Results for 'Joel Eskanazi'
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- Agencia, conflicto y desarrollo humano en Ayacucho : el caso de Sacsamarca post-Sendero Luminoso.JoelEskanazi &Lucía Mercado [Y.] Ismael Muñoz -2017 - In Marcial Blondet, Gonzalo Gamio & Ismael Muñoz,Ética, agencia y desarrollo humano. Lima, Perú: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Fondo Editorial.Export citation
Bookmark - Intuitions as evidence.Joel Pust -2000 - New York: Garland.This book is concerned with the role of intuitions in the justification of philosophical theory. The author begins by demonstrating how contemporary philosophers, whether engaged in case-driven analysis or seeking reflective equilibrium, rely on intuitions as evidence for their theories. The author then provides an account of the nature of philosophical intuitions and distinguishes them from other psychological states. Finally, the author defends the use of intuitions as evidence by demonstrating that arguments for skepticism about their evidential value are either (...) self-defeating or guilty of arbitrary and unjustified partiality towards non-intuitive modes of knowledge. (shrink)
- (1 other version)Intuition.Joel Pust -2017 -Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.This entry addresses the nature and epistemological role of intuition by considering the following questions: (1) What are intuitions?, (2) What roles do they serve in philosophical (and other “armchair”) inquiry?, (3) Ought they serve such roles?, (4) What are the implications of the empirical investigation of intuitions for their proper roles?, and (5) What is the content of intuitions prompted by the consideration of hypothetical cases?
- Probabilistic coherence and proper scoring rules.Joel Predd,Robert Seiringer,Elliott Lieb,Daniel Osherson,H. Vincent Poor &Sanjeev Kulkarni -2009 -IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 55 (10):4786-4792.We provide self-contained proof of a theorem relating probabilistic coherence of forecasts to their non-domination by rival forecasts with respect to any proper scoring rule. The theorem recapitulates insights achieved by other investigators, and clarifi es the connection of coherence and proper scoring rules to Bregman divergence.
- On the appropriate and inappropriate uses of probability distributions in climate projections and some alternatives.Joel Katzav,Erica L. Thompson,James Risbey,David A. Stainforth,Seamus Bradley &Mathias Frisch -2021 -Climatic Change 169 (15).When do probability distribution functions (PDFs) about future climate misrepresent uncertainty? How can we recognise when such misrepresentation occurs and thus avoid it in reasoning about or communicating our uncertainty? And when we should not use a PDF, what should we do instead? In this paper we address these three questions. We start by providing a classification of types of uncertainty and using this classification to illustrate when PDFs misrepresent our uncertainty in a way that may adversely affect decisions. We (...) then discuss when it is reasonable and appropriate to use a PDF to reason about or communicate uncertainty about climate. We consider two perspectives on this issue. On one, which we argue is preferable, available theory and evidence in climate science basically excludes using PDFs to represent our uncertainty. On the other, PDFs can legitimately be provided when resting on appropriate expert judgement and recognition of associated risks. Once we have specified the border between appropriate and inappropriate uses of PDFs, we explore alternatives to their use. We briefly describe two formal alternatives, namely imprecise probabilities and possibilistic distribution functions, as well as informal possibilistic alternatives. We suggest that the possibilistic alternatives are preferable. -/- . (shrink)
- In Contradiction, A Study of the Transconsistent.Joel M. Smith -1991 -Noûs 25 (3):380-383.No categories
- Against explanationist skepticism regarding philosophical intuitions.Joel Pust -2001 -Philosophical Studies 106 (3):227 - 258.Though most of analytic philosophy is based upon intuitions, some philosophers are beginning to question whether intuitions are an appropriate basis for philosophical theory. This paper responds to the arguments of some contemporary philosophers who hold that intuitions should not be treated as evidence for anything other than our contingent psychological constitution. It begins with a demonstration that skeptical arguments by Gilbert Harman and Alvin Goldman are variations on an argument with the potential to undermine the use of intuitions in (...) much philosophical inquiry. After a demonstration that Nicholas Sturgeon’s response to Harman’s argument is inadequate, it argues that all of the instances of the skeptical argument are unsuccessful because they are epistemically self-defeating. (shrink)
- Conditionalization and Essentially Indexical Credence.Joel Pust -2012 -Journal of Philosophy 109 (4):295-315.One can have no prior credence whatsoever (not even zero) in a temporally indexical claim. This fact saves the principle of conditionalization from potential counterexample and undermines the Elga and Arntzenius/Dorr arguments for the thirder position and Lewis' argument for the halfer position on the Sleeping Beauty Problem, thereby supporting the double-halfer position. -/- .
