Results for 'John M. Digman'
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- Growth of a motor skill as a function of distribution of practice.John M.Digman -1959 -Journal of Experimental Psychology 57 (5):310.
- Performance under optimal practice conditions following three degrees of massing of early practice.John M.Digman -1956 -Journal of Experimental Psychology 52 (3):189.No categories
- The Psychology of Justice.John M. Cooper -forthcoming -American Philosophical Quarterly.
- The Promise and Reality of Public Engagement in the Governance of Human Genome Editing Research.John M. Conley,R. Jean Cadigan,Arlene M. Davis,Eric T. Juengst,Kriste Kuczynski,Rami Major,Hayley Stancil,Julio Villa-Palomino,Margaret Waltz &Gail E. Henderson -2023 -American Journal of Bioethics 23 (7):9-16.This paper analyses the activities of five organizations shaping the debate over the global governance of genome editing in order to assess current approaches to public engagement (PE). We compare the recommendations of each group with its own practices. All recommend broad engagement with the general public, but their practices vary from expert-driven models dominated by scientists, experts, and civil society groups to citizen deliberation-driven models that feature bidirectional consultation with local citizens, as well as hybrid models that combine elements (...) of both approaches. Only one group practices PE that seeks community perspectives to advance equity. In most cases, PE does little more than record already well-known views held by the most vocal groups, and thus is unlikely to produce more just or equitable processes or policy outcomes. Our exploration of the strengths, weaknesses, and possibilities of current forms of PE suggests a need to rethink both “public” and “engagement.”. (shrink)
- The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy.John M. Cooper -1988 -Philosophical Review 97 (4):543.No categories
- (1 other version)Reason and Human Good in Aristotle.John M. Cooper -1977 -Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):623-636.No categories
- (1 other version)Plato on Sense-Perception and Knowled ge (Theaetetus 184-186).John M. Cooper -1970 -Phronesis 15:123.
- Aristotelian responsibility.John M. Cooper -2013 -Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 45:265.
- 17. Aristotle on Friendship.John M. Cooper -1980 - In Amélie Rorty,Essays on Aristotle's Ethics. University of California Press. pp. 301-340.
- Aristotelian Infinites.John M. Cooper -2016 -Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 51:161-206.
- 2. The Socratic Way of Life.John M. Cooper -2012 - In John Madison Cooper,Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy From Socrates to Plotinus. Princeton University Press. pp. 24-69.
- Nicomachean ethics VII. 1-2 : introduction, method, puzzles.John M. Cooper -2009 - In Carlo Natali,Aristotle: Nicomachean ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Index.John M. Cooper -2012 - In John Madison Cooper,Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy From Socrates to Plotinus. Princeton University Press. pp. 431-442.No categories
- Is Real-Time ELSI Realistic?John M. Conley,Anya E. R. Prince,Arlene M. Davis,Jean Cadigan &Gabriel Lazaro-Munoz -2020 -AJOB Empirical Bioethics 11 (2):134-144.Background: A growing literature has raised—skeptically—the question of whether cutting-edge scientific research can identify and address broader ethical and policy considerations in real time. In genomics, the question is: Can ELSI contribute to genomics in real time, or will it be relegated to its historical role of after-the-fact outsider critique? We address this question against the background of a genomic screening project where we participated as embedded, real-time ELSI researchers and observers, from its initial design through its conclusion.Methods: As part (...) of the ELSI study design, the project included an ongoing reflexive ethnography in which the authors studied the process of its design and implementation. The authors were true participant observers, serving as members of various task-oriented groups while recording meetings and other events for ongoing qualitative analysis. We also conducted and analyzed interviews of multiple participants at the conclusion of the project.Results: Our real-time ELSI initiative had a mixed record of successes and challenges. If we define success as ELSI researchers having had an opportunity to participate fully in the project and to make the ELSI perspective heard, then our assessment is largely positive. If, however, we define successes as instances where real-time ELSI contributions changed the direction of the genomic or public health aspects of the GeneScreen project or, after careful deliberation, confirmed the appropriateness of the status quo, then we can identify only a few examples. While we had a seat at the table, we were, for the most part, tolerated guests.Conclusions: We conclude that there are significant barriers to real-time ELSI influence. The difficulty does not reside in any intended exclusion of an ELSI perspective, but in factors endemic to genomic research, including knowledge disparities, epistemological biases, and the pressures of time and money. (shrink)No categories
- Two Theories of Justice.John M. Cooper -2000 -Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 74 (2):3 - 27.
