Results for 'Jonathan David Trigg'
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- Representation, Presentation and the Epistemic Role of Perceptual Experience.JonathanDavidTrigg -2011 -International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (1):5-30.In this paper I argue that the representational theory of perception, on which the world is represented as being a certain way in perceptual experience, cannot explain how there can be a genuinely epistemic connection between experience and belief. I try to show that we are positively required to deny that perceptual consciousness is contentful if we want to make its fitness for epistemic duties intelligible. (So versions of the representational theory on which experience has a merely causal purchase on (...) belief are not considered.) But my aim is not just negative. I try to defeat representationalism in such a way as to motivate a robustly presentational theory of perception. According to such a theory, perceptions are relations not between a subject and a content but between a subject and an ordinary object (such that if the relation holds at t, an appropriate subject and object must exist at t, and the object must be presented to the subject). I end by sketching an account of perceptual experience that is meant to show that, contrary to a very popular misconception, there is a way to conceive perceptual consciousness as relational and presentational (not intentional and representational) that does not succumb to the celebrated ?myth of the Given? (shrink)
- Re: CycLin and the role of PF in Object Shift.JonathanDavid Bobaljik -unknownThis volume’s two target articles explore novel approaches to word order alternations, especially Scandinavian Object Shift. They share the common perspective that aspects of linear order long considered the exclusive purview of syntax may be better understood if the burden of explanation is split between phonological and syntactic modules. The two articles differ substantially, however, in how this general hunch plays out, in particular in the amount of the explanation that is attributed to extra-syntactic factors. Fox and Pesetsky’s “Cyclic Linearization” (...) model (hereafter F&P, CycLin) is compatible with familiar syntactic models, and can be seen as a filter running (cyclically) on the output of syntactic derivations. F&P suggest that their proposal can explain various heretofore stipulated conditions on syntactic operations as consequences of the architecture of their system and a single axiom about linearization. Erteschik-Shir’s proposal in “Sound Patterns of Syntax” (hereafter E-S) is more radical, in the sense that far less of the familiar syntax is retained; where for CycLin movement is still a syntactic process, on E- S’s view a good deal of traditionally syntactic movement must be rethought in linear, rather than hierarchical terms. Both articles are largely exploratory and leave many of the details still to be spelled-out. To engage the ideas on specifics, then, will involve to some degree making some educated guesses about what ancillary assumptions the relevant authors might condone. I will therefore restrict myself to a few comments at a general level, though it will be impossible to do justice to these authors’ ideas in the allotted space. (shrink)Export citation
Bookmark - Dual Use and the “Moral Taint” Problem.JonathanDavid Moreno -2005 -American Journal of Bioethics 5 (2):52-53.
- La Revolución onto-epistemológica del Constructivismo en las Relaciones Internacionales.JonathanDavid Arriola -2016 -Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 67:163.No categories
- Hume on mental representation and intentionality.JonathanDavid Cottrell -2018 -Philosophy Compass 13 (7):e12505.The past two decades have seen an explosion of literature on Hume's views about mental representation and intentionality. This essay gives a roadmap of this literature, while arguing for two main interpretive claims. First, Hume aims to naturalize all forms of mental representation and intentionality, that is, to explain them in terms of properties and relations that are found throughout the natural world (not just in minds) and that are not, individually, peculiar to representational or intentional things. Second, Hume holds (...) that the passions are not representational but do have intentionality extrinsically. (shrink)
- Explaining How the Mind Works: On the Relation Between Cognitive Science and Philosophy.JonathanTrigg &Michael Kalish -2011 -Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):399-424.In this paper, we argue that under certain prevalent interpretations of the nature and aims of cognitive science, theories of cognition generate a forced choice between a conception of cognition which depends on the possibility of a private language, and a conception of cognition which depends on mereological confusions. We argue, further, that this should not pose a fundamental problem for cognitive scientists since a plausible interpretation of the nature and aims of cognitive science is available that does not generate (...) this forced choice. The crucial difference between these interpretations is that on the one hand the aim of theories of cognition is to tell us what thinking (etc.) is, and on the other it is to tell us what is causally necessary if an intelligent creature is to be able to think. Our argument draws heavily on a Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy in which no philosophical theory can explain what thinking, perceiving, remembering, etc. are, either. The positive, strictly therapeutic, purpose of a philosophy of cognitive science should be to show that, since the traditional problems which constitute the philosophy of mind are chimerical, there is nothing for philosophical theorizing in cognitive science to achieve. (shrink)
- If: Supposition, Pragmatics, and Dual Processes.Jonathan Evans &David Over -2004 - Oxford University Press. Edited by D. E. Over.'If' is one of the most important words in the English language, being used to express hypothetical thought. The use of conditional terms such as 'if' distinguishes human intelligence from that of all other animals. In this volume,Jonathan Evans andDavid Over present a new theoretical approach to understanding conditionals. The book draws on studies from the psychology of judgement and decision making, as well as philosophical logic.
