Ethics of ARV Based Prevention: Treatment‐as‐Prevention and PrEP.Bridget Haire &John M.Kaldor -2013 -Developing World Bioethics 13 (2):63-69.detailsPublished data show that new HIV prevention strategies including treatment-as-prevention and pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) using oral antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) are highly, but not completely, effective if regimens are taken as directed. Consequently, their implementation may challenge norms around HIV prevention. Specific concerns include the potential for ARV-based prevention to reframe responsibility, erode beneficial sexual norms and waste resources. This paper explores what rights claims uninfected people can make for access to ARVs for prevention, and whether moral claims justify the provision (...) of ARV therapy to those who do not yet clinically require treatment as a way of reducing HIV transmission risk. An ethical analysis was conducted of the two strategies, PrEP and treatment-as-prevention, using a public health stewardship model developed by the Nuffield Bioethics Council to consider and compare the application of PrEP and treatment-as-prevention strategies. We found that treating the person with HIV rather than the uninfected person offers advantages in settings where there are limited opportunities to access care. A treatment-as-prevention strategy that places all the emphasis upon the positive person's adherence however carries a disproportionate burden of responsibility. PrEP remains an important option for receptive partners who face increased biological vulnerability. We conclude that the use of ARV for prevention is ethically justified, despite imperfect global to drugs for those in clinical need. The determination of which ARV-based HIV prevention strategy is ethically preferable is complex and must take into account both public health and interpersonal considerations. (shrink)
Communities need to be equal partners in determining whether research is acceptable.Bridget G. Haire &John M.Kaldor -2018 -Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (3):159-160.detailsIn many countries around the world, people who inject drugs remain at high risk of HIV acquisition not because effective forms of prevention are unknown, nor because they find effective prevention undesirable, but because those in charge, mainly politicians but also bureaucrats, find evidence-based practice politically unacceptable. The evidence for preventive efficacy of harm reduction strategies, most prominently needle and syringe programmes but also treatment programmes such as opiate substitution, is irrefutable.1 However, political responses to drug use issues are varied (...) and complex, so the will to implement appropriate harm reduction programmes in the interests of public health remains lacking in too many jurisdictions. As a consequence, the discussion of how best, in the context of research, to reduce HIV incidence in populations of people who inject drugs but are not offered comprehensive access to known prevention strategies is—tragically—an important one. Dawson et al 2 focus on access to sterile injecting equipment and recognise that this should remain the ‘default’ standard of prevention for HIV prevention trials involving people for whom injecting drug use is the primary risk factor for HIV acquisition. ‘Standard of prevention’ means the background or minimal HIV risk reduction interventions offered to all participants in a trial, regardless of what other investigational interventions they are assigned to receive. The standard of prevention concept is grounded in the ethical principle of beneficence—that researchers and sponsors are obliged to maximise benefits and minimise risks to participants in research studies.3 …. (shrink)
Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Frankfurt: A Reply to Vihvelin.John M. Fischer -2008 -Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):327-342.detailsIn a fascinating and challenging article in this journal, Kadri Vihvelin presents a spirited and vigorous critique of the strategy of defending compatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility that employs the ‘Frankfurt-examples.’ Here is her presentation of such an example:… Jones … chooses to perform, and succeeds in performing, some action X. Tell the story so that it is vividly clear that Jones is morally responsible for doing X. If you are a libertarian, you may specify that Jones is (...) an indeterministic agent who can choose otherwise, given the actual past and the laws. If you are a compatibilist, you may fill in the details so that Jones does X in a way that satisfies your favorite account of the counterfactual or dispositional facts that make it true that Jones could have done otherwise in the sense you think relevant to responsibility. Now, add to your story the following facts: there is standing in the wings another agent, Black. Black is interested in what Jones does. In particular, he wants Jones to do X and, moreover, Black has it in his power to prevent Jones from doing anything other than X. (shrink)
Attention, Emotion, and Evaluative Understanding.John M. Monteleone -2017 -Philosophia 45 (4):1749-1764.detailsThis paper assesses Michael Brady’s claim that the ‘capture and consumption of attention’ in an emotion facilitates evaluative understanding. It argues that emotional attention is epistemically deleterious on its own, even though it can be beneficial in conjunction with the right epistemic skills and motivations. The paper considers Sartre’s and Solomon’s claim that emotions have purposes, respectively, to circumvent difficulty or maximize self-esteem. While this appeal to purposes is problematic, it suggests a promising alternative conception of how emotions can be (...) teleological. The fact that emotional attention manifests dispositions, which have been habituated by repeated association with pleasure or relief, explains how the emotion can acquire the function of producing pleasure or relief. Hence, the emotion can have ‘non-cognitive function,’ in which its patterns of attention reliably produce beliefs that disregard or distort the truth. Not only is non-cognitive function the default condition of emotion prior to any training, but even those who have successfully trained their emotions often revert back to non-cognitive function when faced with trauma or stress. (shrink)