- Some Remarks on Aristotle’s Moral Psychology.John M. Cooper -1989 -Southern Journal of Philosophy 27 (S1):25-42.
- A Moralist in and Out of Parliament:John Stuart Mill at Westminster, 1865-1868.Bruce L. Kinzer,Ann Provost Robson,John Mercel Robson &John M. Robson -1992 - University of Toronto Press.This detailed study places the political and personal beliefs and behaviour of Britain's leading philosopher in the context of the crucial changes resulting from the growing democratization of society and culture in Britain.
- A Trade Secret Model for Genomic Biobanking.John M. Conley,Robert Mitchell,R. Jean Cadigan,Arlene M. Davis,Allison W. Dobson &Ryan Q. Gladden -2012 -Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 40 (3):612-629.The current ethical norms of genomic biobanking creating and maintaining large repositories of human DNA and/or associated data for biomedical research have generated criticism from every angle, at both the practical and theoretical levels. The traditional research model has involved investigators seeking biospecimens for specific purposes that they can describe and disclose to prospective subjects, from whom they can then seek informed consent. In the case of many biobanks, however, the institution that collects and maintains the biospecimens may not itself (...) be directly involved in research, instead banking the biospecimens and associated data for other researchers. Moreover, the future uses of biospecimens may be unknown, if not unknowable, at the time of collection. Biobanking may thus stretch the meanings of inform and consent to their breaking point: if you cannot inform subjects about what their biospecimens will be used for, what can they consent to? Given that informed consent by individual subjects is the ethical gold standard, the seeming dilution of the concept in the context of biobanking is a profound problem. (shrink)
- David Hume and America.John M. Werner -1972 -Journal of the History of Ideas 33 (3):439.
- Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind.John M. Cooper &Julia Annas -1994 -Philosophical Review 103 (1):182.
- Eudaimonism and the Appeal to Nature in the Morality of Happiness.John M. Cooper -1995 -Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):587-598.Recent scholarship has steadily been opening up for philosophical study an increasingly wide range of the philosophical literature of antiquity. We no longer think only of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, and their pre-Socratic forebears, when someone refers to the views of the ancient philosophers. Julia Annas has been one of the philosophers most closely engaged in the renewed study of Hellenistic philosophy over the past fifteen years, enabling herself and other scholars to acquire the necessary ground-level knowledge of the widely-dispersed (...) texts and the problems of interpretation—both historical and philosophical—that they present. In her new book she takes the next step. She presents to the general philosophical public of today an extended reconstruction of the systems of moral philosophy that were developed and pitted in competition with one another during the period when refinement and professionalism were at their height in Greek philosophy—between the end of the 4th and the middle of the 1st centuries B.C. These include the moral philosophies of Epicurus and his followers, several generations of Stoics, sceptical philosophers both Academic and Pyrrhonian, and the “hybrid” theories put together by Antiochus of Ascalon and other Stoic-influenced philosophers as part of the modernizing revival of Aristotelian ethical thought that took place in the 1st century B.C. She finds significant commonalities among these otherwise very disparate theories, and much of the book is devoted to examining these and showing how the conception of ethics and morality that is common to the ancient theorists compares with and differs from what we are familiar with in modern and contemporary theory. She traces these commonalities back to Aristotle in his ethical treatises, and accordingly includes Aristotle’s theory as one among those to be examined—indeed, in a significant sense as the intellectual father or grandfather of the rest of them. She leaves Plato’s dialogues out of account, and she has nothing to say about ethics and moral philosophy in the revived Platonism that gradually came to dominate philosophical thought in later antiquity. Her book, then, is a book about the structure and content of ancient ethical theory during the Hellenistic period, the period when Greek philosophy was at its high-point in professionalism and sophistication. (shrink)
- Plato: Gorgias.John M. Cooper -1982 -Philosophical Review 91 (3):435.