- What Shall We Make ofWolfhart Pannenberg? A Symposium on Beginning with the End: God, Science, and Wolfliart Pannenberg (eds., Carol.Rausch Albright,Joel Haugen &Gregory R. Peterson -1999 -Zygon 34 (1):139.Export citation Bookmark
- Dutch Books and Logical Form.Joel Pust -2021 -Philosophy of Science 88 (5):961-970.Dutch Book Arguments (DBAs) have been invoked to support various requirements of rationality. Some are plausible: probabilism and conditionalization. Others are less so: credal transparency and reflection. Anna Mahtani has argued for a new understanding of DBAs which, she claims, allow us to keep the DBAs for probabilism (and perhaps conditionalization) and reject the DBAs for credal transparency and reflection. I argue that Mahtani’s new account fails as (a) it does not support highly plausible requirements of rational coherence and (b) (...) it does not, even setting aside the first objection, succeed in undermining the DBAs for credal transparency or reflection. (shrink)
- On explaining knowledge of necessity.Joel Pust -2004 -Dialectica 58 (1):71–87.Moderate rationalists maintain that our rational intuitions provide us with prima facie justification for believing various necessary propositions. Such a claim is often criticized on the grounds that our having reliable rational intuitions about domains in which the truths are necessary is inexplicable in some epistemically objectionable sense. In this paper, I defend moderate rationalism against such criticism. I argue that if the reliability of our rational intuitions is taken to be contingent, then there is no reason to think that (...) our reliability is inexplicable. I also suggest that our reliability is, in fact, necessary, and that such necessary reliability neither admits of, nor requires, any explanation of the envisaged sort. (shrink)
- No Double-Halfer Embarrassment: A Reply to Titelbaum.Joel Pust -2023 -Analytic Philosophy 64 (3):346-354.“Double-halfers” think that throughout the Sleeping Beauty Scenario, Beauty ought to maintain a credence of 1/2 in the proposition that the fair coin toss governing the experimental protocol comes up heads. Titelbaum (2012) introduces a novel variation on the standard scenario, one involving an additional coin toss, and claims that the double-halfer is committed to the absurd and embarrassing result that Beauty’s credence in an indexical proposition concerning the outcome of a future fair coin toss is not 1/2. I argue (...) that there is no reason to regard the credence required by the double-halfer as any less acceptable than the one deemed required by Titelbaum. (shrink)
- Horgan on sleeping beauty.Joel Pust -2008 -Synthese 160 (1):97 - 101.With the notable exception of David Lewis, most of those writing on the Sleeping Beauty problem have argued that 1/3 is the correct answer. Terence Horgan has provided the clearest account of why, contrary to Lewis, Beauty has evidence against the proposition that the coin comes up heads when she awakens on Monday. In this paper, I argue that Horgan’s proposal fails because it neglects important facts about epistemic probability.
- Natural selection and the traits of individual organisms.Joel Pust -2004 -Biology and Philosophy 19 (5):765-779.I have recently argued that origin essentialism regarding individual organisms entails that natural selection does not explain why individual organisms have the traits that they do. This paper defends this and related theses against Mohan Matthen's recent objections.