A critique of the regulation of data science in healthcare research in the European Union.John M. M. Rumbold &Barbara K. Pierscionek -2017 -BMC Medical Ethics 18 (1):27.detailsThe EU offers a suitable milieu for the comparison and harmonisation of healthcare across different languages, cultures, and jurisdictions, which could provide improvements in healthcare standards across the bloc. There are specific ethico-legal issues with the use of data in healthcare research that mandate a different approach from other forms of research. The use of healthcare data over a long period of time is similar to the use of tissue in biobanks. There is a low risk to subjects but it (...) is impossible to gain specific informed consent given the future possibilities for research. Large amounts of data on a subject present a finite risk of re-identification. Consequently, there is a balancing act between this risk and retaining sufficient utility of the data. Anonymising methods need to take into account the circumstances of data sharing to enable an appropriate balance in all cases. There are ethical and policy advantages to exceeding the legal requirements and thereby securing the social licence for research. This process would require the examination and comparison of data protection laws across the trading bloc to produce an ethico-legal framework compatible with the requirements of all member states. Seven EU jurisdictions are given consideration in this critique. (shrink)
Eudaimonism and the Appeal to Nature in the Morality of Happiness.John M. Cooper -1995 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):587-598.detailsRecent scholarship has steadily been opening up for philosophical study an increasingly wide range of the philosophical literature of antiquity. We no longer think only of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, and their pre-Socratic forebears, when someone refers to the views of the ancient philosophers. Julia Annas has been one of the philosophers most closely engaged in the renewed study of Hellenistic philosophy over the past fifteen years, enabling herself and other scholars to acquire the necessary ground-level knowledge of the widely-dispersed (...) texts and the problems of interpretation—both historical and philosophical—that they present. In her new book she takes the next step. She presents to the general philosophical public of today an extended reconstruction of the systems of moral philosophy that were developed and pitted in competition with one another during the period when refinement and professionalism were at their height in Greek philosophy—between the end of the 4th and the middle of the 1st centuries B.C. These include the moral philosophies of Epicurus and his followers, several generations of Stoics, sceptical philosophers both Academic and Pyrrhonian, and the “hybrid” theories put together by Antiochus of Ascalon and other Stoic-influenced philosophers as part of the modernizing revival of Aristotelian ethical thought that took place in the 1st century B.C. She finds significant commonalities among these otherwise very disparate theories, and much of the book is devoted to examining these and showing how the conception of ethics and morality that is common to the ancient theorists compares with and differs from what we are familiar with in modern and contemporary theory. She traces these commonalities back to Aristotle in his ethical treatises, and accordingly includes Aristotle’s theory as one among those to be examined—indeed, in a significant sense as the intellectual father or grandfather of the rest of them. She leaves Plato’s dialogues out of account, and she has nothing to say about ethics and moral philosophy in the revived Platonism that gradually came to dominate philosophical thought in later antiquity. Her book, then, is a book about the structure and content of ancient ethical theory during the Hellenistic period, the period when Greek philosophy was at its high-point in professionalism and sophistication. (shrink)
Epicurus.John M. Rist -1972 - Cambridge [Eng.]: University Press.detailsEPICURUS AND HIS FRIENDS Every philosopher has a personal history, and it is often helpful to understand his history if we want to understand his philosophy ...
Content externalism and brute logical error.John M. Collins -2008 -Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):pp. 549-574.detailsMost content externalists concede that even if externalism is compatible with the thesis that one has authoritative self-knowledge of thought contents, it is incompatible with the stronger claim that one is always able to tell by introspection whether two of one’s thought tokens have the same, or different, content. If one lacks such authoritative discriminative self-knowledge of thought contents, it would seem that brute logical error – non-culpable logical error – is possible. Some philosophers, such as Paul Boghossian, have argued (...) that this would present a big problem for externalism, forcing the externalist to overhaul our norms of rationality. I consider several externalist strategies to block this possibly unhappy epistemological consequence, but I argue that they all fail. (shrink)
Collected Works ofJohn Stuart Mill: Xxxii. Additional Letters.Marion Filipuik,Michael Laine &John M. Robson (eds.) -1963 - Routledge.detailsFirst published in 1991. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
Oriental philosophies.John M. Koller -1970 - New York,: Scribner.details"Special attention is paid to the sacred texts in each system, as well as to the life stories of such major figures as the Buddha, Confucius, and Lao-Tzu."--Cover.