- Socrates and philosophy as a way of life.John M. Cooper -2007 - In Dominic Scott,Maieusis: Essays in Ancient Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 20--44.
- The relevance of moral theory to moral improvement in Epictetus.John M. Cooper -2007 - In Theodore Scaltsas & Andrew S. Mason,The philosophy of Epictetus. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Arcesilaus: Socratic and sceptic.John M. Cooper -2005 - In Lindsay Judson & Vassilis Karasmanis,Remembering Socrates: philosophical essays. New York: Oxford University Press.
- (1 other version)Plato's theory of human good in the philebus.John M. Cooper -1977 -Journal of Philosophy 74 (11):714-730.
- Ethical-Political Theory in Aristotle's Rhetoric.John M. Cooper -2015 - In David J. Furley & Alexander Nehamas,Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays. Princeton University Press. pp. 193-210.
- 4. Stoicism as a Way of Life.John M. Cooper -2012 - In John Madison Cooper,Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy From Socrates to Plotinus. Princeton University Press. pp. 144-225.
- Toward a Structural Psychology of Cinema.John M. Carroll -1981 -Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 40 (2):220-222.
- A Note on Aristotle and Mixture.John M. Cooper -2004 - In Frans A. J. de Haas & Jaap Mansfeld,Aristotle On generation and corruption, book 1: Symposium Aristotelicum. New York: Clarendon Press.
- Myth and History in the Book of Revelation.John M. Court -1979No categoriesExport citation
Bookmark - Apel and the transcendental pragmatics of human action.John M. Connoll -1981 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):123 – 141.No categories
- The Will as Impression.John M. Connolly -1987 -Hume Studies 13 (2):276-305.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:276 THE WILL AS IMPRESSION Hume writes, in the Treatise: Let no one, therefore, put an invidious construction on my words, by saying simply, that I assert the necessity of human actions, and place them on the same footing with the operations of senseless matter. I do not ascribe to the will that unintelligible necessity, which is suppos'd to lie in matter. But I ascribe to matter, that intelligible (...) quality, call it necessity or not, which the most rigorous orthodoxy does or must allow to belong to the will. I^ change, therefore, nothing in the receiv'd systems, with regard to the will, but only with regard to material objects. It is surely false that Hume changed "nothing in the receiv'd systems, with regard to the will." In one such "receiv'd system," that of Thomas Aquinas, the concept of will or volition is presented as internally related to two further concepts: that of the "final cause" or goal of the action, and that of "practical intellect," a form of cognition which is productive of its object. Will is always the will to something, a goal to be reached or a product to be produced. Thus will and final cause are concepts which presuppose one another. The mark, however, of the fact that someone wills to do something, i.e., that s/he in fact has some goal, is precisely that that agent knows, non-inductively and without observation, what s/he is doing or will do. The basis of this knowledge is neither evidence nor proof, but rather what Aristotle called "the practical syllogism." We will ask below what it means to describe the relationships among will, final cause, and practical knowledge as 'internal.' 277 The question to be explored here is this: what in fact becomes of the 'receiv'd concept of will' when one contends, in the empiricist spirit common to both Locke and Hume, that all of our knowledge about matters of fact is based on observation and induction? The answer to this question will turn out to be that, in the absence of a notion of "practical knowledge," the concept of final cause becomes unintelligible (since the final cause is precisely the object of practical knowledge); and thus the notion of will must be reconstrued, for Hume as an impression. As an impression it is a brute given, one that is furthermore mute (or lacking in propositional content). Hume views volition as an event, that object of inner experience which is the (Humean) cause of our voluntary actions. In what follows I shall first of all sketch Thomas Aquinas' view of the will (section I), following this with a discussion of the important hybrid view in Locke's Essay, where older notions of volition are presented within an incompatible epistemological framework. In section III we look at Hume's sharp response to Locke, and in section IV at his own doctrine of the will as impression. In the final section I attempt to distinguish two strands of causality in Hume's philosophy of human action, drawing at the same time a moral for the contemporary dispute about reasons and causes. One of the most fully