Results for 'Julia Mayerle'
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- Common genetic variants in the CLDN2 and PRSS1-PRSS2 loci alter risk for alcohol-related and sporadic pancreatitis.David C. Whitcomb,Jessica LaRusch,Alyssa M. Krasinskas,Lambertus Klei,Jill P. Smith,Randall E. Brand,John P. Neoptolemos,Markus M. Lerch,Matt Tector,Bimaljit S. Sandhu,Nalini M. Guda,Lidiya Orlichenko,Samer Alkaade,Stephen T. Amann,Michelle A. Anderson,John Baillie,Peter A. Banks,Darwin Conwell,Gregory A. Coté,Peter B. Cotton,James DiSario,Lindsay A. Farrer,Chris E. Forsmark,Marianne Johnstone,Timothy B. Gardner,Andres Gelrud,William Greenhalf,Jonathan L. Haines,Douglas J. Hartman,Robert A. Hawes,Christopher Lawrence,Michele Lewis,JuliaMayerle,Richard Mayeux,Nadine M. Melhem,Mary E. Money,Thiruvengadam Muniraj,Georgios I. Papachristou,Margaret A. Pericak-Vance,Joseph Romagnuolo,Gerard D. Schellenberg,Stuart Sherman,Peter Simon,Vijay P. Singh,Adam Slivka,Donna Stolz,Robert Sutton,Frank Ulrich Weiss,C. Mel Wilcox,Narcis Octavian Zarnescu,Stephen R. Wisniewski,Michael R. O'Connell,Michelle L. Kienholz,Kathryn Roeder &M. Micha Barmada -unknownPancreatitis is a complex, progressively destructive inflammatory disorder. Alcohol was long thought to be the primary causative agent, but genetic contributions have been of interest since the discovery that rare PRSS1, CFTR and SPINK1 variants were associated with pancreatitis risk. We now report two associations at genome-wide significance identified and replicated at PRSS1-PRSS2 and X-linked CLDN2 through a two-stage genome-wide study. The PRSS1 variant likely affects disease susceptibility by altering expression of the primary trypsinogen gene. The CLDN2 risk allele is (...) associated with atypical localization of claudin-2 in pancreatic acinar cells. The homozygous CLDN2 genotype confers the greatest risk, and its alleles interact with alcohol consumption to amplify risk. These results could partially explain the high frequency of alcohol-related pancreatitis in men. © 2012 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)No categories
- Moral Reason.Julia Markovits -2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.Julia Markovits develops a desire-based, internalist account of what normative reasons are--an account which is compatible with the idea that moral reasons can apply to all of us, regardless of our desires. She builds on Kant's formula of humanity to defend universal moral reasons, and addresses the age-old question of why we should be moral.
- How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel -2019 -Noûs 53 (4):937-962.According to an increasingly popular epistemological view, people need outright beliefs in addition to credences to simplify their reasoning. Outright beliefs simplify reasoning by allowing thinkers to ignore small error probabilities. What is outright believed can change between contexts. It has been claimed that thinkers manage shifts in their outright beliefs and credences across contexts by an updating procedure resembling conditionalization, which I call pseudo-conditionalization (PC). But conditionalization is notoriously complicated. The claim that thinkers manage their beliefs via PC is (...) thus in tension with the view that the function of beliefs is to simplify our reasoning. I propose to resolve this puzzle by rejecting the view that thinkers employ PC. Based on this solution, I furthermore argue for a descriptive and a normative claim. The descriptive claim is that the available strategies for managing beliefs and credences across contexts that are compatible with the simplifying function of outright beliefs can generate synchronic and diachronic incoherence in a thinker’s attitudes. Moreover, I argue that the view of outright belief as a simplifying heuristic is incompatible with the view that there are ideal norms of coherence or consistency governing outright beliefs that are too complicated for human thinkers to comply with. (shrink)
- Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes.Julia Staffel -2019 -Philosophical Issues 29 (1):281-294.In this paper, I highlight an interesting difference between belief on the one hand, and suspended judgment and credence on the other hand. This difference is the following: credences and suspended judgments are suitable to serve as transitional as well as terminal attitudes in our reasoning, whereas beliefs are only appropriate as terminal attitudes. The notion of a transitional attitude is not an established one in the literature, but I argue that introducing it helps us better understand the different roles (...) suspended judgments and credences can play in our reasoning. Transitional and terminal attitudes have interestingly different descriptive and normative properties. I also compare my account of transitional attitudes to other inquiry-guiding attitudes that have recently been characterized in the literature and explain why they are different. (shrink)
- The suberogatory.Julia Driver -1992 -Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (3):286 – 295.