- Superplurals analyzed away.David Nicolas &Jonathan D. Payton -forthcoming -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.Many natural languages include plural terms, i.e., terms which denote many individuals at once. Are there also superplural terms, i.e., terms which denote many pluralities of individuals at once? Some philosophers say ‘Yes’, citing a range of sentence-types which apparently can’t be analyzed in a first-order plural logic, but which can be analyzed in a superplural one. We argue that all the data presented in favor of the superplural can, in fact, be analyzed using only first-order resources. The key is (...) to add to ordinary plural logic a new notion of a generalized cover. A generalized cover reflects how interlocutors in a conversation may divide a salient plurality into many subpluralities, which can then be involved in reference and predication. With generalized covers in place, all the apparently troublesome sentences can be easily handled. Our approach can also be extended to account, not only for linguistic data which seem to favor the superplural, but also for other phenomena involving plurals. The result is a unified approach to natural language plurals on which superplurals are analyzed away. (shrink)No categories
- Nefarious Presentism.Jonathan Tallant &David Ingram -2015 -Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):355-371.Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, face a problem concerning truths about the past. Presentists should (but cannot) locate truth-makers for truths about the past. What can presentists say in response? We identify two rival factions ‘upstanding’ and ‘nefarious’ presentists. Upstanding presentists aim to meet the challenge, positing presently existing truth-makers for truths about the past; nefarious presentists aim to shirk their responsibilities, using the language of truth-maker theory but without paying any ontological price. We argue that presentists (...) should be nefarious presentists. (shrink)
- The Philosophy of Ordinary Language Is a Naturalistic Philosophy.JonathanTrigg -2010 -Essays in Philosophy 11 (2):197-215.It is argued that the only response to the mereological objections of the ordinary language philosopher available to the scientistic philosopher of mind requires the adoption of the view that ordinary psychological talk is theoretical and falsified by the findings of brain science. The availability of this sort of response produces a kind of stalemate between these opposed views and viewpoints: the claim that attribution of psychological predicates to parts of organisms is nonsense is met with the claim that it (...) is only nonsensical if our ordinary ways of talking are – naively – taken to be sacrosanct. The aim of the paper is to show that the ordinary language philosopher has a reply here that the scientistic philosopher is not in a position to ignore. Namely, that the only way to resist mereological objections is to adopt conceptions of personhood that are inimical to naturalistic accounts of mentality. (shrink)
- Why Separation Logic Works.David Pym,Jonathan M. Spring &Peter O’Hearn -2019 -Philosophy and Technology 32 (3):483-516.One might poetically muse that computers have the essence both of logic and machines. Through the case of the history of Separation Logic, we explore how this assertion is more than idle poetry. Separation Logic works because it merges the software engineer’s conceptual model of a program’s manipulation of computer memory with the logical model that interprets what sentences in the logic are true, and because it has a proof theory which aids in the crucial problem of scaling the reasoning (...) task. Scalability is a central problem, and some would even say the central problem, in appli- cations of logic in computer science. Separation Logic is an interesting case because of its widespread success in verification tools. For these two senses of model—the engineering/conceptual and the logical—to merge in a genuine sense, each must maintain their norms of use from their home disciplines. When this occurs, both the logic and engineering benefit greatly. Seeking this intersection of two different senses of model provides a strategy for how computer scientists and logicians may be successful. Furthermore, the history of Separation Logic for analysing programs provides a novel case for philosophers of science of how software engineers and computer scientists develop models and the components of such models. We provide three contributions: an exploration of the extent of models merging that is necessary for success in computer science; an introduction to the technical details of Separation Logic, which can be used for reasoning about other exhaustible resources; and an introduction to the problems, process, and results of computer scientists for those outside the field. (shrink)No categories