developed of the "receiv'd systems with regard to the will" was that of St. Thomas Aquinas, who combined Neo-Platonist, Patristic, and Aristotelian sources into an 2 impressive and influential synthesis. Thomas' 278 doctrine on the will is guided by a Grand Analogy, one inspired by the Creation story in Genesis. He writes, at the beginning of the second main part of his Summa : Man is made to God's image, and since this implies... that he is intelligent and free to judge and master of himself, so then, now that we have agreed [in part one of the Summa] that God is the exemplar cause of things and that they issue from his power through his will, we go on to look at this image, that is to say, at man as the source of actions which are his own and fall under his responsibility and control. The analogy is this: God, the Divine Craf tsperson, is to the Creation as human agents are to their... (shrink)
- CHAPTER 6. Hypothetical Necessity.John M. Cooper -2004 - InKnowledge, Nature, and the Good: Essays on Ancient Philosophy. Princeton University Press. pp. 130-147.No categories
- Justice and Rights in Aristotle's Politics.John M. Cooper -1996 -Review of Metaphysics 49 (4):859-872.If now we turn to the recent translation of the Politics by Carnes Lord we see that the language of "rights" is completely avoided. Lord prefers to speak sometimes in terms of what a person or group of persons is "entitled to" under the laws, or of what is "open" or "permitted" to them; and he usually or always sticks to "justice" or a related term to translate δίκαιον and its derivatives--whether this is justice as established by the laws of (...) a given community or type of community, or the true or correct account of what justice is and demands. It is doubtful, though, whether Lord avoids rights-talk as a matter of interpretative principle. He aims to translate key terms of the Greek with a single English translation throughout, with the result that, since in any event Aristotle uses no single Greek term where we might be tempted to speak of rights, avoiding the language of rights may have seemed to him required simply by his conception of "literal" translation. In his glossary under the heading "Justice," he explicates τὸ δίκαιον in part as "a right or rightful claim" and adds that this sense is generally rendered in his translation by "[claim to] justice." So, if we take this glossary entry as giving his full view, Lord would not object to at least interpreting Aristotle in these passages as speaking of rights or rightful claims. However, Lord is a follower of Leo Strauss and in his avoidance of the noun "right" to render anything Aristotle says, he may also have been falling in with Strauss's own considered view, which was that any attribution of a notion of "rights" to Aristotle or any other ancient thinker is so grossly anachronistic that it must be strictly avoided. In the past forty years or so I think it is fair to say that this view of Strauss's has been shared increasingly by important writers on ancient politics and political thought. Perhaps this tendency is all the more prevalent with the onset of self-described "post-modernist" thought and the historicism in all interpretation of the past that it so often connotes. Is there anything to this objection of vicious anachronism? Were Barker and other older writers making a serious error in rendering and interpreting Aristotle so as to make him hold theories about various ancient constitutions as granting political and other legal rights to people living under them, and also theories of his own about the rights people have under justice as to what their political and legal rights shall be? A major thesis of Fred Miller's recent book, Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics is that they were not--at least they were not, once certain distinctions are carefully drawn, and one is careful to state what is and what is not implied by the "rights" talk they were so readily finding in Aristotle's texts. In what follows I will limit myself to discussing this thesis of Miller's and his handling of it. (shrink)
- Preface.John M. Cooper -2004 - InKnowledge, Nature, and the Good: Essays on Ancient Philosophy. Princeton University Press.
- Male Carriers of the FMR1 Premutation Show Altered Hippocampal-Prefrontal Function During Memory Encoding.John M. Wang,Kami Koldewyn,Ryu-Ichiro Hashimoto,Andrea Schneider,Lien Le,Flora Tassone,Katherine Cheung,Paul Hagerman,David Hessl &Susan M. Rivera -2012 -Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.
- (1 other version)A theory of knowledge which foregoes metaphysics: In reply to dr. Schiller.John M. Warbeke -1920 -Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 17 (5):120-125.
- A postmodern critical theory of research use.John M. Watkins -1994 -Knowledge, Technology & Policy 7 (4):55-77.
