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Some theorists who accept the existence of globaljustice duties to alleviate the condition of distant needy strangers hold that these duties are significantly constrained by special ties to fellow countrymen. The patriotic priority thesis holds that morality requires the members of each nation-state to give priority to helping needy fellow compatriots over more needy distant strangers. Three arguments for constraint and patriotic priority are examined in this essay: an argument from fair play, one from coercion, another from coercion (...) and autonomy. Under scrutiny, none of these arguments qualifies as successful. (shrink)

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Ideas ofjustice have traditionally focused on what individuals owe to one another and have drawn our attention to what is considered fair--what one of us owes to another is justly matched by what the other owes to them. However, what doesjustice require us to do for past and future generations? InJustice Back and Forth, award-winning author Richard Vernon explores the possibility ofjustice in cases where time makes reciprocity impossible. This "temporaljustice" (...) is examined in ten controversial cases including theduty to return historical artifacts, the ethics and politics of parenting, the punishment of historical offences, the right to procreate, and the imposition of constitutions on future citizens. By deftly weaving together discussions on historical redress andjustice for future generations, Vernon reveals that these two opposing topics can in fact be used to illuminate each other. In doing so, he concludes that reciprocity can be adapted to serve intergenerational cases. (shrink)

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This contribution asks how to approach the question of whether the European Union should – replacing or supplementing member states – also be a locus of socialjustice‐based duties to provide welfare state services. The contribution scrutinizes two important theories of globaljustice (cosmopolitan and relational theories) and finds that their normative assumptions hinder them from adequately addressing this question. A new theory is proposed, inspired by Immanuel Kant's political philosophy. The core idea is that socialjustice (...) requires public authorities to protect citizens against private forms of coercion; and that the level (national, European, global) at which such authority needs to be exercised depends on which arrangement best protects citizens' rights to independence. The paper outlines several duties of globaljustice to give specificity to this general principle, and then applies them to the case of integrating European welfare states. (shrink)

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This thesis is the first step in a research project which aims to develop an accurate and robust theory of globaljustice. The thesis concerns the content of our duties of globaljustice, under strict compliance theory. It begins by discussing the basic framework of my theory of globaljustice, which consists in two aspects: duties of minimal wellbeing, which are universal, and duties of fairness and equality, which are associative and not universal. With that in place, (...) it briefly discusses the nature of duties of fairness and equality. I shall argue that they are associative, because they are derived from the form of cooperation at hand; and that there are three kinds of them in our contemporary world: states, local cooperation and trans-state cooperation. It is from their forms of cooperation that these duties are derived. After that, the thesis focuses exclusively on duties of minimal wellbeing. Against the usual account of these duties - the human-flourishing account - I argue for my human-life account. This account argues that the function of these duties is to secure a human life for individuals; and it begins with a Razian conception of wellbeing, which states that the wellbeing of an individual is fundamentally constituted by: (a) the satisfaction of his biological needs, and (b) his success in whole-heartedly pursuing socially defined and determined goals and activities which are in fact valuable. An account of what constitutes a human life is then derived from this conception of wellbeing – it is a life that consists in having a level of wellbeing that is higher than the satisfaction of biological needs, where this is constituted by the pursuit of goals and activities with a sense of what is worth doing; and this in turn consists in: (a) being able to forms ideas of what is worth doing, (b) being able to revise them in light of further reasons, and (c) being able to coordinate one's actions according to them. I then determine the specific objects of duties of minimal wellbeing (means for the satisfaction of biological needs, education, physical security, freedom of belief, association and expression, freedom of non-harmful conduct, and minimal resources), by determining what is involved in securing such a human life for individuals. (shrink)