- (1 other version)Expanding the Phenomenology of Social Anxiety Disorder: Loneliness, Absence, and Bodily Doubt.Joel Krueger,Lucy Osler &Tom Roberts -2025 -Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 32 (1):11-14.Kristiansen's "Feeling like a perpetual outsider: relationality in Social Anxiety Disorder" offers a valuable analysis of loneliness within social anxiety disorder (SAD). Although phenomenological psychopathology has given extensive attention to conditions like schizophrenia, depression, and disordered eating, a more nuanced phenomenological examination of SAD is needed (Bortolan, 2023; Tanaka, 2020; Trigg, 2016). Kristiansen's work addresses this deficit and contributes to broader philosophical and phenomenological discussions of loneliness, including recent work on loneliness within psychopathology (e.g., Krueger et al., 2023; Motta, 2021; (...) Roberts & Krueger, 2021; Seemann, 2022). We propose that first-person narratives illuminate two additional, phenomenologically and clinically relevant aspects: bodily doubt and experiences of absence. Understanding these aspects enriches our descriptive understanding of SAD and potentially informs more effective treatment strategies. (shrink)
- Logique et théorie du signe au XIVe siècle.Joël Biard -1989 - Paris: Vrin.Vers la fin du XIVe siècle se fait jour une théorie du signe et de la signification qui, par une réélaboration des principaux concepts sémantiques, renouvelle toute l’analyse logique du langage.Partant de Guillaume d’Ockham, dont l’œuvre est ici décisive, cet ouvrage suit le développement d’une logique fondée sur des éléments de sémiologie, à travers différents auteurs du XIVe siècle tels que Gauthier Burley, Jean Buridan, Albert de Saxe, Marsile d’Inghen, Pierre d’Ailly...Une telle « logique du signe » prend place dans (...) toute une mutation du savoir, en ce siècle où la crise profonde du monde médiéval appelle une autre conception des rapports entre l’homme, les choses extérieures et le langage. (shrink)
- Reflection in Second-Order Set Theory with Abundant Urelements Bi-Interprets a Supercompact Cardinal.Joel David Hamkins &Bokai Yao -2024 -Journal of Symbolic Logic 89 (3):1007-1043.After reviewing various natural bi-interpretations in urelement set theory, including second-order set theories with urelements, we explore the strength of second-order reflection in these contexts. Ultimately, we prove, second-order reflection with the abundant atom axiom is bi-interpretable and hence also equiconsistent with the existence of a supercompact cardinal. The proof relies on a reflection characterization of supercompactness, namely, a cardinal κ is supercompact if and only if every Π11 sentence true in a structure M (of any size) containing κ in (...) a language of size less than κ is also true in a substructure m≺M of size less than κ with m∩κ∈κ. (shrink)
- 1The introduction of computers into systematic research in the United States during the 1960s.Joel B. Hagen -2001 -Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 32 (2):291-314.
- How (Not) To Defend A Rawlsian Approach To Intergenerational Ethics.Joel Macclellan -2013 -Ethics and the Environment 18 (1):67-85.John Rawls’ account of our obligations towards future generations has received considerable criticism in the environmental ethics literature relative to the scant few passages in which he discusses the issue. I argue that much of this criticism is warranted because Rawls’ Heads of Family strategy for grounding obligations to future generations is not only independently problematic, but also inconsistent with his general framework. Furthermore, the oft-suggested Time Travel strategy will not work either, and for just those reasons which Rawls gave. (...) However, I contend that the less often discussed “Universalizability Principle,” which Rawls discusses most prominently in Political Liberalism, is a plausible account of our obligations to future generations and is consistent with Rawls’ general framework. I then defend this Rawlsian account of our future-oriented obligations against objections in the environmental ethics literature such as those recently advanced by the consequentialist Tim Mulgan. (shrink)
- Physical explanations and biological explanations, empirical laws and a priori laws.Joel Press -2009 -Biology and Philosophy 24 (3):359-374.Philosophers intent upon characterizing the difference between physics and biology often seize upon the purported fact that physical explanations conform more closely to the covering law model than biological explanations. Central to this purported difference is the role of laws of nature in the explanations of these two sciences. However, I argue that, although certain important differences between physics and biology can be highlighted by differences between physical and biological explanations, these differences are not differences in the degree to which (...) those explanations conform to the covering law model, which fits biology about as well as it does physics. (shrink)
