‘‘Is ‘Seeking God’s Help’ Associated with Life Satisfaction and Disease-specific Quality of Life in Cancer Patients? The HUNT Study.Torgeir Sørensen,JosteinHolmen,Sophie D. Fosså,Lars J. Danbolt,Lars Lien &Alv A. Dahl -2012 -Archive for the Psychology of Religion 34 (2):191-213.detailsThis study investigates the prevalence of ‘Seeking God's Help’, its relation to time since diagnosis, and its association with Life Satisfaction for all cancer types. This study also investigates Disease-Specific Quality of Life for patients with breast, prostate, and colorectal cancers. Data were obtained from the third wave of the Nord-Trøndelag Health Study of Norway, with 2,086 cancer patients identified by the Cancer Registry of Norway and 6,258 cancer-free controls. Our results indicate a higher prevalence of ‘Seeking God's Help’ after (...) a shorter time since diagnosis among men. No association was observed in multivariate analyses between ‘Seeking God's Help’ and ‘Life Satisfaction’ or ‘Disease-Specific QoL’ in long-term cancer survivors. Longitudinal investigations are needed to elucidate the relationship between the ‘Seeking God's Help’ variable and Life Satisfaction and Disease-Specific QoL among cancer patients in a Norwegian context. (shrink)
The Syrian refugee crisis in Scandinavian newspapers.Jostein Gripsrud,Hilmar Mjelde &Jan Fredrik Hovden -2018 -Communications 43 (3):325-356.detailsThis article maps and analyzes quantitatively how the Scandinavian news press covered the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis. Our analysis shows that in the coverage of the migration events, Denmark and Sweden occupy polar positions in terms of their newspapers’ emphasis, with the former appearing more negative towards the refugees, and the latter more positive. The Norwegian case is found in between these. Danish print media more often mention the negative economic consequences of the arrivals, and Swedish the positive moral ones, (...) while Norway appears to occupy a middle ground in the Scandinavian discourse. We also find that the Scandinavian press writes less often about the negative consequences of refugees coming than the European press in general. However, the humanitarian aspects of the crisis became less prominent in the Scandinavian press over time, as in the rest of Europe. (shrink)
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The public sphere.Jostein Gripsrud (ed.) -2011 - London: SAGE.detailsv. 1. Discovering the public sphere -- v. 2. The political public sphere -- v. 3. The cultural public sphere -- v. 4. The future of the public sphere.
Sophie's World: A Novel About the History of Philosophy.Jostein Gaarder -1994 - Farrar, Straus and Giroux.detailsThe protagonists are Sophie Amundsen, a 14-year-old girl, and Alberto Knox, her philosophy teacher. The novel chronicles their metaphysical relationship as they study Western philosophy from its beginnings to the present. A bestseller in Norway.
The Neurocorrective Offer and Manipulative Pressure.Sebastian JonHolmen &Emma Dore-Horgan -forthcoming -Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-18.detailsAn important question regarding the use of neurointerventions in criminal justice systems relates to the ethics of offering neurointerventions in exchange for a sentence reduction or as a condition of parole – what has been termed the _neurocorrective offer_. In this paper, we suggest that neurocorrective offers may sometimes involve manipulative pressure. That is, in some cases these offers will involve a pressure to comply with the manipulators’ (i.e., the state’s) bidding that does not rise to the level of coercion, (...) but which cannot be considered an instance of persuasion. We then suggest that offenders may fall victim to this pressure due to general facts about human psychology and their situational vulnerability. We end the paper by identifying three reasons for thinking it prima facie morally wrong for the state to make neurocorrective offers involving manipulative pressure even if such offers do not undermine offenders’ consent to the offer. Specifically, we suggest that such offers are plausibly pro tanto harmful to some offenders and that they sometimes disrespect their autonomy and rationality. (shrink)
Situational Crime Prevention, Advice Giving, and Victim-Blaming.Sebastian JonHolmen -2024 -Philosophia 52 (2):325-340.detailsSituational crime prevention (SCP) measures attempt to prevent crime by reducing the opportunities for crime to occur. One of the ways in which some SCP measures reduce such opportunities is by providing victims with advice about how to avoid being victimised, for instance through public awareness campaigns or safety apps. Some scholars claim that this approach to preventing crime often or always promotes victim-blaming and that it is therefore morally wrong to pursue such strategies. Others have made sweeping rejections of (...) this claim. However, in this paper, I suggest that neither view is correct. Specifically, I demonstrate that there are at least three distinct ways of interpreting what I term the victim-blaming argument against advice-giving SCP measures – i.e. as an argument based on a concern for direct victim-blaming, indirect victim-blaming, or self-blame – and that both SCP opponents and supporters have legitimate grounds for their position, depending on how the argument is spelled out. (shrink)