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After two years of discussions and revisions, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) published the 2021 World Anti-Doping Code on June 16, 2020. Among the most significant additions to this iteration of the Code was the inclusion of new categories of athletes subject to differential treatment by WADA, including the “protected person” category. In this paper, we examine the recent case of figure skater Kamila Valeryevna Valieva, the first athlete given differential treatment due to her being categorized as a “protected person.” (...) We apply a relationaljustice framework to the case to provide a nuanced, descriptive analysis of the case generally, and the application of the “protected person” category in particular.We first describe details of the athlete, her performances and anti-doping rule violation, and the “protected person” category, to provide context. We then describe and analyze the relations between several institutional actors, principally WADA and the International Court for the Arbitration of Sport (CAS), the athlete and her team, and other figure skating athletes at the Beijing Winter Olympic Games. To do so, we use two concepts ofjustice, conservative and ideal, and their component parts, entitlement, desert, and need.Our description and analyses demonstrate that (1) WADA’s notions ofjustice are essentially conservative, while CAS acted toward more ideal notions, creating a fundamental disagreement in what was owed and to whom. We show (2) that CAS’ decision may have nonetheless caused harm to the athlete, raising questions about the efficacy and capability of the “protected person” category. Finally, (3) our analyses show the influence that notions ofjustice necessarily have these actors shape each other, thus change the sporting institutions and activities themselves. (shrink)

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In this paper, I assess critically the recent debate on corrective duties across moral and legal philosophy. Two prominent positions have emerged: the Kantian rights-based view (holding that what triggers corrections is a failure to respect others' right to freedom) and the so-called continuity view (correcting means attempting to do what one was supposed to do before). Neither position, I try to show, offers a satisfactory explanation of the ground (why correct?) and content (how to correct?) of corrective duties. In (...) the final section, I suggest that it is probably better to restrict the label “corrective duties” to duties generated by interpersonal wronging. (shrink)

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The agency objection to applying distributivejustice globally is that principles of distributivejustice need to apply to the behaviour of a special kind of institutional agent of distributivejustice because of the special powers of that agent. No such agent exists capable of configuring cooperative arrangements between all persons globally, and so distributivejustice does not apply globally. One response to institutional views of this kind is that they do not rule out Natural Duties of (...)Justice that fall on all of us to bring about institutional agencies capable of global distributivejustice. In this article I argue that this move presupposes a particular, teleological, conception ofjustice whilst institutional accounts most plausibly rest on a non-teleological one. I provide an argument for favouring the non-teleological conception. I also show why alternative ways of arguing for global Natural Duties ofJustice do not get around this controversy. The debate is at the level of presuppositions aboutjustice, and relying on a partisan conception is question begging. (shrink)

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This article examines the conflict between people's associative duties and their wider obligations of globaljustice. After clarifying the nature of associative duties, it defends the view that such duties may be civic in nature: obtaining between citizens, not just friends and families. Samuel Scheffler's 'distributive objection' to civic associative duties is then presented in the context of global distributive injustice. Three solutions to the objection are considered. One is that the distributive objection is more a philosophical puzzle than (...) a practical problem because of the means by which globaljustice would be achieved. This is only partially correct. The second reply is that associative duties are additional to citizens' more cosmopolitan duties. This reply loses its purchase if globaljustice is conceived of in comparative terms. The third reply claims that associative duties are justified by genuine values and do not disappear even when over-ridden by more weighty moral concerns. While in practice, our duties to engineer globaljustice are likely to over-ride our associative duties in the near future, in ideal circumstances the two kinds of duties can co-exist. (shrink)

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Many social practices treat citizens with cognitive disabilities differently from their nondisabled peers. Does John Rawls's theory ofjustice imply that we have different duties ofjustice to citizens whenever they are labeled with cognitive disabilities? Some theorists have claimed that the needs of the cognitively disabled do not raise issues ofjustice for Rawls. I claim that it is premature to reject Rawlsian contractualism. Rawlsians should regard all citizens as moral persons provided they have the potential (...) for developing the two moral powers. I claim that every citizen requires specific Enabling Conditions to develop and exercise the two moral powers. Structuring basic social institutions to deny some citizens the Enabling Conditions is unjust because it blocks their developmental pathways toward becoming fully cooperating members of society. Hence, we have aduty ofjustice to provide citizens labeled with cognitive disabilities with the Enabling Conditions they require until they become fully cooperating members of society. (shrink)