- Science et nature: la théorie buridanienne du savoir.Joël Biard -2012 - Vrin.La notion medievale de scientia comporte une multiplicite de dimensions: disposition de l'esprit qui accorde un assentiment justifie a des propositions, discours organise qui doit etre analyse du point de vue des criteres semantiques et des modalites argumentatives, encyclopedie des disciplines profanes ou sacrees. Cet ouvrage etudie systematiquement la theorie buridanienne de la science, la diversite de ses sens, l'etagement de ses degres de certitude depuis la connaissance du contingent jusqu'aux formes les plus rigoureuses du savoir demonstratif, ainsi que la (...) diversite de ses rationalismes regionaux. Avec Jean Buridan (ne entre 1295 et 1300, mort en 1361), la science est solidement ancree dans le monde de la nature des hommes, et se deploie en un reseau des savoirs qui surgissent et se developpent dans le cadre du cours naturel du monde, dessinant le champ autonome de la philosophie. (shrink)No categories
- Sleeping Beauty, evidential support and indexical knowledge: reply to Horgan.Joel Pust -2013 -Synthese 190 (9):1489-1501.Terence Horgan defends the thirder position on the Sleeping Beauty problem, claiming that Beauty can, upon awakening during the experiment, engage in “synchronic Bayesian updating” on her knowledge that she is awake now in order to justify a 1/3 credence in heads. In a previous paper, I objected that epistemic probabilities are equivalent to rational degrees of belief given a possible epistemic situation and so the probability of Beauty’s indexical knowledge that she is awake now is necessarily 1, precluding such (...) updating. In response, Horgan maintains that the probability claims in his argument are to be taken, not as claims about possible rational degrees of belief, but rather as claims about “quantitative degrees of evidential support.” This paper argues that the most plausible account of quantitative degree of support, when conjoined with any of the three major accounts of indexical thought in such a way as to plausibly constrain rational credence, contradicts essential elements of Horgan’s argument. (shrink)
- Jla west 145.Joel Thomas Tif-rno,A. Third,Nick Trakakis,William Desmond,Peter Gan Chong Beng &Phillip H. Wiebe -2006 -Sophia 45 (2).No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- Empirical Evidence for Rationalism?Joel Pust -2014 - In Anthony Robert Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom,Intuitions. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.Moderate rationalism is the view a person's having a rational intuition that p prima facie justifies them in believing that p. It has recently been argued that moderate rationalism requires empirical support and, furthermore, that suitable empirical support would suffice to convince empiricists to abandon their opposition to rationalism. According to one argument, the causal requirement argument, empirical evidence is necessary in order to justify the claim that any actual token belief is based on rational intuition and moderate rationalism requires (...) such a claim for its justification. According to a second argument, the reliability argument, empirical evidence is necessary in order to justify the claim that a putative source of evidence is reliable and moderate rationalism requires such a claim for its justification. According to a third argument, the empirical case argument, certain sorts of empirical evidence would be dialectically sufficient to resolve the traditional dispute between empiricists and rationalists in the rationalists' favor. Against the causal requirement argument, I maintain that the core doctrines of moderate rationalism are not hostage to causal claims and that such causal claims as may be plausibly part of other recognizably rationalist doctrines can be justified on broadly non-empirical grounds. Against the reliability argument, I show that no empirical evidence is required to justify belief in the reliability of rational intuition. Against the empirical case argument, I argue that the envisioned empirical support for moderate rationalism should not convince any traditional empiricist. (shrink)
- The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.Joel Schwartz -1985 - University of Chicago Press.Analyzes the eighteenth-century French philosopher's writings about women, sexuality, and the family, and suggests that Rousseau's philosophy is not misogynous.