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Is it getting too personal? On personalized advertising and autonomy.SebastianHolmen -2023 -Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics 2:53-67.detailsIt has recently been suggested that personalized advertising is often _more _an affront to a person's autonomy and thus more morally worrisome than its generic counterpart precisely because it involves or takes advantage of such personalization. This paper argues that central reasons that have been forwarded to support this claim are unpersuasive and that generic and personalized advertising should therefore be treated as morally on par in terms of their potential to undermine consumer autonomy. The paper then suggests that, if (...) this is true, it presses scholars who wish to maintain there to be a moral asymmetry between personalized and generic advertising in terms of their effect on consumer autonomy to choose between three argumentative avenues, but that none of these is likely to be particularly attractive for a defender of the asymmetry. (shrink)
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Cognitive Diminishments and Crime Prevention: “Too Smart for the Rest of Us”?Sebastian JonHolmen -2022 -Neuroethics 15 (1):1-13.detailsIn this paper, I discuss whether it is ever morally permissible to diminish the cognitive abilities or capacities of some cognitively gifted offenders whose ability to commit their crimes successfully relies on them possessing these abilities or capacities. I suggest that, given such cognitive diminishments may prevent such offenders from re-offending and causing others considerable harm, this provides us with at least one good moral reason in favour of employing them. After setting out more clearly what cognitive diminishment may consist (...) of, I then critically discuss variations of four plausible arguments against a proposal of using them on cognitive gifted offenders related to autonomy, harm, narrative identity, and a right to mental self-determination. I argue that none of these concerns should have us reject the use of cognitive diminishments. (shrink)
Leveling (down) the playing field: performance diminishments and fairness in sport.Sebastian JonHolmen,Thomas Søbirk Petersen &Jesper Ryberg -2023 -Journal of Medical Ethics 49 (7):502-505.detailsThe 2018 eligibility regulation for female competitors with differences of sexual development (DSD) issued by World Athletics requires competitors with DSD with blood testosterone levels at or above 5 nmol/L and sufficient androgen sensitivity to be excluded from competition in certain events unless they reduce the level of testosterone in their blood. This paper formalises and then critically assesses the fairness-based argument offered in support of this regulation by the federation. It argues that it is unclear how the biological advantage (...) singled out by the regulation as an appropriate target for diminishment, is relevantly different from other biological advantages that athletes may enjoy, and specifically that Sigmund Loland’s recent attempt to drive a wedge between heightened levels of blood testosterone and other biological advantages fails. The paper also suggests that even if heightened blood testosterone levels do differ relevantly from other types of biological advantage, the regulation is further challenged by studies indicating that athletes with blood testosterone at the high end of the normal range have a competitive advantage over athletes with blood testosterone levels at the low end of it. Finally, the paper contends that the premises of the fairness-based argument do not unequivocally support the conclusion that DSD athletes with heightened levels of testosterone should diminish those levels, since, just as powerfully, they support allowing athletes with normal levels of testosterone to use performance-enhancing drugs in the name of fairness. (shrink)
Neurointerventions and informed consent.Sebastian JonHolmen -2021 -Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (12):e86-e86.detailsIt is widely believed that informed consent must be obtained from a patient for it to be morally permissible to administer to him/her a medical intervention. The same has been argued for the use of neurointerventions administered to criminal offenders. Arguments in favour of a consent requirement for neurointerventions can take two forms. First, according to absolutist views, neurointerventions shouldneverbe administered without an offender’s informed consent. However, I argue that these views are ultimately unpersuasive. The second, and more plausible, form (...) defences of the consent requirement may take are more moderate in that they accept the use of