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One of the most ambitious and sophisticated recent approaches to provide a theory of global healthjustice is Sridhar Venkatapuram's recent work. In this commentary, we first outline the core idea of Venkatapuram's approach to global healthjustice. We then argue that one of the most important elements of the account, Venkatapuram's basis of global health duties, is either too weak or assumed implicitly without a robust justification. The more explicit grounding of theduty to protect and (...) promote health capabilities is based on Martha Nussbaum's version of the capability approach. We argue that this foundation gives rise to humanitarian duties rather than duties ofjustice proper. Venkatapuram's second argument from the social determinants of health thesis is instead a stronger candidate for grounding duties ofjustice. However, as a justificatory argument, it is only alluded to and has not yet been spelled out sufficiently. We offer plausible justificatory steps to fill this gap and draw some implications for global health action. We believe this both strengthens Venkatapuram's approach and serves to broaden the basis for future action in the area of global health. (shrink)

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This article presents an argument related tojustice obligations during a pandemic and explores implications of the argument. A just society responds to a serious threat to the well-being of its people such as a viral pandemic to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on the well-being of its members. This creates identifiable societal obligations which are discharged by the institutions and individuals within society that are situated to do so. There are therefore identifiable obligations resting on various societal (...) institutions, such as government, churches, schools, and corporate institutions, as well as obligations resting on individuals. Should an institution or individual fail to act in ways consistent with these social obligations, they perpetrate an injustice on society and its members. (shrink)

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How are we to navigate between duties to compatriots and duties to non-compatriots? Within the literature there are two important kinds of accounts that are thought to offer contrasting positions on these issues, namely, cosmopolitanism and statism. We discuss these two rival accounts. I then outline my position on globaljustice and how to accommodate insights from both the cosmopolitan and statist traditions within it. Having outlined my ideal theory account of what globaljustice requires, I discuss the (...) far more pressing question of what our remedial responsibilities are in our decidely non-ideal world: what does the developed world owe to the developing world and what are our responsibilities to non-compatriots, given our situation here and now? I argue that we have considerable responsibilities and I sketch some of the supporting grounds for this view. Finally, I consider how the general account of globaljustice and remedial responsibilities developed here applies to the case of responsibilities for migrants’ and refugees’ healthcare. (shrink)

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Historical entitlement theories of property rights, which claim that individuals can acquire moral property rights over natural resources by appropriating them, traditionally face a strong objection: it is widely implausible that a single individual can unilaterally impose duties on everyone around him and yet, apparently, this is exactly what such theories allow. In this essay, I argue that the same problem appears in all other theories of distributivejustice and if this problem was a reason to reject historical entitlement (...) theories, it would also be a reason to reject all rival theories. Which means that as long, as one is committed to any theory of distributivejustice at all, she, at the risk of inconsistency, cannot rely on the aforementioned objection to criticize historical entitlement theories. (shrink)

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Much of the climatejustice discussion revolves around how the remaining carbon budget should be globally allocated. Some authors defend the unjust enrichment interpretation of the beneficiary pays principle (BPP). According to this principle, those states unjustly enriched from historical emissions should pay. I argue that if the BPP is to be constructed along the lines of the unjust enrichment doctrine, countervailing reasons that might be able to block the existence of aduty of restitution should be assessed. (...) One might think that theduty to provide restitution no longer has moral weight if many benefits were already consumed, if the particular benefits obtained from historical emissions cannot be transferred from one country to another, or if present members of developed countries framed their life plans based upon the expectation of continued possession of those benefits. I show that none of these reasons negate theduty to provide restitution. (shrink)

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On what we may call the institutional approach tojustice, the most importantduty ofjustice that individuals have is theduty to establish just institutions when they are absent. How should we understand this institutionalduty in relation to more personal moral actions, such as taking direct personal action to mitigate institutional failures? Is this institutionalduty a necessary responsibility ofjustice? Is it sufficient? I will discuss this question in the context (...) of climate change: what responsibilities ofjustice do individual actors have when their state is not complying with an ideal of just emissions? Do they have theduty to do what they reasonably can to reduce their personal direct emissions, perhaps even picking up the slack of non-compliers? Or is theirduty ofjustice primarily that of doing their part to establish a just regulatory framework? I will examine some options of personal responsibility in response to climate change and argue that the most importantduty is that of working to bring about better institutions. Taking direct personal action can be helpful, but not when they distract us from working towards institutional reform. (shrink)

