Results for 'John Creighton Campbell'
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- Fragmentation and Power: Reconceptualizing Policy Making under Japan's 1955 System.JohnCreightonCampbell &Ethan Scheiner -2008 -Japanese Journal of Political Science 9 (1):89-113.In the 1980s, a wave of newstudies revolutionized the Japanese politics field. The empirical findings of this literature remain the conventional wisdom on Japanese policy-making patterns under the . In this paper, we offer a critical reinterpretation of the new paradigm literature. We do not offer new empirical analysis, but, rather, reconsider this conventional wisdom by putting a new spin on the evidence previous authors utilized to analyze the policy-making process in Japan under the 1955 System. Contrary to the conventional (...) view of strong central bureaucratic power, we argue that in the 1960s policy making was quite fragmented. In contrast to literature suggesting substantial politician influence in the 1980s, we argue that there was a decline in the influence of politicians in general in policy making. (shrink)
- Financial functional analysis: a conceptual framework for understanding the changing financial system.John P. Wilson &LarryCampbell -2016 -Journal of Economic Methodology 23 (4):413-431.The financial system is currently undergoing a revolution brought about by e-finance, digital convergence, new market entrants and government-encouraged competition. New market entrants such as Apple, Alibaba, Facebook and Google come from industries such as IT, retail, social media and telecoms, and, therefore, do not fit comfortably within traditional financial institutional structures. A functional perspective might provide more practical insights into this revolution; however, the functional perspective has had a limited impact. This paper will investigate the benefits and limitations of (...) financial functional analysis; probe the underpinning principles of sociology’s structural functional analysis; revisit Merton and Bodie’s six core financial functions in relation to new entrants in the financial landscape; and, finally, argue that in the new financial environment, functional analysis provides a more coherent and explanatory framework of the financial system for students and practitioners alike. (shrink)
- Environmental beliefs and farm practices of New Zealand farmers Contrasting pathways to sustainability.John R. Fairweather &Hugh R.Campbell -2003 -Agriculture and Human Values 20 (3):287-300.Sustainable farming, and waysto achieve it, are important issues foragricultural policy. New Zealand provides aninteresting case for examining sustainableagriculture options because gene technologieshave not been commercially released and thereis a small but rapidly expanding organicsector. There is no strong governmentsubsidization of agriculture, so while policiesseem to favor both options to some degree,neither has been directly supported. Resultsfrom a survey of 656 farmers are used to revealthe intentions, environmental values, andfarming practices for organic, conventional,and GE intending farmers. The results show thatorganic (...) and conventional farmers are relativelysimilar but contrast to GE intending farmers,especially with respect to perceivedconsequences of each technology. While 75%of farmers have not yet made a commitmentto either technology, one fifth were GEintending and one quarter may become organic.Organic farmers have different attitudes tonature, matched in part by conventionalfarmers. In terms of policy for sustainableagriculture, the results suggest that organicand conventional farmers are incrementallymoving towards agroecological sustainabilitywhile GE intending farmers are committed tointensive production methods of which GEproducts are potentially important. GEintending farmers reject incrementalism infavor of a revolutionary technological fix forsustainability concerns in agriculture.Overall, the results show that there areclearly two different paradigms ofsustainability among farmers. Policies that areseeking to achieve sustainable agriculture needto address the tensions that span the differentparadigms. (shrink)
- Book Review Section 1. [REVIEW]Craig Kridel,John A. Beineke,Malcolm B.Campbell,Wayne J. Urban,Bruce Anthony Jones,Lynda Stone,Patricia A. Major,John R. Thelin,Edward H. Berman &Donald Vandenberg -1994 -Educational Studies 25 (2):101-152.No categories
- I–JohnCampbell.JohnCampbell -1997 -Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):55-74.
- Reference and Consciousness.JohnCampbell -2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.JohnCampbell investigates how consciousness of the world explains our ability to think about the world; how our ability to think about objects we can see depends on our capacity for conscious visual attention to those things. He illuminates classical problems about thought, reference, and experience by looking at the underlying psychological mechanisms on which conscious attention depends.
- Book Review Section 1. [REVIEW]Joe Pizzillo,Robert W. Bernard,Robert H. Graham,Susan Ludmer-Gliebe,-Joseph M. McCarthy,Erskine S. Dottin,John R. Thelin,Richard A. Hartnett,-John F. Murphy &-Jack K.Campbell -1977 -Educational Studies 8 (3):263-285.No categories
- Rights, Justice, and Community.Creighton Peden &John K. Roth (eds.) -1992The essays in this collection address some of the many social dilemmas that concern philosophers, such as AIDS, abortion, addictive drugs and crime. Written in a clear, accessible style, the book seeks to provide encouragement for the defence of human rights, justice and community.