neurointerventions in some cases, but not in others. Based on common rationales for consent in medical interventions, I discuss whether four moderate approaches in defence of the informed consent requirement for medical interventions succeed in establishing that informed consent must be obtained from offenders prior to administering neurointerventions to them. I offer novel critical perspectives on approaches that have already received some attention in the literature, and I critically discuss other approaches to defending informed consent in a medical context that have not yet received due attention. Ultimately, I argue that it is not obvious that any of these considerations support a requirement of offenders’ informed consent to neurointerventions. Lastly, however, I suggest that there is at least one overlooked fact as regards how courts currently employ mandatory neurointerventions, which may support such a requirement. (shrink)
The Agency Objection to Preventive Exclusion from Public Spaces.Sebastian JonHolmen -2023 -Criminal Justice Ethics 42 (2):178-192.detailsOne way to seek to reduce the risk of potential offenders engaging in certain types of crime in a public or semi-public area is to make it much more difficult, or even impossible, for them to gain access to the area in question and subject them to a sanction if they do enter the area. This paper considers whether preventive exclusion of this kind should be considered a pro tanto morally impermissible means of crime prevention because it violates the agency (...) of those excluded. Several variants of this agency objection to preventive exclusion are identified and critically assessed. It is argued that none persuasively show preventive exclusion to be pro tanto morally wrong. (shrink)
Direct Brain Interventions, Changing Values and the Argument from Objectification – a Reply to Elizabeth Shaw.SebastianHolmen -2017 -Neuroethics 11 (2):217-227.detailsThis paper critically discusses the argument from objectification – as recently presented by Elizabeth Shaw – against mandatory direct brain interventions targeting criminal offenders’ values as part of rehabilitative or reformative schemes. Shaw contends that such DBIs would objectify offenders because a DBI “excludes offenders by portraying them as a group to whom we need not listen” and “implies that offenders are radically defective with regard to one of the most fundamental aspects of their agency”. To ensure that offenders are (...) not objectified, Shaw first maintains that we should restrict rehabilitative/reformative schemes to attempts at rational dialogue because such an approach respects the offender’s personhood. Second, Shaw claims that we should not portray offenders as radically defective because such treatment would only negatively impact offenders’ already tenuous relationship with society. Third, Shaw contends that we should not confer the state the power to change an offender’s values because the state lacks insight into what constitutes the right values. I contend that none of these arguments should prevent the use of value-targeting DBIs. First, I show that the dialogue requirement for rehabilitative schemes is insufficient ground from which to oppose the use of these DBIs. Second, I show that it is doubtful that the use of DBIs as proposed would damage the relationship between offenders and society. Finally, although the state may often lack insight into what constitutes the correct values, this lack of insight should not by itself prevent value-targeting DBIs from being employed on certain groups of offenders. (shrink)
Respect, Punishment and Mandatory Neurointerventions.Sebastian JonHolmen -2020 -Neuroethics 14 (2):167-176.detailsThe view that acting morally is ultimately a question of treating others with respect has had a profound influence on moral and legal philosophy. Not surprisingly, then, some scholars forcefully argue that the modes of punishment that the states mete out to offenders should not be disrespectful, and, furthermore, it has been argued that obliging offenders to receive neurological treatment is incompatible with showing them their due respect. In this paper, I examine three contemporary accounts of what showing respect for (...) offenders in our sentencing practices would amount to: that it involves not interfering with offenders’ capacities for rationality and autonomy, that it should not undermine offenders’ prospect of reform, and that it amounts to treating offenders as if opaque. I then critically discuss whether any of these accounts plausibly imply that mandating neurointerventions to some offenders is necessarily morally wrong. I argue that they do not. (shrink)
Hvorfor handlingskunnskapikke er slutningsbasert.Heine A.Holmen -2017 -Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 52 (4):161-179.detailsThe paper discusses the epistemological basis for how you know what you are doing intentionally (and why). In particular, it challenges and ulimately rejects the claim made by Sarah K. Paul that such knowledge has an inferential basis.