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This paper is about the implications of a common view on globaljustice. The view can be called the Minimalist View, and it says that we have no positive duties to help the poor in foreign countries, or that if we do, they are very minimal. It might seem as if, by definition, the Minimalist View cannot require that we do very much about global poverty. However, in his book World Poverty and Human Rights, Thomas Pogge pointed out that (...) this conclusion is at least up for debate. Although Minimalism countenances very few positive duties to the global poor, it certainly countenances negative duties not to harm. Perhaps one can argue that these negative duties are somehow being violated, and thus even a Minimalist must make substantial compensation to the global poor. However, in this paper I argue that Pogge’s argument about Minimalism does not succeed. The second half of the paper offers ways to revise and improve the argument in order to make the case for assistance to the global poor. (shrink)

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Are positive duties to help others in need mere informal duties of virtue or can they also be enforceable duties ofjustice? In this paper I defend the claim that some positive duties (which I call basic positive duties) can be duties ofjustice against one of the most important prin- cipled objections to it. This is the libertarian challenge, according to which only negative duties to avoid harming others can be duties ofjustice, whereas positive duties (...) (basic or nonbasic) must be seen, at best, as informal moral requirements or recommendations. I focus on the contractarian version of the libertarian challenge as recently presented by Jan Narveson. I claim that Narveson’s contractarian construal of libertarianism is not only intuitively weak, but is also subject to decisive internal problems. I argue, in particular, that it does not pro- vide a clear rationale for distinguishing between informal duties of virtue and enforceable duties ofjustice, that it can neither successfully justify libertarianism’s protection of negative rights nor its denial of positive ones, and that it fails to undermine the claim that basic positive duties are duties of globaljustice. -/- . (shrink)

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This article considers Pablo Gilabert’s attempt to defend against libertarian critics his ambitious argument for basic positive duties ofjustice to the world’s destitute. The article notes that Gilabert’s argument – and particularly the vocabulary of perfect and imperfect duties that he adopts – has firm roots in the modern natural rights tradition. The article goes on to suggest, however, that Gilabert employs the phrase ‘imperfect duties’ in a manner that is in some tension with the tradition from which (...) it is derived. Indeed, Gilabert’s novel deployment of the phrase contains a number of radical possibilities that are not pursued in his text. The article suggests that Gilabert would do better to break more decisively from a tradition that insists on the essential distinction betweenjustice and charity. (shrink)

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The literature on cosmopolitanjustice has yet to address what principles to adopt when duties of globaljustice and duties of socialjustice are in conflict. In this paper, I address David Miller’s contention that some may fall into thejustice gap since we need to prioritize duties of socialjustice in cases of conflict. I argue that Miller’s analysis depends on three stipulations: the incommensurability of the values underlying duties of socialjustice and (...) those of globaljustice; the need to justify duties ofjustice to their holders; and the need to consider the necessary institutions to realize and implementjustice obligations. I argue against the incommensurability clause by showing that both conceptions ofjustice pursue moral equality as the underlying and commensurate value. Instead, I propose that the currencies ofjustice we employ in the two contexts ofjustice are different. Discussing the justifiability clause I agree with the stipulation that we have to justify decisions that affect the realization ofjustice to those who have to carry the burden of realizing them. This implies, however, that we may have to accept that some prioritize duties of globaljustice over duties of socialjustice. If this is the case, it seems as though the state has little recourse to prioritize duties of socialjustice. Finally, discussing Miller’s institutional clause I ask why thejustice relevant institutions can only be those of the state. It is plausible to say that in our current world, institutions of humanitarian aid are effective means to satisfy duties of globaljustice. (shrink)

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Informal political representation can be a political lifeline, particularly for oppressed and marginalized groups. Such representation can give these groups some say, however mediate, partial, and imperfect, in how things go for them. Coeval with the political goods such representation offers these groups are its particular dangers to them. Mindful of these dangers, skeptics challenge the practice for being, inter alia, unaccountable, unauthorized, inegalitarian, and oppressive. These challenges provide strong pro tanto reasons to think the practice morally impermissible. This paper (...) considers the question: On what conditions is the informal political representation of oppressed and marginalized groups permissible? By responding to skeptics’ challenges, I develop a systematic account of moral constraints that, if adopted, would make such representation permissible. The account that emerges shows that informal political representatives (IPRs) must aim to fulfill two sets of sometimes conflicting duties to the represented: democracy within duties, which concern how the representative treats and relates to the represented, andjustice without duties, which concern how the representative’s actions advance the aims of the representation. (shrink)