- Book Review Section 2. [REVIEW]Barbara K. Mullins,Randy Raphael,Amee Adkins,John A. Beineke,Malcolm B.Campbell,Daniel Perlstein,C. Douglas Lamoreaux &Cheri Louise Ross -1996 -Educational Studies 27 (1):23-61.No categories
- (3 other versions)An Essay concerning Human Understanding.John Locke &AlexanderCampbell Fraser -1894 -Mind 3 (12):536-543.No categories
- Past, Space, and Self.JohnCampbell -1994 - MIT Press.In this bookJohnCampbell shows that the general structural features of human thought can be seen as having their source in the distinctive ways in which we...
- Cogito Ergo Sum: Christopher Peacocke andJohnCampbell: II—Lichtenberg and the Cogito.JohnCampbell -2012 -Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3pt3):361-378.Our use of ‘I’, or something like it, is implicated in our self-regarding emotions, in the concern to survive, and so seems basic to ordinary human life. But why does that pattern of use require a referring term? Don't Lichtenberg's formulations show how we could have our ordinary pattern of use here without the first person? I argue that what explains our compulsion to regard the first person as a referring term is our ordinary causal thinking, which requires us to (...) find a persisting object as the mechanism that underpins the causal structure we naturally ascribe to the self. I thus argue against Peacocke's picture (2012), on which it's the cogito that explains one's knowledge of one's own existence. (shrink)
- On PaintingTreatise on Painting.Creighton Gilbert,Leon Battista Alberti,John R. Spencer,Leonardo da Vinci &A. Philip McMahon -1957 -Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 15 (4):488.
- Perceptual attention.JohnCampbell -2015 - In Mohan Matthen,The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.Export citation
Bookmark - (4 other versions)The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy.J. E.Creighton &John Dewey -1911 -Philosophical Review 20 (2):219.
- Absence and Light: Meditations from the Klamath Marshes.John R.Campbell -2002 - Environmental Arts and Humanit.Campbell came to the Klamath marshes, a wetland in southern Oregon formed by three ancient, shallow lakes, a vast emptiness that is paradoxically home to an amazing diversity of life, of untold thousands of birds both migratory and resident, of all the interconnected life forms that make up one of North America's richest natural environments.".
- Book Reviews Section 1.John Ohlinger,David Conrad,Frederick S. Buchanan,Jack Christensen,Jeffrey Herold,J. Don Reeves,Everett D. Lantz,Ursula Springer,Robert L. Hardgrave Jr,Noel F. Mcginn,Malcolm B.Campbell,R. J. Woodin,Norman Lederer,Jerry B. Burnell &Rodney Skager -1973 -Educational Studies 4 (2):65-75.No categories
- Philosophical lecture.JohnCampbell -unknownIr IS winmx HELD that the capacity for spatial thought depends upon the ability to refer to physical things. The argument is that the identification of places depends upon the identification of things; places in themselves are all very much alike and can be distinguished only by their spatial relations to things. So one could not so much as think about places unless one could think about things (Strawson, 1959). It has to be acknowledged that our identifications of places are (...) greatly enriched by our ability to refer to physical things. But, as we shall see, it is possible to identify places without identifying objects. 'Ihis raises the question whether there is any fundamental role that physical objects do play in our spatial thinking. I begin with the ways in which reference to physical objects enriches our capacity to identify places. We shall then consider whether reference to places as such demands reference to objects, and if not, what special role there might be for physical things in spatial thinking. A physical object has a certain causal structure. We can bring this out by reflecting on the way in which the properties of a physical thing affect its behaviour. Some of the properties of a thing just are propensities for it to behave in particular ways in particular circumstances. For example, being elastic, or brittle, are dispositional charac- 'teristics, they say that the thing will behave one way rather than another under pressure. But other properties of a thing, such as its size and.. (shrink)
- Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D M Armstrong.John Bacon,KeithCampbell &Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.) -1993 - New York: Cambridge University Press.D. M. Armstrong is an eminent Australian philosopher whose work over many years has dealt with such subjects as: the nature of possibility, concepts of the particular and the general, causes and laws of nature, and the nature of human consciousness. This collection of essays explores the many facets of Armstrong's work, concentrating on his more recent interests. There are four sections to the book: possibility and identity, universals, laws and causality, and philosophy of mind. The contributors comprise an international (...) group of philosophers from the United States, England and Australia. An interesting feature of the volume is that Armstrong himself has written responses to each of the essays. There is also a complete bibliography of Armstrong's writings. (shrink)
- A simple view of colour.JohnCampbell -1993 - In John Haldane & Crispin Wright,Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 257-268.Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..