- Descartes on the Identity of Passion and Action.Joel A. Schickel -2011 -British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (6):1067 - 1084.According to the standard Aristotelian doctrine of the identity of passion and action (Ipa), a passion and the action with which it is identified are distinguished through a distinction of reason, and both passion and action are located in the patient. Descartes has recently been interpreted by some scholars to be rejecting Ipa in favor of a view that throws into contention a dualistic interpretation of his philosophy of mind. This article contends that Descartes did hold Ipa, albeit expressed in (...) his own metaphysical vocabulary of substance and mode. On this interpretation, (1) a passion and the action with which it is identified are distinguished through a conceptual distinction or distinction of reason and (2) the passion and the action constitute one and the same mode which is locatedin the patient. This result is significant first, because it shows Descartes's retention of a fundamentally Aristotelian understanding of the metaphysical categories of passion and action and second, because it removes some of the support for recent interpretations on which Descartes is seen in the Passions of the Soul to diverge from a dualistic view of mind and body. (shrink)
- Herodotean Realism.Joel Alden Schlosser -2014 -Political Theory 42 (3):239-261.With the renaissance of political realism has come an insistence that the study of politics be historically located. While many political realists trace their conception of historical inquiry to Thucydides, this article shows how Herodotus can offer a more realist approach to political phenomena. Herodotus crafts a self-conscious form of historical inquiry that foregrounds the actual activity of the historian as intersubjective, reflective, and particular. Herodotus thus models a historical investigation that shows its own limits while demanding the evaluation of (...) its readers, offering a way to address criticisms of political realism’s singular and unacknowledged historical narratives. Moreover, Herodotus’s Histories exemplify a disposition toward open inquiry among others—what Herodotus calls wonder—that can invigorate responsive curiosity as part of the project of historical understanding essential to both political realism and contemporary democracies. (shrink)
- The gate control theory: reaching for the brain.Ronald Melzack &Joel Katz -2004 - In Thomas Hadjistavropoulos & Kenneth D. Craig,Pain: Psychological Perspectives. Psychology Press. pp. 13--34.
- Do not resuscitate patients.Kelly N. Michelson &Joel E. Frader -2010 - In Gail A. Van Norman, Stephen Jackson, Stanley H. Rosenbaum & Susan K. Palmer,Clinical Ethics in Anesthesiology: A Case-Based Textbook. Cambridge University Press. pp. 39.
- Les doctrines de la science de l'antiquité à l''ge classique.Roshdi Rashed &Joël Biard -1999 - Peeters Pub & Booksellers.Une part substantielle de la réflexion philosophique est née et s'est développée aux confins de la science. Depuis l'aube de la philosophie, on ne peut faire l'économie des mathématiques, de l'astronomie, de l'optique... si l'on veut comprendre les voies empruntées par les philosophes et les modèles qu'ils ont élaborés. Cette étude examine quelques-uns de ces liens jusqu'à l'âge moderne.No categories
- The ethics movement in the biological and health sciences.StanleyJoel Reiser -2002 - In Ruth Ellen Bulger, Elizabeth Heitman & Stanley Joel Reiser,The ethical dimensions of the biological and health sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Providing a Medical Excuse to Organ Donor Candidates Who Feel Trapped: A Reply to Spital's Concerns.Mary Simmerling &Joel Frader -2008 -Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 17 (1).
- De la Théologie aux Mathématiques: L'Infini au XIVe Siècle.Joël Biard &Jean Celeyrette (eds.) -2005 - Paris: Belles lettres.Le 14e siècle est une période où les débats sur l'infini se multiplient. Les mêmes doctrines se trouvent indifféremment développées dans les oeuvres théologiques, dans les commentaires sur la "Physique" d'Aristote voire dans des traités spécialement dévolus à la question du continu. Cet ouvrage révèle la place de ces doctrines dans la logique, les mathématiques, la philosophie naturelle.