- The phenomenology of virtue.Julia Annas -2008 -Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):21-34.What is it like to be a good person? I examine and reject suggestions that this will involve having thoughts which have virtue or being a good person as part of their content, as well as suggestions that it might be the presence of feelings distinct from the virtuous person’s thoughts. Is there, then, anything after all to the phenomenology of virtue? I suggest that an answer is to be found in looking to Aristotle’s suggestion that virtuous activity is pleasant (...) to the virtuous person. I try to do this, using the work of the contemporary social psychologist Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi and his work on the ‘flow experience’. Crucial here is the point that I consider accounts of virtue which take it to have the structure of a practical expertise or skill. It is when we are most engaged in skilful complex activity that the activity is experienced as ‘unimpeded’, in Aristotle’s terms, or as ‘flow’. This experience does not, as might at first appear, preclude thoughtful involvement and reflection. Although we can say what in general the phenomenology of virtue is like, each of us only has some more or less dim idea of it from the extent to which we are virtuous—that is, for most of us, not very much. (shrink)
- Plato and Aristotle on friendship and altruism.Julia Annas -1977 -Mind 86 (344):532-554.
- Accuracy for Believers.Julia Staffel -2017 -Episteme 14 (1):39-48.In Accuracy and the Laws of Credence Richard Pettigrew assumes a particular view of belief, which states that people don't have any other doxastic states besides credences. This is in tension with the popular position that people have both credences and outright beliefs. Pettigrew claims that such a dual view of belief is incompatible with the accuracy-first approach. I argue in this paper that it is not. This is good news for Pettigrew, since it broadens the appeal of his framework.
- Expressivism, Normative Uncertainty, and Arguments for Probabilism.Julia Staffel -2019 -Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.I argue that in order to account for normative uncertainty, an expressivist theory of normative language and thought must accomplish two things: Firstly, it needs to find room in its framework for a gradable conative attitude, degrees of which can be interpreted as representing normative uncertainty. Secondly, it needs to defend appropriate rationality constraints pertaining to those graded attitudes. The first task – finding an appropriate graded attitude that can represent uncertainty – is not particularly problematic. I tackle the second (...) task by exploring whether we can devise expressivist versions of the standard arguments used to support rationality constraints on degrees of uncertainty, Dutch book arguments and accuracy-dominance arguments. I show that we can do so, but that the resulting arguments don’t support the same rationality constraints as the original versions of the arguments. (shrink)
- Aristotle on inefficient causes.Julia Annas -1982 -Philosophical Quarterly 32 (129):311-326.
- Something wicked this way comes: Causes and interpretations of sleep paralysis.Christopher C. French &Julia Santomauro -2007 - In Sergio Della Sala,Tall Tales About the Mind and Brain: Separating Fact From Fiction. Oxford University Press. pp. 380.
- A 50 años del Cordobazo… Pensar las “puebladas” en la Argentina de los años setenta.AnaJulia Ramírez -2019 -Aletheia: Anuario de Filosofía 9 (18):e003.El trabajo se propone revisitar el proceso político argentino de los tempranos años setenta a la luz de un análisis renovado sobre los estallidos populares mejor conocidos como puebladas o “azos”, que imprimieron con tintes insurreccionales las protestas y movilizaciones del período y nutrieron de gran dinamismo e incertidumbre al proceso nacional.No categories
- Attitudes in Active Reasoning.Julia Staffel -2019 - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Jackson,Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press.Active reasoning is the kind of reasoning that we do deliberately and consciously. In characterizing the nature of active reasoning and the norms it should obey, the question arises which attitudes we can reason with. Many authors take outright beliefs to be the attitudes we reason with. Others assume that we can reason with both outright beliefs and degrees of belief. Some think that we reason only with degrees of belief. In this paper I approach the question of what kinds (...) of beliefs can participate in reasoning by using the following method: I take the default position to be maximally permissive – that both graded and outright beliefs can participate in reasoning. I then identify some features of active reasoning that appear at first glance to favor a more restrictive position about which types of belief we can reason with. I argue that the arguments based on these features ultimately fail. (shrink)
- Modesty and ignorance.Julia Driver -1999 -Ethics 109 (4):827-834.