- (1 other version)The Role of Sensory Experience in Propositional Knowledge.JohnCampbell -2014 - In John Campbell & Quassim Cassam,Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us? New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 76–99.No categories
- The Main Trends in Philosophy.T. I. Oizerman &H.CampbellCreighton -1991 -Studies in Soviet Thought 41 (2):155-157.No categories
- What Capitalism Needs: Forgotten Lessons of Great Economists.John L.Campbell &John A. Hall -2021 - Cambridge University Press.From unemployment to Brexit to climate change, capitalism is in trouble and ill-prepared to cope with the challenges of the coming decades. How did we get here? While contemporary economists and policymakers tend to ignore the political and social dimensions of capitalism, some of the great economists of the past - Adam Smith, Friedrich List,John Maynard Keynes, Joseph Schumpeter, Karl Polanyi and Albert Hirschman - did not make the same mistake. Leveraging their insights, sociologistsJohn L.No categories
- The self.JohnCampbell -2009 - In Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron,The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. New York: Routledge.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- The Legacy of Sigmund FreudThe Annual Survey of PsychoanalysisGreat MenArt and PsychoanalysisHamlet's Mouse Trap.Campbell Crockett,Jacob A. Arlow,John Frosch,Edward Hitschmann,William Phillips &Arthur Wormhoudt -1958 -Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 16 (3):403.
- Schizophrenia, the space of reasons, and thinking as a motor process.JohnCampbell -1999 -The Monist 82 (4):609-625.Ordinarily, if you say something like “I see a comet,” you might make a mistake about whether it is a comet that you see, but you could not be right about whether it is a comet but wrong about who is seeing it. There cannot be an “error of identification” in this case. In making a judgement like, “I see a comet,” there are not two steps, finding out who is seeing the thing and finding out what it is that (...) is being seen, so that you could go wrong at either step. The only place to go wrong is in your description of what is being seen. We usually take it that the same point applies to present-tense ascriptions to oneself of psychological states in general. You can get it wrong about which psychological state you are in, but you cannot get it right about the psychological state but wrong about whose psychological state it is. In contrast, in a room full of people, I might hear a noise and conclude, “Bill sneezed,” and in this case I could be wrong either about who it was that sneezed or about whether it was a sneeze, rather than say a death-rattle. (shrink)
- Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us?JohnCampbell &Quassim Cassam (eds.) -2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Sensory experience seems to be the basis of our knowledge of mind-independent things. The puzzle is to understand how that can be: how does our sensory experience enable us to conceive of them as mind-independent? This book is a debate between two rival approaches to understanding the relationship between concepts and sensory experience.
- The historical background.JohnCampbell -2014 - In John Campbell & Quassim Cassam,Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us? New York, NY: Oxford University Press.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- David Hume.Thomas Reid.John Grier Hibben,Henry Calderwood &A.Campbell Fraser -1899 -Philosophical Review 8 (5):549.
- Preface.Creighton Peden &John K. Roth -1992 -Social Philosophy Today 7:9-9.
- Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusion.JohnCampbell -2001 -Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):89-100.
- An interventionist approach to causation in psychology byJohnCampbell.JohnCampbell -My project in this paper is to extend the interventionist analysis of causation to give an account of causation in psychology. Many aspects of empirical investigation into psychological causation fit straightforwardly into the interventionist framework. I address three problems. First, the problem of explaining what it is for a causal relation to be properly psychological rather than merely biological. Second, the problem of rational causation: how it is that reasons can be causes. Finally, I look at the implications of an (...) interventionist analysis for the idea that an inquiry into psychological causes must be an inquiry into causal mechanisms. I begin by setting out the main ideas of the interventionist approach. (shrink)
- Failing to get the gist of what's being said: background noise impairs higher-order cognitive processing.John E. Marsh,Robert Ljung,Anatole Nöstl,Emma Threadgold &Tom A.Campbell -2015 -Frontiers in Psychology 6.
- Consciousness and Reference.JohnCampbell -2007 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter,The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Is sense transparent?JohnCampbell -1988 -Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:273-292.
- Meaning, Quantification, Necessity. Themes in Philosophical Logic.JohnCampbell -1983 -Philosophical Quarterly 33 (130):107-108.
- The Role of Sensory Experience in Propositional Knowledge.JohnCampbell -2014 - In John Campbell & Quassim Cassam,Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us? New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 76–99.No categories
- Letters pro and con.Charles de Tolnay,Creighton Gilbert,Martin Steinmann,Monroe C. Beardsley &John Alford -1956 -Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 15 (1):122-126.
- (1 other version)Reference and Consciousness.JohnCampbell -2004 -Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):191-194.No categories
- The Plantation System Throughout Jamaica and the Early Caribbean.Jason StJohn OliverCampbell -2006 -International Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):19-29.