- The probability of conditionals: The psychological evidence.David E. Over &Jonathan St B. T. Evans -2003 -Mind and Language 18 (4):340–358.The two main psychological theories of the ordinary conditional were designed to account for inferences made from assumptions, but few premises in everyday life can be simply assumed true. Useful premises usually have a probability that is less than certainty. But what is the probability of the ordinary conditional and how is it determined? We argue that people use a two stage Ramsey test that we specify to make probability judgements about indicative conditionals in natural language, and we describe experiments (...) that support this conclusion. Our account can explain why most people give the conditional probability as the probability of the conditional, but also why some give the conjunctive probability. We discuss how our psychological work is related to the analysis of ordinary indicative conditionals in philosophical logic. (shrink)
- Self-reflection and the temporal focus of the wandering mind.Jonathan Smallwood,Jonathan W. Schooler,David J. Turk,Sheila J. Cunningham,Phebe Burns &C. Neil Macrae -2011 -Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1120-1126.Current accounts suggest that self-referential thought serves a pivotal function in the human ability to simulate the future during mind-wandering. Using experience sampling, this hypothesis was tested in two studies that explored the extent to which self-reflection impacts both retrospection and prospection during mind-wandering. Study 1 demonstrated that a brief period of self-reflection yielded a prospective bias during mind-wandering such that participants’ engaged more frequently in spontaneous future than past thought. In Study 2, individual differences in the strength of self-referential (...) thought — as indexed by the memorial advantage for self rather than other-encoded items — was shown to vary with future thinking during mind-wandering. Together these results confirm that self-reflection is a core component of future thinking during mind-wandering and provide novel evidence that a key function of the autobiographical memory system may be to mentally simulate events in the future. (shrink)
- Rationality in the selection task: Epistemic utility versus uncertainty reduction.Jonathan St B. T. Evans &David E. Over -1996 -Psychological Review 103 (2):356-363.M. Oaksford and N. Chater presented a Bayesian analysis of the Wason selection task in which they proposed that people choose cards in order to maximize expected information gain as measured by reduction in uncertainty in the Shannon-Weaver information theory sense. It is argued that the EIG measure is both psychologically implausible and normatively inadequate as a measure of epistemic utility. The article is also concerned with the descriptive account of findings in the selection task literature offered by Oaksford and (...) Chater. First, it is shown that their analysis data reported in the recent article of K. N. Kirby is unsound; second, an EIG analysis is presented of the experiments of P. Pollard and J. St. B. T. Evans that provides a strong empirical disconfirmation of the theory. (shrink)
- Reasoning to and from belief: Deduction and induction are still distinct.Jonathan St B. T. Evans &David E. Over -2013 -Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):267-283.
- Published Material from the Cambridge Genizah Collections: A Bibliography, 1896-1980.DavidJonathan Gilner &Stefan C. Reif -1992 -Journal of the American Oriental Society 112 (1):162.No categories
- Presentism.David Ingram &Jonathan Tallant -2022 -The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Presentism is the view that only present things exist. So understood, presentism is primarily an ontological doctrine; it’s a view about what exists, absolutely and unrestrictedly. The view is the subject of extensive discussion in the literature on time and change, with much of it focused on the problems that presentism allegedly faces. Thus, most of the literature that frames the development of presentism has grown up either in formulating objections to the view (e.g., Sider 2001: 11–52), or in response (...) to such objections (e.g., Bigelow 1996; Markosian 2004), with exceptions to this largely coming via the ways in which presentism is motivated. This entry mirrors the structure of that literature, for the most part. Here’s the plan for what follows. We begin with a more detailed sketch of presentism, unpacking its commitments and motivations. Then, we move to consider several concerns raised for presentists. We use these to illustrate the breadth and severity of the challenges that presentism faces, as well as the range of different versions of presentism developed to help meet these challenges. (shrink)
- Gesture-first, but no gestures?David McNeill,Bennett Bertenthal,Jonathan Cole &Shaun Gallagher -2005 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):138-139.Although Arbib's extension of the mirror-system hypothesis neatly sidesteps one problem with the “gesture-first” theory of language origins, it overlooks the importance of gestures that occur in current-day human linguistic performance, and this lands it with another problem. We argue that, instead of gesture-first, a system of combined vocalization and gestures would have been a more natural evolutionary unit.