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What is considered in this paper is the Hobbesian contention that there is no morality without government and consequently that there can be no moral criticism of government. It is argued that there are vital shifts in the way Hobbes thinks of rights, duties, andjustice, without which outright contradictions result. Thus the Hobbesian claim that, in a state of nature, everyone has a right to everything, is equivalent to the claim that, in a state of nature, no one (...) has a right to anything. But on Hobbes’ own account there must be rights as well as duties in a state of nature, hence alsojustice and injustice. It is argued that confusion about duties andjustice as well as rights results from failing to distinguish rights from liberties and from power. (shrink)

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This paper explores the theoretical basis of the third party’sduty ofjustice as to grave human rights violations, presenting role obligations as the best complement to the literature. It begins with discussions on agents ofjustice induty-based theories, notably O’Neill’s account on globaljustice, and rights-based theories, which are both included in the institution-centred perspective. I claim that these studies have failed to consider an individualduty bearer’s motive, autonomous reasoning and integrity (...) in relation tojustice, all of which constitute serious lacunae for the effective accomplishment of responsibility. To supplement, I introduce the distinction between responsibility and commitment, and acknowledge that combining the two is the desirable condition for recognising theduty ofjustice. Finally, I argue that the role obligations undertaken through personal acceptance of an institution-based role or a commitment-based role related to human rights norms adequately explain third parties’duty to protect others from serious harm. (shrink)

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Compelling research in international relations and international political economy on global warming suggests that one part of any meaningful effort to radically reverse current trends of increasing green house gas (GHG) emissions is shared policies among states that generate costs for such emissions in many if not most of the world’s regions. Effectively employing such policies involves gaining much more extensive global commitments and developing much stronger compliance mechanism than those currently found in the Kyoto Protocol. In other words, global (...) warming raises the prospect that we need a global form of political authority that could coordinate the actions of states in order to address this environmental threat. This in turn suggests that any serious effort to mitigate climate change will entail new limits on the sovereignty of states. In this book I focus on the normative question of whether or not we have clear moral reasons to bind ourselves together in such a supranational form of political association. I argue that one can employ familiar liberal arguments for the moral legitimacy of political order at the state level to show that we do have aduty to support such a global political project. Even if one adopts the premises employed by the most influential forms of liberal scepticism to the ideas of global political and distributivejustice, such as those advanced by John Rawls and Thomas Nagel, it is clear that the threat of global warming has expanded the scope ofjustice. We now have a global and demandingduty ofjustice to create the political conditions that would allow us to collectively address our impact on the Earth’s atmosphere. (shrink)

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The COVID-19 pandemic exposed vulnerabilities in inadequately prioritized healthcare systems in low- and middle-income countries such as Kenya. In this prolonged pandemic, nurses and midwives working at the frontline face multiple ethical problems, including their obligation to care for their patients and the risk for infection with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2. Despite the frequency of emergencies in Africa, there is a paucity of literature on ethical issues during epidemics. Furthermore, nursing regulatory bodies in African countries such as Kenya (...) have primarily adopted a Western code of ethics that may not reflect the realities of the healthcare systems and cultural context in which nurses and midwives care for patients. In this article, we discuss the tension between nurses’ and midwives’duty of care and resource allocation in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. There is an urgent need to clarify nurses’ and midwives’ rights and responsibilities, especially in the current political setting, limited resources, and ambiguous professional codes of ethics that guide their practice. (shrink)

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In this essay. I explore questions pertaining to ‘radical’ acts of forgiveness as they relate to considerations of duties andjustice. I will survey recent examples and show a possible philosophical basis for understanding them in terms of self-duty. Thus I will try to show that a little noticed basis exists for understanding acts of radical forgiveness as morally required (and not simply admirable or reserved for the saintly). I argue both that considerations of self-duty can provide (...) a secular basis for justifying radical acts of forgiveness and that problems associated with this kind of forgiveness andjustice are not as serious as they are often taken to be. (shrink)