- A plea for hedonism..JohnCampbell Palmer -1903 - Wooster, O.,: Herald printing co..This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)
- Joint attention and common knowledge.JohnCampbell -2005 - In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler,Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 287--297.This chapter makes the case for a relational version of an experientialist view of joint attention. On an experientialist view of joint attention, shifting from solitary attention to joint attention involves a shift in the nature of your perceptual experience of the object attended to. A relational analysis of such a view explains the latter shift in terms of the idea that, in joint attention, it is a constituent of your experience that the other person is, with you, jointly attending (...) to the object. We need such an analysis of joint attention to explain the possibility of success in tasks such as coordinated attack. (shrink)
- Berkeley's puzzle.JohnCampbell -2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne,Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press.But say you,surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees,for instance,in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no dif?culty in it:but what is all this,I beseech you,more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of anyone that may perceive them? But do you not yourself perceive or think of (...) them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shows you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind;but it doth not shew that you can conceive it possible, the objects of your thought may exist without the mind: to make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. (shrink)
- Immunity to error through misidentification and the meaning of a referring term.JohnCampbell -1999 -Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):89-104.
- Information processing, phenomenal consciousness, and Molyneux's question.JohnCampbell -2005 - In José Luis Bermúdez,Thought, reference, and experience: themes from the philosophy of Gareth Evans. New York : Oxford University Press: Clarendon Press.
- (1 other version)An interventionist approach to causation in psychology.JohnCampbell -2007 - In Alison Gopnik & Laura Schulz,Causal learning: psychology, philosophy, and computation. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 58--66.
- British Academy: One-Day Conference on the Philosophy of Mind.JohnCampbell -1992 -Mind 101:404.No categories
- Student-generated personality scales.John B.Campbell -1987 -Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 25 (4):277-279.
- The Epistemology of the Fragile and the God.JohnCampbell &Robert Pargetter -1985 -Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 (1-2):154-169.
- The Ownership of Thoughts.JohnCampbell -2002 -Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):35-39.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.1 (2002) 35-39 [Access article in PDF] The Ownership of ThoughtsJohnCampbell Keywords: schizophrenia, thought insertion, immunity to error through misidentification. SYDNEY SHOEMAKER FORMULATED a basic point about first-person, present-tense ascriptions of psychological states when he declared that they are, in general, immune to error through misidentification (Shoemaker 1984). Assuming Shoemaker's point to be correct, the puzzle it raises is this: how (...) are we to explain this datum? Why should it be that first-person, present-tense ascriptions of psychological states are immune to error through misidentification? One type of explanation is in terms of the meaning of the first person: that "I" just stands for whoever is the owner of these (demonstrated) psychological states (including any states being self-ascribed). I argued against this account of the first person in a number of places, and in favor of an alternative explanation of Shoemaker's datum. On the alternative explanation, the reason for the immunity is provided by an account of the ownership of psychological states, on which what makes a psychological state mine is the possibility of self-ascription of it by me (Campbell 1986, 1999a). Suppose we call this the Introspectionist explanation of the immunity to error through misidentification of present-tense self-ascriptions of psychological states. I do think, though, that the simple Introspectionist account is too simple an account of Shoemaker's datum (Campbell 1999a, 1999b). The reason is that there is a certain complexity in our notion of the ownership of a token thought. We cannot give a full account of our ordinary notion of the ownership of a thought simply in terms of the person who is capable of introspective knowledge of the thought. The reason is that there is another dimension to our ordinary notion of the ownership of a thought. We also think of the possessor of a thought as being the person who generated that very thought; we think of the owner of the thought as being the person who brought that particular token thought into existence, the person who formed it. Of course, that token thought may be a copying of someone else's idea; that other person may have influenced my formation of that particular thought. But the point remains that I play a special role in the production of my thoughts.Suppose we have a document bearing a signature and we ask, "Whose signature is that?" In this case we are asking about the authorship of the signature; we are asking who made those particular marks on that bit of paper. Of course, someone else can copy my signature, trying to make it look as if what they write was written by me. But for a particular piece of writing to be an authentic signature of mine, the thing has to be generated by me personally. I think it is helpful to bear in mind this aspect of the notion of the ownership of a signature, when we consider a certain complexity in the notion of the ownership of a thought—I mean, an occurrent, episodic [End Page 35] thought. There are, I am saying, two strands in the ordinary notion of the ownership of a thought, which we do not ordinarily have any reason to separate. First, there is the notion of the person who generated that particular thought, which we might think of on the model of the person who inscribed a particular signature. Of course, in generating a particular token thought, you may be subject to all sorts of influences. Perhaps your thought is derivative, largely shaped by others. Perhaps your thoughts are sometimes simply echoes of the things other people have said. Nonetheless, when we consider how your individual token thoughts are being brought about, you play a proximal role in their formation that no one else does. To give an analogy, suppose that I am taking notes at your dictation. Then there is a sense in which the contents of my notes are entirely determined by you. But there is also a sense in which the token sentences are being generated by... (shrink)
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Area Editors:
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Gwen Bradford
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