- The science of fake news.David Lazer,Matthew Baum,Yochai Benkler,Adam Berinsky,Kelly Greenhill,Filippo Menczer,Miriam Metzger,Brendan Nyhan,Gordon Pennycook,David Rothschild,Michael Schudson,Steven Sloman,Cass Sunstein,Emily Thorson,Duncan Watts &Jonathan Zittrain -2018 -Science 359 (6380):1094-1096.Addressing fake news requires a multidisciplinary effort The rise of fake news highlights the erosion of long-standing institutional bulwarks against misinformation in the internet age. Concern over the problem is global. However, much remains unknown regarding the vulnerabilities of individuals, institutions, and society to manipulations by malicious actors. A new system of safeguards is needed. Below, we discuss extant social and computer science research regarding belief in fake news and the mechanisms by which it spreads. Fake news has a long (...) history, but we focus on unanswered scientific questions raised by the proliferation of its most recent, politically oriented incarnation. Beyond selected references in the text, suggested further reading can be found in the supplementary materials. (shrink)No categories
- Truth and Dependence.Jonathan Tallant &David Ingram -2017 -Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4:955-980.Truths depend upon what there is. So say many. A significant subset of that group say more; they say that the best way—perhaps the only way—to make sense of the claim that truth depends upon what there is, is to adopt a form of truth-maker theory. Truth-maker theorists claim that truths require ground; what’s true must depend upon what there is. Typically, truth-maker theory isn’t seen as a theory about the nature of truth. Rather, it’s seen as a theory about (...) what truths must do. Truths must depend. Relatedly, the claim that truths require ‘truth-makers’, that is, some putative ontological grounds, is used as a methodological tool in metaphysics. Put somewhat crudely, fix on what truths there are and locate the truth-makers—if necessary, add to your ontology until you satisfy this demand for truth-makers. Truth-making is thus at once both narrow and broad. It’s narrow insofar as it’s not a theory (it’s not a claim) about the nature of truth, and yet it’s broad insofar as it enables us to determine our ontological commitments. We take this to be a two-part orthodoxy about truth-making. We reject the orthodoxy on both counts. (shrink)
- Uncertain deduction and conditional reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans,Valerie A. Thompson &David E. Over -2015 -Frontiers in Psychology 6.
- Collective nouns and the distribution problem.David Nicolas &Jonathan D. Payton -2025 -Synthese 205 (4):1-29.Intuitively, collective nouns are pseudo-singular: a collection of things (a pair of people, a flock of birds, etc.) just _is_ the things that make ‘it’ up. But certain facts about natural language seem to count against this view. In short, distributive predicates and numerals interact with collective nouns in ways that they seemingly shouldn’t if those nouns are pseudo-singular. We call this set of issues ‘the distribution problem’. To solve it, we propose a modification to cover-based semantics. On this semantics, (...) the interpretation of distributive predicates and numerals depends on a cover, where the choice of cover is strongly semantically constrained by the noun with which they interact. (shrink)No categories
- Sceptics, millenarians, and Jews.David S. Katz,Jonathan Israel &Richard H. Popkin (eds.) -1990 - New York: E.J. Brill.The essays in this volume are a contribution to this process of reappraisal, focusing specifically on the phenomena of scepticism and millenarianism, especially ...
- The Discourse Interview.Jonathan Lowe &David J. Mossley -2005 -Discourse: Learning and Teaching in Philosophical and Religious Studies 5 (1):17-28.No categories
- Review of Varieties of Presence, by Alva Nöe. [REVIEW]JonathanTrigg -2013 -Essays in Philosophy 14 (2):303-322.
- Gratitude increases third-party punishment.Jonathan Vayness,Fred Duong &David DeSteno -2020 -Cognition and Emotion 34 (5):1020-1027.Third-party punishment (TPP) occurs when the perpetrator of a transgression is punished by an individual who is not the victim of the transgression and, therefore, not directly affected by it. As F...