- Degrees coded in jumps of orderings.Julia F. Knight -1986 -Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (4):1034-1042.
- Should I pretend I'm perfect?Julia Staffel -2017 -Res Philosophica 94 (2):301-324.Ideal agents are role models whose perfection in some normative domain we try to approximate. But which form should this striving take? It is well known that following ideal rules of practical reasoning can have disastrous results for non-ideal agents. Yet, this issue has not been explored with respect to rules of theoretical reasoning. I show how we can extend Bayesian models of ideally rational agents in order to pose and answer the question of whether non-ideal agents should form new (...) degrees of belief in the same way as their ideal counterparts. I demonstrate that the epistemic and the practical case are parallel: following ideal rules does not always lead to optimal outcomes for non-ideal agents. (shrink)
- (1 other version)The use of corporate social disclosures in the management of reputation and legitimacy: A cross sectoral analysis of UK top 100 companies.Julia Clarke &Monica Gibson-Sweet -1999 -Business Ethics, the Environment and Responsibility 8 (1):5–13.Recent years have witnessed an escalation in corporate social reporting (CSR) by UK companies (Gray, Kouhy and Lavers 1995). Whilst some elements of CSR reporting are required by law, much of it represents voluntary reporting. By investigating the non‐mandatory reporting of two aspects of social responsibility, corporate community involvement (CCI) and environmental impact, this paper seeks to explore why companies choose to make such disclosures. It specifically asks whether companies are primarily motivated by the strategic need to manage their reputation (...) and legitimacy rather than by the recognition of their ethical accountability, which is the stated purpose of reports produced by cutting edge companies (Clarke 1998). (shrink)
- (1 other version)Aristotle, number and time.Julia Annas -1975 -Philosophical Quarterly 25 (99):97-113.
- On the development of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of imagination and its use for interdisciplinary research.Julia Jansen -2005 -Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):121-132.In this paper I trace Husserl’s transformation of his notion of phantasy from its strong leanings towards empiricism into a transcendental phenomenology of imagination. Rejecting the view that this account is only more incompatible with contemporary neuroscientific research, I instead claim that the transcendental suspension of naturalistic (or scientific) pretensions precisely enables cooperation between the two distinct realms of phenomenology and science. In particular, a transcendental account of phantasy can disclose the specific accomplishments of imagination without prematurely deciding upon a (...) particular scientific paradigm for its experimental investigation; a decision that is best left to the sciences themselves. (shrink)
- Replies to Fitelson and Konek.Julia Staffel -2022 -Philosophical Studies 179 (10):3155-3167.
- Three Puzzles about Lotteries.Julia Staffel -2020 - In Igor Douven,Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.In this article, I discuss three distinct but related puzzles involving lotteries: Kyburg’s lottery paradox, the statistical evidence problem, and the Harman-Vogel paradox. Kyburg’s lottery paradox is the following well-known problem: if we identify rational outright belief with a rational credence above a threshold, we seem to be forced to admit either that one can have inconsistent rational beliefs, or that one cannot rationally believe anything one is not certain of. The statistical evidence problem arises from the observation that people (...) seem to resist forming outright beliefs whenever the available evidence for the claim under consideration is purely statistical. We need explanations of whether it is in fact irrational to form such beliefs, and of whether a clear distinction can be drawn between statistical and non-statistical evidence. The Harman-Vogel paradox is usually presented as a paradox about knowledge: we tend to assume that we can know so-called ordinary propositions, such as the claim that I will be in Barcelona next spring. Yet, we hesitate to make knowledge claims regarding so-called lottery propositions, such as the claim that I won’t die in a car crash in the next few months, even if these lottery propositions are obviously entailed by the ordinary propositions we claim to know. Depending on one’s view about the relationship between rational belief and knowledge, the Harman-Vogel paradox has ramifications for a theory of rational outright belief. Formal theories of the relationship between rational credence and rational belief, such as Leitgeb’s stability theory, tend to focus mostly on handling Kyburg’s lottery paradox, but not the other two puzzles I mention. My aim in this article is to draw out relationships and differences between the puzzles, and to examine to what extent existing formal solutions to Kyburg’s lottery paradox help with answering the statistical evidence problem and the Harman-Vogel paradox. (shrink)
- Moralism.Julia Driver -2005 -Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (2):137–151.abstract In this paper moralism is defined as the illicit use of moral considerations. Three different varieties of moralism are then discussed — moral absolutism, excessive standards and demandingness, and presenting non‐moral considerations as moral ones. Both individuals and theories can be regarded as moralistic in some of these senses. Indeed, some critics of consequentialism have regarded that theory as moralistic. The author then describes the problems associated with each sense of ‘moralism’ and how casuistry evolved to try to deal (...) with some of these problems. The author also defends consequentialism against one charge of moralism [1]. (shrink)
- [no title].Julia Staffel -unknownNo categories
- Prudence and morality in ancient and modern ethics.Julia Annas -1995 -Ethics 105 (2):241-257.Examines prudential and moral reasoning in ancient and modern ethics. Ancient ethical theories' task of articulating the agent's overall goal; Structural differences between ancient eudaemonist theories and modern theories; Virtue as a complex intellectual kind of understanding.
