the historicity of philosophy but in the timeless essence of philosophical reasoning itself. (shrink)
Neo-Kantianism as hermeneutics? Heinrich Rickert on psychology, historical method, and understanding.Katherina Kinzel -2020 -British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (4):614-632.detailsThis paper explores the Baden Neo-Kantian attempt to integrate hermeneutic ‘understanding’ into the formal philosophy of the historical sciences. It focuses primarily on Heinrich Ricker...
Historische Kontinuität und affirmative Genealogie: Johann Gustav Droysens politische Historik.Katherina Kinzel -2019 -Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (3):418-428.detailsThis paper analyses the methodological writings of the nineteenth century historian Johann Gustav Droysen. It explores how Droysen integrates the political and methodological aspects of historiography. The paper shows that Droysen relies on a procedure of “affirmative genealogy” which, in turn, is based on a concept of historical continuity. On Droysen’s account, historical continuity enables “historical understanding”. And the understanding of historical continuities provides the statesman – the “practical historian” – with a solid basis for political decision making.
No categories
Paradigmatische Fälle. Konstruktion, Narration und Verallgemeinerung von Fall-Wissen in den Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften.Katherina Kinzel &Ruben Hackler (eds.) -2016 - Basel: Schwabe.detailsFallgeschichten werden seit dem 18. Jahrhundert zunehmend genutzt, um juristisches, psychologisches und medizinisches Wissen einer grösseren Öffentlichkeit zu vermitteln. In den letzten zehn Jahren haben sie auch in den Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften mehr Aufmerksamkeit erfahren. Die Diskussion über paradigmatische Fälle in diesem Band zielt darauf ab, Fallgeschichten in ihrer Funktion als besonders anschauliche oder lehrreiche Beispiele in verschiedenen historischen Kontexten zu untersuchen und zu vergleichen. Die in diesem Heft versammelten Texte gehen der Frage nach, wie Fälle dazu beitragen, Debatten zu (...) verdichten und Entwicklungen erzählbar zu machen, wie sie über den Einzelfall hinausgehendes Wissen generieren und so paradigmatischen Status erlangen. Neben konzeptuellen Gesichtspunkten widmen sich die Beiträge mehreren Forschungsfeldern, darunter der Rechts- und Medizingeschichte, der Geschichte der Geschichtsschreibung, literarischen Fällen, den Sozialwissenschaften und der Technikgeschichte. (shrink)
Neo-Kantian conceptualism: between scientific experience and everyday perception.Katherina Kinzel -2023 -British Journal for the History of Philosophy 32 (6):1350-1373.detailsThis paper reconstructs the major transformations in the Marburg neo-Kantian account of experience. By focusing on the problem of ‘conceptualism’, it traces connections between four issues that are central to the transcendental projects of the Marburg philosophers: the interpretation of Kant, the critique of experiential givenness, the account of objective cognition in science, and the relation between scientific and pre-scientific experience. My historical narrative identifies two shifts. The first is from Cohen's conceptualist answer to the threat of subjectivism to Cassirer's (...) functionalist answer to empiricism. The second is from Cassirer's conceptualism about scientific experience to his symbolic non-conceptualism about everyday perception. My reconstruction reveals the fate of neo-Kantian conceptualism to be linked to the fate of pre-scientific perception and suggests that the continuing significance of the Marburg philosophers lies in their responses to the coming apart of the manifest and the scientific image. (shrink)
Values and Worldviews. Windelband and Dilthey on the Historicity of Philosophy.Katherina Kinzel -2019 - In Martin Kusch, Johannes Steizinger, Katherina Kinzel & Niels Jacob Wildschut,The Emergence of Relativism: German Thought from the Enlightenment to National Socialism. London, New York: Routledge. pp. 26-42.detailsThe professionalization of the study of history in the Nineteenth Century made possible a new way of thinking about the history of philosophy: the thought emerged that philosophy itself might be relative to time, historical culture, and nationality. The simultaneous demise of speculative metaphysics scattered philosophers’ confidence that the historical variance of philosophical systems could be viewed in terms of the teleological self-realization of reason. Towards the late Nineteenth Century, philosophers began to explicitly address the worry that all philosophical systems (...) might have only relative validity. This paper compares two key figures in late-nineteenth-century debates concerning historical relativism: Wilhelm Windelband and Wilhelm Dilthey. Beneath the deep disagreements between these two authors, it reveals their common concern to immunize philosophy from the threat of historical relativism. The paper traces how both philosophers sought to fend off relativism by defending the idea of an ahistorical and permanent stratum of philosophical thinking. And it argues that although they succeeded in blocking historical versions of relativism, they did so at the cost of incurring a relativism vis-à-vis philosophical systems. This relativism turned out to be rooted not in the historicity of philosophy but in the timeless essence of philosophical reasoning itself. (shrink)
Unifying themes and irresolvable tensions in Cassirer's system of symbolic forms.Katherina Kinzel -2023 -British Journal for the History of Philosophy 32 (5):1173-1181.details1. Samatha Matherne’s reading of Ernst Cassirer’s complex and multifaceted oeuvre demonstrates a remarkably strong systematic grasp.1 By identifying the themes, ideas, and working concepts that are...