- Informed Consent and Respecting Autonomy: What's a Signature Got to Do with It?David Wendler &Jonathan E. Rackoff -2001 -IRB: Ethics & Human Research 23 (3):1.No categories
- Multiple Faiths in Postcolonial Cities: Living Together After Empire.Jonathan Dunn,Heleen Joziasse,Raj Bharat Patta,Helena Mary Kettleborough,Phil Barton,Elaine Bishop,Terry Biddington,C. I.David Joy,Esther Mombo,Chris Shannahan &Peter Manley Scott -2019 - Springer Verlag.This book addresses the challenges of living together after empire in many post-colonial cities. It is organized in two sections. The first section focuses on efforts by people of multiple faiths to live together within their contexts, including such efforts within a neighborhood in urban Manchester; the array of attempts at creating multi-faith spaces for worship across the globe; and initiatives to commemorate divisive conflict together in Northern Ireland. The second section utilizes particular postcolonial methods to illuminate pressing issues within (...) specific contexts—including women’s leadership in an indigenous denomination in the variegated African landscape, and baptism and discipleship among Dalit communities in India. In the context of growing multiculturalism in the West, this volume offers a postcolonial theological resource, challenging the epistemologies in the Western academy. (shrink)No categories
- When can we say ‘if’?Jonathan StB. T. Evans,Helen Neilens,Simon J. Handley &David E. Over -2008 -Cognition 108 (1):100-116.
- Un aggiornamento sulla ricerca con neuroimmagini nella ADHD.David Cohen &Jonathan Leo -2004 -Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (2):161-166.Export citation Bookmark
- Human Reasoning.David E. Over &Jonathan St B. T. Evans -2024 - Cambridge University Press.This Element is on new developments in the psychology of reasoning that raise or address philosophical questions. In traditional studies in the psychology of reasoning, the focus was on inference from arbitrary assumptions and not at all from beliefs, and classical binary logic was presupposed as the only standard for human reasoning. But recently a new Bayesian paradigm has emerged in the discipline. This views ordinary human reasoning as mostly inferring probabilistic conclusions from degrees of beliefs, or from hypothetical premises (...) relevant to a purpose at hand, and as often about revising or updating degrees of belief. This Element also covers new formulations of dual-process theories of the mind, stating that there are two types of mental processing, one rapid and intuitive and shared with other animals, and the other slow and reflective and more characteristic of human beings. The final topic covered is the new developments and rationality. (shrink)No categories
- Whole mind theory: Massive modularity meets dual processes.Jonathan St B. T. Evans &David E. Over -2008 -Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):200 – 208.Carruthers, P. (2006). The architecture of the mind. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 462 pp. ISBN 0-19-92708-9, £55/$99 (hbk); 0-19-920707-0, £25/$45 (pbk).There is much to admire about this b...
- Reconciling Ecological and Democratic Values: Recent Perspectives on Ecological Democracy.David Schlosberg,Karin Bäckstrand &Jonathan Pickering -2019 -Environmental Values 28 (1):1-8.
- Context, cortex, and dopamine: A connectionist approach to behavior and biology in schizophrenia.Jonathan D. Cohen &David Servan-Schreiber -1992 -Psychological Review 99 (1):45-77.
- The Jewish Family in Antiquity.DavidJonathan Gilner &Shaye J. D. Cohen -1997 -Journal of the American Oriental Society 117 (2):364.
- The encyclopaedic life.David Philip Miller,Jonathan Topham &Marina Frasca-Spada -2002 -Metascience 11 (2):154-171.No categories
- Knowing thyself, knowing the other: They're not the same.Jonathan Schull &J.David Smith -1992 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):166-167.
- Discovering Eve: Ancient Israelite Women in Context.DavidJonathan Gilner &Carol Meyers -1990 -Journal of the American Oriental Society 110 (1):158.
- Acceptance and Commitment Therapy for the Treatment of Music Performance Anxiety: A Pilot Study with Student Vocalists.David G. Juncos,Glenn A. Heinrichs,Philip Towle,Kiera Duffy,Sebastian M. Grand,Matthew C. Morgan,Jonathan D. Smith &Evan Kalkus -2017 -Frontiers in Psychology 8.
- Public policy: why ethics matters.Jonathan Boston,Andrew Bradstock &David L. Eng (eds.) -2010 - Acton, A.C.T.: ANUE Press.1. Ethics and public policy .Jonathan.Boston,.Andrew.Bradstock,.and.David.Eng Introduction This book is about ethics and public policy. ...