- Reasons Fundamentalism and Rational Uncertainty – Comments on Lord, The Importance of Being Rational.Julia Staffel -2020 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):463-468.In his new book "The Importance of Being Rational", Errol Lord aims to give a real definition of the property of rationality in terms of normative reasons. If he can do so, his work is an important step towards a defense of ‘reasons fundamentalism’ – the thesis that all complex normative properties can be analyzed in terms of normative reasons. I focus on his analysis of epistemic rationality, which says that your doxastic attitudes are rational just in case they are (...) correct responses to the objective normative reasons you possess. For some fact to be an objective normative reason to do something that you possess, you have to be in a position to know this fact and be able to competently use it as a reason to do that thing. Lord’s view is thus a knowledge-first view about possessing normative reasons. Throughout the book, Lord conceptualizes belief in the traditional tripartite way – if you take any attitude at all towards a proposition, then you either believe it, or disbelieve it, or you suspend judgment about it. Lord doesn’t discuss cases in which we’re uncertain. Yet, those cases are ubiquitous. I explore how his view can be extended to them. I first discuss whether his strategy for vindicating coherence requirements in terms of normative reasons can be applied to credences. I then ask how Lord can conceive of the doxastic attitudes that encode uncertainty . (shrink)
- Computable Boolean algebras.Julia Knight &Michael Stob -2000 -Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (4):1605-1623.
- Focus: Aspects of Accountancy.John Blake,Julia Clarke &Catherine Gowthorpe -forthcoming -Business Ethics:388.Export citation
Bookmark - Conflictos, dilemas y paradojas: cine y bioética en el inicio de la vida.Pinto Bustamante,Boris Julián,Gómez Córdoba &Ana Isabel (eds.) -2019 - Bogotá, D.C.: Editorial Universidad del Rosario.The topics addressed in this work deal with the bioethical and legal conflicts in scenarios such as the termination of pregnancy, assisted reproductive technologies, technical developments in the genomic era, the reproductive cloning of human beings, divergences of sexual development and transsexualism, and a proposal for the analysis of ethical conflics in clinical practice. The joint work of students and professors has lead to identifying a set of issues that address both medical elements and cultural, moral, and legal variables in (...) relation to the proposed topics, in order to offer the necessary elements to deal with the complexity of each of these issues, in which cinema has been used as a didactic and mimetic resource that organizes the argumentative process of each case."--page 2 of cover. (shrink)Export citation Bookmark
- Christian Morality.James Nelson &Julia Macneice -1998In this text, the authors confront the many issues which can confuse, frighten or ensnare young people as they struggle to make their own decisions in a world where the hard edges of moral choice have become increasingly blurred. Issues such as drug abuse and abortion are explored in their secular context, while also being placed under the microscope of both Biblical and church teaching. The positions of the Roman Catholic, Church of Ireland, Prebyterian and Methodist churches are examined through (...) their own statements and publications. (shrink)
- Rethinking Human Rights in the Global South: Development and Colonial Power.Julia Suárez-Krabbe -2015 - Rowman & Littlefield International.An analysis of the evolution of the overlapping histories of human rights and development, and an exploration of the alternatives, through the lens of indigenous and other southern theories and epistemologies.No categories
- Ancient ethics and modern morality.Julia Annas -1992 -Philosophical Perspectives 6:119-136.