- Position effect variegation inDrosophila: Towards a genetics of chromatin assembly.Joel C. Eissenberg -1989 -Bioessays 11 (1):14-17.The formation of a highly condensed chromosome structure (heterochromatin) in a region of a eukaryotic chromosome can inactivate the genes within that region. Genetic studies using the fruitfly Drosophila melanogaster have identified several essential genes which influence the formation of heterochromatin. My purpose in this review is to summarize some recent work on the genetics of heterochromatin assembly in Drosophila and a recent model for how chromosomal proteins may interact to form a heterochromatic structure.
- Skepticism, Reason and Reidianism.Joel Pust -2013 - In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow,The a Priori in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 205.The traditional problems of epistemology have often been thought to be properly solved only by the provision of an argument, with premises justified by rational intuition and introspection, for the probable truth of our beliefs in the problematic domains. Following the lead of Thomas Reid, a sizable number of contemporary epistemologists, including many proponents of so-called "Reformed epistemology" regarding religious belief, reject as arbitrary the preferential treatment of reason and introspection implicit in the traditional view of the problems. These "Reidians" (...) insist that the traditional problems cannot be solved in the expected manner, but they go on to suggest that this result is of little significance because similar skeptical questions can be raised regarding a priori and introspective justification. After making clear the significance of the Reidian objection, I endeavor to defend the traditional preference for rational intuition over our other sources of belief by demonstrating that the usual skeptical worries cannot be equally raised against a priori justification. Then, after a brief consideration of some unduly neglected passages in Reid's writings in which he appears to concede that the traditional partiality to reason and introspection is not, in fact, arbitrary, I argue that it is the Reidians who are guilty of arbitrary partiality. (shrink)
- Nietzsche on Self-Reverence.Joel A. Van Fossen -2022 -Journal of Nietzsche Studies 53 (2):181-201.Respect and self-respect are the cornerstone motivations in Kantian moral psychology. But “respect” is an ambiguous term. As Stephen Darwall has argued, sometimes respect refers to a constraint on practical reason, but at other times it refers to a person-directed pro-attitude. In this article, I argue that this distinction is a problem regarding self-respect since self-respect, in the latter sense, lacks warrant. Furthermore, I discuss Nietzsche’s conception of “self-reverence,” which in some ways serves as a replacement for Kantian self-respect in (...) the pro-attitude sense. I argue that, in Nietzsche’s view, the value that a person anticipates and aspires to realize in the future warrants self-reverence, even in cases where the person cannot fully articulate this value. This kind of self-directed value is what Nietzsche means when he claims in Beyond Good and Evil §287, “The noble soul has reverence for itself.”. (shrink)
- Reactions & Debate.Andreas Føllesdal,Joel Perlmann,Bashir Bashir,Raphael Cohen-Almagor,Said Zeedani &Chaim Gans -2011 -Ethical Perspectives 18 (4):625-681.
- Law, love and freedom: from the sacred to the secular: by Joshua Neoh, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019, 216 pp., £85.00 (hardback), ISBN: 9781108427654.Joel Harrison -2020 -Jurisprudence 11 (1):150-156.Volume 11, Issue 1, March 2020, Page 150-156.No categories
- Darwin, Wallace, and the Descent of Man.Joel S. Schwartz -1984 -Journal of the History of Biology 17 (2):271-289.
- Warrant and analysis.Joel Pust -2000 -Analysis 60 (1):51–57.Alvin Plantinga theorizes about an epistemic property he calls "warrant," defined as that which makes the difference "between knowledge and mere true belief." I show that, given this account, Plantinga can have no justification for claiming that a false belief is warranted nor for claiming that warrant comes in degrees.