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That we owe duties to others is a commonplace, the subject of countless philosophical treatises and monographs. Morality is interpersonal and other-directed, many claim. But what of what we owe ourselves? InDuty to Self, Paul Schofield flips the paradigm of interpersonal morality by arguing that there are moral duties we owe ourselves, and that in light of this, philosophers need to significantly rethink many of their views about practical reason, moral psychology, politics, and moral emotions. -/- Among these (...) views is the idea that divisions within a person's life enable her to relate to herself second-personally--that is, as though she were relating to a distinct other person--in the way required by morality. Further, there exist political duties owed to the self, which the state may coerce persons to perform. This amounts to a novel argument for paternalistic law, which appeals to considerations of right,justice, and freedom in order to justify coercing a person for their own sake--a liberal justification for an idea typically thought to be deeply at odds with liberalism. -/- Schofield untangles how this view would impact various issues in applied ethics and political philosophy, for example, financial prudence and risk, the pursuit of the good life, and medical ethics.Duty to Self is essential for anyone working in moral and political philosophy or political theory. (shrink)

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Principles of distributivejustice bind macro-level institutional agents, like the state. But what doesjustice require in non-ideal circumstances, where institutional agents are unjust or do not e...

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This article challenges an argument from Tom Donaldson''s recent bookThe Ethics of International Business with a claim that distributivejustice, deemed in many circles to impose aduty of mutual aid on individuals and nations, establishes a basis for holding multinational corporations to such aduty as well. The root idea I advocate is that Rawls'' theory ofjustice can be deployed — beyond its original intent yet in line with its spirit — to underwrite aprima (...) facie obligation of international business to render aid to ameliorate suffering on behalf of the inhabitants of developing countries in which they operate. (shrink)

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Ancillary care is care that research participants need that is not essential to make the research safe or scientifically valid and is not needed to remedy injuries that eventuate as a result of the research project itself. Ancillary care duties have recently been defended on the grounds of beneficence, entrustment, utility and consent.Justice has also been mentioned as a possible basis of ancillary care duties, but little attention has been paid to this approach. In this paper, the author (...) seeks to rectify this omission by arguing that ancillary care duties can be based on a principle ofjustice as rectification. (shrink)

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In a recent paper in this journal I argued that the distribution of the burdens involved in combating climate change should be determined by a combination of a particular version of the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) and a particular version of the Ability to Pay Principle. Carl Knight has presented three objections to my analysis. In what follows, I argue that he largely misinterprets my arguments.

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This paper argues that economic agents, including corporations, have theduty to furtherjustice, not just aduty merely to comply with laws and do their share. Theduty to furtherjustice is the requirement to assist in the establishment of just arrangements when they do not exist in society. The paper is grounded in liberal theory and draws heavily on one liberal theorist, Kant. We show that theduty to furtherjustice must (...) be interpreted as aduty of virtue that is owed. This means that theduty is not enforceable but that violating thisduty is still wrong and not merely non-virtuous. Our analysis has consequences for the morality of commercial life. It is often suggested that the morality of the market is a special, restricted morality that is leaner than the morality that agents must acknowledge outside the market. If our analysis is correct, theduty to furtherjustice cannot be exempted from market morality, even if it is agreed that this must be leaner than the morality outside commercial life. Our analysis also has direct consequences for John Ruggie’s view on the responsibilities of businesses. Ruggie has never explicitly acknowledged aduty on the part of business enterprises to furtherjustice. If our analysis is correct, his view is contradictory in that it presupposes the normative validity of free market enterprise yet shrinks from taking into account the conditions of its possibility. (shrink)

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Problems in normative ethics paradigmatically concern what it is obligatory or permissible for an individual to do. Yet sometimes, each of us ought to do something individually in virtue of what we ought to do together. Unfortunately, traversing these two different levels at which a moral obligation can arise – individual and collective – is fraught with difficulties that easily lure us into conclusions muddying our understanding of collective obligations. This paper seeks to clearly lay out a systematic problem central (...) to the relation between collective and individual duties in view of alleviating some such confusion and facilitating more concerted attempts at resolving it: Collective duties require individuals to act in order for the collectiveduty to be fulfilled. Yet typically, a collectiveduty does not entail any one set of individual duties that would prescribe such contributory actions: The work we need to do in order to fulfil aduty can be allocated differently to the individuals collectively bearing it. Much like in matters of distributivejustice, then, deriving individual duties from a collective one requires us to employ a distributive scheme, which raises separate normative concerns that have rarely taken centre stage in the debate so far. (shrink)