- Is the world really a mess? The circularity objection.Julia Göthling &Matthias Paul -1999 - In Matthias Paul,Nancy Cartwright: Laws, Capacities and Science : Vortrag und Kolloquium in Münster 1998. Münster: Lit.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- III.Julia Hölzl -2015 - In Jeremy Fernando,[Given, if, then]: a reading in three parts. Brooklyn, NY: BABEL Working Group.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Unphenomenal Shakespeare: Pending Critical Quarrels.Julián Jiménez Heffernan -2023 - BRILL."In the aftermath of New Historicism and Cultural Materialism, the field of Shakespeare Studies has been increasingly overrun by post-theoretical, phenomenological claims. Many of the critical tendencies that hold the field today--post-humanism, speculative realism, ecocriticism, historical phenomenology, new materialism, performance studies, animal studies, affect studies--are consciously or unwittingly informed by phenomenological assumptions. This book aims at uncovering and examining these claims, not only to assess their philosophical congruency but also to determine their hermeneutic relevance when applied to Shakespeare. More specifically, (...) Unphenomenal Shakespeare deploys resources of speculative critique to resist the moralistic and aestheticist phenomenalization of the Shakespeare playtexts across a variety of schools and scholars, a tendency best epitomized in Bruce Smith's Phenomenal Shakespeare "--. (shrink)No categories
- Atendimento aos portadores de fissuras labiais e/ou palatais: características de um serviço.Alice Maggi &Júlia Biasin Scopel -2011 -Revista Aletheia 34:175-186.O estudo caracterizou a clientela atendida em um serviço interdisciplinar de atendimento aos portadores de fissura labial e/ou palatal numa cidade de porte médio, destacando o perfil sociodemográfico, o tipo de fissura, o histórico do atendimento e a situação psicossocial. O método adotado foi o doc..
- Challenging Prophetic Metaphor: Theology and Ideology in the Prophets.Julia M. O'Brien -2008No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Race, Rights and Rebels: Alternatives to Human Rights and Development From the Global South.Julia Suárez-Krabbe -2015 - Rowman & Littlefield International.An analysis of the evolution of the overlapping histories of human rights and development, and an exploration of the alternatives, through the lens of indigenous and other southern theories and epistemologies.
- The Hellenistic Version of Aristotle’s Ethics.Julia Annas -1990 -The Monist 73 (1):80-96.From the Hellenistic period we have two extensive texts of great interest which draw on Aristotle’s ethical works. One is Antiochus’ system of ethics in Cicero’s De Finibus V; the other is the long account of “the ethics of Aristotle and the other Peripatetics” in Stobaeus’ Eclogae II, 116-152, plausibly ascribed to Arius Didymus. Antiochus’ ethics is consciously “eclectic” in the sense that he is using a variety of ethical material and approaches, Aristotelian and other, to create something of his (...) own. Arius, however, professes to be telling us what Aristotelian ethics is, and scholars have been disconcerted to find something so different from any idea we have of Aristotelian ethics. We find a text in which material clearly taken from the ethical works and the Politics has been not just summarized but recast in terms that are clearly Stoic. Most strikingly, before we get to what we recognize as Aristotelian material we find a long section developing in an Aristotelian context what seems clearly to be the Stoic notion of oikeiōsis. Either Arius, or more likely the Peripatetic source he is following, has presented Aristotle’s ethics in a very changed form. Since we have no hope of pinpointing a particular Peripatetic source for the passage, I shall for convenience refer to “Arius” or “the Arius passage,” but the person or people with whom we are concerned are more likely to be, in fact, Arius’ source or sources. (shrink)
- La Question de l'homme et le fondement de la philosophie.DidierJulia -1964 - Aubier: Éditions Montaigne.