- Managing New Technology When Effective Control is Lost: Facing Hard Choices With CRISPR.Joel Andrew Zimbelman -2022 -Journal of Religious Ethics 50 (3):433-460.This paper seeks to expand our appreciation of the gene editing tool, clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats‐associated protein 9 (CRISPR‐Cas9), its function, its benefits and risks, and the challenges of regulating its use. I frame CRISPR's emergence and its current use in the context of 150 years of formal exploration of heredity and genetics. I describe CRISPR's structure and explain how it functions as a useful engineering tool. The contemporary international and domestic regulatory environment governing human genetic interventions is (...) reviewed and shown to be increasingly ineffective in its ability to restrain, guide, and optimize the emerging use of CRISPR. Several reasons for this lack of consensus are discussed. In conclusion, I suggest a number of public policy recommendations that might allow us to simultaneously embrace our most important moral values and manage the inevitable power CRISPR will come to have in our lives. (shrink)
- Introduction.Joel Backström,Hannes Nykänen,Niklas Toivakainen &Thomas Wallgren -2019 - In Joel Backström, Hannes Nykänen, Niklas Toivakainen & Thomas Wallgren,Moral Foundations of Philosophy of Mind. Springer Verlag. pp. 1-27.This introductory chapter argues that the great excitement around the discourse of mind is not generated by legitimate scientific expectations but by an obscure notion that uncovering the truth about the mind is simultaneously a very important and a morally uncommitted task. By contrast, we suggest that the ‘life of the mind’ is inevitably morally engaged, and that any meaningful analysis of the mind will enter into this morally charged field where ‘neutrality’ is impossible and truthfulness and philosophical adequacy are (...) themselves moral tasks. Critically discussing the technoscientific view of the mind, the idea of naturalism, the nature of ethics and the conception of philosophy as a theoretical endeavour divided into different sub-disciplines, the chapter also briefly describes the contents of the volume. (shrink)No categories
- Philosophy of Mind and/as the Repression of Interpersonal Understanding.Joel Backström -2019 - In Joel Backström, Hannes Nykänen, Niklas Toivakainen & Thomas Wallgren,Moral Foundations of Philosophy of Mind. Springer Verlag. pp. 231-266.This chapter argues that traditional philosophy of mind turns on misrepresenting the I-you-relationship as a subject-object-relationship. This leads to interminable paradox and makes accounting for interpersonal understanding, the heart of human intelligibility, impossible. Detailing the absurdity of inferentialist accounts of understanding others, I show how this understanding is an essentially moral matter, that is, in itself a form of openness to and engaged caring for the other. For example, the very perception of suffering as suffering is already a form of (...) compassion. Failures to act compassionately and, more generally, apparent failures to understand others, are forms of repressing one’s own caring-understanding, rather than mere absences of understanding. The confused subject-object-perspective in philosophy arises from and mirrors the moral-existential confusion in everyday life created through repression. (shrink)No categories
- The Philosophy of Neo-Noir (review).Joel Black -2008 -Symploke 16 (1-2):343-345.
- A topological model of epistemic intentionality.Joël Bradmetz -2002 -Axiomathes 13 (2):127-146.Beyond their linguistic and rhetorical uses, the mental epistemic verbs to knowand to believe reveal a basic conceptual system for human intentionality and the theory of representational mind. Numerous studies, particularly in the field of child development, have been devoted to the conditions under which knowledge and belief are acquired. Upstream of this empirical approach, this paper proposes a topological model of the conceptual structure underlying the linguistic use of to know and to believe. A cusp model of catastrophe theory (...) is chosen to model the formation of epistemic states. Its main characteristic is considering to believe as an intermediate state which lacks stability and presents the delayed effect of hysteresis. The attribution of mental states to the other (viewpoint of the third person) is obtained by the crossing of first and third person knowledge and belief, which gives rise to new categories (to know if and to falsely believe) and closes the system. Another merging of the beliefs of persons A and B, using the butterfly catastrophe, provides a model of interpersonal belief appreciated by an independent observer along a potential evolving from agreement to disagreement. (shrink)
