Results for 'John L. Margetis'
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- Both novelty and expertise increase action observation network activity.Sook-Lei Liew,Tong Sheng,John L.Margetis &Lisa Aziz-Zadeh -2013 -Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
- How to do things with words.John L. Austin -1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.For this second edition, the editors have returned to Austin's original lecture notes, amending the printed text where it seemed necessary.
- The Problem of a Science of Ethics in the Philosophies ofJohn Dewey and Bertrand Russell.John L. Mckenney -1952 - Dissertation, The Ohio State UniversityExport citation
Bookmark - (1 other version)Contemporary theories of knowledge.John L. Pollock -1986 - London: Hutchinson.This new edition of the classic Contemporary Theories of Knowledge has been significantly updated to include analyses of the recent literature in epistemology.
- La línea y la caverna en la República de Platón.John L. Austin -1980 -Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 10 (2/3):109.
- Wort und Bedeutung: Philosophische Aufsätze.John L. Austin -1975No categories
- Comparing the Smooth and Dedekind Reals in Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis.John L. Bell -unknownAxioms for the continuum, or smooth real line R. These include the usual axioms for a commutative ring with unit expressed in terms of two operations + and i , and two distinguished elements 0 ≠ 1. In addition we stipulate that R is a local ring, i.e., the following axiom: ∃y x i y = 1 ∨ ∃y (1 – x) i y = 1. Axioms for the strict order relation< on R. These are: 1. a< b (...) and b< c implies a< c. 2. ¬(a< a) 3. a< b implies a + c< b + c for any c. ≤ 4. a< b and 0< c implies acbc.. (shrink)Export citation Bookmark
- The Incredible Shrinking Manifold.John L. Bell -unknownTraditionally, there have been two methods of deriving the theorems of geometry: the analytic and the synthetic. While the analytical method is based on the introduction of numerical coordinates, and so on the theory of real numbers, the idea behind the synthetic approach is to furnish the subject of geometry with a purely geometric foundation in which the theorems are then deduced by purely logical means from an initial body of postulates. The most familiar examples of the synthetic geometry are (...) classical Euclidean geometry and the synthetic projective geometry introduced by Desargues in the 17th century and revived and developed by Carnot, Poncelet, Steiner and others during the 19th century. The power of analytic geometry derives very largely from the fact that it permits the methods of the calculus, and, more generally, of mathematical analysis, to be introduced into geometry, leading in particular to differential geometry (a term, by the way, introduced in 1894 by the Italian geometer Luigi Bianchi). That being the case, the idea of a “synthetic” differential geometry seems elusive: how can differential geometry be placed on a “purely geometric” or “axiomatic” foundation when the apparatus of the calculus seems inextricably involved? To my knowledge there have been two attempts to develop a synthetic differential geometry. The first was initiated by Herbert Busemann in the 1940s, building on earlier work of Paul Finsler. Here the idea was to build a differential geometry that, in its author’s words, “requires no derivatives”: the basic objects in Busemann’s approach are not differentiable manifolds, but metric spaces of a certain type in which the notion of a geodesic can be defined in an intrinsic manner. I shall not have anything more to say about this approach. The second approach, that with which I shall be concerned here, was originally proposed in the 1960s by F. W. Lawvere, who was in fact striving to fashion a decisive axiomatic framework for continuum mechanics.. (shrink)Export citation Bookmark
- (1 other version)Aristotle on action.John L. Ackrill -1976 -Mind 87 (348):595-601.
- What Capitalism Needs: Forgotten Lessons of Great Economists.John L. Campbell &John A. Hall -2021 - Cambridge University Press.From unemployment to Brexit to climate change, capitalism is in trouble and ill-prepared to cope with the challenges of the coming decades. How did we get here? While contemporary economists and policymakers tend to ignore the political and social dimensions of capitalism, some of the great economists of the past - Adam Smith, Friedrich List,John Maynard Keynes, Joseph Schumpeter, Karl Polanyi and Albert Hirschman - did not make the same mistake. Leveraging their insights, sociologistsJohn L. Campbell (...) andJohn A. Hall trace the historical development of capitalism as a social, political, and economic system throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. They draw comparisons across eras and around the globe to show that there is no inevitable logic of capitalism. Rather, capitalism's performance depends on the strength of nation-states, the social cohesion of capitalist societies, and the stability of the international system - three things that are in short supply today. (shrink)No categories
- Knowledge and Justification.John L. Pollock -1974 - Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Edited by John Pollock.Princeton University Press, 1974. This book is out of print, but can be downloaded as a pdf file (5 MB).