Thinking Educationally about Psychology in Education: Gert Biesta's Critique Reconsidered.Jostein Sæther -2024 -Educational Theory 74 (3):411-433.detailsLearning and development are well established as concepts in educational psychology. Gert Biesta has used terms such as “learnification” and “developmentalism” to describe a tendency that, in his view, removes existential qualities from teaching and education. Although important in the right contexts, the concepts do not represent the core of what education should be about, he claims.Jostein Sæther notes that in many ways he shares Biesta's view on the most fundamental quality of education, i.e., helping young people exist (...) as independent subjects in confrontation with their own will, responsibility, and freedom. In this paper, he addresses the overarching question of whether it is possible and desirable to think educationally about psychology in educational theory, specifically through relating Biesta's critique to selected handbooks, reviews, and metaliterature. Sæther does not propose integrating educational psychology into Biesta's existential theory but rather hopes to open a dialogue on different points of view that challenge each other in fruitful ways. The process of discussing certain principles, problems, and examples should yield a certain kind of “unclean” educational psychology, one that is relevant to “subjectification.” There are problems related to eclecticism and the tension between essence and existence, yet, in this context, Sæther sees a dialogical project as the only way forward. (shrink)
Action and the problem of evil.Heine A.Holmen -2015 -International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 76 (4):335-351.detailsMost contemporary action theorists deny the possible existence of intentionally evil actions or diabolic agency. The reason for this is a normative interpretation of agency that appears to be motivated by action theoretic concerns, where agents are conceived as necessarily acting sub specie bonie or under ‘the guise of the good’. I argue that there is nothing in human agency to motivate this view and that diabolic evil is not at odds with inherent features of our nature.
Ideal Fairness in Sport is Impossible.Thomas S. Petersen,Sebastian J.Holmen &Jesper Ryberg -2024 -American Journal of Bioethics 24 (11):48-49.detailsJennings and Braun (2024) argue convincingly for the conclusion that the World Athletics (WA) definition of fairness in sport is applied inconsistently in its efforts to regulate the participation...
A note on psychological continuity theories of identity and neurointerventions.Sebastian JonHolmen -2022 -Journal of Medical Ethics 48 (10):742-745.detailsAn important concern sometimes voiced in the neuroethical literature is that swift and radical changes to the parts of a person’s mental life essential for sustaining his/her numerical identity can result in the person ceasing to exist—in other words, that these changes may disrupt psychological continuity. Taking neurointerventions used for rehabilitative purposes as a point of departure, this short paper argues that the same radical alterations of criminal offenders’ psychological features which under certain conditions would result in a disruption of (...) numerical identity can be achieved without these having any effect on numerical identity. Thus, someone interested in making radical alterations to offenders’ psychology can avoid the charge that this would kill the offenders, while still achieving a radical transformation of them. The paper suggests that this possibility makes the question of what kinds of qualitive alterations to offenders’ identity are morally permissible pressing, but then briefly highlights some challenges for arguments against making radical qualitative identity alterations to offenders. No data are available. (shrink)
Designing a Delinked Incentive for Critical Antibiotics: Lessons from Norway.Christine Årdal,Jostein Johnsen &Karianne Johansen -2018 -Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 46 (s1):43-49.detailsNo country has yet implemented a pilot to ensure access to or the innovation of new antibiotics for multi-drug infections. A team from national health agencies in Norway, with the support of the Innovative Medicine Initiative-funded project DRIVE-AB, designed a model suitable for the national context, including the selection of the antibiotics, the potential value, and the operational model.