Consumer Expectations Regarding Emerging Technologies.James T. Ault &John M. Gleason -2001 -Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society 21 (2):99-107.detailsThis article reports the results of marketing research that was undertaken as part of an information technology prototype development project. The project was devoted to the creation of a multimedia-based prototype system to provide timely and accurate information from government geographic information databases to government decision makers and the general public in an easy-to-use interactive visual format. The general public (i.e., private citizens, schools, and businesses—society in general) had to be able to access the product via broadband-to-the-home (-business/-school) technology. Because (...) of significant time and budget constraints, a satisficing approach to the marketing research was adopted. This approach led to the definition of several social categories of the general public whose opinions were thought to be critical to the commercial development of the prototype: (a) elementary and secondary education leaders (both technophiles and technophobes), (b) adults with a record as early adopters of information technologies, (c) adults with no previous interest in (or limited experience with) information technologies, and (d) high school students. Six focus groups were defined based on these social categories. The results of the marketing research devoted to information needs of the focus group participants are reported, and implications related to their expectations regarding emerging technologies are discussed. The research suggests that expectations in the portion of the market on which the success of the technologies depend are often inconsistent with the types of technologies that are being developed for that market. (shrink)
No categories
Rationing mental health care: Parity, disparity, and justice.Robert L. Woolfolk &John M. Doris -2002 -Bioethics 16 (5):469–485.detailsRecent policy debates in the US over access to mental health care have raised several philosophically complex ethical and conceptual issues. The defeat of mental health parity legislation in the US Congress has brought new urgency and relevance to theoretical and empirical investigations into the nature of mental illness and its relation to other forms of sickness and disability. Manifold, nebulous, and often competing conceptions of mental illness make the creation of coherent public policy exceedingly difficult. Referencing a variety of (...) approaches to ethical reflection on health care, and drawing from the empirical literature on therapeutic efficacy and economic efficiency, we argue that differential rationing, ‘disparity,’ is unjustifiable. (shrink)
Whither Action theory.John M. Connolly -1991 -Journal of Philosophical Research 16:85-106.detailsThe problem of ‘wayward causal chains’ threatens any causal analysis of the concept of intentional human action. For such chains show that the mere causation of an action by the right sort of belief and/or desire does not make the action intentional, i.e. one done in order to attain the object of desire. Now if the ‘because’ in ‘wayward’ action-explanations is straightforwardly causal, that might be argued to indicate by contrast that the different ‘because’ of reasons-explanations (which both explain and (...) justify) is non-causal. Myles Brand, in Intending and Acting (1984), resists this conclusion, but argues that waywardness shows that philosophers must ‘naturalize’ action theory by drawing on contemporary work in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. I argue that this is a misconceived response to the problem of waywardness: in Brand’s work action theory itself has gone astray, unsure which way to tum next. (shrink)
Eudaimonism, Teleology, and the Pursuit of Happiness.John M. Connolly -2009 -Faith and Philosophy 26 (3):274-296.detailsRecent interest among both philosophers and the wider public in the tradition of virtue ethics often takes its inspiration from Aristotle or from Thomas Aquinas. In this essay I briefly outline the ethical approaches of these two towering figures, and then describe more fully the virtue ethics of Meister Eckhart, a medieval thinker who admired, though critically, both Aristotle and Aquinas. His related but distinctively original approach to the virtuous life is marked by a striking and seemingly paradoxical injunction to (...) “live without why.”. (shrink)
Lower Court Application of the “Overruling Law” of Higher Courts.John M. Rogers -1995 -Legal Theory 1 (2):179-204.detailsThe obligation of a court to follow the law of a superior court is commonly taken to be stronger than the obligation of the higher court to respect its own precedent. The Supreme Court has recently asserted this stronger obligation in the most forceful terms. What follows is an attempt to demonstrate that this is wrong as a matter of policy and as a matter of law.
Anomaly and folk psychology.John M. Connolly -1993 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):179 – 198.details(1993). Anomaly and folk psychology∗. Inquiry: Vol. 36, No. 1-2, pp. 179-198.