- Could Waleed Aly ever become a humanist?John L. Perkins -2012 -The Australian Humanist (106):24.Perkins,John L With his regular programmes on radio and television, newspaper columns and commentary, Waleed Aly has become Australia's favourite Muslim celebrity. He is intelligent, articulate and provides incisive analysis of political and social issues. Given this, it might have been expected that he could have applied the same quality of analysis in his book, People Like Us: How Arrogance is Dividing Islam and the West (2007); however this is not the case.Export citation Bookmark
- How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon.John L. Pollock -1989 - MIT Press.Pollock describes an exciting theory of rationality and its partial implementation in OSCAR, a computer system whose descendants will literally be persons.
- Dictionary of the Bible.John L. McKenzie -1965No categories
- Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction.John L. Pollock -1990 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.In this book Pollock deals with the subject of probabilistic reasoning, making general philosophical sense of objective probabilities and exploring their ...
- David Harvey's geography.John L. Paterson -1984 - Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble.What is the discipline of geography attempting to achieve? One of the world's leading geographers, David Harvey, has long addressed himself to this question; his first book, Explanation in Geography, is a classic in the methodology of geography. David Harvey's Geography analyzes and discusses Harvey's thought and his work from his undergraduate days to the present. It also tells the story of the developments in the discipline during the past two decades.
- Conclusion : notes toward a global synthesis.John L. Brooke &Julia C. Strauss -2018 - In John L. Brooke, Julia C. Strauss & Greg Anderson,State formations: global histories and cultures of statehood. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.Export citation Bookmark
- (1 other version)Philosophical foundations of adult education.John L. Elias -1980 - Huntington, N.Y.: R. E. Krieger Pub. Co.. Edited by Sharan B. Merriam.
- Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 172, Biographical Memoirs of Fellows, X.L. FloodJohn -2011No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- The Discipline of Pure Reason.S. J.John L. Treloar -1982 -Idealistic Studies 12 (1):35-55.The present study is the result of two questions which arose in dealing with the Critique of Pure Reason. What is the relationship of the “Doctrine of Method” to the “Doctrine of Elements?” Does the “Doctrine of Method” tell us anything important about Kant and his philosophy? It will be the contention of this paper that the second half of the Critique relies heavily on the “Doctrine of Elements,” and is a natural expansion of the first half of the Critique. (...) In effect, this is a tentative denial of Norman Kemp Smith’s patchwork thesis. With respect to the second question mentioned above, we shall see that Kant does have a very special place for methodology in his philosophy. This methodology of philosophy has implications for a theory of the division of the sciences and the method proper to each of them. (shrink)No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- How to reason defeasibly.John L. Pollock -1992 -Artificial Intelligence 57 (1):1-42.
- Meaning and the Moral Sciences.John L. Koethe -1979 -Philosophical Review 88 (3):460.No categories
- Philosophy of education: classical and contemporary.John L. Elias -1995 - Malabar, Fla.: Krieger Pub. Co..Introduces classical and contemporary philosophical ideas of education in various areas, including intellectual, moral, aesthetic, religious, political, vocational, physical, and special education, from a historical perspective. Chapters treat the history of ideas in each area and the history of ideas in practice. Annotation copyright Book News, In.
- Reading the Bible with the Dead: What You Can Learn from the History of Exegesis that You Can't Learn from Exegesis Alone.John L. Thompson -2007No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- The Apostle of God: Paul and the Promise of Abraham.John L. White -1999No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Defeasible Reasoning.John L. Pollock -1987 -Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.There was a long tradition in philosophy according to which good reasoning had to be deductively valid. However, that tradition began to be questioned in the 1960’s, and is now thoroughly discredited. What caused its downfall was the recognition that many familiar kinds of reasoning are not deductively valid, but clearly confer justification on their conclusions. Here are some simple examples.
- Organization of abilities and the development of intelligence.John L. Horn -1968 -Psychological Review 75 (3):242-259.No categories
- Peripherally presented and unreported words may bias the perceived meaning of a centrally fixated homograph.John L. Bradshaw -1974 -Journal of Experimental Psychology 103 (6):1200.
- Continuity and Infinitesimals.John L. Bell -unknownThe usual meaning of the word continuous is “unbroken” or “uninterrupted”: thus a continuous entity —a continuum—has no “gaps.” We commonly suppose that space and time are continuous, and certain philosophers have maintained that all natural processes occur continuously: witness, for example, Leibniz's famous apothegm natura non facit saltus—“nature makes no jump.” In mathematics the word is used in the same general sense, but has had to be furnished with increasingly precise definitions. So, for instance, in the later 18th century (...) continuity of a function was taken to mean that infinitesimal changes in the value of the argument induced infinitesimal changes in the value of the function. With the abandonment of infinitesimals in the 19th century this definition came to be replaced by one employing the more precise concept of limit. (shrink)
- Educational philosophy of Dewey.John L. Childs -1951 - In John Dewey, Paul Arthur Schilpp & Lewis Edwin Hahn,The Philosophy of John Dewey. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.Export citation Bookmark
- The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 9: Philosophy of Mind.John L. Pollock -2000 - Charlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr.Export citation Bookmark
- Reply to Leeds.John L. Pollock -1985 -Philosophical Studies 48 (1):141 - 144.