- Whither Action theory.John M. Connolly -1991 -Journal of Philosophical Research 16:85-106.The problem of ‘wayward causal chains’ threatens any causal analysis of the concept of intentional human action. For such chains show that the mere causation of an action by the right sort of belief and/or desire does not make the action intentional, i.e. one done in order to attain the object of desire. Now if the ‘because’ in ‘wayward’ action-explanations is straightforwardly causal, that might be argued to indicate by contrast that the different ‘because’ of reasons-explanations (which both explain and (...) justify) is non-causal. Myles Brand, in Intending and Acting (1984), resists this conclusion, but argues that waywardness shows that philosophers must ‘naturalize’ action theory by drawing on contemporary work in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. I argue that this is a misconceived response to the problem of waywardness: in Brand’s work action theory itself has gone astray, unsure which way to tum next. (shrink)
- When Pinocchio becomes a real boy: Capability and felicity in AI and interactive depictions.John M. Carroll -2023 -Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e25.Clark and Fischer analyze social robots as interactive depictions, presenting characters that people can interact with in social settings. Unlike other types of depictions, the props for social robot depictions depend on emerging interactive technologies. This raises questions about how such depictions depict: They conflate character and prop in ways that delight, confuse, mistreat, and may become ordinary human–technology interactions.
- Eudaimonism, Teleology, and the Pursuit of Happiness.John M. Connolly -2009 -Faith and Philosophy 26 (3):274-296.Recent interest among both philosophers and the wider public in the tradition of virtue ethics often takes its inspiration from Aristotle or from Thomas Aquinas. In this essay I briefly outline the ethical approaches of these two towering figures, and then describe more fully the virtue ethics of Meister Eckhart, a medieval thinker who admired, though critically, both Aristotle and Aquinas. His related but distinctively original approach to the virtuous life is marked by a striking and seemingly paradoxical injunction to (...) “live without why.”. (shrink)
- Terror.John M. Carvalho -1998 -Philosophy Today 42 (Supplement):85-93.
- The Michael Polanyi Papers In The Department Of Special Collections, University Of Chicago Library.John M. Cash -1996 -Tradition and Discovery 23 (1):4-47.
- Anomaly and folk psychology.John M. Connolly -1993 -Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):179 – 198.(1993). Anomaly and folk psychology∗. Inquiry: Vol. 36, No. 1-2, pp. 179-198.
- Adam Smith on Wealth and Authority.John M. Connolly -1979 -Philosophy Research Archives 5:461-471.There is a question over whether or not Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations (1776), contended that the rich devise structures of authority (especially civil government) to protect their wealth. At issue is whether significant, private wealth can exist prior to forms of authority. Smith seems to me not to have thought so. It is true that he asserts that, "antecedent to any civil institutions", superiority of fortune can "give some men superiority over the greater part of their brethren" (...) (p.670). However, I argue that there is strong reason not to take the word "antecedent" here in a temporal sense. In numerous and important examples Smith depicts the relationship between wealth and authority as non-empirical (or at least not simply empirical). This connection flows naturally from Smith's epoch-making redefinition of wealth as the productive capacity which a society can command within its given social and political framework. Appreciating this point leads one to see Smith as developing an early form of historical materialism. (shrink)
- Living Without Why: Meister Eckhart's Critique of the Medieval Concept of Will.John M. Connolly -2014 - New York, US: Oup Usa."Live without why!" advised Meister Eckhart . Arguing from classical philosophy and the Christian tradition, he opposed the views of Augustine and Aquinas. Connolly's book, the first to deal fully with the topic, discusses what Eckhart meant, how he justified it, and why it was condemned.No categories
- (1 other version)Acknowledgments.John M. Cooper -2004 - InKnowledge, Nature, and the Good: Essays on Ancient Philosophy. Princeton University Press.No categories
- 3. Aristotle: Philosophy as Two Ways of Life.John M. Cooper -2012 - In John Madison Cooper,Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy From Socrates to Plotinus. Princeton University Press. pp. 70-143.
- Chappell and Aristotle on matter.John M. Cooper -1973 -Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):696-698.
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
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Area Editors:
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Gwen Bradford
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Ezio Di Nucci
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Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
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