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This essay asks what it is about the practice of trade that grounds duties ofjustice between states as trade partners. The answer advanced is that such duties are grounded in the dependence that trade generates. The essay puts forward four conditions that a plausible account of grounding in trade must meet: it must admit of degrees, explain the distinctly international character of tradejustice, ground both procedural and distributive duties, and it must be a necessary feature of (...) all trade relationships which generate duties ofjustice. A dependence account of grounding meets all four conditions, and does so in an intuitively compelling way. While other accounts of what grounds duties of tradejustice can meet some of the conditions, none can meet all of them. Relative to rival candidates, then, the dependence account provides a firmer foundation for the ongoing attempts to develop a comprehensive theory of tradejustice. (shrink)

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This book argues thatjustice often governs apologies. Drawing on examples from literature, politics, and current events, Cohen presents a theory of apology as corrective offers. Many leading accounts of apology say much about what apologies do and why they are important. They stop short of exploring whether and howjustice governs apologies. Cohen argues that correctivejustice may require apologies as offers of reparation. Individuals, corporations, and states may then have rights or duties regarding apology. Exercising (...) rights to apology or fulfilling duties to provide them are ways of holding one another mutually accountable. By casting rights and duties of apology as justifiable to free and equal persons, the book advances conversations about how liberalism may respond to historic injustice. Apologies and Moral Repair will be of interest to scholars and advanced students in ethics, political philosophy, and social philosophy. (shrink)

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This paper focuses on the issue ofjustice as a challenge facing business and society. I advance a simple deductive argument based on two premises. The first emerges out of theories ofjustice and holds that fairness, as a foundational basis forjustice, demands impartiality or the avoidance of bias. The second emerges out of fiduciary law and holds that theduty of loyalty owed by managers to serve the interests of investors is fundamentally partial or (...) biased. The conclusion is the troubling fact that the fiduciaryduty of loyalty owed by managers to serve the interests of investors appears to be incompatible with the demands ofjustice. Having presented this, I describe the impartiality tools of Rawls’ veil of ignorance and Adam Smith’s impartial spectator and discuss how these might be applied in this context. I speculate that while Smith’s impartial spectator is absolutely incommensurable with managers’ fiduciaryduty of loyalty, Rawls’ veil of ignorance might be used to imagine a synthesis between thisduty of loyalty and the impartiality demands ofjustice – in theory at least. And finally, as a parting shot, I wonder whether the real “Leadership Challenge that Matters” isn’t the gap between theory and reality. (shrink)

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The interrelated causes and consequences of environmental degradation, poverty, and war are creating a dangerous snowball effect that poses a real threat to people in every nation. While moral arguments for cosmopolitanism may be subject to nationalist objections, the practical argument becomes more convincing as the long-term consequences of global injustice unfold. Contemporary conditions demand a critical re-examination of what is at stake in the question of globaljustice: when understood as highly influential to all national spheres, the global (...) sphere ofjustice may turn out to be just as relevant to nationalists as it is to cosmopolitans. Given the pressing nature of the practical demands posed by poverty, war, and environmental destruction, it may well be in the best interest of everyone's co-nationals to prioritise global duties ofjustice, at least for the time being. (shrink)

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Can agents beduty-bound towards ends that are infeasible? Some scholars have endorsed a “feasibility constraint” onjustice and answered that we cannot beduty-bound to bring about the infeasible. In this paper, I question whether the feasibility constraint onjustice should still be endorsed and whether we areduty-bound to pursue some aims regardless of this constraint. I ask: Can an ethical agent beduty-bound to work towards bringing about a state of affairs (...) that is desirable but infeasible? I consider the climate crisis: climatejustice may require us to work towards ends that may be infeasible, such as maintaining global climate warming below 1.5°C or mitigating climate change in a way that treats all people affected fairly. I argue that we may beduty-bound or obliged to work towards some desirable goals when faced with the infeasible and conclude that we should reject feasibility constraints on climatejustice. (shrink)

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