A dialectical approach to action theory.John M. Connolly -1976 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 19 (1-4):427 – 442.detailsRecent work in the theory of action by analytical philosophers has focused on explaining actions by citing the agent's motivating reason(s). But this ignores a pattern of explanation typical in the social sciences, i.e. situating the agent in a reference group whose members typically manifest that behavior. In some cases the behavior of such groups can itself be shown to be the product of social forces. Two extended examples of this explanatory pattern are studied. In each case the motivating reasons (...) of the agents concerned can scarcely be understood apart from reference to the groups of which the agents are members and the social forces which work on those groups. However, attention to the agent's own reasons for action remains important, in part because of action theory's critical potential to help liberate people from arbitrary, hypostasized social forces. (shrink)
Adam Smith on Wealth and Authority.John M. Connolly -1979 -Philosophy Research Archives 5:461-471.detailsThere is a question over whether or not Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations (1776), contended that the rich devise structures of authority (especially civil government) to protect their wealth. At issue is whether significant, private wealth can exist prior to forms of authority. Smith seems to me not to have thought so. It is true that he asserts that, "antecedent to any civil institutions", superiority of fortune can "give some men superiority over the greater part of their brethren" (...) (p.670). However, I argue that there is strong reason not to take the word "antecedent" here in a temporal sense. In numerous and important examples Smith depicts the relationship between wealth and authority as non-empirical (or at least not simply empirical). This connection flows naturally from Smith's epoch-making redefinition of wealth as the productive capacity which a society can command within its given social and political framework. Appreciating this point leads one to see Smith as developing an early form of historical materialism. (shrink)
Visual Attention and the Attention-Action Interface.John M. Henderson -1996 - In Enrique Villanueva,Perception. Ridgeview Pub. Co. pp. 5--290.detailsThe chapter focuses on the often neglected aspect of the perceptual experience—the impact and effect of the visual process on our attention-action interface. The chapter utilizes studies on eye movement control to explore further the linkage between action and perception. A selection function is ascribed to the visual system, which causes an intended motor action to be directed at a specific object within the visual field. This selective capability links the various visual representations with visual processing and motor programming. Succeeding (...) sections explore the concept of visual attention further and its relationship to eye movements, citing studies using the Moving Window Paradigm, the Sequential Attention Model, and Feature Integration Theory. These studies support the theory that visual attention precedes saccadic eye movement to a specific location of a stimulus in the visual field, and enables the motor system to bind the said location with a motor action. (shrink)
Karl Rahner on Two Infinities.John M. McDermott -1988 -International Philosophical Quarterly 28 (4):439-457.detailsAlthough rahner originally maintained the validity of conceptual abstractions and the nonintelligibility of matter, Other works arguing from the ultimate unity of spirit in matter both in god, Their common origin and end, And in the essence of the soul, Led to the affirmation of a certain intelligibility of matter. Rahner's proof for god's existence, Based on the intellectual dynamism that transcends all finite realities, Concepts included, As it seeks fulfillment in the infinite, Is ambiguous. Whether the infinite is god, (...) Matter, Or perpetual transcendence cannot be demonstrated, And the appeal to the supernatural beatific vision is insufficient. "grundkurs" finally argues that the matter entering into human "esse" and knowing demands the affirmation of god's infinite mystery if the world has a sense. Yet rahner simultaneously strives to preserve conceptual knowledge and catholicism's "sacramental vision." in this he is similar to maritain and st. Thomas. (shrink)
Sacrifice and the Possibilities for Environmental Action.John M. Meyer -2015 - In Stephen Mark Gardiner & Allen Thompson,The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics. Oxford University Press USA.detailsA key political-strategic question facing those aiming to foster environmental action is, When and how do environmental concerns resonate widely with citizens? This question invites reflection upon the rhetoric of “sacrifice,” especially as often deployed within wealthy consumer societies. This rhetoric has become a political sticking point that often entangles environmental discourse in a false dichotomy between sacrifice and self-interest and thereby constrains the political imaginary. By challenging this dichotomy we can draw attention to the ubiquity of notions of sacrifice (...) in everyday life, thereby defusing its ability to shut down ambitious proposals for action. We might use this insight to reorient talk about sacrifice in a manner that expands our imaginary and opens up broader possibilities for democratic change. (shrink)
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Foldout includes foreshortening in drawings by a blind man.John M. Kennedy &Sherief Hammad -2011 -Rivista di Estetica 47:31-45.detailsIn a case-history, Ben, a university-graduate blind adult, is shown to draw a cube as if it were folded out, but with slim rectangles for the sides around a central square. This form is drawn by sighted 8-year-olds. It might involve foreshortening and parallel projection, despite the presence of more sides than would be present in parallel projection in a single direction. Also, Ben drew a glass’s brim as both a straight line and as an ellipse, a form common in (...) drawings by sighted 8-year-olds that may include the circular brim foreshortened to an ellipse in a ¾ view. In several drawings made later in the testing session Ben only showed aspects of the depicted object facing one direction. In elevation and plan drawings, he showed aspects facing to the side of the object or above the object. Also, Ben’s use of foreshortening advanced in sophistication in the testing session. We hypothesize that the blind and the sighted are on the same drawing developmental trajectory. (shrink)