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Ought the State Use Non-Consensual Treatment to Restore Trial Competence?Sebastian JonHolmen -2023 -Res Publica 29 (1):111-127.detailsThe important question of the legality of the state obliging trial incompetent defendants to receive competency-restoring treatment against their wishes, is one that has received much attention by legal scholars. Surprisingly, however, little attention has been paid to the, in many ways more fundamental, moral question of whether the state ought to administer such treatments. The aim of this paper is to start filling this gap in the literature. I begin by offering some reasons for thinking it morally acceptable to, (...) at least sometimes, oblige trial-incompetent defendants to receive competency-restoring treatments. The paper then discusses whether three prominent arguments (and their variations) offered by legal scholars against using non-consensual treatment to restore trial competence provide grounds for thinking there to be a general moral prohibition against these treatments. I argue that they do not. (shrink)
Handling og den praktiske kunnskapens metafysikk.Heine A.Holmen -2016 -Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift:5-19.detailsThe following paper argues that the epistemology of action can best be understood via a metaphysical framework of knowledge where the latter is conceived as a metaphysically primitive relation holding between a subject (or mind) and a fact. In particular, it argues that we must separate sharply between the knowledge relation itself and the different means by virtue of which knowledge obtains. Once that distinction is in place, we can see that there is no obstacle to argue that ordinary knowledge (...) can be had on the basis of distinctively practical attitudes or intentional actions. (shrink)
Time and Space in Time and Space.Janne Holmén -2020 -Contributions to the History of Concepts 15 (2):105-129.detailsMental maps and historical consciousness, which describe the spatial and temporal dimensions of worldviews, are not, as commonly stated, twentieth century concepts. Historical consciousness was coined simultaneously by several German scholars in the mid-1800s. Mental maps, used in English since the 1820s, had a prominent role in US geography education from the 1880s. Since then, the concepts have traveled between practical-technical, educational, and academic vocabularies, cross fertilizing fields and contributing to the formation of new research questions. However, when these initial (...) periods of reflection gave way to empirical investigation, strict intra-disciplinary definitions of the concepts have strengthened disciplinary borders by excluding the interpretations of the same concepts in other fields. (shrink)
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Why die – a philosophical apology of death.Heine A.Holmen -2017 -International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 79 (1-2):136-155.detailsIn the Insanity Defence Woody Allen claims that when we say humans are mortal we are obviously not complimenting them. It is difficult to contradict great comedy, of course, but if what I argue holds, Allen is wrong on this account. Mortality is a compliment – or at least something for which we should be grateful – since life without it threatens with disaster. To live without death also means living in the universe in its more hostile stages under conditions (...) where there can be no meaningful life. In this way, immortality is worse than death. In addition, I argue that no matter how carefully we qualify the conditions that make up immortality the old problem of death resurface. I therefore conclude, with a nod towards Voltaire, that if death did not exist, it would have been necessary to invent it. (shrink)
Heller død enn udødelig.HeineHolmen -2017 -Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 52 (1-2):40-56.details«Hva er det vi egentlig mener når vi sier, mennesket er dødelig?» spør Woody Allen i boken The Insanity Defence. Han legger til: «Det er åpenbart ikke et kompliment.»1 Jeg tror Woody tar feil her. Vår dødelighet er et kompliment – eller i det minste av det gode – siden livet uten døden ville være katastrofalt. Udødelige liv fører til dyp kjedsomhet, eksistensiell angst og en radikal form for verdinihilistisk tilværelse. Grunnen er at udødeligheten gjør at vi en gang i (...) fremtiden må konfronteres med de radikalt livsfiendtlige stadiene av universets historie. Jeg argumenterer for at dette er en skjebne langt verre enn døden. Konklusjonen blir derfor, med et nikk til Voltaire, at om døden ikke hadde eksistert, hadde vi vært nødt til å finne den opp. (shrink)