- Thinking About Acting: Logical Foundations for Rational Decision Making.John L. Pollock -2006 - , US: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Pollock.The objective of this book is to produce a theory of rational decision making for realistically resource-bounded agents. My interest is not in “What should I do if I were an ideal agent?”, but rather, “What should I do given that I am who I am, with all my actual cognitive limitations?” The book has three parts. Part One addresses the question of where the values come from that agents use in rational decision making. The most comon view among philosophers (...) is that they are based on preferences, but I argue that this is computationally impossible. I propose an alternative theory somewhat reminiscent of Bentham, and explore how human beings actually arrive at values and how they use them in decision making. Part Two investigates the knowledge of probability that is required for decision-theoretic reasoning. I argue that subjective probability makes no sense as applied to realistic agents. I sketch a theory of objective probability to put in its place. Then I use that to define a variety of causal probability and argue that this is the kind of probability presupposed by rational decision making. So what is to be defended is a variety of causal decision theory. Part Three explores how these values and probabilities are to be used in decision making. In chapter eight, it is argued first that actions cannot be evaluated in terms of their expected values as ordinarily defined, because that does not take account of the fact that a cognizer may be unable to perform an action, and may even be unable to try to perform it. An alternative notion of “expected utility” is defined to be used in place of expected values. In chapter nine it is argued that individual actions cannot be the proper objects of decision-theoretic evaluation. We must instead choose plans, and select actions indirectly on the grounds that they are prescribed by the plans we adopt. However, our objective cannot be to find plans with maximal expected utilities. Plans cannot be meaningfully compared in that way. (shrink)
- Ear asymmetry and delayed auditory feedback: Effects of task requirements and competitive stimulation.John L. Bradshaw,Norman C. Nettleton &Gina Geffen -1972 -Journal of Experimental Psychology 94 (3):269.
- Archaeology and the philosophy of Wittgenstein.John L. Bintliff -forthcoming -Philosophy.
- Contraception and the natural law.S. J.John L. Russell -1969 -Heythrop Journal 10 (2):121–134.
- A refined theory of counterfactuals.John L. Pollock -1981 -Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (2):239 - 266.
- Presenting This Issue-Wordsworth and Ultimate Reality: Poetry and Religious Practice.John L. Mahoney -2007 -Ultimate Reality and Meaning 30 (4):259.Export citation Bookmark
- Getting By September 11, 2001.John L. Wright -2003 -Journal of Medical Humanities 24 (1-2):169-172.
- Some Remarks on Metaphysics and the Existence of God.John L. Yardan -1963 -New Scholasticism 37 (2):213-219.
- Wilderness and heritage values.John L. Hammond -1985 -Environmental Ethics 7 (2):165-170.Some proponents of the preservation of American wildemess-for example, Aldo Leopold-have argued in terms of the role of wildemess in forming and maintaining a set of distinctive national character traits. l examine and defend the value judgment implicit in Leopold’s argument. The value of one's cultural heritage is, I contend, as important and valid as other familiar goods appealed to in defense of social policy.
- The foundations of philosophical semantics.John L. Pollock -1984 - Princeton University Press. Edited by Lloyd Humberstone.Princeton University Press, 984. This book is out of print, but can be downloaded as a pdf file (3.9 MB).
- (1 other version)Cognitive Carpentry: A Blueprint for How to Build a Person 1995.John L. POLLOCK -1995No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Causal Probability.L.John -2002 -Synthese 132 (1-2):1-2.
- Education and Industry: Women, Schooling, and Labor Force Participation; 1900-1920.John L. Rury -1986 -Education and Culture 6:2.