- Towards lifting the burden of stereotyping.Julia Tanner -2016 -“Ethos”:152-172.Some may doubt whether the question of equality of opportunity applies to women anymore. In most Western countries every career is now, in theory, open to women. Firstly, while this may be true in Western countries, it is not true in others; there are still many careers barred to women outside the West. However, affirmative action is not a remedy where women are barred from given careers, for in such cases the principle of equality of opportunity has been rejected. Rather, (...) affirmative action is a measure for achieving equality of opportunity. (shrink)
- Reading Plato's Dialectics: Schleiermacher's Insistence on Dialectics as Dialogical.Julia A. Lamm -2003 -Journal for the History of Modern Theology/Zeitschrift für Neuere Theologiegeschichte 10 (1):1-25.Zusammenfassung Sprechen Wissenschaftler üblicherweise vom Platonischen Charakter der Dialektik Schleiermachers, meinen sie deren grundlegend Sokratisch-dialogischen Charakter, zumal Schleiermacher Dialektik als „die Kunst des Diskurses oder des Dialogs“ definierte. Problematisch daran ist nun, daß Platons Dialoge mehr als eine Art von Dialektik aufweisen. Der Aufsatz beginnt mit einem Überblick auf die, in der „Allgemeinen Einleitung“ dargelegten fünf Grunddeutungsprinzipien, die Schleiermachers Interpretation der platonischen Dialektik untermauern, leiten und einschränken sollen. Der Beitrag wendet sich dann den Einleitungen der einzelnen Dialoge zu, um zu (...) überprüfen, wie Schleiermacher diese Prinzipien auf konkrete Situationen bei seiner Bearbeitung eines jeden Dialogs anwendet. Schleiermacher scheint manchmal einfach die eher spekulativen Züge der Platonischen Dialektik zu ignorieren, wie seine Interpretation des Phaidros zeigt. Gelingt es ihm nicht diese spekulativen Züge zu ignorieren, unterdrückt er sie, indem er einen zwingenden Bezug zur dialogischen Form der Dialektik herstellt, wie seine Interpretationen des Sophistes und des Phaidon zeigen. Läßt er dann schließlich einen bestimmten unabhängigen Status der spekulativen Dialektik Platons zu, marginalisiert Schleiermacher die entsprechenden Passagen so, daß er sie ihrer Bedeutung beraubt, wie seine Interpretation der Bücher V–VII der Politeia zeigt. (shrink)
- Models of arithmetic and closed ideals.Julia Knight &Mark Nadel -1982 -Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (4):833-840.
- Hanf numbers for omitting types over particular theories.Julia F. Knight -1976 -Journal of Symbolic Logic 41 (3):583-588.
- The Struggle for Identity in Today's Schools: Cultural Recognition in a Time of Increasing Diversity.Betty Alford,Julia Ballenger,Angela Crespo Cozart,Sandy Harris,Ray Horn,Patrick M. Jenlink,John Leonard,Vincent Mumford,Amanda Rudolph,Kris Sloan,Sandra Stewart,Faye Hicks Townes &Kim Woo (eds.) -2009 - R&L Education.This book examines cultural recognition and the struggle for identity in America's schools. In particular, the contributing authors focus on the recognition and misrecognition as antagonistic cultural forces that work to shape, and at times distort identity.
- Zum Verhältnis von Empirie und kultursoziologischer Theoriebildung: Stand und Perspektiven.Julia Böcker (ed.) -2018 - Weinheim: Beltz Juventa.No categories
- No "mere accumulation of material" : land as evidence in early Americanist anthropology.Julia E. Rodriguez -2022 - In Sarah Ehlers & Stefan Esselborn,Evidence in action between science and society: constructing, validating and contesting knowledge. New York, NY: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Why Governance for Harmony?Chenyang Li,Julia Tao,A. Cheung &M. Painter (eds.) -2009No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Los privilegios de Octavio Paz.Julián Ríos -2017 - In Miguel Angel Muñoz,La vida constante: conversaciones en el tránsito del milenio. México, DF: Editorial Praxis.Export citation Bookmark
- El hombre como síntesis del universo.Julián Román -1963 - Rosario [República Argentina]: Librería y Editorial Ruiz.No categories
- Expansions of models and Turing degrees.Julia Knight &Mark Nadel -1982 -Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (3):587-604.
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
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Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
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Esa Diaz-Leon
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Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
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Øystein Linnebo
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Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
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Jack Alan Reynolds
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