AI, doping and ethics: On why increasing the effectiveness of detecting doping fraud in sport may be morally wrong.Thomas Søbirk Petersen,Sebastian JonHolmen &Jesper Ryberg -2025 -Journal of Medical Ethics 51 (2):102-106.detailsIn this article, our aim is to show why increasing the effectiveness of detecting doping fraud in sport by the use of artificial intelligence (AI) may be morally wrong. The first argument in favour of this conclusion is that using AI to make a non-ideal antidoping policy even more effective can be morally wrong. Whether the increased effectiveness is morally wrong depends on whether you believe that the current antidoping system administrated by the World Anti-Doping Agency is already morally wrong. (...) The second argument is based on the possibility of scenarios in which a more effective AI system may be morally worse than a less effective but non-AI system. We cannot, of course, conclude that the increased effectiveness of doping detection is always morally wrong. But our point is that whether the introduction of AI to increase detection of doping fraud is a moral improvement depends on the moral plausibility of the current system and the distribution of harm that will follow from false positive and false negative errors. (shrink)
Not in My Neighborhood: The Ethics of Excluding Ex-offenders from Housing.Thomas Søbirk Petersen &Sebastian JonHolmen -2025 -Criminal Law and Philosophy 19 (1):1-17.detailsThe policy adopted by housing authorities of denying prospective tenants with a criminal record access to housing is an important barrier to ex-offenders seeking somewhere to live. The policy is legal, but are there any good reasons in favor of it when we know that having no, or limited, access to secure and affordable housing increases the probability of recidivism? The primary aim of this article is to critically discuss two central reasons that have been given for denying people with (...) criminal records access to housing: that doing so will prevent crime, and that the policy reduces fear of crime. We also try to evaluate an argument for the conclusion that current law, and the policies that follows wrongfully discriminate against people with criminal records. The general thrust of the article is that arguments for this practice turning on its crime preventive effect, and its role in reducing or preventing fear of crime, are unpersuasive. We then explained why, in our view, excluding ex-offenders from housing amounts to wrongful discrimination against them. Our analysis suggests that ex-offenders, apart from a few excemptions, ought to be allowed access to housing to the same extent as other people. (shrink)
Kunnskapens Metafysikk.Heine A.Holmen -2014 -Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 49 (3-4):190-202.detailsThis paper discusses and develops an account in the metaphysics of knowledge where knowledge is explained as a metaphysically primitive relation holding between a subject (or mind) and a fact.
Looking beyond Popper: how philosophy can be relevant to ecology.Tina Heger,Alkistis Elliott-Graves,Marie I. Kaiser,Katie H. Morrow,William Bausman,Gregory P. Dietl,Carsten F. Dormann,David J. Gibson,James Griesemer,Yuval Itescu,Kurt Jax,Andrew M. Latimer,Chunlong Liu,Jostein Starrfelt,Philip A. Stephens &Jonathan M. Jeschke -2025 -Oikos 2025 (2):e10994.detailsCurrent workflows in academic ecology rarely allow an engagement of ecologists with philosophers, or with contemporary philosophical work. We argue that this is a missed opportunity for enriching ecological reasoning and practice, because many questions in ecology overlap with philosophical questions and with current topics in contemporary philosophy of science. One obstacle to a closer connection and collaboration between the fields is the limited awareness of scientists, including ecologists, of current philosophical questions, developments and ideas. In this article, we aim (...) to overcome this obstacle and trigger more collaborations between ecologists and philosophers. First, we provide an overview of philosophical research relevant to ecologists. Second, we use examples to demonstrate that many ecological questions have a philosophical dimension and point to related philosophical work. We elaborate on one example – the debate around the appropriate level of complexity of ecological models – to show in more detail how philosophy can enrich ecology. Finally, we provide suggestions for how to initiate collaborative projects involving both ecologists and philosophers. (shrink)
From the other side: On dialogue in texts byJostein Gaarder.Zuzana Svobodová -2020 -Paideia: Philosophical e-Journal of Charles University 17 (1):1-6.detailsFrom the other side: On dialogue in texts byJostein Gaarder. – By analysing the phenomenon of dialogue in the works of the Norwegian writerJostein Gaarder the paper shows the essence of the dialogical situation of man in the world. Admittingly, people find themselves in such dialogical situation already. However, by virtue of their freedom, they are capable of going beyond the existing feeling of security, and – through fundamental dialogue with a person coming from the other (...) side, one, that is different, whose situation is different – finding a new dimension of human life, find life in truth, life of the uncovered (alétheia), in which freedom and responsibility of the dialogical being can be realised in a unique way. (shrink)
Television as the Centre of the Universe.Geoff Lealand -2002 -Film-Philosophy 6 (3).details_Television and Common Knowledge_ Edited byJostein Gripsrud London: Routledge, 1999 ISBN 0-415-18929-2 209 pp.