- Beauty and Generalized Conditionalization: Reply to Horgan and Mahtani.Joel Pust -2014 -Erkenntnis 79 (3):687-700.Horgan and Mahtani (Erkenntnis 78: 333–351, 2013) present a new argument for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem resting on a principle for updating probabilities which they call “generalized conditionalization.” They allege that this new argument is immune to two attacks which have been recently leveled at other arguments for thirdism. I argue that their new argument rests on a probability distribution which is (a) no more justified than an alternative distribution favoring a different answer to the problem, (...) and (b) ultimately unjustified. I go on to show that generalized conditionalization cannot be applied in the manner suggested, given the cogency of the aforementioned attacks on thirder arguments. Hence, the new argument fails to advance the case for the 1/3 answer. (shrink)
- A Conflict between Indexical Credal Transparency and Relevance Confirmation.Joel Pust -2021 -Philosophy of Science 88 (3):385-397.According to the probabilistic relevance account of confirmation, E confirms H relative to background knowledge K just in case P(H/K&E) > P(H/K). This requires an inequality between the rational degree of belief in H determined relative to two bodies of total knowledge which are such that one (K&E) includes the other (K) as a proper part. In this paper, I argue that it is quite plausible that there are no two possible bodies of total knowledge for ideally rational agents meeting (...) this requirement. Hence, the positive relevance account may have to be rejected. (shrink)
- Darwin, Wallace, and Huxley, and Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation.Joel S. Schwartz -1990 -Journal of the History of Biology 23 (1):127-153.Publication of the Vestiges and the rather primitive theory of evolution it expounded thus played a significant role in the careers of Darwin and Wallace. In addition, in spite of his poor opinion of the Vestiges, it presented Huxley with a convenient topic for critical discussion and the opportunity to focus more attention on the subject of evolution. The dynamic interactions among these leading figures of nineteenth-century natural science helped spur the development of more sophisticated models of evolution.Darwin had a (...) proper appreciation of Chambers's contribution to evolutionary thought, although he fully recognized the shortcomings of this work. He understood the importance of allowing fresh ideas about organic change to be ventilated. However, he was primarily concerned with his own theory and viewed all developments in evolutionary biology from this perspective. If he did not give full consideration to Chambers and his book early on, it was due mainly to his feeling that the concepts in the Vestiges were very different from his own; he was therefore reluctant to embrace them as the forerunners of his own theory. As a scholar, he was also troubled by the scientific errors in the book. However, the record demonstrates that he attempted to make amends for any oversight on his part. His generous letter to Chambers's daughter, and his gracious treatment of Chambers during the brief time the latter lived in London, are ample proof of that.The attacks of Huxley, Sedgwick, and other prominent natural historians and geologists at the time, the problems inherent in Chambers's evolutionary theory, and the publication of the Origin, are the major reasons why the Vestiges became a neglected work. Nevertheless, Chambers's contribution will always stand out because, together with those of other late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century predecessors of Darwin, it laid the foundations of modern evolutionary thought and, more importantly, helped prepare the scientific community for the more fully developed ideas of Darwin and Wallace. (shrink)
- Die Lehre des Socrates als sociales Reform-system.A. Dörino &K. Joël -1896 -Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 4 (1):86-117.No categoriesExport citation Bookmark
- William James and the Transatlantic Conversation: Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Philosophy of Religion.Martin Halliwell &Joel D. S. Rasmussen (eds.) -2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.This volume focuses on the American philosopher and psychologist William James and his engagements with European thought, together with the multidisciplinary reception of his work on both sides of the Atlantic since his death. James participated in transatlantic conversations in science, philosophy, psychology, religion, ethics, and literature.
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Area Editors:
David Bourget
Gwen Bradford
Berit Brogaard
Margaret Cameron
David Chalmers
James Chase
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Esa Diaz-Leon
Barry Hallen
Hans Halvorson
Jonathan Ichikawa
Monte Johnson
Michelle Kosch
Øystein Linnebo
Paul Livingston
Brandon Look
Manolo Martínez
Matthew McGrath
Michiru Nagatsu
Susana Nuccetelli
Giuseppe Primiero
Jack Alan Reynolds
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Aleksandra Samonek
Constantine Sandis
Howard Sankey
Jonathan Schaffer
Thomas Senor
Daniel Star
Jussi Suikkanen
Aness Kim Webster
Other editors
Contact us
Learn more about PhilPapers
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