- The WritingWriting Matter: From the Hands of the English Renaissance"Milton and Modernity".David Lee Miller,Jonathan Goldberg &Gordon Teskey -1990 -Diacritics 20 (4):17.
- Explicit representations in hypothetical thinking.Jonathan St B. T. Evans &David E. Over -1999 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):763-764.Dienes' & Perner's proposals are discussed in relation to the distinction between explicit and implicit systems of thinking. Evans and Over (1996) propose that explicit processing resources are required for hypothetical thinking, in which mental models of possible world states are constructed. Such thinking requires representations in which the individuals' propositional attitudes including relevant beliefs and goals are made fully explicit.
- Knowledge entails dispositional belief.David Rose &Jonathan Schaffer -2013 -Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):19-50.Knowledge is widely thought to entail belief. But Radford has claimed to offer a counterexample: the case of the unconfident examinee. And Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel have claimed empirical vindication of Radford. We argue, in defense of orthodoxy, that the unconfident examinee does indeed have belief, in the epistemically relevant sense of dispositional belief. We buttress this with empirical results showing that when the dispositional conception of belief is specifically elicited, people’s intuitions then conform with the view that knowledge entails (dispositional) (...) belief. (shrink)
- Folk Mereology is Teleological.David Rose &Jonathan Schaffer -2017 -Noûs 51 (2):238-270.When do the folk think that mereological composition occurs? Many metaphysicians have wanted a view of composition that fits with folk intuitions, and yet there has been little agreement about what the folk intuit. We aim to put the tools of experimental philosophy to constructive use. Our studies suggest that folk mereology is teleological: people tend to intuit that composition occurs when the result serves a purpose. We thus conclude that metaphysicians should dismiss folk intuitions, as tied into a benighted (...) teleological view of nature. (shrink)
- Green bioethics, patient autonomy and informed consent in healthcare.David B. Resnik &Jonathan Pugh -2024 -Journal of Medical Ethics 50 (7):489-493.Green bioethics is an area of research and scholarship that examines the impact of healthcare practices and policies on the environment and emphasises environmental values, such as ecological sustainability and stewardship. Some green bioethicists have argued that healthcare providers should inform patients about the environmental impacts of treatments and advocate for options that minimise adverse impacts. While disclosure of information pertaining to the environmental impacts of treatments could facilitate autonomous decision-making and strengthen the patient–provider relationship in situations where patients have (...) clearly expressed environmental concerns, it may have the opposite effect in other situations if makes patients feel like they are being judged or manipulated. We argue, therefore, that there is not a generalisable duty to disclose environmental impact information to all patients during the consent process. Providers who practice green bioethics should focus on advocating for system-level changes in healthcare financing, organisation and delivery and use discretion when bringing up environmental concerns in their encounters with patients. (shrink)
- Rationality in reasoning: The problem of deductive competence.Jonathan Evans &David E. Over -unknown -Current Psychology of Cognition 16 (1-2):3-38.
- Editorial: Judgment and Decision Making Under Uncertainty: Descriptive, Normative, and Prescriptive Perspectives.David R. Mandel,Gorka Navarrete,Nathan Dieckmann &Jonathan Nelson -2019 -Frontiers in Psychology 10.
- Cyclical population dynamics of automatic versus controlled processing: An evolutionary pendulum.David G. Rand,Damon Tomlin,Adam Bear,Elliot A. Ludvig &Jonathan D. Cohen -2017 -Psychological Review 124 (5):626-642.No categories
- Gesture following deafferentation: a phenomenologically informed experimental study.Jonathan Cole,Shaun Gallagher &David McNeill -2002 -Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1):49-67.Empirical studies of gesture in a subject who has lost proprioception and the sense of touch from the neck down show that specific aspects of gesture remain normal despite abnormal motor processes for instrumental movement. The experiments suggest that gesture, as a linguistic phenomenon, is not reducible to instrumental movement. They also support and extend claims made by Merleau-Ponty concerning the relationship between language and cognition. Gesture, as language, contributes to the accomplishment of thought.
- Posture-based motion planning: Applications to grasping.David A. Rosenbaum,Ruud J. Meulenbroek,Jonathan Vaughan &Chris Jansen -2001 -Psychological Review 108 (4):709-734.No categories
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
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