- From Georges Sorel: Hermeneutics and the sciences.John L. Stanley &John Stanley -1990 - Transaction.As his editorJohn L. Stanley points out, Georges Sorel was "that fascinating polymath." This volume, the third in his selected works in the English language published by Transaction, emphasizes Sorel's extraordinary writings in the philosophy of science, religion, culture, and art. For those who know Sorel only as author of Reflections on Violence, the present volume will come as a forceful reminder of the range and depth of Sorelian efforts to construct a world view. Sorel is throughout concerned (...) with the moral development of human beings. In this sense, his writings on politics are of a piece with his writings on religion, "facticity" of human history and society. Sorel's earliest writings were on religion, and key portions of that period are reflected in selections here. And he went on from there to study the sociology of science, the ways in which science fits into the cultural history of civilization and present day social relationships of industrial society. Stanley provides a profound framework based on two decades of close study and translation of Sorel's texts. He helps to explain how the partial theories of Sorel lead to holistic intellectual consequences, how the psychological method does not foreclose political activism, and how historical limits can be transformed against a background of aesthetics or considerations of taste. He shows that Sorel comes as a close as Manheim and Simmel and Durkheim to the creation of a modern social science--albeit he lacks the overall philosophical theorems of people like Marx and Weber. In Sorel we have a first-class mind at work. And in Stanley, we have a first-class analyst at work. Together, the volume adds up to something special for the political scientist, sociologist, art historian, theologian--in short for those to whom the ideal of a human science endures.John L. Stanley is professor of political science at the University of California at Riverside. He is the author of The Sociology of Virtue: The Political and Social Theories of Georges Sorel. He has written many articles and reviews on the history of European political theory. With his wife, Charlotte Stanley, he has been long engaged in the translation of the works of Georges Sorel. (shrink)
- Horizons of the Self: An Essay in the Socio-Semiological and Psychological Boundaries of Practical Autonomy.John L. Duncan -1998 - Dissertation, The University of OklahomaThe practice of personal autonomy is a dynamic event that consists of a vital interplay between the self, socio-cultural reality, meaning, and being epistemically responsible. Autonomy is not static, something that we simply possess by virtue of a status as 'rational beings'. Therefore, in this dissertation, I examine the traditional notion of autonomy as it has been developed by Kant and subsequently influenced the current debate between 'liberals' and 'communitarians'. Primarily from the standpoint of the critiques developed by Charles Taylor, (...) I argue that the fundamental disagreement between these two camps is over the concept of the self. While this landscape stands divided, some middle ground can be found in the work of Joseph Raz, who postulated the need for a combination of individual abilities and an autonomy-supporting environment as necessary conditions for practicing personal autonomy. His characterization of 'personal autonomy', distinct from Kantian autonomy, forms the underlying paradigm for this work. (shrink)
- Logical Options: An Introduction to Classical and Alternative Logics.John L. Bell,David DeVidi &Graham Solomon -2001 - Peterborough, CA: Broadview Press.Logical Options introduces the extensions and alternatives to classical logic which are most discussed in the philosophical literature: many-sorted logic, second-order logic, modal logics, intuitionistic logic, three-valued logic, fuzzy logic, and free logic. Each logic is introduced with a brief description of some aspect of its philosophical significance, and wherever possible semantic and proof methods are employed to facilitate comparison of the various systems. The book is designed to be useful for philosophy students and professional philosophers who have learned some (...) classical first-order logic and would like to learn about other logics important to their philosophical work. (shrink)
- Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion.John L. Schellenberg -2005 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press."There is no attempt here to lay down as inviolable or to legislate certain ways of looking at things or ways of proceeding for philosophers of religion, only proposals for how to deal with a range of basic issues-proposals that I hope will ignite much fruitful discussion and which, in any case, I shall take as a basis for my own ongoing work in the field."-from the Preface Providing an original and systematic treatment of foundational issues in philosophy of religion, (...) J. L. Schellenberg's new book addresses the structure of religious and irreligious belief, the varieties of religious skepticism, and the nature of religion itself. From the author's searching analysis of faith emerges a novel understanding of propositional faith as requiring the absence of belief. Schellenberg asks what the aims of the field should be, setting out a series of principles for carrying out some of the most important of these aims. His account of justification considers not only belief but also other responses to religious claims and distinguishes the justification of responses, propositions, and persons. Throughout Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, Schellenberg is laying the groundwork for an elaboration of his own vision while at the same time suggesting how philosophers might rethink assumptions guiding most of today's work in analytic philosophy of religion. (shrink)
- John Wilson as moral educator.John L. Harrison -1977 -Journal of Moral Education 7 (1):50-63.John Wilson's work as moral educator is summarized and evaluated. His rationalist humanistic approach is based on a componential characterization of the morally educated person. Such a person consistently manifests a unity of reflection, feeling, belief, and acting under the logically structured rubrics of PHIL, EMP, GIG and KRAT, and exemplifying the formal features of 'moral opinion'. The rationale and conceptual status of the components is discussed, as is the view that the concept of education entails that teachers be (...) moral educators. This involves cultivating autonomous rationality with respect to the unconscious, motivation, day-to-day moral decision-making, and the emotions; in the latter case there are extensive applications in religious education. Finally, certain weaknesses and pre-eminent strengths of Wilson's position are indicated, and comparisons briefly made with the views of McPhail, Peters, Frankena and Kohlberg. (shrink)
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
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